LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. COURT OF TAX APPEALS AND COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.

Petitioner, a domestic
corporation in the lighterage business, hauled bunker
fuel, gasoline and other petroleum products for the Caltex Refinery in Bauan, Batangas. For this purpose, it used tugboats and barges
which moored at the privately owned Caltex pier in
Bauan. This pier is in the
port of Batangas
, a national
port.^[1]

The amount of P9,506.92 is broken down as follows:

1957———————————–P1,638.98

1958———————————–
4,781.40

1959———————————–
3, 086 54

        P9,506.92

Of this total, the berthing fees
paid for barges from August 1957 to June 30, 1959, amounted to P7,837.72.^[2]

Received by the customs collector
for the port of Batangas on August
4, 1959
was petitioner’s written protest against the collection of P9,506.92. That protest was dismissed. Petitioner elevated the
matter to respondent Commissioner of Customs. It suffered the same fate. A
review was sought from the Court of Tax Appeals.^[3] That court voted to dismiss
the petition for review, with costs. Hence, the present appeal.

1. Petitioner assails the
government’s right to impose the berthing or mooring charges aforesaid. Argument
advanced is that such charges are improper. Reason: the Caltex pier to which petitioner’s vessels moor is private,
not government-owned.

The controlling statute is
Section 2901 of the Tariff and Customs Code, which textually reads:

“Section
2901. Definition. – Berthing charge is the amount assessed against
a vessel for mooring or berthing at a pier, wharf, bulkhead-wharf, river or
channel marginal wharf at any port in the Philippines; or for mooring or making
fast to a vessel so berthed; or for coming or mooring within any slip, channel,
basin river or canal under the jurisdiction of any port of the Philippines. The
owner, agent, operator or master of the vessel is liable for this charge.”

Adverting to the terms of the
law, it is quite apparent that the government’s right to collect berthing
charges is not planted upon the condition that the pier be publicly owned. The
statute employs the word pier – without more. Nothing there said speaks of
private or public pier. Where the law does not exact the nature of ownership as
a condition, that condition should not be read into the law, We are not to indulge in statutory construction. Because the
law is clear. Our plain duty is to apply the law as it is written.^[4] So applying, we rule that
berthing or mooring charges here were properly collected.

2. But we look in retrospect at
the philosophy behind the right to impose berthing or mooring charges. And we
find that reason exists for their imposition. Note that berthing or mooring
charges are assessed (a) against a vessel mooring or berthing at a pier, wharf,
bulkhead-wharf, river or channel marginal wharf at any port in the Philippines;
(b) for mooring or making fast to a vessel so berthed; or (c) for coming or
mooring within any slip, channel, basin, river or canal under the jurisdiction
of any port of the Philippines. It thus results that a vessel which as much as
come within any slip, channel, basin, river or canal under the jurisdiction of
any port in the Philippines is subject to the charge. It is
unnecessary that that vessel be moored to a pier or to a berthed vessel. But why? Because port facilities afford benefits to the
vessels mentioned in the statute; and the maintenance and development of the
port, and the purchase, conditioning and replacement of the equipment thereof –
all to enable such vessels to make use of a pier or wharf – are the concern of
the government.^[5] Petitioner’s vessels enjoy
the benefits of such governmental undertaking. Petitioner should thus contribute
thereto.

Again, we say that berthing or
mooring charges are here appropriately collected under the law.

3. Not much need be said on
petitioner’s other point that respondent Commissioner of Customs is estopped from requiring written protest as a condition
precedent to refund.

By Section 2308 of the Tariff and
Customs Code, such “written protest” must be filed within thirty days after
payment. Otherwise, by the next succeeding provision, Section 2309, “the action
of the Collector shall be final and conclusive against him.” ^[6]

The verbal protest urged upon us
was supposedly made with the local customs collector at the
port of Batangas as early as August, 1957. That
official, according to petitioner, entertained the protest in the sense that he
agreed to take up the matter with the Commissioner of Customs. But this
allegation of verbal protest was denied in paragraph 3 of the answer to the
petition for review.

The situation here presented
would not create estoppel. Besides, the government is
not bound by the mistakes of its agents. ^[7] At all events. the requirement that protest be in writing must be for some
purpose. One is that verbal protest breeds uncertainty. For, human memory
suffers from frailty. Verbal protest therefore will be unavailing to petitioner.

The net result is that the
protest in so far as it refers to payments of berthing charges (for tugboats and
barges) prior to July 5,
1959
cannot be considered. As aforestated, written protest
was only lodged on August 4, 1959 . And those made from
July 5,
1959 to
July 20,
1959 (for
tugboats alone) are not refundable either. Because the law
enjoins collection thereof.

We, accordingly, affirm the
judgment under review. Costs against petitioner.

SO
ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J. B. L., Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, J. P,, Zaldivar
and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.

Barrera, J., on leave.

Makalintal, J., no part.

^[1] Section 701, Tariff and Customs
Code.

^[2] On June
20, 1959 , barges were expressly included
in the statute providing for berthing or mooring fees. Republic Act No. 2369, amending Sec. 2906, Tariff and Customs
Code.

^[3] CTA Case No. 1146,;Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, petitioner, versus
Commissioner of Customs, respondent”.

^[4] 50 Am. Jur., pp. 205-207.

^[5] Republic Act 2695.

^[6] Emphasis supplied.

^[7] Koppel [Phil.] Inc. vs.
Collector, G.R. No. L-10550, September 19,
1961; Central Azucarera de Tarlac vs. Collector,
et al., G.R. No. L-11092, September 30, 1958 .