REYNALDO GOMEZ, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. NORTH CAMARINES LUMBER COMPANY, INC., DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

This is an appeal filed by Reynaldo Gomez from an
order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing Civil Case
No. 30103 of said Court. The facts of the case are as follows:

Reynaldo
Gomez was employed from July 3, 1954, to September 29, 1955, as an
oiler aboard the vessel M/V Vega, owned and operated by the North
Camarines Lumber Co. Inc., with a monthly salary of P110, plus bonus of
P5 and free meals valued at P36, or for a total sum of P151 a month.

On
September 30, 1955, Gomez was relieved of his employment, hence, on
December 29, 1955, he filed a complaint with the Regional Office No. 1
of the Department of Labor against the North Camarines Lumber Co. Inc.,
for alleged unpaid overtime services, underpayment and separation pay
(Exhibit 1). The claim (C-4718) was thus investigated by the
aforementioned office, in which investigation, the parties appeared and
presented their evidence in support of their respective stand without
the aid of counsel. As in the course of said hearing, the complainant
manifested his desire to confine his claim only to the question of the
separation pay, the Investigator in his “Findings and Recommendations”
dated April 5, 1956, dismissed the complaint for lack of merit on the
ground that preponderant evidence showed that complainant’s dismissal
from the employ of defendant was justified and he was not, therefore,
entitled to a separation pay (Exhibit 2). The Investigator did not
touch on the merits of the claim for overtime services and
underpayment.

On July 3, 1956,
Reynaldo Gomez filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila an
action for collection of overtime and separation pay against the North
Camarines Lumber Co. Inc., which was docketed as Civil Case No. 30103.
In claiming for overtime compensation, plaintiff charged that although
his schedule of work was from 12:00 a.m. to 4:00 a.m. and again from
12:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m., he was actually made to perform additional
work at an average of 5 hours daily. For this cause of action,
plaintiff claimed a total of P2,199.60. It was also contended that on
September 30, 1955, he was relieved of his employment without
justifiable reason and without prior notice, thus he claimed for
separation pay equivalent to one month salary. Plaintiff likewise
prayed for attorney’s fees, costs and such other relief as might be
equitable in the premises.

In its answer to the complaint,
defendant corporation denied all the material averment thereof and as
affirmative defenses it averred that plaintiff’s dismissal from work
was precipitated by the latter’s violations of the rules and
regulations of the company and for the commission of acts of disrespect
towards the passengers of the vessel, not only once but on several
occasions; that plaintiff’s claim was already heard and dismissed by
the Regional Office No. 1 of the Department of Labor; and that the said
action was brought merely to harass said defendant. It was, therefore,
prayed that the complaint be dismissed and plaintiff be ordered to pay
to defendant the sum of P1,000 as damages.

During the hearing
of the case, defendant, invoking the ruling laid down by this Court in
the case of Brillantes vs. Castro, 99 Phil., 497; 56 Off. Gaz. (29)
4621, moved for its dismissal on the ground that as plaintiff failed to
appeal from the order of the Investigator of the Department of Labor
dismissing the complaint filed therein within the reglementary period,
as provided by Section 7 of Republic Act No. 602, the matter was
already res judicata and
serves as a bar to another action involving the same parties and over
the same subject matter. Plaintiff filed an opposition thereto
contending that the Wage Administration Service possessed no power to
render the judgment upon which the motion to dismissed was based and,
even assuming that it had, the aforementioned order did not constitute res judicata
with respect to the claim for overtime services. In an order dated
October 27, 1956, the lower court held that following the doctrine in
the Brillantes vs. Castro case, the decision rendered by the Regional
Office No. 1 of the Department of Labor constituted res judicata on the
matter and barred a subsequent action over the same claim. Furthermore,
the lower Court ruled that the aforesaid decision was final and
conclusive not only with respect to the separation pay but also as to
the claim for under payment and overtime compensation for the reason
that a judgment is conclusive upon all matters that might have been
litigated and decided in a suit. The complaint was thus dismissed
without costs. As the motion for reconsideration of said order, filed
by plaintiff, was denied, the case was elevated to this Court, on the
allegation that the lower Court erred:

1. In holding that the decision of the Regional Office of the Department of Labor is a bar to the instant action;
2. In holding that the decision of the Regional Office of the Department of Labor is a bar to the claim for overtime pay; and
3. In sustaining the motion to dismiss.

There
is no controversy that as a consequence of plaintiff and appellant’s
complaint lodged before the Regional Office No. 1 of the Department of
Labor, an investigation was conducted by said office wherein both
parties appeared and adduced their respective evidence. Upon the
dismissal of his complaint, however, Gomez instituted in the Court of
First Instance of Manila Civil Case No. 30103 which was filed 2 months
and 28 days after the aforementioned order of dismissal was issued. The
question raised by the instant appeal is whether or not the order of
the Regional Office No. 1 of the Department of Labor dismissing the
complaint for lack of merit has the effect of res judicata upon appellant’s claims.

Plaintiff-appellant
in assailing the ruling of the lower Court maintains that the Minimum
Wage Law (Rep. Act 602) contains no provision empowering the Wage
Administration Service to pass upon the merit of a claim for
compensation under the said Act. We really find no specific
provision in the aforesaid Act to this effect. The lower Court,
however, in upholding the theory of defendant relied on the doctrine
laid down by this Court in the case of Brillantes vs. Castro, 99 Phil.,
497; 56 Off. Gaz. (29) 4621. Said case is not applicable in the instant
action for whereas in the Brillantes case it appears that the parties
signed a written agreement wherein they bound themselves to respect the
decision of the Investigator, such a document is wanting in the case at
bar. In this connection, Section 9, Article 7-B of the Code of Rules and Regulations to Implement the Minimum Wage Law prescribed the following:

SEC.
9. If no amicable agreement is arrived at between the parties on the
whole or any part of the claim, the claims investigator or claims
attorney shall immediately ask the parties whether they are willing to
submit the case for arbitration by the Service with him or any other
claims attorney or investigator acting as arbitrator, whose decision
shall be binding, final and conclusive between them, the agreement to arbitrate shall be made in writing and signed by the parties before the claims investigator or claims attorney. In case of arbitration, the hearing on the claim shall not exceed one week from the initiation thereof.

It
will be noted from the foregoing that for a decision of the
Investigator to have a binding force, an agreement to abide by whatever
conclusion he may arrive at must appear in writing and signed by the
parties. While it may be said that in the instant case the complaint
was lodged before the Department of Labor by plaintiff-appellant
himself and that he appeared during the hearing thereof without the aid
of counsel, yet considering that said regulation is couched in
mandatory language as evidenced by the consistent use of the word
“shall”, such requirement must be given a strict interpretation. The
Investigator from the Department of Labor must be presumed to know that
the conducting of an investigation and the consequential rendering of a
decision therein without the parties having executed any such agreement
produces no effect whatsoever and will not constitute a bar to a
subsequent action involving the same claim.

Notwithstanding
this conclusion, appellant’s case must fail on a different ground.
Section 16 of the Minimum Wage Law reads as follows:

Jurisdiction of the Courts.—(a)
The Court of First Instance shall have jurisdiction to restrain
violations of this Act; action by the Secretary or by the employees
affected to recover UNDERPAYMENT may be brought in any COMPETENT Court,
which shall render its decision on such cases within fifteen days from
the time the case has been submitted for decision; in appropriate
instances, appeal from the decisions of these courts on any action
under this Act shall be in accordance with applicable law.

It
is clear from the foregoing that the Court of First Instance has
jurisdiction only over controversies involving violations of the
Minimum Wage Law. The instant action, however, was for the collection
of overtime compensation under the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Com. Act 444)
and for separation pay, and that actions of this nature shall be
brought before a court of competent
jurisdiction. In this respect, it has been held by this Court that with
the enactment of the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875), cases
involving hours of employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law
specifically fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations (Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions—PAFLU vs. Tan,
99 Phil., 854; 52 Off. Gaz. [13] 5836, Reyes vs. Tan, 99 Phil., 880; 52
Off. Gaz. [14] 6187; Oebu Port Labor Union vs. States Marine
Corporation, 101 Phil., 468).

It is to be noted in this
connection that the case at bar involves 2 points or causes of action:
(1) the claim relative to overtime pay which, as ruled in the preceding
jurisprudence, comes within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations; and (2) the claim for separation pay allowed by Republic Act
No. 1052, as amended by Republic Act No. 1787. With respect to the
latter point, the law creating such right (Republic Act 1052 which was
approved on June 12, 1954), does not shed light on the matter of the
jurisdiction of the court or commission that can take cognizance
thereof. It must be remembered, however, that Commonwealth Act No. 103,
in creating the Court of Industrial Relations, vested said Tribunal
with powers that were broad enough to comprehend practically all and
every labor dispute; labor-management conflicts of almost any kind and
character, and to the extent that although Article 302 of the Code of
Commerce providing for the payment of separation pay or “mesada” was
considered repealed by Article 2270 of the new Civil Code (Lara vs. Del
Rosario, 94 Phil., 778; 50 Off. Gaz. [5] 1975), this Court still
declared that:

“* * * Regardless of
the strict applicability of Art. 302 (of the Code of Commerce), the
Court of Industrial Relations by reason of its general jurisdiction
and) authority to decide labor disputes, the amount of salary or wages
to be paid laborers and employees, to determine their living
conditions, has been deciding not only the minimum that the employer
should pay its employees but also granting them even sick and vacation
leave with pay without any express legal provision. A month’s pay upon
separation from service without just cause and without notice may also
in the discretion of the Industrial Court be granted provided that said
discretion is not abused” (Sta. Mesa Slipways & Engineering Co.,
Inc., vs. CIR, et al., 48 Official Gazette 3353),

which is
a clear indication that claims for separation pay are cognizable by the
Industrial Court. Again, in the case of G.P.T.C. Employees Union vs.
Court of Industrial Relations and Gonzalo Puyat Timber Concessions, 102
Phil., 538, we affirmed the decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations which took cognizance of and passed upon the matter of
separation pay, one of the demands presented in said case by the labor
union.

It may be argued, however, that pursuant to the ruling
laid down by this Court in the cases of Philippine Association of Free
Labor Union vs. Tan, supra, “Reyes vs. Tan, supra, as affirmed in
several subsequent decisions, the enactment of the Industrial Peace Act
curtailed the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations to take
cognizance of controversies to the following: (1) when the labor
dispute affects an industry which is indispensable to the national
interest and is so certified by the President to the Industrial Court
(Section 10, Republic Act 875); (2) when the controversy refers to
minimum wage under the Minimum Wage Law (Republic Act 875); (3) when it
involves hours of employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law
(Commonwealth Act 444); and (4) when it involves an unfair labor
practice (Section 5-a, Republic Act 875). But considering that in this
case, plaintiff-appellant’s main claim is for the collection of
overtime compensation, which comes within the jurisdiction of the
Industrial Court, We see no reason for dividing the 2 causes of action
involved herein and for holding that one falls within the jurisdiction
of one court and the remaining cause of action of another court.
Anyway, We believe that it is more in consonance with the ends of
justice that both causes of action be cognizable and heard by only one
court: the Court of Industrial Relations. The complaint herein having
been filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila, same must be
dismissed and the matter submitted to the Court of Industrial
Relations.

Wherefore, the order appealed from has to be
affirmed and this case dismissed for the reasons abovementioned.
Without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, Bautista
Angelo, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Paras, C. J., Montemayor, and Endencia, JJ., concur in the result.

Reyes, J. B. L., J., concurs but reserves his vote on the separation pay issue.