EMBASSY MOTORS WORKERS UNION (PAFLU), PETITIONER VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Embassy Motors Workers Union versus Court of Industrial Relations

The Case

This is a petition for review brought by the Embassy Motors Workers Union, affiliated with the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions, against the Court of Industrial Relations and Embassy Motors, Incorporated. The union asks the Supreme Court to compel the industrial court to execute its own resolution of February 14, 1959, which had set aside the trial judge's order authorizing the layoff of fifteen laborers, and to order the reinstatement of those workers with back wages. The case matters because it fixes the meaning of the statutory requirement that at least three of the five judges must concur before the Court of Industrial Relations can pronounce a decision, order, or award — a question of jurisdiction and procedure that every labor lawyer must know.

Procedural History

The union first filed a complaint for unfair labor practice before the Court of Industrial Relations against Embassy Motors, Incorporated, for dismissing fifteen employees because of their union activities. Judge Emiliano Tabigne found the company guilty and ordered reinstatement with back wages. The court en banc affirmed, and when the company elevated the matter to the Supreme Court on a petition for review, the appeal was dismissed for lack of merit.

Barely three weeks after reinstatement, the company filed a petition before the same court, as an incident of the original case, seeking authority to lay off the same employees. Judge Tabigne, after hearing, issued an order on November 20, 1958, holding that the court had jurisdiction under Section 17 of Commonwealth Act Number 103, as amended, and authorizing the layoff on condition that the workers be given priority of employment once normal business returned. The union moved for reconsideration, and on February 14, 1959, the court en banc reversed by a split vote. The company sought clarification, arguing that only two judges truly supported the reversal, but the industrial court denied the motion. The company then went to the Supreme Court on certiorari, and that petition was again dismissed for lack of merit.

When the union later asked the trial court to execute the February 14, 1959 resolution, Judge Tabigne denied the motion on April 28, 1960, reasoning that the resolution was ineffective because it rested only on the votes of two judges. The court en banc sustained that order, also by a split resolution. The union then interposed the present petition for review.

Facts

Sometime in 1957, the union filed an unfair labor practice complaint against Embassy Motors, Incorporated, for dismissing fifteen employees due to alleged union activities. Judge Tabigne found the company guilty and ordered reinstatement with back wages. The court en banc affirmed, and the Supreme Court dismissed the company's appeal for lack of merit.

On April 1, 1958, barely three weeks after the fifteen employees were reinstated, the company filed a petition before the same court, as an incident of the original case, seeking authority to lay off the same employees. It alleged that they had no work to perform because the company was suffering losses from a general business recession, lack of materials, and reduced dollar allocation. The union moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, but the trial judge set the petition for hearing on the merits.

On November 20, 1958, the trial court upheld its jurisdiction and authorized the layoff, subject to a priority-of-employment condition. Without waiting for the order to become final, the company immediately laid off the employees. On reconsideration, the court en banc reversed on February 14, 1959, by a split vote: Presiding Judge Jose Bautista, concurred in by Judge Baltazar Villanueva, voted to reverse on the merits, while Judge Arsenio Martinez concurred in the result on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Judge Tabigne dissented. The company's motion for clarification was denied, and its petition for certiorari was dismissed by the Supreme Court for lack of merit. When the union later sought execution, the trial court refused, and the en banc sustained the refusal, prompting this petition.

Issues

• Whether or not the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations dated February 14, 1959 is valid and effective, considering that it appears supported only by the affirmative vote of two judges while the third judge merely concurred in the result.
• Whether or not the employees who were laid off prematurely should be reinstated with payment of back wages.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act Number 103, as amended, provides:

Should any party aggrieved by a ruling or decision of any of the Judges, request a reconsideration thereof, or at the request of any of them, the Judges shall sit together, and the concurrence of at least three of the five Judges shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, order, or award.

This is the provision the Court construes: it fixes the number of concurring votes needed for a valid decision, order, or award of the Court of Industrial Relations.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the February 14, 1959 resolution is valid and effective because it finds support in the affirmative votes of three judges as required by law. The Court reasoned that for there to be a decision, order, or award, it is enough that the judges composing the court sit together and that the concurrence of at least three of the five judges be obtained. It is not necessary that the requisite number of judges agree on the issues raised or on the reasons each may advance; it is sufficient that they concur or agree on the result. The Court put the rule thus:

The issues may vary, the reasons may differ, but if the judges arrive at the same conclusion, or agree on the same result, there is decision.

Here, Judges Bautista and Villanueva found the order erroneous on the merits, while Judge Martinez found it untenable on the issue of jurisdiction. In substance, all three agreed that the trial judge acted erroneously in issuing the order, and so they decided to set it aside.

On the second issue, the Court held that the voiding of the trial judge's order authorizing the layoff carries with it the concomitant directive to reinstate the employees, since they were laid off prematurely. Even before the order had become final, because the period to appeal had not yet expired, the company proceeded to decree their layoff. Since the layoff was unauthorized, it is imperative that the employees be reinstated with payment of back wages.

Doctrine

Under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act Number 103, as amended, the concurrence of at least three of the five judges of the Court of Industrial Relations is necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, order, or award. That concurrence is counted on the result, not on the reasons: the issues may vary and the reasons may differ, but if three judges arrive at the same conclusion, there is a valid decision. A judge who concurs in the result on a different ground — here, lack of jurisdiction rather than error on the merits — still counts toward the required three votes. And where a layoff is decreed before the authorizing order becomes final, the layoff is unauthorized, and reinstatement with back wages follows as a matter of course.

Disposition

The petition was granted; the Court of Industrial Relations was ordered to immediately issue an order of execution of its February 14, 1959 resolution, with the directive that the laid off employees be immediately reinstated with back wages, without costs.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the issues may vary and the reasons may differ, but if three judges agree on the result, there is a valid decision. Examiners use this case to test whether a concurrence in the result on a different ground counts toward the statutory three-vote requirement, and to test the rule that a premature layoff compels reinstatement with back wages.