CONCHITA VDA. DE SALUDES, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. GREGORIO PAJARILLO AND VICENTE BAUTISTA, JUDGE OF MUNICIPAL COURT OF MANILA, RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.

Conchita Vda. de Saludes, herein petitioner and appellant, brought an action
in the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 12, 1945, to annul a deed
of sale of a house and lot executed by her in favor of the herein respondent and
appellee, Gregorio Pajarillo. During the pendency of the suit, respondent
Pajarillo filed an action for ejectment in the municipal court of Manila against
petitioner Saludes to compel her to vacate said house and lot. Petitioner
Saludes filed in that case a motion to dismiss upon the ground that there was
another action pending between the same parties and for the same cause and that
the court had no jurisdiction over the case. The motion was heard and submitted
for resolution. The municipal court, however, presided over by Judge Vicente
Bautista, without acting upon said motion for dismissal, and without a trial
upon the merits, rendered judgment ordering the defendant Saludes “to vacate
said premises, pay the rental at the rate of eighty pesos per month beginning
July 1st, 1946, until she leaves the premises and surrenders possession thereof
to plaintiff, plus costs of suit.” Whereupon, Saludes filed a motion for
reconsideration and new trial mainly upon the ground that the judgment was a
patent nullity there having been no trial on the merits wherein both parties
could introduce their evidence. While this motion was pending, Judge Bautista,
upon motion of Pajarillo, and without notice upon Saludes, ordered the execution
of the judgment. Hence, Saludes filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of First Instance of Manila to annul said judgment. The petition was denied upon
the ground that the remedy was appeal. And Saludes appealed to this Court.

It is a fact that there has been no trial on the merits in the municipal
court and that its judgment was rendered after the hearing of the motion to
dismiss the defendant having not even the opportunity to file her answer to the
complaint. Respondent admits this impliedly although in his brief he alleges
that at the hearing of the motion to dismiss, respondent Judge questioned both
parties as to their stand on the case; that defendant Conchita Vda. de Saludes
admitted in open court having received the sum of P2,000; and that she agreed to
leave the premises in question on March 31, 1946, but that she could not find a
place where she and her orphaned children could transfer to.

In the first place, there is nothing before us to show that these supposed
questions and answers have really been made. A brief is not the place where
issues of fact may be pleaded for the first time. In the second place, these
alleged questions and answers made at the hearing of the motion to dismiss
cannot take the place of a valid trial that is a prerequisite to a valid
judgment.

Although a municipal court is a court of limited jurisdiction, the procedure
therein should be orderly and not so summary as to disregard important measures
provided by the rules to safeguard the vital interests of justice. A defendant
is accorded by the rules the right to raise preliminary questions by means of a
motion to dismiss (Rule 4, section 7), and the court is powerless to deprive him
of such right by ignoring completely the motion to dismiss filed and argued by
him and disposing of the case finally on other issues not submitted by the
parties. The court is bound to act on the motion, and in the event of a denial
the defendant is given the other right to answer the complaint and plead all the
defenses and counterclaims he may have (Rule 4, sections 6 and 7); and, in case
of counterclaim, defendant is bound to put it in writing (Rule 4, section 6).
The right to answer is not an empty ceremony in an inferior court. Well known is
the rule that affirmative defenses not pleaded in an inferior court cannot be
pleaded for the first time in the Court of First Instance on appeal. (Bernardo
vs. Genato, 11 Phil., 603; Beech vs. Jimenez and Crossfield, 12
Phil., 212.) And compulsory counterclaims not set forth therein are barred
forever (Rule 4, section 19; Rule 10, section 6). Thus, an omission to answer
may be of harmful consequences to defendant.

It is only after the defendant has answered the complaint that the court may
proceed to the trial of the case on the merits. In the trial, first the
plaintiff is entitled to testify and to introduce the testimony of his
witnesses, and next the defendant may also testify and offer the testimony of
his witnesses, and finally plaintiff may offer rebutting testimony. After
testimony has been closed, the parties or their representatives may be heard in
argument (Rule 4, section 8). And at the conclusion of such trial and not
before, may the court render judgment according to the law and the facts proved
by the evidence duly presented by the parties (Rule 4, section 11). Thus, the
trial to which a defendant is entitled is one in which he has a full opportunity
to present all the evidence he may have in support of all the defenses or
counterclaims duly pleaded by him. The court has no authority to hold the trial
before defendant had an opportunity to plead, and has no power to limit such
trial to a mere questioning of the parties as to what their stand on the case
is, particularly when the questioning is made at a time when a motion to dismiss
is being heard, the parties having no idea at the moment that the trial of the
case is already being held and confined to such interrogatory. Under such
circumstances, in answering the questions of the court, statements may be made
by the parties which are not intended as a pleading or testimony and may thus be
devoid of accuracy and completeness; facts may have been stated without care,
with omission of important circumstances that may be of decisive influence; and
since the parties, or at least the defendant, did not know that she was
testifying in a formal trial, she may have failed to mention other issues and
other transactions that may affect or change the meaning of all the statements
she has actually made. We believe and so hold that such procedure is irregular
and arbitrary, conducive to confusion and injustice, and is mill and void.

Respondent contends that certiorari was improper because an appeal from the
decision of the municipal court was available. This contention is untenable. An
appeal under the circumstances was not an adequate remedy there being an order
of execution issued by the municipal court.

Judgment appealed from is reversed and the judgment rendered by the municipal
court in the ejectment case is set aside, with costs against
appellee.

Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, Hontiveros,
Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.