PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY, INC. AND LA MALLORCA, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. MUNICIPALITY OF TARLAC, PROVINCE OF TARLAC, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Pampanga Bus Company versus Municipality of Tarlac

The Case

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac declaring null and void Ordinance No. 1 and Resolution No. 323 of the Municipal Council of the Municipality of Tarlac, which prohibited the establishment and operation of bus and freight terminals along a portion of F. Tañedo Street and ordered the plaintiffs to remove their terminal. The plaintiffs, Pampanga Bus Company, Inc. and La Mallorca, are public utility operators whose bus terminal stood on F. Tañedo Street. The case matters because it is the classic illustration of the limits of the municipal general welfare clause: an ordinance that is not shown to promote the health, safety, or general welfare of the inhabitants, and that singles out one operator, is void.

Procedural History

The plaintiffs filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac to declare Ordinance No. 1 and Resolution No. 323 null and void, and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court granted the writ upon a bond. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment on 17 March 1958, declaring the ordinance and resolution null and void and making the injunction permanent. The defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The defendant then appealed to the Supreme Court, assigning as errors the trial court's findings that the ordinance and resolution were discriminatory, unreasonable, and oppressive, and the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.

Facts

On 21 January 1952, the Municipal Council of Tarlac adopted Ordinance No. 1, prohibiting the establishment or operation of bus or freight truck terminals along F. Tañedo Street from its intersection with Zamora Street to its intersection with the national highway. The ordinance gave existing terminals thirty days to remove and transfer, and imposed a fine of not more than 200 pesos or imprisonment of not more than six months, or both. On 26 March 1952, the Provincial Board of Tarlac approved the ordinance but extended the period for removal to six months. On 27 October 1952, the Municipal Council passed Resolution No. 323, ordering the La Mallorca-Pambusco Joint Transportation Management to remove its bus terminal within ten days and transfer it to another place subject to the approval of the council.

The plaintiffs' terminal had been in the area for a long time. It was constructed of strong materials along modern lines, with modern toilets, a store, and an employee assigned to keep the premises and the sidewalk clean. The terminal occupied an area large enough to allow buses to enter and leave without maneuvering on the street. Passengers boarded and alighted, cargo was loaded and unloaded, and buses not in operation were parked inside the premises. At the time of the ordinance, there was no other bus terminal on F. Tañedo Street except that of the plaintiffs.

The trial court found that the real objection of the municipality was the turning of the plaintiffs' buses in going in and out of the terminal, but that the evidence fell short of proving that this caused traffic obstruction. The cause of obstruction was the U-turns and the loading and unloading of passengers by carromatas, buses, midget buses, and jeepneys on both sides of F. Tañedo Street. The trial court also found that the terminal was not a nuisance and in fact helped relieve pedestrian congestion on the sidewalks.

Issues

• Whether or not Ordinance No. 1 is a valid exercise of the general welfare clause of the Revised Administrative Code.
• Whether or not Ordinance No. 1 is a valid zoning ordinance.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction and making it permanent.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Section 2238. General power of council to enact ordinances and make regulations. The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof and for the protection of property therein.

This is the source of the general welfare power invoked by the municipality, and the standard against which the ordinance must be tested.

Section 17(j) of the Public Service Act, Commonwealth Act No. 146, provides:

Section 17. The Commission shall have power, without previous hearing, subject to established limitations and exceptions and saving provisions to the contrary: (j) To require any public service to comply with the laws of the Philippines and with any provincial resolution or municipal ordinance relating thereto and to conform to the duties imposed upon it thereby or by the provisions of its own charter, whether obtained under any general or special law of the Philippines.

This provision is cited by the municipality to show that public utility operators must comply with municipal ordinances, but it presupposes a valid ordinance.

Section 71 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, Act No. 3992, provides:

Section 71. Municipal Councils are authorized and empowered to prescribe reasonable regulations and fees not inconsistent with this Act for the conduct, control, and operation of garages, and to determine where and how vehicles of all kinds may, while not in use, park upon or occupy the public streets or places.

This provision is also invoked by the municipality, but it concerns the parking of vehicles not in use, not the establishment of bus terminals.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the ordinance falls short of the standard required by Section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code. The trial court's findings, binding on appeal on questions of law only, showed that the terminal was of strong materials, equipped with modern toilets, kept clean, large enough to allow ingress and egress without obstructing traffic, and not a nuisance. The ordinance was enacted mainly to relieve traffic congestion, but the evidence showed that the congestion was caused by other vehicles, not by the plaintiffs' buses. The requirement that an ordinance provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants, and for the protection of property therein, was not satisfied. The Court quoted the standard:

to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein

On the second issue, the Court held that the ordinance is not a zoning ordinance. Zoning is the regulation of the uses of land and buildings according to districts or zones, and it must be comprehensive, governed by a single plan for the entire municipality. Ordinance No. 1 did not establish any zone; it merely prohibited bus and freight terminals along a portion of one street. It was partial and limited, not comprehensive zoning.

On the third issue, the Court held that the trial court did not err in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction and making it permanent, because the ordinance and resolution were void and the plaintiffs were entitled to protection against their enforcement.

Doctrine

A municipal ordinance enacted under the general welfare clause is valid only if it is not repugnant to law and is necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants, and for the protection of property therein. The ordinance must be shown to accomplish a legitimate public purpose; if it does not, it is void. A zoning ordinance, to be valid, must be comprehensive, governed by a single plan for the entire municipality, and must establish districts or zones; an ordinance that merely prohibits a particular use along a portion of one street is not zoning. The findings of the trial court on questions of fact are binding on the Supreme Court in an appeal on questions of law only.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, declaring Ordinance No. 1 and Resolution No. 323 null and void and making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing: an ordinance under the general welfare clause must actually promote the health, safety, and general welfare of the inhabitants, and a partial prohibition along one street is not zoning. Examiners like to use this case to test the limits of municipal police power and the distinction between a valid comprehensive zoning ordinance and a discriminatory partial prohibition.