GENARO PRADO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. APOLINARIO CALPO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

On May 24, 1957, plaintiff Genaro Prado, filed with the Justice of the
Peace Court of San Jacinto, Pangasinan, a forcible entry case against
the defendants. On June 6, 1957, defendants presented their Answer, and
interposed special and affirmative defenses, among which was the claim
that defendant Dalmacio Cabrera was the owner of the property allegedly
occupied by said defendants, having purchased the same from one
Marciana Calpito, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. 1), and
for which he (Cabrera) was issued a TCT No. 23006 for said land in his
name (Exh. 2). The Answer also averred that the Justice of the Peace
Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case, because it involved
question of title over the property. A counter-claim in the sum of
P500.00 for damages and P300.00 for attorney’s fees, was also
interposed.

Before trial, defendants filed a Petition for
Dismissal dated July 25, 1959, on the principal ground that since the
question of title and/or ownership was necessarily involved, the JP
Court had no jurisdiction thereof, for to determine who had the right
of possession (the issue in forcible entry cases), a finding as to the
title or ownership was imperative. Plaintiff opposed, claiming, among
others, that the ground on which the same was based could only be
resolved in a trial on the merits, for, whether title is necessarily
involved in an action for forcible entry or not is a question of fact.
On August 28, 1957, the JP Court denied the Petition for Dismissal and
set the case for trial on the merits.

On November 21, 1957, the JP Court rendered judgment, the pertinent portions of which read:

“A careful study of the evidence adduced by both parties, testimonial
and documentary, clearly shows that the preponderance of evidence is in
favor of the plaintiff. This Court can not see with valid reason the
justification of the defendants in not presenting the supposed
predecessor or predecessors of defendant Dalmacio Cabrera. * * *.

* * In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the only issue is
possession in fact, or physical possession of real properly,
independently of any claim of ownership and either party may put forth
in his pleading, if plaintiff can prove prior physical possession in
himself, he may recover such possession from the owner, * * *.

The defendants have never questioned the due execution, or validity of
the documents presented by plaintiff nor has plaintiff questioned the
issuance of the TRANSFER CERTIFICATE No. 23006 issued in the name of
defendant Dalmacio Cabrera nor any of the other documents presented by
the defendant Dalmacio Cabrera.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, this Court is of the
honest opinion, and so holds, that the preponderance of evidence is in
favor of the plaintiff, for which reason judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the herein defendants, to wit:

(a) That defendants are hereby ordered to vacate the premises and restore unto the plaintiff the possession thereof;

(b)
That defendants are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally unto
the plaintiff the sum of P50.00 per month from May 18, 1957 up to the
time the land is actually delivered;

(c) That
defendants are ordered to pay jointly and severally unto the plaintiff
the sum of P500.00 in concept of damages, moral and actual; and

(d) That defendants are hereby ordered to pay the costs of this suit.”

Upon denial of defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial,
they perfected their appeal to the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan. Instead of presenting their Answer, defendants filed a
Motion to Dismiss again raising the same issue of jurisdiction of the
inferior court.

On December 17, 1958, the CFI without any hearing, landed down an Order, of the following tenor:

“After a close scrutiny of the pleading and the jurisprudence on the
matter, the court is constrained to grant the motion to dismiss. The
land in question is presently covered by a certificate of title in the
names of the defendants, and the defense upon which defendants rely
necessarily involves ownership, the registration of the property in
question in their names. Possession is merely an attribute of ownership
and the mere filing of a forcible entry ease does not make possession
superior in character to that of ownership.

“The lower
court, therefore, should hare dismissed the case when the evidence
presented by the defendants involved the ownership of the property
which (it is not denied but on the contrary admitted) is described in
the certificate of title of the defendants for the reason that from
then on it had lost jurisdiction to try the case.

Actual
evidence of ownership have been introduced by the parties in the lower
courts. Those consist of the deed of sale in plaintiffs’ favor (Exh.
A); deed of sale in favor of the vendor of plaintiff (Exh. D); and the
deed of sale and transfer certificate of title No. 23006 in the name of
defendant Dalmacio V. Cabrera (Exhs. 1 and 2). These proofs center on
the ownership of the property described in the complaint which issue
the lower court has so jurisdiction to adjudicate.

In view of the foregoing, this case is hereby dismissed with costs against the plaintiff.

Plaintiff moved for the reconsideration of the above Order, stating
that trial on the merits would have been more consistent with law and
equity. On January 16, 1959, the trial court denied the motion for
reconsideration. Thus, this appeal, plaintiffs-appellants alleging that
the lower court committed three (3) errors, which center on the
question of whether or not, under the facts of the case, the JP Court
had jurisdiction to entertain the case and the CFI could legally take
cognizance of the appeal.

The CFI erred in quashing the case, upon a mere motion to dismiss. The
findings of the JP Court clearly show that the plaintiffs had prior
physical possession of the disputed property and the alleged
circumstance that the defendant Cabrera was the registered owner of the
property, did not detract from the fact that plaintiffs had a right of
possession thereof which should be protected. Incidentally, We note
that the Certificate of Title in the name of Cabrera was issued only on
February 17, 1956; whereas the plaintiffs’ right to occupy the premises
was evidenced by a Deed of Sale of the property to them, dated November
28, 1947, executed by Ventura Garcia and his wife Maria Consuelo
Frianeza, who bought the same property from Gonzalo Sandoval, by virtue
of a Deed of Sale dated May 2, 1938. When possession is the issue, an
action for Forcible Entry and Detainer is the proper remedy. The CFI
should have heard the ease on the merits, and find out whether the
findings and conclusions of fact of the JP, regarding the prior
possession of the plaintiffs and their subsequent dispossession by the
defendants are correct or not. Insofar as the appeal with the CFI is
concerned, the latter did not have to delve into the issue of
ownership, which could toe threshed out in an action, to quiet title.
Forcible entry and detainer lies even against the very owner of
property.

Conformable with the foregoing, the order of the CFI of Pangasinan,
dated December 17, 1958, ordering the dismissal of the case, is hereby
set aside and another entered, remanding the case to the said Court,
for further appropriate proceedings. No special pronouncement as to
costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.