PLACIDO C. RAMOS AND AUGUSTO L. RAMOS, PETITIONERS, VS. PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I. AND ANDRES BONIFACIO, RESPONDENTS.

Ramos versus Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippine Islands

The Case

This is a civil action for damages arising from a vehicular collision, brought by Placido Ramos and Augusto Ramos against Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippine Islands and its driver, Andres Bonifacio. The petitioners sought to hold the company liable for injuries and losses suffered in a collision with a Pepsi-Cola tractor-truck and trailer. The case matters because it is the Supreme Court's clearest statement that a motor vehicle owner is not an absolute insurer of the public, that the employer's liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code rests on the employer's own negligence in selection and supervision, and that the Anglo-American doctrine of respondeat superior is not followed in this jurisdiction.

Procedural History

The case was tried in the Court of First Instance, which rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and absolved Pepsi-Cola from liability. The petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, which rendered a decision affirming the Court of Appeals in toto. The petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration of that decision. In the decision now before us, the Supreme Court resolved the motion for reconsideration and denied it, still affirming the Court of Appeals in toto.

Facts

On the night of the collision, Andres Bonifacio was driving a Pepsi-Cola tractor-truck and trailer. The combination had a total weight of 30,000 kilograms and was about 3 meters wide. It was being driven at approximately 30 kilometers per hour. Bonifacio was driving alone, without a helper.

The petitioners alleged that the company violated several provisions of the Revised Motor Vehicles Law and its implementing regulations: the 15 kilometer per hour speed limit for certain trailers, the requirement of a rear-vision mirror or a helper, the permissible width limit, and the requirement of a special permit for oversized vehicles. The traffic policeman who went to the scene testified that he saw the tractor-truck but did not remember whether it had a rear-vision mirror.

The petitioners also asked the Court to abandon the Bahia ruling and to apply instead the Anglo-American doctrine of respondeat superior, under which the employer is liable for the acts of his employee regardless of the employer's own diligence.

Issues

• Whether or not Pepsi-Cola violated the 15 kilometer per hour speed limit for trailers under the motor vehicle regulations.
• Whether or not Pepsi-Cola violated the requirement of a rear-vision mirror or a helper for the driver.
• Whether or not Pepsi-Cola violated the permissible width limit for motor vehicles.
• Whether or not the Court should abandon the Bahia ruling and apply the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Applicable Provisions

Section 27, paragraph (a), subparagraph 1 of Motor Vehicles Office Administrative Order Number 1, dated September 1, 1951, provides:

No such trailer shall be operated at any time at a speed in excess of 15 kilometers per hour in conjunction with a tractor-truck, the actual gross weight of which is less than twice the weight of the trailer.

This provision sets the 15 kilometer per hour limit, but only for trailers without effective brakes, so it bears on whether the speed of 30 kilometers per hour was unlawful.

Section 27, paragraph (a), subparagraph 4(d) of the same Order provides:

Tractor-trucks shall be either equipped with rear-vision mirror to enable the driver to see vehicles approaching from the rear or shall carry a helper who shall be so stationed on the truck or trailer that he will constantly have a view of the rear. He shall be provided with means of effectively signaling to the driver to give way to overtaking vehicles.

This provision is complied with by either alternative, so it bears on whether the absence of a helper alone constitutes a violation.

Section 27, paragraph (a), subparagraph 4(e) of the same Order provides:

No truck and trailer combination shall be operated at a speed greater than 30 kilometers per hour.

This is the provision that applies in the absence of a finding that the trailer lacked effective brakes, and it bears on the lawfulness of the speed.

Section 8-A, paragraph (b) of the Revised Motor Vehicles Law provides:

No motor vehicle operating as a single unit shall exceed the following dimensions: Overall width ………………………………………… 2.5 meters

This sets the permissible width, and it bears on whether the 3 meter width was unlawful.

Section 9, paragraph (d) of the same law, as amended, provides:

For registration or use of a motor vehicle exceeding the limit of permissible dimensions specified in subsections (b) and (c) of section eight-A hereof.

This provision allows the registration or use of oversized vehicles upon a special permit, so it bears on whether the excess width was unlawful.

Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:

The owner's responsibility shall cease once it proves that it has observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

This is the basis of the employer's liability, and it bears on whether the company may be held liable for the acts of its driver.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that there was no violation of the 15 kilometer per hour limit. That limit applies only to trailers without effective brakes, and the Court of Appeals made no finding that the truck-trailer lacked such brakes. In the absence of that fact, the applicable provision is the 30 kilometer per hour limit, and the petitioners admitted that the vehicle was driven at about 30 kilometers per hour.

On the second issue, the Court held that there was no violation of the rear-vision mirror or helper requirement. The provision is complied with if either alternative is present, and it is violated only where there is a positive finding that the tractor-truck had neither a rear-vision mirror nor a helper. The policeman's testimony that he did not remember whether there was a mirror could not prove its absence.

On the third issue, the Court held that there was no violation of the width limit. Section 9 expressly allows the registration or use of oversized vehicles upon a special permit. To conclude that there was a violation of law, it was not enough that the width exceeded the limit; it must also appear that there was no special permit. That vital factual link was missing, and it was incumbent upon the petitioners to prove the lack of a permit since the vehicles were registered. Compliance with law and regularity in the performance of official duty are presumed.

On the fourth issue, the Court refused to abandon the Bahia ruling. A motor vehicle owner is not an absolute insurer against all damages caused by its driver. Under Article 2180, the basis of the employer's liability is his own negligence, not that of his employee. The employer is made responsible for failing to properly and diligently select and supervise his erring employees. The Court has never followed the respondeat superior rule, so the American rulings cited by the petitioners are not authoritative here.

Doctrine

A motor vehicle owner is not an absolute insurer against all damages caused by its driver. The employer's liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code rests on the employer's own negligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, and the employer is relieved from liability once it proves that it observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. The Bahia ruling merely clarified that this diligence consists of diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver-employee. The Anglo-American doctrine of respondeat superior is not followed in this jurisdiction. Where a violation of law is charged, the burden of proving the violation falls upon the party alleging it, and compliance with law and regularity in the performance of official duty are presumed.

Disposition

The motion for reconsideration was denied, and the decision of the Court of Appeals absolving Pepsi-Cola from liability was affirmed in toto.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that a motor vehicle owner is not an absolute insurer, and the employer's liability under Article 2180 rests on his own negligence in selection and supervision, not on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Examiners like to use this case to test the difference between the employer's own negligence and vicarious liability, and to test the burden of proving a violation of the motor vehicle law.