PHILIPPINE ENGINEERING CORPORATION, GONZALO DEL ROSARIO AND ELEUTERIO AGUIRRE, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. PATRICIO C. CENIZA, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

The Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, in its Civil Case No.
1701, had rendered, on 30 July 1955, judgment in favor of Emigdio C. Serna,
party plaintiff, and against defendants Gonzalo del Rosario, Eleuterio Aguirre,
and Philippine Engineering Corporation, sentencing the latter as follows:

“Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
defendants to pay to the plaintiff the amount of totalling P6,657.35 including
P16.00 his unpaid traveling expenses, moral damages in the amount of P3,000.00
and attorney’s fees in the amount of P2,000.00 plus interest of 6% from the date
the complaint was filed until the full amount of the judgment is satisfied, and
to pay the costs.” (Petition Annex D, p. 5)

Upon appeal by the defendants, the Court of Appeals, in case CA-No. 16617-R,
by decision promulgated 13 April 1950, affirmed in toto the judgment of
said Court of First Instance. The award having become final, the records were
remanded to the court below for execution. A writ of execution was issued by the
clerk of the court of origin for—

“The total amount of P6,637.35 plus P16.00 plus P3,000.00 as moral damages,
and the further sum of P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees with 6% per annum interest
on the principal of P6,637.35 from the date of the filing of the complaint on
October 28, 1954 up to the present.”

Defendants moved for amendment of this writ of execution on the ground that
the same was not in conformity with the judgment in that:

(a) The principal sum of P6,637.35 already included the traveling
expenses, damages, and attorney’s fees;

(b) The interest of 6% should not be computed on the damages and
attorney’s fees; and

(c) The interest should be deemed due only from the date of the
amended complaint, not from that of the original pleading.

After hearing, the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental allowed the
First amendment sought, but denied the two others. Reconsideration having been
refused, defendants resorted to this Court, petitioning for certiorari
on the ground of abuse of discretion in the refusal to exclude interest on
the damages and counsel fees, and in computing it from the date of the original
complaint instead of the amended one.

We find the petition untenable. The rule is firmly established that as
between the same parties, on the same subject matter and causes of action, a
final valid judgment is conclusive not only on the issues actually determined by
the decision, but on all issues that could have been raised and litigated in the
anterior suit (PNB vs. Barretto, 52 Phil. 818, 824; San Diego vs. Cardona, 70
Phil. 281; Miranda vs. Tiangco, 96 Phil., 526). The petitioners herein
(originally defendants in the preceding action) felt rightly aggrieved by the
allowance of interest on the moral damages and attorneys’ fees made by the
Misamis Court of First Instance in its Civil Case No. 1701; but the proper
remedy was to ask for the amendment of the judgment in the manner now urged, and
in case of refusal, to appeal the issue to the higher courts. The defendants
below failed to make use of this remedy, and instead allowed the decision to
become final and executory. It is now too late for them to seek a modification
of the judgment at its execution stage.

The res judicata rule likewise bars the second claim of petitioner
that interest be computed from the filing of the amended complaint, since the
final decision specifically declares the complaint of October 28, 1954 to be the
start of the running of interest. In addition, the records show that the amended
complaint merely amplified the items of damage asked by plaintiff, and did not
introduce any new cause of action, so that the amended claim relates back to the
original (Guazo vs. Ramirez, 32 Phil. 492). Hence, interest should properly
start from the filing of the original pleading.

We may further note that by their previous appeals and motions, the
petitioners have managed to’stave off the payment of a claim that was due since
1955 to respondent herein, whose wife, in addition, appears to have been
desperately ill. We can not, in all equity, say now that the decision of the
Court of First Instance was in abuse of discretion.

Wherefore, the petition is dismissed, with costs against petitioners.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal JJ., concur.