PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RAMIL GAVINO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
LOPEZ, J.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused guilty for the crime charged – Murder- for killing the victim Dennis Lachica with treachery and with attendant circumstances of ignominy and hereby sentences the accused to a death penalty by lethal injection or by electric chair.
SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellant, is charged with murder for the death of Dennis Lachica (hereafter, “Dennis”) in an Information[2] docketed as Criminal Case No. 312-C, viz:
That on or about 15th day of November 1996, in the Municipality of Caluya, Province of Antique, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then armed with a bamboo pole, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and beat with said bamboo pole one Dennis Lachica, thereby inflicting upon the latter fatal wounds on the vital parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death. Dumping the dead body of Dennis Lachica to the deep sea and beyond recovery even up to the present,[3] was attended by ignominy.
With the qualifying circumstance of treachery and attended by the ordinary aggravating circumstance of ignominy.
Contrary to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659.
Per Order dated September 16, 1997, accused-appellant was arraigned.[4] Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The prosecution then presented its case.
The Version of the Prosecution
The Prosecution presented as witnesses Benedicto Gavino (hereafter, “Benedicto”), Rommy Villalon (hereafter, “Rommy”)[5] and Eliezer Lachica (hereafter, “Eliezer”).
The version of the Prosecution as synthesized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG):[6]
On the evening of November 15, 1998 at Sitio Caacob,[7] Sibay, Caluya, Antique, witness Romy Villalon was awakened by noise from people outside is house. When he peeped at the window, he saw accused-appellant Ramil Gavino, Jairo Matulac and the victim Dennis Lachica walking towards the sea shore. Subsequently, Lachica went to his house looking for a bolo but was not able to get any. On Lachica’s way back to the shore, witness Villalon saw accused-appellant hit Lachica on the face with a bamboo pole causing the latter to lose consciousness. Accused-appellant then pulled Lachica’s body to the shore, loaded it on his banca, and sailed towards the sea.
Meanwhile, witness Benedicto Gavino, younger brother of the accused-appellant was sleeping at his Auntie Diday’s house on the evening of November 15, 1998, when he was awakened by his brother. Accused-appellant asked Benedicto and a certain Ariel Surilla to go with him to the seashore. Upon reaching the seashore, accused-appellant pointed to the two, blood stains on the coconut leaves that belong to the victim Lachica whom he bragged that he killed. After which, accused-appellant burned the leaves; and when they all returned to the house of Auntie Diday, he even showed the wallet belonging to the victim to Benedicto.
Witness Eliezer Lachica, brother of the victim, on November 17, 1998 heard from two children about a news that a man was found floating in the sea. The following day, he with three others, went to the Tambalang plantation, where the floating body was seen. Sadly, it was the dead body of Dennis Lachica, apparently with a broken nose and wound on his cheek.
The Version of the Defense
The defense, on the other hand, presented Rodel Lorenzo (hereafter, “Rodel”), Victorio Ortega (hereafter, “Victorio”), and accused-appellant himself to establish his defense of self-defense.
The defense’s version of the facts is as follows:
Accused-appellant testified[8] that on November 15, 1996, at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, he was at the seashore of Sitio Cacub, Sibay, Caluya, Antique together with Rodel, watching the Tambalang seaweeds. They heard a shout for fight three (3) times. Dennis approached them, unsheathed his bolo and said “I will kill you”. Accused-appellant held a paddle and inquired from Dennis why the latter wanted to kill accused-appellant. But Dennis hacked accused-appellant. Accused-appellant parried the blow of Dennis and struck Dennis with his paddle. Dennis fell into the water. Rodel and accused-appellant then left the area. Accused-appellant did not return home because he was afraid that the family of Dennis might retaliate. On November 25, 1996, accused-appellant surrendered to Barangay Captain Allan Janairo.
Rodel corroborated this testimony of accused-appellant,[9] stating that it was Dennis who challenged accused-appellant to a fight, unsheathed his bolo and tried to hack accused-appellant but the latter was able to parry the blow of Dennis. Accused-appellant then struck Dennis on the forehead with a paddle, who fell into the water. Rodel then ran away followed by accused-appellant.
Also presented to corroborate this testimony, was witness Victorio who testified[10] that on the night of November 15, 1996, he was inspecting the seaweed plantation when he heard a shout for a fight. He saw Dennis walking towards the pump boat ridden by accused-appellant. Upon arriving at the pump boat, Dennis unsheathed his bolo and hacked accused-appellant, shouting “I will kill you”. Accused-appellant was able to parry the blow and retaliated by hitting Dennis on the head with a paddle. Rodel then ran away followed by accused-appellant.
On October 4, 2005, the court a quo rendered the assailed Decision,[11] finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.
On December 27, 2005, a Notice of Appeal[12] was filed by accused-appellant and was given due course by the court a quo via an Order[13] dated January 4, 2006.
On June 20, 2013, accused-appellant filed the Appellant’s Brief[14] with the following assignment of errors:
I
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT AQUO (SIC) ERRED IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WTINESSES (SIC) WHICH ARE HEARSAY, CONTRADICTORY AND INTERTWINED WITH BIAS AND PREJUDICE.II
THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER AND NOT EXCULPATING HIM ON THE GROUND OF COMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE.
In his Appellant’s Brief, accused-appellant maintains that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should not be given weight as these were not credible. He strongly asserts that he should have been acquitted because he had sufficiently proved all the elements of self-defense. He claims that his witnesses vividly clarified to the court a quo that it was Dennis who actually hacked him and because of this aggression, he struck Dennis in the forehead with a paddle. Accused-appellant contends that his use of the paddle is reasonable necessity to repel the unlawful aggression. And the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should have been credited in his favor.
On the other hand, the Republic in its Brief[15] alleges that the elements of the crime of murder are present in the instant case. Moreover, the Republic contends that accused-appellant failed to satisfactorily establish all the elements of self-defense.
The Ruling of the Court
We deny the appeal.
The Supreme Court in the case of People v. Fontanilla[16] explained the effects of an admission of self-defense, viz:
It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability. Having thus admitted being the author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, and he would be held criminally liable unless he established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory proof. He should discharge the burden by relying on the strength of his own evidence, because the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak, would not be disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing.(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the burden to establish self-defense is on accused-appellant to show by strong, clear and convincing evidence that the killing is justified and that, therefore, no criminal liability has attached. Notably, a plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated where it is not only uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence, but also extremely doubtful in itself.[17]
Here, accused-appellant failed to establish self-defense by clear, convincing and credible evidence.
Accused-appellant’s version of the events leading to Dennis’ death strains credulity. He admitted before the court a quo that he had never met Dennis prior to the incident. Yet, accused-appellant failed to explain why Dennis would want to kill him. There appears no trouble between them.[18] Clearly, there was no motive on the part of Dennis to hurt accused-appellant. Accused-appellant wanted to impress upon the Court that Dennis wanted to fight and then Dennis approached him particularly and tried to hack him. It is confusing at the very least, why, of all people, it was accused-appellant who was hacked by Dennis when it was accused-appellant’s contention that he was with Rodel when Dennis approached them. Also, Victorio testified that he was also within the vicinity when the incident happened.
Accused-appellant’s plea of self-defense appears extremely doubtful. Except for the self-serving testimonies, there was no other evidence presented to prove unlawful provocation by Dennis. The bolo used by Dennis to allegedly hack accused-appellant was nowhere to be found. Also, there was no injury sustained by accused-appellant. Moreover, We note that the cause of death as reflected in the Certificate of Death and certified by the Rural Health Physician Dr Noel C. Alojado was skull fracture and not drowning.[19] Hence, accused-appellant was able to injure Dennis fatally with no injury at all caused to himself.
The absence of injury on the part of accused-appellant, together with the evidence consisting of testimonies from accused-appellant and his witnesses, could not ouster the testimony of eyewitnesses Rommy and Benedicto whom We found to be credible.
Eyewitness Rommy was straightforward and categorical in his narration of how accused-appellant attacked and killed Dennis. His testimony could not be shaken. In fact, it withstood rigorous cross-examination by the defense. Besides, he positively identified accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. He was the one being asked by Dennis for a bolo and the latter failed to get it from him, and then accused-appellant met Dennis in going back to the beach and struck Dennis three (3) times with a bamboo pole. He was also the person being asked by accused-appellant for a paddle after the latter brought Dennis to the boat. Rommy testified that he was merely eight (8) meters away from the area of incident,[20] and saw everything because there was a half-moon and it was a clear night.[21] Moreover, Rommy personally knew accused-appellant, the latter being their neighbor, their houses facing each other.[22] Notably, once a person has gained familiarity with another, identification becomes an easy task even from a considerable distance. Most often, the face and body movements of the assailants create a lasting impression on the victim’s and eyewitness’ minds which cannot be easily erased from their memory.[23]
Moreover, Benedicto testified that on the said fateful night, accused-appellant admitted to him and to Ariel Surilla that he killed Dennis after the latter showed to him the blood of Dennis on the coconut leaves.[24] He further testified that he and Ariel Surilla saw the cadaver of Dennis the next day, upon the instruction of the accused-appellant to check on the cadaver. Benedicto is the brother of accused-appellant. Hence, We shall give credit to his testimony considering that it is the natural tendency of a person to testify for and not against his relatives.[25] We see no reason why Benedicto would fabricate an untruth at the expense of his brother.
Besides, these two witnesses had no ill motive to testify against accused-appellant. It has been a consistent ruling of the Supreme Court that a witness’ testimony deserves full faith and credit where there exists no evidence to show any improper motive why he should testify falsely against the accused, or why he should implicate the accused in a serious offense.[26] Also, jurisprudence dictates that if an accused had really nothing to do with a crime, it would be against the natural order of events and of human nature, and against the presumption of good faith, that a prosecution witness would falsely testify against him.[27]
In the instant case, accused-appellant’s self-serving claim of self-defense coupled with the fact that he did not sustain any injuries from his supposed attacker, accused-appellant fails to support any claim of unlawful aggression, the crucial requisite to his defense. As found by the court a quo, there was no clear, credible, and convincing evidence that Dennis was the one who instigated the fight and that accused-appellant was merely fending off an attack.
Notably, the question of whether or not accused-appellant acted in self-defense is one of fact.[28] The appellate court will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court. Its findings on such matters are binding and conclusive on appellate courts unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted.[29]
In the final analysis, accused-appellant miserably failed to show that the victim was guilty of unlawful aggression. Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.[30]
Like alibi, self-defense is inherently a weak defense and can easily be fabricated.[31] Verily, accused-appellant’s self-serving claim of self-defense coupled with the fact that he sustained merely superficial injuries from his supposed assailant Efren, fail to support any claim of unlawful aggression, the crucial requisite to his defense. There appears no clear, credible, and convincing evidence that Efren was the one who instigated the fight and that accused-appellant was merely fending off an attack.
Although the question of whether the degree of proof has been met is largely left for the trial courts to determine, an appeal throws the whole case open for review. Thus, the factual findings of the trial court may be reversed if, by the evidence or the lack of it, it appears that the trial court erred, as in this case.[32]
We found that the qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be applied in the instant case as treachery was not properly alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.[33] Notably, when the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the Information, accused-appellant is guilty only of homicide as this is in violation of his right to due process.[34] The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation is guaranteed by no other than the Constitution.[35]
In the case of People v. Dimaano, the Court elaborated:
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. [emphasis supplied]
There is also no aggravating circumstance of ignominy in this case. The mere fact that the cadaver of Dennis was thrown out into the sea does not constitute ignominy.
Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order, which adds disgrace and obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime.[36] For cruelty to be appreciated against the accused, it must be shown that the accused, for his pleasure and satisfaction, caused the victim to suffer slowly and painfully as he inflicted on him unnecessary physical and moral pain. The crime is aggravated because by deliberately increasing the suffering of the victim the offender denotes sadism and consequently a marked degree of malice and perversity. The mere fact of inflicting various successive wounds upon a person in order to cause his death, no appreciable time intervening between the infliction of one (1) wound and that of another to show that he had wanted to prolong the suffering of his victim, is not sufficient for taking this aggravating circumstance into consideration.[37]
We could not give credence to the claim of accused-appellant that he voluntarily surrendered.
Suffice to state that the essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture. Without these reasons and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender is the inevitability of arrest and the need to ensure his safety, the surrender cannot be spontaneous and cannot be the “voluntary surrender” that serves as a mitigating circumstance.[38] Here, it appears that accused-appellant surrendered to Barangay Captain Janairo when he was already surrounded by the barangay tanods in the pump boat of Barangay Captain Janairo.[39] Clearly, he surrendered simply because there was no other way out without risking his own life. Hence, no mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in his favor.
We now address the correct penalty for the crime committed by accused-appellant.
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that any person found guilty of homicide shall be punished by reclusion temporal, i.e., twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of the sentence shall be within the range of the penalty next lower, which is prision mayor, i.e., anywhere between six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty that should be imposed is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by law, that is, reclusion temporal in its medium period, or, anywhere between fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.[40] Accordingly, the prison term of an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fifteen (15) years, as maximum is sufficient.
With regard to the civil indemnity, We rule that the heirs of Dennis are entitled to the amount of P75,000.00.[41]
Moral damages must likewise be granted in the amount of P50,000.00. The award of moral damages is mandatory in cases of murder and homicide, without need of allegation and proof other than the victim’s death.[42]
The award of actual damages is deleted as no evidence was presented to prove the same. It is necessary for a party seeking the award of actual damages to produce competent proof or the best evidence obtainable to justify such award. Only substantiated and proven expenses, or those that appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake, or burial of the victim will be recognized in court.[43] However, an award of temperate damages is in order in the amount of P25,000.00. Article 2224 of the Civil Code[44] provides that temperate damages may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty.[45]
Finally, consistent with recent jurisprudence on damages, interest on all damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment until such damages shall have been fully paid, is imposed.46
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is DENIED. However, the Decision dated October 4, 2005 of Branch 13, Regional Trial Court of Culasi, Antique in Criminal Case No. C-250 is MODIFIED, finding accused-appellant Ramil Gavino GUILTY of the crime of HOMICIDE and is SENTENCED to suffer the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day as minimum to fifteen (15) years, as maximum. Ramil Gavino is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim the following:
| 1) | Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity; | |
| 2) | Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages; | |
| 3) | Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate damages; and | |
| 4) | Six Percent Interest (6%) per annum on all damages from the finality of judgment until such damages shall have been fully paid. |
SO ORDERED.
Ingles, Chairperson, and Lagura-Yap, JJ., concur.
[1] Records, p. 408.
[2] Ibid., p. 31.
[3] The cadaver of Dennis was found on November 18, 1996 floating in the Tambalang Plantation (TSN dated September 8, 2004 of Eliezer Lachica, the brother of Dennis)
[4] Ibid., p. 41.
[5] Also referred to in the records as Romy Villalon.
[6] Rollo, pp. 153-154.
[7] Also referred to in the records as Sitio Cacub.
[8] TSN dated December 13, 2004, pp. 5-6.
[9] TSN dated October 25, 2004, pp 5-8.
[10] TSN dated May 10, 2005, pp. 5-8.
[11] Supra, Note 1.
[12] Records, p. 434.
[13] Ibid., p. 436.
[14] Rollo, p. 99.
[15] Ibid., p. 148.
[16] G.R. No. 177743, January 25, 2012, citing Cabuslay v. People, G.R. No. 129875, September 30, 2005; People v. Capisonda, 1 Phil. 575 [1902 ]; People v. Baguio, 43 Phil. 683 [1922 ]; People v. Gutierrez, 53 Phil. 609 [1929 ]; People v. Silang Cruz, 53 Phil. 625 [1929 ]; People v. Embalido, 58 Phil. 152 [1933 ]; People v. Dorico, No. L-31568, November 29, 1973; People v. Boholst-Caballero, G.R. No. L-23249, November 25, 1974; People v. Quiño, G.R. No. 105580, May 17, 1994; People v. Camacho, G.R. No. 138629, June 20, 2001; People v. Galvez, G.R. No. 130397, January 17, 2002; People v. Mayingque, G.R. No. 179709, July 6, 2010; People v. Gelera, G. R. No. 121377, August 15, 1997; People v. Molina, G.R. No. 59436, August 28, 1992; People v. Alapide, G.R. No. 104276, September 20, 1994; People v. Albarico, G.R. Nos. 108596-97, November 17, 1994; People v. Camahalan, G.R. No. 114032, February 22, 1995.
[17] People v. Tabarnero, et al, G.R. No. 168169, February 24, 2010, citing People v. De la Cruz, 353 Phil. 363, 381 [1998 ].
[18] TSN dated December 13, 2004, p. 11-12.
[19] Records, p.294 ( Exhibit “A”, Death Certificate).
[20] TSN dated August 6, 2003, p.10.
[21] Ibid., p. 15.
[22] Ibid., p. 4.
[23] People v. Ducabo, G.R. No. 175594, September 28, 2007.
[24] TSN dated June 17, 1998, p. 10.
[25] People v. Vicente, G.R. No. 137296, June 26, 2003.
[26] People v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 143935, June 04, 2004, citing People vs. Merino, G.R. No. 132329, December 17, 1999.
[27] People vs. Simon, et al., G.R. No. 130531, May 27, 2004, citing People vs. Zuniega, G.R. No. 126117, February 21, 2001.
[28] People vs. Marcelo, G.R. No. 140385, April 14, 2004, citing People v. Belaje, G.R. No. 125331, November 23, 2000.
[29] People v. Mapalo, G.R. No. 172608, February 6, 2007; People v. Tampis, G.R. No. 148725, July 31, 2003.
[30] People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004.
[31] Pelonia v. People, G.R. NO. 168997, April 13, 2007.
[32] People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 186498, March 26, 2010, citing Zarraga v. People, G.R. No. 162064, March 14, 2006; People v. Santos, Jr., G.R. No. 175593, October 17, 2007.
[33] SEC. 8. Designation of the offense.—The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
[34] See People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 175602, February 13, 2013.
[35] Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
[36] People v. Catian, G.R. No. 139693, January 24, 2002.
[37] People v. Magayac, G.R. No.126043, April 19, 2000, citing People v. Dayug, et al., 49 Phil. 423 (1926). See also People v. Basao, G.R. No. 128286, 20 July 1999.
[38] People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 174479, June 17, 2008, citing People v. Acuram, G.R. No. 117954, April 27, 2000; People v. Deopante, G.R. No. 102772, October 30, 1996.
[39] TSN dated September 8, 2004, p. 14.
[40] Oriente v. People, G.R. No. 155094, January 30, 2007.
[41] People v. Malicdem, G.R. No. 184601, November 12, 2012, citing People v. Anticamara, G.R. No. 178771, June 8, 2011.
[42] People v. Panado, G.R. No. 133439, December 26, 2000.
[43]
R E S O L U T I O NG.R. NO. 176526, August 08, 2007, citing People v. Caraig, 448 Phil. 78, 95 [2003 ].
[44] Art. 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be provided with certainty.
[45] People v. Del Castillo, G.R. No. 169084, January 18, 2012.
[46] People v. Dollendo, et al., G.R. No. 181701, January 18, 2012, citing People v. Maningding, G.R. No. 195665, September 14, 2011.