PEDRO HINOLAN JR., PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JUAN CAMINOS, REPRESENTED BY NOW ADMINISTRATORS, NAMELY: CRISPINA ESPARCIA AND ZEFRED C. SALIMBOT; HEIR…

Hinolan versus Intestate Estate of the Late Juan Caminos

The Case

This is Pedro Hinolan Junior against the Intestate Estate of the Late Juan Caminos, represented by its administrators, together with the heirs of Amado Parreño Junior, and the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Escalante City. Hinolan was the defendant in an ejectment case, and he went to the Supreme Court to stop the execution of the judgment that had already been rendered against him. The case matters because it fixes when the five-year period to execute a judgment by motion begins to run in ejectment cases, and it teaches that a judgment which is immediately executory is not the same as a judgment that is final and executory.

Procedural History

The ejectment case was filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Escalante City, and that court rendered judgment against Hinolan. He appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, which denied the appeal and affirmed the trial court in full. He then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by petition for review, and that petition was still pending.

Meanwhile, the Regional Trial Court granted a motion for execution pending appeal and remanded the records to the court of origin. The Municipal Trial Court then granted a motion for issuance of a writ of execution and issued the writ. Hinolan moved to suspend or hold in abeyance the implementation of the decision and the writ, but the Municipal Trial Court denied the motion, and it likewise denied his motion for reconsideration.

Hinolan then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59 of San Carlos City, seeking to annul those orders. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition, denied his motion for reconsideration and his motion for approval of an injunction bond, and refused leave to file a second motion for reconsideration. He appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied the appeal and affirmed the Regional Trial Court in full.

Facts

Sometime in 2000, the estate and the heirs filed an ejectment case against Hinolan before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Escalante City. On December 18, 2001, that court rendered judgment against him. He appealed to the Regional Trial Court, but he did not file a supersedeas bond to stay execution. On December 4, 2002, the Regional Trial Court denied the appeal and affirmed the trial court in full, and it later denied his motion for reconsideration.

Hinolan then went up to the Court of Appeals by petition for review, and that petition remained pending. In the meantime, the Regional Trial Court granted execution pending appeal and remanded the records to the court of origin. On November 21, 2007, the Municipal Trial Court granted the motion for issuance of a writ of execution, and on January 30, 2008, it issued the writ.

Hinolan moved to suspend or hold in abeyance the implementation of the decision and the writ. The Municipal Trial Court denied the motion on December 14, 2009, and denied his motion for reconsideration on June 15, 2011. He then brought the matter to the Regional Trial Court by certiorari, which dismissed the petition, and the case reached the Supreme Court on appeal.

Issues

• Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in affirming the order of the Municipal Trial Court denying the motion to suspend or hold in abeyance the implementation of the decision and the writ of execution.
• Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in not applying Sections 4 and 14 of Rule 39 and Section 19 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, and the doctrine in Terry versus People.
• Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari.

Applicable Provisions

Section 6 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.

This is the provision the Court construes, because the five-year period it fixes applies only to a judgment that is final and executory.

Section 19 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court.

This is the provision Hinolan invoked, since he filed no supersedeas bond, and the Court explains that the absence of a bond does not make the judgment final.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Regional Trial Court did not err. The findings of fact of the lower courts are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed absent a clear showing that some fact of weight and significance was overlooked or misinterpreted. The Court found no compelling reason to depart from the ruling below, and it quoted that ruling with its imprimatur. The writ of execution was issued pursuant to Section 21 of Rule 70, because a judgment had already been rendered by the Regional Trial Court when the motion for execution was filed. In ejectment cases, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court as an appellate court is immediately executory notwithstanding a further appeal, and neither a further appeal nor the posting of a supersedeas bond can stop its execution. But while the decision is immediately executory, it does not become final if a further appeal is taken. It is akin to execution pending appeal, except that execution under Section 21 of Rule 70 is mandatory and ministerial upon the court, not merely discretionary.

On the second issue, the Court held that Hinolan's reliance on Sections 4 and 14 of Rule 39, on Section 19 of Rule 70, and on Terry versus People was misplaced. Section 6 of Rule 39 is clear that the five-year period applies only to a final and executory decision. Here, it was never disputed that the decision of the Municipal Trial Court had not attained finality, because the decision of the Regional Trial Court affirming it was still the subject of a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. The Court asked how a decision still pending review by a higher court could be considered final and executory, and answered that it would be absurd and even preposterous to apply the five-year period to such a decision. The discussions in Terry versus People and in Justice Regalado's commentaries refer to a final and executory decision, not to one still subject to review.

On the third issue, the Court held that the Regional Trial Court committed no reversible error in dismissing the petition for certiorari. The appellant, said the Court, was merely engaging in nit-picking.

Doctrine

First, the five-year period to execute a judgment by motion under Section 6 of Rule 39 runs only from the entry of a judgment that is final and executory. A judgment still pending review before a higher court has not attained finality, so the period has not begun to run.

Second, in ejectment cases, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court as an appellate court is immediately executory notwithstanding a further appeal, and neither a further appeal nor the posting of a supersedeas bond can stop its execution. Execution is mandatory and ministerial upon the court.

Third, a judgment that is immediately executory is not the same as a judgment that is final and executory. Immediate execution does not make the judgment final, and it does not trigger the five-year period under Section 6 of Rule 39.

Disposition

The appeal was denied, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court dismissing the petition for certiorari was affirmed in full.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the five-year period to execute by motion runs only from a judgment that is final and executory, and an immediately executory ejectment judgment is not yet final. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between executory and final judgments, and to test whether a candidate knows that a supersedeas bond stays execution but does not make the judgment final.