G.R. No. L-10634-35. May 28, 1958

FELIMON CENIDO, CRISTINA CENIDO ADORACION BARRETO, JOVENAL BARRETO, AND PORVENIR BARRETO, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, VALENTIN ANTAZO AND ADRIANO ANTAZO, RESPONDENTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions May 28, 1958 REYES, J.B.L., J.:


REYES, J.B.L., J.:


On September 13, 1931, Eulogia Antaso, a resident of Binangonan, Rizal,
died. She was predeceased by her husband Mariano Aralar, and their two children,
Maxima and Martina Aralar. Maxima was the mother of petitioners-appellants
Adoracion, Jovenal and Porvenir, all surnamed Barretto, while Martina was the
mother of plaintiffs Felimon and Cristina Cenido. Respondent-appellee Valentin
Antazo was the cousin of Eulogia Antazo de Aralar.

On September 21, 1931, Valentin Antazo commenced Special Proceedings No.
4915, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the probate of a will of the
deceased, Eulogia Antazo, distributing her property. Valentin Antazo was
appointed administrator in the testate proceedings. All the herein appellants
were minors at the time, but the Barrettos were represented by guardians ad
litem
. On January 14, 1932, the court approved the project of partition; and the
administrator on October 21, 1936, asked the court with the heirs’ consent to
relieve him from accounting; to be authorized to cede two parcels of land to
Mateo Celerian in payment of the obligations of the deceased (Exh. E-2); and for
the closure of the proceedings. The motion was granted by the court on February
13, 1937 (Exh. E-3).

On June 26, 1950, the grandchildren of Eulogia Antazo filed a motion in the
testate proceedings to punish for contempt and remove administrator Antazo.
Since the re constitution of the lost records of the testate case appeared
impossible, the court suggested in an order, dated July 17, 1950, the filing of
separate and independent actions. This resulted in the filing of Civil Cases
Nos. 1160 and 1208 on July 17 and August 3, 1950, respectively.

In Civil Case No. 1160 (CA-G.R. No. 11719-R) against Valentin and Adriano
Antazo, plaintiffs (grandchildren of Eulogia Antazo) urged the annulment of the
project of partition submitted in the testate proceedings on the ground of fraud
on the part of Valentin Antazo, as administrator, in asserting that the deceased
Eulogia Antazo left no forced heirs, when she left grandchildren, and two of
them, Felimon and Cristina Cenido were then minors; and sought recovery of three
parcels described in paragraph 3 of their complaint, with damages and costs;
and, in the even that the project of partition be declared valid, then
plaintiffs pray for the partition of parcel (a), and the delivery of parcel (c),
which was omitted in the project of partition. Valentin Antazo averred that
parcel (a) was bequeathed by the deceased to him and his brother Adriano Antazo,
pursuant to the order of the original owner ;and with respect to parcel (b),
that it was delivered and transferred by him to Adriano Antazo, in the
administration proceedings. As to parcel (c), the record discloses that this was
adjudicated to the plaintiffs by the trial court in its judgment on the
pleadings dated November 13, 1952. Anyway, Valentin Antazo claimed that he had
never been in possession of this parcel of land in his capacity as administrator
of the estate of Eulogia Antazo.

In Civil Case No. 1208-(CA-G. R. No. 11720-R), involving 14 parcels of land
(including the three claimed in the other case) and a religious carriage locally
know as a trescaida, allegedly belonging to the estate of the Aralar spouses,
plaintiffs prayed for the value of the products of said lands, for the return of
the trescaida and for damages. According to Valentin Antazo, parcels (e) and
(g), the last being the same as parcel (c) in Civil Case No. 1160, have never
come into his possession as administrator; that parcels (h) and (i) have been
sold by him to Mateo F. Celerian, with the approval of the court, to satisfy all
claims against the estate; and the remaining parcels of land have already been
delivered to the legatees named in the will aid project of partition.

After a joint hearing of the cases, the Court of First Instance rendered
judgment on February 26, 1953, and adjudicated parcel (c) of case No. 1160 to
the plaintiffs, by a prior judgment for the pleadings; held that plaintiffs
action accrued in 1931 and therefore barred by prescription and by the orders
issued in the probate proceedings; and dismissed the actions, sentencing
plaintiffs Barretto and Cenido to pay P2,000.00 damages to defendants.

Plaintiffs then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, after tearing, duly
rendered a decision setting aside the award of damages to the defendants Antazo,
but upholding the dismissal of the cases saying

“These three cases are essentially the offshoot of the testate proceedings.
The project of partition was prepared strictly in accordance with the
dispositions made in the will (Exhibits E and Q-1). Even the sale to Mateo
Celerian of the parcels of land described under paragraphs 2 (h) and (i) of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 1208, which are the same as parcels Nos. 9 and 10 in
the will, for the satisfaction of all claims against Idle estate, was in
conformity with the will. The termination of the proceedings by the probate
court on February 13, 1937 (Exhibit E-3) meant that a final distribution of the
estate of the testatrix was made and approved by the court. This final
distribution vested title to the lands composing the estate in the distributees
or legatees (Santos v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil. 893).
Assuming that at least Cristina Cenido and Felimon Cenido were not duly
represented in the testate proceedings, the evidence of record does not show
that they have been left out in the partition and distribution to warrant a
reopening of the probate proceedings and let another court or judge throw out a
decision or order already final and executed (Ramos v. Ortuzar, G. R. No.
L-3299, August 29, 1951). If the lands were not actually delivered to the
respective legatees after the termination of the proceedings the cause of action
accrued in February, 1947, when all the appellants have attained the age of
majority because the youngest of them, Provenir Barretto, became of age in May
1940. In Ramos v. Ramos, 45 Phil. 362, it was held that if the three-year saving
clause in favor of a minor expires before the full ten-year prescriptive period
has elapsed, prescription becomes effective at the expiration of the latter
period. The law, said the Supreme Court in that, case, does not unconditionally
give the period of three years in addition to the ten years allowed for
prescription. It is clear therefore, that the causes of action of appellants
have bees barred by prescription when the cases at bar were filed in 1950.”
(Petitioners’ Brief, pp. 36-38)

Appellants Barretto and Cenido then resorted to this Court, We granted
certiorari.

In their brief, appellants make the following assignment of
errors:

“1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT COURT CLOSED THE
ADMINISTRATION ON FEBRUARY 13, 1937′, WHEN IT ALSO SAID THAT ‘ON FEBRUARY 24,
1937, ADMINISTRATOR ANTAZO FILED A CONSTANCIA’ WHICH SHOWS THAT ON SAID DATE OF
FEB. 24, 1937, THE ADMINISTRATOR WAS JUST PRAYING THAT HE BE ORDERED TO DELIVER
THE SHARE OF ADORACION BARRETTO, AND THE REFORE THE ADMINISTRATION PROCEEDINGS
COULD NOT BE TERMINATED PRIOR TO FEBRUARY 24, 1937.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THESE CASES ARE GOVERNED
BY ACT 3110, AND THAT UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ACT 3110, SECTION 7. AN ORDER. OF
PROBATE OF A WILL AND A FINAL ORDER OF TERMINATION OF THE PROCEEDINGS CANNOT BE
PROVED EXCEPT BY AN AUTHENTIC COPY THEREOF.

3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT AWARDING THE WHOLE OF PARCEL (A) AND
PARCEL (B) TO THE PLAINTIFFS, TOGETHER WITH THE HARVESTS THEREOF AT LEAST FROM
1937 UP TO AND UNTIL THEY ARE DELIVERED TO THE PLAINTIFFS.

4. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS
FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF P10.000,00 CLAIMED BY THE PLAINTIFFS FOR BAD FAITH AND
FRAUDS COMMITTED BY DEFENDANT ADMINISTRATOR.

5. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT AWARDING DAMAGES IN PAST HARVESTS IN
FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS AFTER THE LOWER COURT HAD RENDERED JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS WHICH DECLARED THE PLAINTIFFS THE COMPLETE AND ABSOLUTE OWNERS OF
PARCEL (C), WHICH PARCEL THE DEFENDANT ADRIANO ANTAZO CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN IN
HIS POSSESSION ‘SINCE 1918’ UNTIL IT WAS DELIVERED TO THE PLAINTIFFS BY THE
SHERIFF ON EXECUTION ISSUED BY THE TRIAL COURT, ON DEC. 19,
1952.”

The first error raises a question of fact. The only reason advanced against
the holding of the Court of Appeals that the administration of the estate of
Eulogia Antazo was in fact closed by the order of February 13, 1937, is that on
the 24th of said month, said Valentin Antazo as Administrator filed a motion
(Exh, I) for the removal of Cirilo Barretto as guardian ad litem of his minor
children (petitioners and appellants Barretto) and to authorize the
Administrator to make delivery of her share to Adoracion Barretto herself, since
she had already married and was released from her father’s parental power. We do
not believe that this motion contradicts the finding of the Court of Appeals,
for obviously the motion concerned merely the execution of the project of
partition, which was unquestionably passed upon and approved by the court on
January 14, 1937 (Rec. App, pp. 25-26) and again on February 13, 1937 (Rec, App.
p. 30), thus fixing the rights of the heirs and legatees as of the later
date.

Anyway, whether the proceedings were or were not closed on February 13, 1937,
there is no question that the order of approval of the project of partition had
become final by that time, since ao appeal was interposed. Any right of the
distributees accrued as of that date in conformity with the approved partition;
and by 1950, when the present cases were instituted, it was too late to have the
partition reviewed or altered. Even in the case of the heir Cristina Cenido, who
did not become of age until July 8, 1939 (since according to Exh. M, she was
born on July 8, 1918), it was too late for her in 1950 to reinvindicate any
properties to which she might lay claim because she had allowed more than the
ten-year maximum period of limitation (1939-1949) to elapse without asserting
her rights.

The second assignment of error is untenable. Act 3110 applies to
reconstitution of records of pending cases, and did not apply to the Estate of
Eulogia Antazo, which the court had declared terminated as of 1937.

As to the third error, parcel (b) of case No. 1160 (CA-G.R. No. 11719-R) was
adjudicated in the final partition to appellee Adriano Antazo. This adjudication
was in strict conformity with paragraphs 11 and “e” of the will or the deceased
(Exh. Q-1). More than ten years having elapsed during which Adriano was in
possession of said land, appellants are barred from questioning either the
adjudication to Adriano or his ownership thereof.

But as to parcel (a) (land in Mambalon, Binangonan, Rizal, covered by Tax
Declaration No. 20867), we agree with appellants that it was error to dismiss
their claim in toto. Valentin Antazo’s averment that said parcel had been
“devuelto, transferido y entregado absolutamente y a perpetuidad a dicho
demandado y a su hermano Adriano Antazo por la finada Eulogia Antazo” (Rec. App.
p. 35) is contradicted by his own evidence. Paragraph (g) of the testament provided the following:

“g. Que devuelvo, entrego y transfiero en absoluto y a perpetuidad a primos
Adriano Antazo y Valentin Antazo la propiedad descrita en el numero 12 de este
documento, porque la citada propiedad de dos balitas y media es de la propiedado
del Santo (Tres Caidas) de acuerdo con el testamento otorgado por nuestro
abuelo, Capitan Pedro Antazo el 31 de Diciembre de 1891; y la otra mitad
restante, lego y dono en partes iguales, a mis nietas Adoracion Barretto y
Cristina Cenido.” (Rec. App. p.42)

The property described in No. 12 of the testament is precisely parcel (a) of
paragraph 3 of the complaint in case No. 1160; as can be seen, only one half was
bequeathed to the brothers Antazo, while the other half was devised to the
granddaughters of the testatrix. And this is confirmed by the prorject of
partition submitted by Valentin Antazo himself, as Judicial Administrator; for
it adjudicated to Adoracion Barretto “una cuarta (1/4) proindivisa” of said land
(See. App. p. 20); to Cristina Cenido also an undivided fourth interest (Rec.
App. p. 21); another fourth to Adriano Antazo (Rec. App. p.22); and a like
interest to Valentin (Rec. App. p.23). Valentin Antazo is estopped, therefore,
both by his own act and the court’s decree, from denying that appellants
Adoracion Barretto and Cristina Cenido have each a fourth interest in this land
in Barrio Mambalon, Binangonan, Rizal, prewar Tax Declaration No. 20867, and
that interest carries with it the right to partition and to a share in the
fruits received by Valentin Antazo.

Adverse possession does not lie between coownesrs In the absence of express
repudiation brought home to the other coovoiers (Laguna vs. Levantino, 71 Phil.
566; Mallari vs. Sunga, G. R. No. L-5043, Dec. 17, 1952). None having been
proved in this case, appellants’ action for revindication, partition, and
accounting of the fruits was erroneously dismissed.

We see no error in the refusal of the Court of Appeals to award moral damages
(fourth assignment of error) to plaintiffs, it appearing that the partition was
strictly in conformity with the testament of the deceased grandmother of the
appellants, and that most of the prejudice allegedly suffered by them is either
non-existent or attributable to their concurrent negligence to enforce their
rights. Neither is there any showing that the legitimes of the grandchildren
were impaired.

As to the fifth assignment of error, suffice it to observe that the Court of
First Instance awarded parcel (c) of the complaint in Case No. 1160, to herein
appellants by a judgment on the pleadings on November 13, 1952, but refrained
from making any pronouncement on the harvests thereof; yet the appellants
acquiesced therein, and did not protest or prosecute an appeal from that award.
The same having become final, appellants have only themselves to for the
incomplete relief granted.

In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is modified by declaring
each one of appellants, Adoracion Barretto and Cristina Cenido, the owner of an
undivided fourth of the land described paragraph 3(a) of the complaint in case
No. 1160 of the Court First Instance of Rizal, and ordering the records remanded
to said court for further proceedings regarding partition of the property and
accounting and distribution of its fruits from and after 1937, by appellee
Valentin Antazo, In all other respects, said decision is affirmed. No costs.

So Ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia,
and Felix, JJ.,
concur.