PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF, VS. RODULFO SABIO, ALIAS “PAPU”, DEFENDANT.

People versus Sabio

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Rodulfo Sabio, known in his barrio as Papu. The case began as a prosecution for robbery with homicide, arising from the killing of an eighty-year-old storekeeper in Argao, Cebu, in the early morning of October 5, 1965. It matters to a reviewee for two reasons. First, it fixes the standard for proving robbery when the killing is clear but the taking is not. Second, it is a compact lesson on the dying declaration: when it is admissible, what it may prove, and why the declarant's belief in impending death, not the speed of his death, is the test.

Procedural History

The accused was tried in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch Two, for robbery with homicide. In a decision dated April 29, 1966, the trial court convicted him of robbery with homicide, attended by the aggravating circumstances of disregard of respect due to the victim as an octogenarian and of recidivism, with no mitigating circumstance. It imposed the death penalty, ordered indemnity of 6,000 pesos to the heirs, and ordered him to pay the costs. The trial judge, however, recommended that the death penalty be commuted to life imprisonment because of the accused's youth. Because the penalty was death, the case went to the Supreme Court on automatic review. The defense assigned four errors: that only homicide, not robbery with homicide, was established; that the victim's ante-mortem statement was wrongly admitted; that the eyewitness Jesusa Birondo was wrongly believed; and that the accused was not the perpetrator.

Facts

At about five o'clock in the morning of October 5, 1965, Jesusa Birondo, a fish vendor, was preparing to go to the seashore when she heard a cry for help from the house of her neighbor Catalino Espina, an eighty-year-old storekeeper who lived across the street. She recognized his voice. Looking out of her window, she saw the accused, Rodulfo Sabio, coming out of the door of the store. She had known him since birth; his house stood about forty meters from hers, and she saw him almost every day. Frightened, she retreated and shouted for help, and shortly afterward she saw many neighbors go to the victim's house.

Earlier that same morning, Camilo Semilla, the victim's grandnephew who had lived with him since childhood, had left the house before dawn to go fishing. At the seashore he saw the accused run past him about six meters away, toward the accused's own house, wearing a black shirt and long denim pants, with both hands tucked inside his shirt in front of his stomach. Minutes later a neighbor told Camilo to go home because his granduncle had cried for help. He found the victim lying wounded upstairs, moaning, and able to speak only when his head was raised. The victim told him to fetch a policeman. The merchandise in the store was in disarray, and the tin can called the barro, which the night before had held about eight pesos in sales for Sunday and Monday, lay empty on the floor.

Patrolman Paulino Fuentes arrived with Patrolman Pedro Burgos. Asked who had hacked him, the victim answered that it was Papu Sabio, son of Menes. Asked why, he answered that Papu had demanded money from him. Asked how much money he had lost, he could not answer. Sensing the gravity of the bleeding wound, the patrolman tore a leaf from a calendar and wrote down his questions and the victim's answers, and had the victim thumbmark it with his own blood, with the two policemen signing as witnesses. The victim was taken to the hospital and died three days later from a compound fracture of the skull with laceration and cerebral contusion. The accused, eighteen years old, raised alibi, saying he was asleep at home at the time, and a neighbor corroborated that he was in the house that morning. The prosecution also showed that he had been previously convicted and had served sentence for two thefts.

Issues

• Whether or not the evidence established robbery with homicide, or only homicide.
• Whether or not the victim's ante-mortem statement was admissible as a dying declaration.
• Whether or not the testimony of Jesusa Birondo identifying the accused deserved credence.
• Whether or not the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Applicable Provisions

Section 31 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, on dying declarations, provides:

A dying declaration made under the consciousness of an impending death may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.

This is the provision the Court construes when it asks whether the victim spoke under a consciousness of impending death, and it is the provision that limits what the declaration may prove.

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, on homicide, provides:

Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.

This is the provision under which the accused was ultimately sentenced, once robbery was excluded.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that only homicide was committed. The evidence of robbery was at best circumstantial: no eyewitness saw a taking, and no part of the alleged missing money was recovered. The Court refused to infer the taking from the accused running with his hands inside his shirt, from the empty barro on the floor, or from the disorder of the merchandise. A conviction for robbery with homicide requires that the robbery itself be proven as conclusively as any other essential element of the crime. Nor could the dying declaration supply the robbery, because the Court held that:

The admission of dying declarations has always been strictly limited to criminal prosecutions for homicide or murder as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of death.

On the second issue, the Court held the ante-mortem statement admissible. The gravity of the forehead wound, which had affected the brain and was bleeding profusely; the victim's inability to speak until his head was raised; his spontaneous answer that only Papu Sabio was responsible for his death; and his death from the wound, all showed that he knew his end was inevitable. That death came three days later did not matter, for it is the belief in impending death, not the rapid succession of death, that makes the declaration admissible. The instruction to fetch the police did not negate hopelessness; it showed he knew he had little time to name his assailant.

On the third issue, the Court upheld the credibility of Jesusa Birondo. One who had known the accused since infancy and saw him almost daily could recognize him at a side view, at seventeen meters, at five in the morning, even in the rain, and her description of his clothing was corroborated by Camilo Semilla. The divergence between her affidavit and her testimony concerned minor details, for an affidavit taken ex parte is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, and no ulterior motive was shown.

On the fourth issue, the Court held the alibi could not stand against the positive identification by two witnesses and the dying declaration, especially since the accused's house was near the scene. The Court found the accused guilty only of homicide, attended by the aggravating circumstances of disregard of respect due the offended party on account of his age and of dwelling, with no mitigating circumstance. Recidivism was not considered, because the robbery had not been conclusively established.

Doctrine

First, in robbery with homicide the robbery must be proven as conclusively as any other essential element; it cannot be inferred from suspicion, from the accused's manner of running, or from the disorder of the premises, and there must be proof that personalty of the offended party was carried away. Second, a dying declaration is admissible only in prosecutions for homicide or murder, and only as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of death; it cannot be used to establish a separate crime such as robbery. Third, the test of admissibility is the declarant's consciousness of impending death, not how soon death followed. Fourth, an affidavit taken ex parte is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, so minor divergences from trial testimony do not destroy credibility.

Disposition

The Court set aside the conviction for robbery with homicide and convicted Rodulfo Sabio only of homicide, sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of twelve years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty years of reclusion temporal as maximum, ordering him to indemnify the heirs in the amount of 12,000 pesos, and to pay the costs.

Remember This

Memorize the line that robbery must be proven as conclusively as any other essential element of the crime, and that a dying declaration proves only the cause and surrounding circumstances of death. Examiners use this case to test the strict limits of dying declarations and the insufficiency of circumstantial evidence of taking in robbery with homicide.