REGINO EUSTAQUIO, PETITIONER, VS. JUAN R. LIWAG, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

REYES, J.:


This is a petition to enjoin further prosecution of a defendant in a criminal case.

It appears that on January 29, 1949, a bus driven by the petitioner
hit one Demetria Ganadin on one of the streets of the municipality of
San Juan del Monte, Rizal, causing her various physical injuries.
Charged with responsibility for the mishap, petitioner was named
defendant in a complaint for serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence filed by the chief of police in the justice of the peace
court of the municipality. Acting on the complaint, the justice of the
peace cited petitioner to appear before him at a specified date and
hour for “arraignments and trial.n We have no record of these
proceedings, but it would appear from petitioner’s own memorandum that
the private prosecutor objected to trial on the merits on the ground
that the offense charged was punishable under Section 67(d) of
the Revised Motor Vehicle Law with imprisonment for 15 days to 6 years
and was therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace
court. Obviously impressed by this objection, the justice of the peace
gave the hearing, the character of a mere preliminary investigation,
and finding the evidence insufficient to warrant elevation of the
record to the Court of First Instance, dismissed the case upon motion
of the accused. At first the provincial fiscal did not protest against
this dismissal. But he later filed in the Court of First Instance an
information, charging petitioner with the crime of serious physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence committed according to said
information as follows:

“That on or about the 29th day of January, 1949 in
the municipality of San Juan, Rizal, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
then the driver and person in charge of bus bearing Plate No.
TPU-3O36-48, without taking the necessary care and precaution to avoid
injury to person, in a reckless and imprudent manner did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloneously operate and drive his said bus
thereby Causing it to hit on Demetria Ganadin, inflicting upon her
person physical injuries which necessitates medical attention for a
period of from 6 to 8 months and incapacitate her to perform her
customary labor for the same period of time.”

“Contrary to Law.”

Acting on the above information, the respondent Judge of First
Instance issued an order in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 10# of
the Rules of Court, directing the justice of the peace court of the
capital “to conduct the preliminary investigation of this case.” The
accused claims that this new prosecution would again place him in
jeopardy for the same offense. Hence this petition to have the Judge of
First Instance, the provincial fiscal, and the justice of the peace of
Pasig, Rizal, enjoined from further proceeding with the case.

The petition must be denied. Neither the complaint presented by the
chief of police nor the information filed by the provincial fiscal
mentions the statute under which the petitioner was being prosecuted.
But.the facts alleged in both clearly constitute a violation of the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law, punishable under section 67(d)
thereof with imprisonment for 15 days to 6 years. The offense, it is
true, also comes under the.Revised Penal Code. But it is now settled
that section 67(d) of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law supersedes
the corresponding provisions of the Revised Penal Code with respect to
the penalty in cases of automobile accidents resulting in death or
serious bodily injuries to a person as a consequence of negligent or
reckless driving. (People vs. Moreno, 60 Phil, 712.)
Petitioner, however, contends that the rule in the case cited applies
only where the penalty imposable under the Revised Motor Vehicle Law
would be lighter than that under the Revised Penal Code and therefore
more favorable to the accused. To this contention we can not agree. The
decision in the case establishes no such distinction. And there is
nothing in the Revised Motor Vehicle Law to indicate an intention to
confine the application of its section 67(d) only to cases of
automobile accidents resulting in the death of a person. On the
contrary, it seems obvious from the provisions of said section that the
legislative intent is to make them apply to a wider range of cases from
mere physical injuries to death, since the range of penalty provided is
from 15 days to 6 years of imprisonment. The minimum penalty of 15 days
imprisonment is eloquent proof that the said section is also meant to
be applied to cases of mere physical injuries.

Since the offense charged in the complaint filed by the chief of
police was, because of the extent of the penalty that could be imposed,
beyond the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court, that court
could not have law-fully acquitted the accused, even had it been his
intention to do so. The fact, however, is that the justice of the peace
did not acquit the accused but merely dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the evidence adduced by the prosecution during the
preliminary investigation did not establish a prima facie ease to
warrant elevation of the record to the Court of First Instance.

The facts disclosed by the pleadings do not show that petitioner is
being placed in double jeopardy for the same offense. The petition is,
therefore, denied with costs against the petitioner.

Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, and Montemayor, JJ., concur.