PASCUALA R. VITO, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. THE HON. ARSENIO H. LACSON, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.

Petitioner
is a civil service eligible and has held various positions in the
government service such as classroom teacher in 1940 and property
custodian in the Office of the Mayor of the City of Manila effective.
July 1, 1946. When respondent assumed the Office of Mayor in the City
of Manila petitioner was transferred to the office of the city
treasurer on.September 4, 1952. On September 8, 1953, petitioner filed
certain administrative charges against respondent Mayor Lacson with
the Office of the President. On December 21, 1953, petitioner was
arrested as she was; criminally charged with breach of the peace
together with one Lourdes Caruncho which was later dismissed for lack
of sufficient evidence. Related to the same incident, an administrative
charge for misconduct involving preach of the peace with malicious
damage to government property was filed by Mayor Lacson against
petitioner as a result of which Mayor Lacson dismissed her from the
service on June 11, 1954, In due time, petitioner appealed to the then
Executive Secretary Mariano Yengco, Jr. who, acting under the authority
of the President, rendered decision modifying that of Mayor Lacson is
by imposing upon petitioner only two months suspension without pay and
adding, “As she is at present under suspension, her immediate
reinstatement into the service is also hereby ordered.”

On
May 23, 1955, Mayor Lacson received copy of this decision and on June
29, 1955, or 37 days thereafter, he filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied. On January 11, 1956, he filed a second motion for
reconsideration, and this time Executive Secretary Fortunato de Leon
issued a resolution dated February 8, 1956 reversing the former
decision of Secretary Yengco, Jr. and in lieu thereof ordered the
dismissal of petitioner from the service. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied on March 26, 1957.

Subsequently,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus against Mayor
Arsenio H. Lacson and Secretary Fortunate de Leon before the Supreme
Court seeking the setting aside of the latter1s resolution dismissing
her from the service alleging lack of authority to act thereon on the
part of said official, which petition was dismissed without prejudice
of reiterating it in the court of first instance. Thereupon, petitioner
instituted the present action seeking, the same relief before the Court
of First Instance of Manila on March 25, 1958. And acting on a motion
to dismiss set up by respondents, the court a quo dismissed the
petition holding that respondent mayor is not bound by the rules and
regulations governing appeals to the Executive Secretary from decisions
or orders of the Mayor of Manila In administrative cases and,
therefore, his co-respondent acted within his authority in issuing the
resolution disputed in the petition. The case is now before us on a
direct appeal taken by petitioner.

The pertinent provisions
of the rules and regulations relative to appeals in administrative
cases from decisions of the Mayor of Manila are quoted hereunder for
ready reference:

“

12.00

RULES
AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING APPEALS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR FROM THE
DECISION OF THE MAYOR OF MANILA IN ADMINISTRATIVE GASES, PURSUANT TO THE
PROVISIONS OF SECTION 22 OF REPUBLIC ACT 409, KNOWN AS THE REVISED CHARTER OF
THE CITY OF MANILA.

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 22 of
Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as the Revised Charter; of the
City of Manila, the following rules and Regulations governing
administrative cases on appeal to this Department are hereby prescribed.

1. Period within which to perfect an appeal.—
   The respondent-appellant shall, within ten (10) days from and after
   receipt by him of the decision of the Mayor of Manila, file with the
   latter his appeal, stating distinctly the date he received the decision
   and the grounds of the appeal, together with the supporting arguments.
   * * *

*            *            *            *            *            *            *

3. Extension of time.—In
   case the respondent-appellant should find the period of filing his
   appeal, as prescribed in the preceding rule, insufficient for the
   purpose, he may request an extension thereof before the expiration of
   said period by filing a petition thereof with the Mayor of Manila,
   stating the reason or reasons for such extension. * * *

*            *            *            *            *            *            *

5. Appearance of respondent-appellant or his counsel before the Secretary of Interior.—With the permission of the Secretary of the Interior first obtained or upon requirement by him motu proprio,
   the respondent-appellant may, in the interest of justice,”appear
   personally before said Secretary, with or without counsel, to give oral
   explanation on certain facts or points pertinent to the appeal which
   require further elucidation.

*            *            *            *            *            *            *

7. Petition for reconsideration of decision rendered by the Secretary of the Interior.—(now Executive Secretary)—

(a)
A petition for reconsideration may be filed by the appellant with the
Secretary of the Interiors thru the Mayor of Manila, within five (5)
days from and after receipt by him of a copy of the decision or notice
thereof.

*            *            *            *            *            *            *

(c) Upon
the expiration of this period (5) days without appellant having filed
such petition the decision of the Secretary of the Interior shall
become final unless within the said period appellant shall have secured
or was granted an extension of time by the Secretary of the Interior
within which to file such petition.

*            *            *            *            *            *            *

(d) No second motion for reconsideration shall be entertained

(e)
Within three (3) days from and after receipt of the petition, the Mayor
of Manila shall transmit the same together with all the records of the
cases with statements as to whether or not said petition was filed
within the time prescribed above.”

The
question to be determined is whether the above-quoted rules apply to
respondent mayor particularly the 5-day period within which to file a
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Secretary of Interior
or the Executive Secretary in cases taken to him for review of
decisions of said respondent.

It should be noted that when a
case is decided adversely against an employee who is a respondent in an
administrative case, he may appeal within 10 days from receipt by him
of the decision of the mayor stating therein the grounds for his appeal
and the arguments he may have in support thereof. He is referred to
therein as respondent appellant. This is an indication that
this rule applies exclusively to him for certainly the mayor cannot
appeal from his own decision. The rule, however, differs when the case
has already been acted upon by the Executive Secretary or the Secretary
of Interior. Note that when the rule speaks of the filing of a petition
for reconsideration of the decision that may be rendered by the
Secretary of Interior it makes mention of appellant without adding the
word respondent. The reason is obvious. A decision of the
Executive Secretary or the Secretary of Interior on appeal from that of
the mayor may either be favorable or adverse to the latter, and if
adverse, then the mayor is the one prejudiced,, and he may desire to
have the decision reconsidered. The one to file the petition does not,
therefore, necessarily have to be the respondent. It is, therefore,
logical to conclude that while with regard to appeals from a decision
of the mayor the rule only refers to respondent, because he alone could
be interested in appealing from the adverse decisions of the mayor, the
rule relative to petitions for reconsideration of decisions of the
Executive Secretary refers to both respondent and the mayor, or whoever
may be adversely affected by the decision. No other interpretation can
be adopted if we want to have a rational and impartial application of
the rule for, to hold otherwise, would be discriminatory or derogatory
to the principle that no one should be denied the equal protection of
the laws.

It appearing from the facts extant in the record
that the decision of Executive Secretary Yengco, Jr. dated May 16, 1955
was received by Mayor Lacson on May 23, 1955 and he filed his petition
for reconsideration only on June 29, 1955, or 37 days thereafter it is
clear that in the light of the rules and regulations adopted by the
Department of Interior governing appeals in administrative cases, such
petition came late and cannot serve as basis for a valid resolution on
the part of Executive Secretary Fortunato de Leon. As a consequence,
the decision of Secretary Yengco, Jr. had already become final and
executory at the time Mayor Lacson filed his petition for
reconsideration. Such petition cannot, therefore, have any valid
effect.

The case of Negado vs. Ruiz Castro, 104
Phil., 103; 55 Off. Gaz., (51) 10534 invoked by respondents, is not in
point. An analysis of our decision in that case will reveal that the
30-day period mentioned therein refers to the period within which an
appeal may be made to the Civil Service Board of Appeals from a
decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and as there is nothing
said as to when and who can appeal from the decision of the Civil
Service Board of Appeals to the President, we stated that that period
could not apply to the latter for as to it there is no limitation as to
time or persons. We even added that, even if there is no appeal, the
President could motu proprio review the decision of the Appeals Board
by virtue of his constitutional control of the executive departments of
our government. Such is not the instant case. While it may admitted
that the Executive Secretary may alter, modify or reverse the previous
actuation of his office even without any petition for reconsideration,
or can motu proprio alter, modify or reverse his own
decision, the same can only be done before it becomes final and
executory. Otherwise, such action can no longer be taken, for it would
be contrary to the very rule adopted by the Department of Interior.
Thus, Rule 7(c) provides that upon the expiration of the 5-day
period within which a petition for reconsideration may be filed,
without the same having been filed, the decision shall become final
unless that period is extended. And this period has long expired.

Wherefore,
the decision appealed from is reversed. As a consequence, decision is
hereby rendered setting aside the resolution issued by Executive
Secretary Fortunato de Leon on February 8, 1956 reversing the decision
of former Secretary Yengco, Jr., as well as his confirmatory resolution
dated March 26, 1957. No pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.