EUFRONIO J. LLANTO, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. MOHAMAD ALI DIMAPORO, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF LANAO DEL NORTE; PROVINCIAL BOARD OF LANAO DEL NORTE; VALERIO V. ROVIRA, VICE-GOVE…

Llanto versus Dimaporo

The Case

This is the case of Llanto versus Dimaporo, decided in March 1966. Eufronio Llanto, the Assistant Provincial Assessor of Lanao del Norte, brought an action for mandamus against Governor Mohamad Ali Dimaporo, the Provincial Board of Lanao del Norte, the Vice-Governor, and the Provincial Treasurer. He asked the court to annul a provincial board resolution that abolished his position, to restore the salary appropriation for that position, to reinstate him, and to order the payment of back salaries and damages. The case matters because it gathers in one decision several rules a reviewee must know: the effect of a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of cause of action, the limits of the provincial board's power to abolish offices, the presumption of good faith and regularity in official action, the Local Autonomy Act, and the proper office of the writ of mandamus.

Procedural History

Llanto first sought relief outside the courts. He appealed to the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Justice, the Auditor General, and the President of the Philippines, but these appeals were of no avail. He then filed a petition for mandamus in the Court of First Instance. The respondents moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the petition. Llanto's motion for reconsideration was denied. He then appealed to the Supreme Court, which resolved the appeal in the decision now before us.

Facts

On January 6, 1960, the Provincial Board of Lanao del Norte adopted Resolution Number 7, Series of 1960. That resolution reverted the salary appropriation for the years 1960 to 1961 for the position of Assistant Provincial Assessor to the general fund. The effect was to abolish the position, which Llanto then held.

Llanto exhausted his administrative remedies without success and came to court on mandamus. The respondents moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action. The motion was filed on February 1, 1961 and set for hearing on February 10. On February 8, Llanto's counsel sent a telegram requesting postponement of the motion until a written opposition could be filed, and he did not appear at the scheduled hearing. On March 4, he filed his written opposition. The trial court, in an eight-page order dated May 15, 1961, recited the arguments at length and concluded that Llanto made no case. Llanto moved for reconsideration, squarely raising the claim that no hearing had been conducted on the motion to dismiss, but the same judge denied the motion as not meritorious.

The respondents maintained that the motion to dismiss had in fact been reset for hearing on March 23, 1961, that their attorneys appeared, and that Llanto did not. Llanto disputed this, but the record contained nothing to support his position. The resolution itself recited a huge deficit of 60,330 pesos and 60 centavos, and noted that the position of Assistant Provincial Assessor was not one required to be created by the Administrative Code and could be dispensed with and performed by others.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court's order dismissing the petition, allegedly issued without any hearing on the motion to dismiss, is void.
• Whether or not the petition for mandamus was correctly dismissed on the ground of lack of cause of action.
• Whether or not the provincial board's resolution abolishing the position was ineffective for lack of the approval of the Secretary of Finance.
• Whether or not mandamus will lie to compel the provincial board to restore the petitioner's item in the budget.

Applicable Provisions

Section 12 of the Local Autonomy Act lays down the rule for interpreting powers allocated to local governments:

Sec. 12. Rules for the interpretation of the Local Autonomy Act. — 1. Implied power of a province, a city or municipality shall be liberally construed in its favor. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of the local government and it shall be presumed to exist.

This provision bears on the case because it stops the Court from writing into the statute the approval of the Secretary of Finance as a condition for the effectivity of the resolution.

Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court states when the writ of mandamus will issue:

which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station

This provision bears on the case because the duty that mandamus compels must be clear and specific, and the writ cannot be used to control the normal exercise of judgment or discretion.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the dismissal order was not void. The motion to dismiss was grounded on lack of cause of action, and the existence or lack of a cause of action is determined by a reference to the facts averred in the challenged pleading. The question was purely one of law, and it was fully discussed in the motion and in the opposition. In this posture, oral arguments on the motion were reduced to an unnecessary ceremony. The Court also relied on the presumption that the proceeding was regular and that all the steps required by law had been taken, and Llanto offered no clear showing of irregularity. Even conceding that there was no previous notice of hearing, the Court held that the alleged defect was fully cured by the motion for reconsideration, which was overruled. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard.

On the second issue, the Court held that the petition was correctly dismissed. The job of Assistant Provincial Assessor is a creation of the provincial board, and the power to create normally implies the power to abolish. The power is subject to the limitations that it be exercised in good faith, not for personal or political reasons, and not in violation of the Civil Service Law. The Briones case, which Llanto invoked, was not controlling because it involved the wholesale creation and abolition of offices in almost the same breath, and because the case had not gone beyond the pleadings stage. The petition's averment that the respondents maliciously and illegally reverted the fund for the purpose of political persecution and political vengeance was a mere conclusion of law unsupported by factual premise, and submitted no justiciable controversy. Against the allegation of malicious and illegal abolition, the Court set the presumption of good faith and the presumption that official duty had been regularly performed, which the facts in the resolution supported.

On the third issue, the Court held that the approval of the Secretary of Finance was not required. The necessity for such approval under Republic Act Number 1062 was done away with by the Local Autonomy Act. Section 3 of that Act gives the provincial board the power to appropriate money having in view the general welfare of the province and its inhabitants, and concomitant to this express power is the implied power to withdraw unexpended money already appropriated. The sole authority given to the Secretary of Finance is to review provincial and city budgets and city and municipal tax ordinances, and nothing in the law requires his approval for the abolition of positions.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that mandamus will not lie. Mandamus compels the performance of a ministerial duty, and that duty must be clear and specific. But mandamus is not meant to control or review the normal exercise of judgment or discretion, which is the case here. The respondent board therefore cannot be compelled to restore the petitioner's item in the budget.

Doctrine

A motion to dismiss grounded on lack of cause of action raises a purely question of law, determined by the facts averred in the challenged pleading, and the absence of oral argument on it does not render the dismissal void where the parties were given the opportunity to be heard and the defect, if any, was cured by a motion for reconsideration. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard.

The power to create an office normally implies the power to abolish it. The power to abolish is not absolute; it must be exercised in good faith, not for personal or political reasons, and not in violation of the Civil Service Law. An allegation of malicious and illegal abolition that is a mere conclusion of law unsupported by factual premise submits no justiciable controversy, and it is met by the presumption of good faith and the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

Under the Local Autonomy Act, the approval of the Secretary of Finance is not required for the abolition of positions in provincial, city, or municipal governments. Implied powers of local governments are liberally construed in their favor, and any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power is interpreted in favor of the local government and presumed to exist.

Mandamus compels the performance of a ministerial duty that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. That duty must be clear and specific, and mandamus is not meant to control or review the normal exercise of judgment or discretion.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal, with costs against the appellant, Llanto.

Remember This

Memorize the line that the power to create normally implies the power to abolish, subject only to good faith, no personal or political reasons, and no violation of the Civil Service Law. Examiners use this case for the requisites of a valid abolition of office, the treatment of conclusions of law in a motion to dismiss, and the rule that mandamus will not control discretion.