IGMIDIO HIDALGO AND MARTINA ROSALES, PETITIONERS, VS. POLICARPIO HIDALGO, SERGLO DIMAANO, MARIA ARDE, SATURNINO HIDALGO, BERNARDINA MARQUEZ, VICENTE DIMAANO, ARCADIA DIMAANO, TE…

Two petitions for review of decisions of the
Court of Agrarian Relations dismissing petitioners’ actions as share tenants
for the enforcement of the right to redeem agricultu­ral lands, under the
provisions of section 12 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code.  As the same issue of law is involved and the
original landowner and vendees in both cases are the same, the two cases are
herein jointly decided.

Respondent-vendor Policarpio Hidalgo
was until the time of the execution of the deeds of sale on September 27, 1963
and March 2, 1964 in favor of his seven above-named private co-respondents, the
owner of the 22,876-square meter and 7,638-square meter agricultural parcels of
land situated in Lumil, San Jose, Batangas,
described in the decisions under review.

In Case L-25326, respondent-vendor sold the 22,876-square meter
parcel of land, together with two other parcels of land for P4,000.00. 
Petitioners-spouses Igmidio Hidalgo and
Martina Rosales, as tenants thereof, alleging that the parcel worked by them as
tenants is fairly worth P1,500.00, “taking into
account the respective areas, productivities, accessibilities, and assessed
values of the three lots, seek by way of redemp­tion the execution of a deed of
sale for the same amount of P1,500.00 by respondents-vendees^[1]
in their favor.

In Case L-25327, respondent-vendor sold the 7,638-square meter
parcel of land for P750.00, and petitioners-spouses Hilario
Aguila and Adela Hidalgo as
tenants thereof, seek by way of redemption the execution of a deed of sale for
the same price of P750.00 by respondents-vendees in their favor.

As stated in the decisions under review, since the parties
stipulated on the facts in both cases, petitioners-tenants have for several years been working on the lands as share tenants. 
No 90-day notice of intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the right of pre-emption prescribed by
section 11 of the Agricultural Land
Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844, enact­ed on August 8, 1963) was given by
respondent-vendor to peti­tioners-tenants. 
Subsequently, the deeds of sale executed by respondent-vendor were
registered by respondents register of deeds and
provincial assessor of Batangas in the records of
their respective offices notwithstanding the non-execution by respondent-vendor
of the affidavit required by section 13 of the Land Reform Code.^[2] The actions for
redemption were timely filed on March 26, 1965 by
petitioners-tenants within the two-year prescriptive period from registration
of the sale, prescribed by section 12 of the said Code.

The agrarian court rendered on July 19, 1965 two iden­tical decisions dismissing the
petitions for redemption.

It correctly focused on the sole issue of law as follows:  “(T)he only issue in this case is
whether or not plaintiffs, as share tenants, are entitled to redeem the parcel
of land they are working from the purchasers thereof, where no notice was
previously given to them by the vendor, who was their landholder, of the
latter’s intention to sell the property
and where the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec. 13
of Republic Act No. 3844 before the registration of the deed of sale.  In other words, is the right of redemption
granted by Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 3844 applicable to share
tenants?”

But proceeding from
several erroneous assumptions and premises, it arrived at its erroneous conclusion
that the right of redemption granted by section 12 of the Land Reform Code is
available to leasehold tenants only but not to share tenants, and
thus dismissed the petitions:  “(S)ec. 12
of Rep­ublic Act No. 3844, which comes under Chapter I of said Act under the
heading ‘Agricultural Leasehold System’, reads as follows:

“‘Sec. 12.  Lessee’s Right of
Redemption.  — In case the
landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural
lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable
price and consideration:  Provided:
further, That where there
are two or more agri­cultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of
redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him.  The right of redemp­tion under this Section
may be exercised within two years from the registration of the sale, and shall
have priority over any other right of legal redemp­tion.’

“The systems of agricultural tenancy recognized in this
jurisdiction are share tenancy and leasehold tenancy.  (Sec. 4, Republic Act No.
1199; Sec. 4, Republic Act No. 3844). 
A share tenant is altogether different from a leasehold tenant and their
respective rights and obligations are not co-extensive or co-­equal.  (See Secs. 22 to
41, inclusive, and Secs. 42 to 48, inclusive, of
Republic Act No. 1199; see also Secs. 4 to 38,
inclusive; of Republic Act. No. 3844).

“It is our considered view that the right of redemption granted
by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 3844 is applicable to leasehold tenants
only, but not to share tenants, because said provision of law clearly, definitely, and
unequivocally grants said right to the ‘agricultural lessee’, and to nobody
else.  In enacting the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, Congress was fully aware of the existence of share tenancy
and in fact provided for the abolition of the agricultural share tenancy system.  (Sec. 4, Republic Act No. 3844).  If it were the intention of Congress to grant
the right of redemption to share tenants, it would have unmistakably and
unequivocally done so.  We cannot extend
said right to share tenants through judicial legislation, wherever our
sympathies may lie.”

The
agrarian court fell into several erroneous assump­tions and premises in holding
that agricultural share tenancy remains recognized in this jurisdiction; that
“a share tenant is altogether different from a leasehold
tenant and their respective rights and obligations are not co-extensive or
co-equal”; and that the right of redemption granted by sec­tion 12 of the Land
Reform Code “is applicable to leasehold tenants only, but not to share
tenants, because said provision of law clearly, definitely, and unequivocally
grants said right to the ‘agricultural lessee’ and to nobody else.”

1.     
The very essence
of the Agricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural
share tenancy as proclaimed in its title. 
Section 4 of the Code expressly outlaws agricultural share tenancy as
“contrary to public policy” and decrees its abolition.^[3] Section 2 of the
Code expressly declares it to be the policy of the State, inter alia “to establish owner cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as
the basis of Philippine agriculture and, as a consequence, divert landlord
capital in agriculture to industrial development; to achieve a dignified
existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional
restraints and practices; x x x
and to make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and
responsible citizens, and a source of strength in our democratic society.”^[4]  It was error, therefore, for the agrarian
court to state the premise after the Land Reform Code had already been enacted,
that “the systems of agricultural tenancy recognized in this jurisdiction
are share tenancy and leasehold tenancy.”  A more accurate statement of the premise is
that based on the transitory provision in the first proviso of section 4
of the Code, i. e. that existing share tenancy
contracts are allowed to continue temporarily in force and effect, not with­standing
their express abolition, until whichever of the following events occurs
earlier: (a) the end of the agricultural year when the National Land Reform
Council makes the proclama­tion declaring the region or locality a land reform
area; or
(b)
the shorter period provided in the share tenancy contracts expires; or (c) the
share tenant sooner exercises his option to elect the leasehold system.

In anticipation of the expiration of share tenancy con­tracts —
whether by contractual stipulation or the tenant’s exercise of his option to elect
the leasehold system instead or by virtue of their nullity — occuring before the proclama­tion of the locality as a land
reform area, the same section 4 has
further declared in the third proviso thereof that in such event, the tenant
shall continue in possession of the land for cultivation and “there shall
be presumed to exist a leasehold relationship under the provisions of this
Code.”

2.  The foregoing exposes the
error of the agrarian court’s corollary
premise that “a share tenant is altogether different from a leasehold
tenant.” The agrarian court’s dictum that ‘their respective rights and
obligations are not co-extensive or co-equal” refer to their contractual
relations with the landowner, with respect to the contributions given,
management, division or payment of the produce.^[5]

 But the Land Reform Code
forges by operation of law, between the landowner and the farmer — be he a
leasehold tenant or temporarily a share tenant — a vinculum juris with
certain vital juridical consequences, such as security of tenure of the tenant
and the tenant’s right to continue in posses­sion of the land he works despite
the expiration of the contract or the sale or transfer of the land to third
persons, and now, more basically, the farmer’s pre-emptive right to buy
the land he cultivates under section 11 of the Code^[6] as well as the right to redeem the
land, if sold to a third person with­out his knowledge, under section 12 of the
Code.

This is an essential and indispensable mandate of the Code to
implement the State’s policy of establishing owner-cultivatorship
and to achieve a dignified and self-reliant exist­ence for the small farmers
that would make them a pillar of strength of our Republic.  Aside from expropriation by the Land
Authority of private agricultural land for resale in economic family-size farm
units “to bona fide tenants, occupants and qualified
farmers,”^[7]
the purchase by farmers of the lands cultivated by them, when the owner decides
to sell the same — throught the rights of
pre-emption and redemption — are the only means prescribed by the Code to
achieve the declared policy of the State.

3.  The agrarian court
therefore facilely let itself fall into the error of concluding that the right
of redemption (as well as necessarily the right of preemption) imposed by the
Code is available to leasehold tenants only and excludes share
tenants for the literal reason that the Code grants said rights only to the “agricultural lessee and to
nobody else.”  For one, it immediately
comes to mind that the Code did not mention tenants, whether leasehold or share
tenants, because it outlaws share tenancy and envisions the agricultural
leasehold system as its replacement. 
Thus, Chapter I of the
Code, comprising sec­tions 4 to 38, extensively deals with the establishment of
‘agri­cultural leasehold relations,” defines the parties thereto
and the rights and obligations of the “agricultural lessor”
and of the “agricultural lessee” (without the slightest
mention of leasehold tenants) and the statutory consideration or rental
for the lease­hold to be paid by the lessee. 
There is a studied omission in the Code of the use of the term tenant in
deference to the “aboli­tion of tenancy” as proclaimed in the very
title of the Code, and the elevation of the tenant’s status to that of lessee.

Then, the terms “agricultural lessor”
and “agricultural lessee” are consistently used throughout the
Chapter and carried over to the particular sections (11 and 22) on pre-emption
and redemption.  The agrarian court’s
literal construction would wreak havoc on and defeat the proclaimed and
announced legis­lative intent and policy of the State of establishing owner-cul­tivatorship for the farmers, who invariably were all share tenants; before the enactment of
the Code and whom the Code would now uplift to the status, of lessees.

A graphic instance of this fallacy would be found in sec­tion 11
providing that “In case the agricultural lessor
decides to sell the landholding the agricultural lessee shall
have the pre­ferential right to buy the same under reasonable terms and
conditions.”  It will be seen that
the term “agricultural lessor” is
here used interchangeably with the term “landowner“; which conflicts with the Code’s definition of “agricultural
lessor” to mean “a person, natural or
juridical, who, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary,
or legal possessor, lets or grants to another the cultivation and use of his
land for a price certain.”^[8]
Obviously, the Code imprecisely referred to the “agricultural lessor (who) decides
to sell the landholding,” when it could have more precisely referred to
the “landowner“, who alone as such, rather than a civil law
lessee, usufruct­uary or legal possessor, could sell
the landholding, but it certainly cannot be logically contended that the
imprecision should defeat the clear spirit and intent of the provision.

4.  We have, here, then a
case of where the true intent of the law is clear that calls for the
application of the cardinal rule of statutory construction that such intent or
spirit must prevail over the letter thereof, for whatever is within the spirit
of a statute is within the statute, since adherence to the letter would result
in absurdity, injustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital
purpose of the statute.

Section 11 of the Code providing for the “agricultural lessee’s” preferential right to buy
the land he cultivates provides expressly that “the entire landholding
offered for sale must be pre-empted by the Land Authority if the landowner so
desires, unless the majority of the lessees object to such acquisition”,
presumably for being beyond their capabilities. 
Taken together with the provisions of Chapter III of the Code on the organiza­tion and functions of the
Land Authority and Chapter VII on the Land Project Administration and the
creation and functions of the National Land Reform Council, (in which chapters
the legis­lature obviously was not laboring under the inhibition of refering to the
term tenants as it was in Chapter
I establishing the agricultural leasehold system and decreeing the abolition of
share tenancy),^[9]
the Code’s intent, policy and objective to give both agricultural lessees and
farmers who transitionally continue to be share tenants notwithstanding the
Code’s enactment,
the same priority and preferential rights over the lands under their
cultivation, in the event of acquisition of the lands, by expropriation or
voluntary sale, for distribution or resale that may be initiated by the Land
Authority or the National Land Reform Council, are clearly and expressly
stated.

Thus Chapter III, section 51 of the Code decrees it the responsibility of the Land Authority “(1) To
initiate and prose­cute expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of private
agricultural lands as defined in Section one hundred sixty-six of Chapter XI of
this Code for the purpose of subdivision into economic family-size farm units
and resale of said farm units to bona fide tenants, occupants
and qualified farmers x x x”
and “(2) To help bona fide farmers without lands or
agricultural owner-cultivators of uneconomic-size farms to acquire and own
economic family size farm units x x .”

Similarly, Chapter VII, section 128 of the Code, in en­joining
the National Land Reform Council to formulate the necessary rules and
regulations to implement the Code’s pro­visions for selection of agricultural
land to be acquired and distributed and of the beneficiaries of the family farms, ordains the
giving of the same priority “to the actual occupants
personal­ly cultivating the land either as agricultural lessees or other­wise with respect to
the area under their cultivation.”

5.  It would certainly result
in absurdity, contradictions and injustice if a share tenant would be denied
the rights of pre-emption and redemption which he seeks to exercise on his
own resources, notwithstanding that the National Land Reform Council has
not yet proclaimed that all the government machineries and agencies in the
region or locality envisioned in the Code are oper­ating — which machineries
and agencies, particularly, the Land Bank were precisely created “to
finance the acquisition by the Government of landed estates for division and
resale to small landholders, as well as the purchase of the landholding by the
agricultural lessee from the landowner.”^[10]
The non-operation in the interval of the Land Bank and the government
machineries and agencies in the region which are envisioned in the Code to
assist the share tenant in shedding off the yoke of tenancy and afford him the
financial assistance to exercise his option of electing the leasehold system
and his preferential right of purchasing the land cultivated by him could not
possibly have been intended by Congress to prevent the exercise of any of these vital
rights by a share tenant who is able to do so, e. g. to purchase the land, oh
his own and without government assistance. 
It would be absurd and unjust that while the government is unable to
render such assistance, the share tenant would be deemed deprived of the very
rights granted him by the Code which he is in a position to exercise even
without government assistance.

6.  Herein lies the
distinction between the present case and Basbas
vs. Entena^[11]
where the Court upheld the agra­rian court’s dismissal of the therein tenant’s
action to redeem the landholding sold to a third party by virtue of the
tenant’s failure to tender payment or consign the purchase price of the
property.  There, the tenant-redemptioner was shown by the evidence have no funds and
had merely applied for them to the Land Authority which was not yet operating
in the locality and hence, the Court held that no part of the Code
“indicates or even hints that the 2-year redemption period will not commence to run
(indefinitely) until the tenant obtains financing from the Land Bank, or stops the tenant from securing redemption funds from some other
source.“^[12] In the present case, the petitioners-tenants’
possession of funds and compliance with the requirements of redemption are not questioned, the case having
been submitted and decided on the sole legal issue of the right of redemption
being available to them as share tenants. 
The clear and logical implication of Basbas
is where the tenant has his own resources or secures redemption funds from sources other than the Land
Bank or government agencies under the
Code, the fact that the locality has not been proclaimed a land reform area and
that such government machineries and agencies are not operating therein is of
no relevance and cannot prejudice the tenant’s rights under the Code to redeem the land­holding.

7.  Even from the landowner’s
practical and equitable viewpoint, the landowner is not prejudiced in the least
by recog­nizing the share tenant’s right of redemption.  The landowner, having decided to sell his
land, has gotten his price therefor from his vendees.  (The same holds true in case of the
tenant’s exercise of the pre-emptive right by the tenant who is called upon to
pay the landowner the price, if reasonable, within ninety days from the
landowner’s written notice.) As for the vendees, neither are they prejudiced
for they will get back from the tenant-redemptioner
the price that they paid the vendor, if reasonable, since the Code grants the
agricultural lessee or tenant the top priority of redemption of the landholding
cultivated by him and expressly decrees that the same “shall have priority
over any other right of legal redemption.” 
In the absence of any provision in the Code as to manner of and amounts
payable on redemption, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code apply in a suppletory character.^[13]
Hence, the vendees would be entitled to receive from the redemptioners
the amount of their purchase besides “(1) the expenses of the contract,
and any other legitimate payments made by reason of the sale; (and) (2) the
necessary and useful expenses made on the thing sold.”^[14]

8.  The historical background
for the enactment of the Code’s
provisions on pre-emption and redemption further streng­thens the Court’s
opinion.  It is noted by Dean Montemayor^[15]
that “(T)his is a new right which has not been
granted to tenants under the Agricultural Tenancy Act.  It further bolsters the security of tenure of
the agricultural lessee and further encour­ages agricultural lessees to become
owner-cultivators.

“In the past, a landlord often ostensibly sold his land being
cultivated by his tenant to another tenant, who in turn filed a petition for ejectment
against the first tenant on the ground
of personal cultivation.  While many of
such sales were simulated, there was a formal transfer of title in every case, and the
first tenant was invariably ordered ejected.”

There is indication in this case of the same pattern of sale by
the landowner to another tenant,^[16]
in order to effect the ejectment of
petitioners-tenants.  This is further
bolstered by the fact that the sales were executed by respondent-vendor on
September 27, 1963 and March 2, 1964 shortly after the enactment on August 8,
1963 of the Land Reform Code — which furnishes still another reason for
upholding petitioners-tenants’ right of redemption, for certainly a landowner
cannot be permitted to defeat the Code’s clear intent by precipitately
disposing of his lands, even before the tenant has been given the time to exer­cise
his newly granted option to elect the new agricultural lease­hold system
established by the Code as a replacement for the share tenancy outlawed by it.

9.  Clearly then, the Code
intended, as above discussed, to afford the farmers, who transitionally
continued to be share tenants after its enactment but who inexorably would be
agricultural lessees by virtue of the Code’s proclaimed abolition of tenancy,
the same priority and preferential right as those other share tenants,
who upon the enactment of the Code or soon thereafter were earlier converted
by fortuitous circumstance into agricultural lessees, to acquire the lands
under their culti­vation in the event of their voluntary sale by the owner or
of their acquisition, by expropriation or
otherwise, by the Land Authority. 
It then becomes the court’s duty to enforce the intent and will of the
Code, for “x x (I)n fact, ‘the spirit or
intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof.’ (Tañada vs. Cuenco, G.R. No.
L-10520, Feb, 23, 1957, citing 82
C.J.S., p. 526).  A statute ‘should be construed according to
its spirit or inten­tion, disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the
law.’  (Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax
Appeals, 100 Phil. 855).  By this, we do
not correct the act of the Legislature, but rather x x
x carry out and give due course to ‘its intent.’  (Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals,
100 Phil. 850).”^[17] The Court has
consistently held in line with authoritative princi­ples of statutory
construction that it will reject a narrow and literal interpretation, such as
that given by the agrarian court, that would defeat
and frustrate rather than foster and give life to the law’s declared policy and
intent.^[18] Finally, under
the established jurisprudence of the Court, in the interpretation of tenancy
and labor legislation, it will be guided by more than just an inquiry into the
letter of the law as against its spirit and will ultimately resolve grave
doubts in favor of the tenant and worker.^[19]

The agrarian court’s dismissal of the cases at bar should
therefore be reversed and petitioners-tenants’ right to redeem the landholdings
recognized under section 12 of the Code.

In Case L-25326, however, the deed of sale executed by
respondent-vendor in favor of respondents-vendees for the price of P4,000.00
covers three parcels of land, while what is sought to be redeemed is only the
first parcel of land, of 22,876 square meters, described in the deed.  Petitioners-tenants’ allegation that the proportionate
worth of said parcel, “taking into account the respective areas,
productivities, accessibilities and assessed values of the three lots “is P1,500.00, was traversed by res­pondents in
their answer, with the claim that “the said land is fairly worth
P20,000.00.^[20]
While the vendor would be bound by, and cannot claim more than, the price
stated in the deed, and the Code precisely provides that the farmer shall have
“the pre­ferential right to buy the (landholding) under reasonable
terms and conditions” or “redeem the same at a reasonable rice
and consideration“^[21] with a view to
affording the farmer the right to seek judicial assistance and relief to fix
such reason­able price and terms when the landowner places in the notice to
sell or deed an excessive or exorbitant amount in collusion with the vendee, we
note that in this case the deed of sale itself acknowledged that the selling
price of P4,000.00 therein
stated was not the fair price since an additional consideration therein stated
was that the vendees would support the vendor during his lifetime and take care
of him, should he fall ill, and even assumed the expenses of his burial upon
his death:

“Ang halagang
P4,000.00 ay hindi kaulat sa
tunay ha halagan ng mga lupa
subali’t ang mga bumili ay may katungkulan na sostentohin ako habang ako’y nabubuhay,
ipaanyo at ipagamot ako kung ako ay may sakit saka ipalibing
ako kung ako ay mamatay sa kanilang
gastos at ito ay isa sa alang
alang o consideracion bilihang ito.”

Under these circumstances, since the agrarian court did not rule
upon the conflicting claims of the parties as to what was the proportionate
worth of the parcel of land in the stated price of P4,0 000.00 — whether
P1,500.00 as claimed by petitioners or a little bit more, considering the
proportionate values of the two
other parcels, but the whole total is not to exceed the stated price of
P4,000.00, since the vendor is bound thereby — and likewise, what was the
additional propor­tionate worth of the expenses assumed by the vendees, assum­ing
that petitioners are not willing to assume the same obligation, the case should
be remanded to the agrarian court solely for the purpose of determining the
reasonable price and consideration to be paid by petitioners for redeeming the
landhold­ing, in accordance with these observations.

In Case L-25327, there is no question as to the price of P750.00
paid by the vendees and no additional consideration or expenses, unlike in Case
L-25326, supra, assumed by the vendees. 
Hence, petitioners therein are entitled to redeem the landholding for
the same stated price.

ACCORDINGLY, the decisions appealed from are hereby
reversed, and the petitions to redeem the subject landholdings are granted.

In Case L-25326, however, the case is remanded to the agrarian court solely for determining the reasonable price to be paid by
petitioners therein to respondents-vendees for redemption of the landholding in
accordance with the observations hereinabove made.

No pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Barredo, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Castro, J., on leave.

^[1]
Per answer of respondents and the parties’ stipula­tion of facts;
respondents-vendees Saturnino Hidalgo and Bernardina Marquez, together with petitioners-spouses Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Rosales in Case L-25326 and
petitioners-spouses Hilario Aguila
and Adela Hidalgo in Case L-25327 compose the three
sets of tenants working on their lands.

^[2]  “Sec. 13.  Affidavit Required in Sale
of Land Subject to Right of Pre-emption. 
— No deed of sale of agri­cultural land under cultivation by an
agricultural lessee or lessees shall be recorded in the Registry of Property
unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given the written
notice re­quired in Section eleven of this Chapter or that the land is not
worked by an agricultural lessee.” (R. A. No. 3844).

^[3]
 “SEC. 4.  Abolition of Agricultural Share Tenancy.  — ­Agricultural share tenancy, as
herein defined, is hereby declared to be contrary to public policy and shall
be abolished:  Provided, That
existing share tenancy contracts may continue in force and effect in any region
or locality, to be governed in the meantime by the pertinent provisions of
Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred and ninety-nine as amended, until the end
of the agricultural year when the National Land Reform Council proclaims that
all the government machineries and agencies in that region or locality relating
to leasehold
envisioned in this Code are operating, unless such contracts provide for a shorter or the tenant
sooner exercises his option to elect the leasehold system:  Provided, further, That in
order not to jeopardize international commitments, lands devoted to crops
covered by marketing allotments shall be made the subject of a separate
proclamation that adequate provisions, such as the organization of
cooperatives, marketing agreements, or other similar workable arrangements,
have been made to insure efficient management on all matters requiring
synchronization of the agricultural with the processing phases of such crops:  Provided, furthermore, That
where the agricultural share tenancy contract has ceased to he operative by
virtue of this Code, or where such a tenancy contract has been entered into in
violation of the provisions off’ this Code and is, therefore, null and void,
and the tenant continues in possession of the land for cultivation there shall
be presumed to exist a leasehold relation ship under the provisions of this
Code, without prejudice to the right of the landowner and the former tenant
to enter into any other lawful contract in relation to the land formerly under
tenancy con­tract, as long as in the interim the security of tenure of the
former tenant under Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred and ninety-nine, as
amended, and as provided in this Code, is not impaired:  Provided, finally, That
if a lawful leasehold tenancy contract was entered into prior to the effectivity of this Code, the rights and obligations
arising therefrom shall continue to subsist until
modified by the parties in accordance with the provi­sions of this Code.”
R. A. 3844, Emphasis supplied.

^[4]
Section 2, pars. (1), (2) and (6),
R. A, 3844; emphasis
supplied.

^[5]
(2)      “‘Agricultural lessee’ means
a person who, by himself and with the aid available from within his immediate
farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another with
the latter’s consent for purposes of production, for a price certain in money or in produce or both.  It is distinguished from civil law lessee as understood in the Civil Code
of the Philippines.”
Sec. 166, R. A. 3844.

“(25)    ‘Share tenancy’ as used in this Code means
the relationship which exists whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking
for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other
his labor, with either or both contributing any one or several of the items of
production, the tenant cultivating the land personally with the aid of labor
available from members of his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof
to be divided between the
landholder and the tenant.” Idem.

^[6]
“Sec. 11.  Lessee’s Right of Pre-emption.  — In case the agricultural lessor decides to sell the landhold­ing, the agricultural
lessee shall have the preferential right to buy the same under reasonable
terms and conditions:  Provided,
That the entire landholding offered for sale must be pre-empted by the Land
Authority if the landowner so desires, unless the majority of the lessees object to such acquisition:  Provided, further, That where
there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said preferential right only to the extent of the
area actually cultivated by him.  The
right of pre-emption under this Section may be exercised within ninety days from notice in writing, which
shall be served by the owner on all lessees affected.” R. A.
3844, emphasis supplied.

^[7]
Section 51, R. A. 3844.

^[8]
Sec. 166, par. (3), R.A. 3844.

^[9]
Supra, paragraph 3.

^[10]
Sec. 74, R.
A. 3844.

^[11]
G.R. No. L-26255, June 30, 1969;
28 SCRA 665.

^[12]
Id.,
Emphasis
and notes in parentheses supplied.

^[13]
Art. 18 Civil Code.

^[14]
Art. 1616 Civil Code.

^[15]
Vol. 3, Montemayor’s Labor, Agrarian and Social Le­gislation, 2d Ed.
1967, p. 246.

^[16]
Respondents-vendees, the spouses Saturnino Hidalgo
and Bernardina Marquez; see fn. 1.

^[17]
City of Baguio
vs. Marcos, G.R. No. L-26100, Feb. 28, 1969;
27 SCRA 342.

^[18]
Automotive Parts & Equipment Co. Inc. vs. Lingad, G.R. No. L-26406, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA. 248; U. P. Bd. of Regents vs. Auditor-General, G.R. No. L-19617, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 5; and Pagdanganan
vs. Galleta, G.R. No. L-23564, Nov. 28, 1969; 30 SCRA 426; Sarcos
vs. Castillo, G.R. No. L-29755, Jan. 31,
1969, 26 SCRA 853 and cases cited.

^[19]
Maniego vs. Castelo, 101 Phil. 293, (1957); Vda. de Santos vs. Garcia, G.R. No. L-16894, May 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 194; Quimson vs. de Guzman, G.R. No. L-18240, Jan. 31, 1963, 7 SCRA 158; and
Pagdañganan vs.Court
of Agrarian Relations, G.R. No. L-13858, 108 Phil. 590
(1960).

^[20]
Annex B,
Petition.

^[21]
Secs. 11 and 12, R. A.
3844; See Montemayor, op. cit. Vol. 3, p. 246.