ELENITA LEDESMA SILVA, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. ESTHER PERALTA, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

Appellants spouses Saturnino Silva and Elenita Ledesma Silva pray
for the reconsideration of this Court’s decision of November 25, 1960,
claiming that—

(1) Appellant Elenita Silva should be awarded moral damages for
Esther Peralta’s unauthorized use of the designation in “Mrs. Esther
Silva”;

(2) the award of pecuniary damages against appellant Saturnino Silva is unwarranted by the facts and the law.

I

It is contended that the prohibition imposed upon appellee Esther
Peralta from representing herself, directly or indirectly, as the wife
of Saturnino Silva should result in an award of moral damages in favor
of appellant Elenita Ledesma, whose exclusive right to the appellation
is recognized by the decision.

This argument misapprehends the basis of the decision. Esther
Peralta was forbidden from representing herself as Mrs. Saturnino Silva
for the reason that it was proved in this case that she was not legally
married to him, and because he is now lawfully married to Elenita
Ledesma. But an award of damages in the latter’s favor would require a
further finding that the assumption of the disputed status by Esther
Peralta was made in bad faith or through culpable negligence and no
such finding has been made in the decision. The facts are that Esther
in good faith regarded herself as Saturnino’s lawful wife, and that the
man himself led her into this belief prior to his desertion. That later
on, unknown to Esther, Silva should have married his co-appellant in
the United States is not sufficient to impose upon Esther any liability
for damages or to destroy her original good faith, their being no proof
that the existence of a valid marriage between Saturnino and Elenita
was adequately driven home to Esther before this case was instituted.
That the two appellants Silva were living together as husband and wife
was certainly not sufficient proof, considering Saturnino Silva’s past
history and conduct. How was appellee to know that Saturnino’s
connection with Elenita Ledesma was any more legitimate then his
previous one with appellee herself?

Moreover, the trial court found Elenita Silva’s claim for damages
not adequately proved, and we have not found in the record any
justification to depart from that finding.

II

As to the Award of damages against Saturnino Silva, it is to be
noted that while the latter’s liability was extra-contractual in
origin, still, under the Civil Code of 1889, the damages resulting from
a tort are measured in the same manner as those due from a contractual
debtor in bad faith, since he must answer for such damages, whether he
had foreseen them or not, just as he must indemnify not only for damnum emergens but also for lucrum cessans,
as required by Article 1106. Article 1992 of the 1889 Civil Code of
Spain formulated no standard for measuring quasi-delictual damages, the
article merely prescribing that the guilty party “shall be liable for
the damage so done”. This indefiniteness led modern civil law writers
to hold that the standards set in article 1106 and 1107, placed in the
general rules on obligations, “rigen por igual para las contractuales y
las extras contractuales, las preestablecidas y las que broten ex-lege
de actos ilicitos”. (Roces, Notes to Fischer)” Los Daños Civiles y su
Reparacion,” (1927). Since liability for damages arises in either case
from a breach of a pre-existing obligation (to behave without fault or
negligence in case of quasi-delicts, and, in case of contracts, to
observe the conduct required by the stipulation), it is logical to
conclude with Planiol that “La responsabilidad contractual y la extra
contractual tienen el mismo fundamento, por lo que se hallan sujetas en
principio a identicas reglas” (6 Planiol-Ripert, Derecho Civil, p. 529,
sec. 378). Giorgi is of the same opinion (5 Teoria de Obligaciones, pp.
133, 207-208). So is de Cossio y Corral (“El Dolo en el Derecho Civil”,
pp. 132-133) :

“Pero si ello es asi, resulta claro que la
aproximacion entre esta clase de culpa y la contractual, es cada dia
mayor, hasta el extremo de que, segun hemos antes indicado, solamente
se pueden señalar diferencias accessorias, y muchas veces aparentes
entre una y otra. En primer termino, porque el concepto de culpa
contractual se exteinde no solo a las obligaciones nacidas ex
contractu, sino, en general, a todas aquellas preexistentes entre las
partes a la realidad del acto dañoso (obligaciones legales). De otra
parte, porque si bien consideramos las cosas, la responsabilidad
llamada extracontractual, deriva siempre del quebrantamiento de un
deber general, implicitamente reconocido por la ley, cual es el de que
todos deben actuar socialmente con la debida diligencia, evitando
causar daño a los demas, y un derecho que todo ciudadano tiene,
correlativamente, a no ser dañado en su patrimonio y bienes por la
conducta dolosa o negligente de los demas. En tal sentido, habria
siempre entre el autor del daño y la victima, una relacion juridica,
constituida por este derecho y aquel deber.

Esta idea de
unidad entre ambas instituciones se traduce en que as pretendidas
diferencias en orden a la extension de la indemnizacion, en ambos
casos, no puendan defenderse a la vista de los preceptos de nuestro
Derecho positivo. En efecto, no contiene el Capitulo II del Titulo XVI
del Libro IV de nuestro Codigo civil norma alguna referente a la
extension de la indemnizacion que en cada caso haya de prestarse, lo
que nos obliga forzosamente a acudir a las normas generales contenidas
en el Capitulo II, del Titulo I de dicho libro IV, relativo a los
“efectos de las obligaciones”, que ninguna razon permite limitar a las
de naturaleza contractual, ya que el articulo 1.101 habla genericamente
de obligaciones; el 1.102, de “todas las obligaciones”; el 1.103, de
“toda clase de obligaciones”, y en ninguno de los articulos
subsifuientes se hace referencia a una clase especial de obligaciones,
sino a todas en general.

Que las disposiciones de este
Capitulo son aplicables en los casos de culpa extracontractual, es
doctrina constantemente reconocida por la jurisprudencia del Tribunal
Supremo. Asi, en la sentencia de 14 de diciembre de 1894, concretandose
a los articulos 1.101, 1.103 y 1.104, afirma que son de caracter
general y aplicables a toda clase de obligaciones, no ofreciendo
contradiccion con las especiales de los articulos 1.902 y 1.903; la
sentencia de 15 enero de 1902, permite interpretar los articulos 1.902
y 1.903 por los 1.103 y 1.106, a los efectos de determinar los
elementos que han de entrar en la indemnizacion. La misma doctrina se
mantiene en la sentencia de 2 de diciembre de 1946, y en otras muchas
que pudieramos aducir.”

Whether or not the damages awarded to appellee are a natural and
direct consequence of Silva’s deceitful maneuvers in making love to
appellee, and inducing her to yield to his advances and live with him
as his wife (when Silva knew all the time that he could not marry
Esther Peralta because of his undissolved marriage to an Australian
woman, a prior wedlock that he concealed from appellee), is a question
of appreciation. It is clear that Esther Peralta would not have
consented to the liaison had there been no concealment of Silva’s
previous marriage, or that the birth of the child was a direct result
of this connection. That Esther had to support the child because Silva
abandoned her before it was born is likewise patent upon the record,
and we can not see how said appellant can be excused from liability
therefor.

Silva’s seduction and subsequent abandonment of appellee and his
illegitimate child were likewise the direct cause for the filing of the
support case in Manila, and in order to prosecute the same, appellee
had to quit her employment in Davao. While the case could have been
filed in Davao, we do not believe that this error in selecting a more
favorable venue (due to her unfamiliarity with the technicalities of
the law) should be allowed to neutralize the appellant Silva’s
responsibility as the primary causative factor of the prejudice and
damage suffered by appellee.

It is argued that the maintenance of the child can not be
considered as an element of damage because the child’s case for support
was dismissed. This contention fails to take into account the action
there was for support as an acknowledged natural child, and that under
the Civil Code of 1889 (the law in force when the child was born), the
right of natural children to be supported by their father depended
exclusively on the recognition by the father of his paternity; the rule
being thus—

“The mere fact of birth gave no legal right to the
child, and imposed no legal duty upon the father, except, perhaps, in
cases arising under the criminal law. *** The father was not, prior to
the Civil Code, and is not now, bound to recognize his natural son by
reason of the mere fact that he is its father. *** But as to the father
the question is, and always has been, has he performed any acts which
indicate his intention to recognize the child as his?” (Buenaventura vs. Urbano, 5 Phil., pp. 2-3)

It follows that in said suit, the real issue was whether the child
had been duly recognized, the support being a mere consequence of the
recognition. Therefore, the failure of the child’s action for support
did not adjudge that he was not the defendant’s child, but that the
defendant never recognized him as such. That the decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA-G. R. No. 24532—R) rejecting the child’s action did not
declare him without right to support under all circumstances can be
seen from the following statement in the decision:

“The proofs so far found in the record may possibly
warrant the filling of an action for compulsory recognition, under
paragraphs 3 and 4 of Art. 283, but there was no action presented to
that effect.”

Plainly, the issues and parties being different, the result of the child’s action can not constitute res judicata
with regard to the mother’s claim for damages against the father on
account of the amounts she was compelled to spent for the maintenance
of their child. On the contrary, the very fact that the child was not
allowed to collect support from the father (appellant therein) merely
emphasizes the account of his birth and rearing, which, in turn, was a
direct consequence of appellants tortuous conduct. Since Esther Peralta
had expressly pleaded that she had to support the child (Record of
Appeal, p. 27, in fine), and had prayed for such relief “as may be
deemed just and equitable in the premises”, there is no reason why her
expenses for the child’s maintenance should not be taken into account.

Appellants submit that the damages allowed for maintenance of the
son should be limited to P600.00 a year, because the income tax law
allows only that much deduction for each child. We do not believe that
income tax deductions constitute a reasonable basis for an award of
damages, since they are fixed for an entirely different purpose (to
arrive at the net taxable income) and merely represent the amount that
the state is willing to exempt from taxation. At that, it should be
noted that the deductible amount has been lately increased to P1,000.00
per annum. But even at P600.00 per annum, the damages suffered by
appellee on this count, from 1945 to 1960, already amounts to around
P9,000.00 a year, to which must be added the loss of appellee’s salary
as executive of the Girl Scouts in Davao; so that the P15,000.00
damages awarded by the court below is by no means excessive, as already
held in our decision in chief.

Appellants also contend that the claim for pecuniary damages has
prescribed, because they date back to 1945. Suffice it to note that the
defense of prescription was not invoked by appellants against the claim
for pecuniary damages, and this defense must be regarded as waived in
relation to the same. Appellant’s reply to the appellee’s first counterclaim
in her second amended answer (which was for actual or pecuniary
damages) reads as follows (Answer to Counterclaim, Rec. App. p. 33) ;

“1.—That plaintiff is without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations contained under paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of
the first counterclaim and, therefore, specifically denies the same.”

The defense of prescription was actually interposed only against the second counterclaim, in this wise:

“1.—That the cause of action alleged in the second counterclaim has already prescribed, more than ten years having already elapsed.” (Answer, to Counterclaim, Rec. App. p. 34).

The second counterclaim referred to was for damages due to “mental
torture, anguish and hurt feelings, all to her damage in the amount of
P250,000.00” (Rec. App. p. 28). Upon the other hand, our own award for
moral damages was based, not on the deceit practiced by Silva in
securing Esther’s assent to live maritally with him, but on his
subsequent harassment of her in 1954, by filing suits against her in
different provinces and otherwise applying pressure to cause her to
abandon her child’s case. As this cause of action arose less than three
years before the present action was filed, the defense of prescription
is rendered untenable against it, for the limitation period had not yet
expired when the suit was brought.

Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon JJ., concur.