THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. JUAN P. ENRIQUEZ, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS, SECOND BRANCH, AND FIDEL SALUD JR., RESPONDENTS.

On April 17, 1951, the respondent promulgated its decision
sentencing the defendant in criminal case No. 158 of said court to an
indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (l) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

The defendant filed on May 2, 1951, a motion for reconsideration
based on the ground that the court erred “in appreciating the age
between seventeen and eighteen of the defendant as ordinary mitigating
circumstance of minority and not as a privileged mitigating
circumstance which lower the penalty by one degree, and in not
appreciating the surrender of the defendant, admitted by the fiscal, as
another mitigating circumstance, on the ground that the mere previous
issuance of an order for his arrest precludes the appreciation of his
surrender as mitigating circumstance.”

The respondent judge, on June 18, 1951, granted the motion and
amended its original decision promulgated on April 17, 1951, by
considering the attendance of the above mentioned mitigating
circumstances, in the commission of the offense, and sentencing the
defendant to an indeterminate sentence of one (1) year and one (1) day
of prision correccional as a minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. A motion for reconsideration of the second judgment “was filed by the prosecution and denied by the court.

After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, the
provincial fiscal of Batangas has filed this petition for certiorari
against the respondents on the ground that the respondent judge acted
in excess of the courts jurisdiction in amending his original judgment
promulgated on April 17, 1951, upon a motion for reconsideration filed
by the defendant on the grounds above set forth, citing in support of
his contention the decision of this Court in the case of People vs. Tamayo,^[*]
G. R. No. L-2233, promulgated on April 25, 1950, wherein it was said
that “the period at the end of which a judgment becomes final, which is
fifteen days, is never, under any circumstances, suspended except by
the filing of a motion for nevi trial by the defendant under Section 1
of Rule 117,” and that “the judgment in a criminal case may be revised
or modified only within the period to appeal or fifteen days from the
date of its promulgation.”

The decision in the case of Tamayo above quoted though not
concurred in by the majority, who concurred in the result, is correct.
The last quoted portion of the decision in “People vs.
Tamayo” was taken from Section 7 of Rule 116 which provides that “A
judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside by the court
rendering it before the judgment has become final or appeal has been
taken,” but it does not support and is not applicable to the contention
of the petitioner. What is applicable is the first quoted portion of
the decision, though not in its literal sense, to the effect “that the
period at the end of which the judgment became final is never under any
circumstances suspended except by the filing of a motion for new trial
by the defendant under Section 1 of Rule 117,” because if it is
suspended by the filing of a motion for new trial by the defendant, it
follows that it is also suspended by a motion for reconsideration filed
by the defendant on errors law which is one of the grounds for new
trial, for such motion for reconsideration is equivalent to a motion
for new trial.

A motion for new trial filed in criminal case in a Court of First
Instance may be based either (l) on the ground of errors of law or
irregularities committed daring ‘ the trial in its general sense, that
is, errors of law committed during the period from the arraignment to
the rendition of the judgment, prejudicial to the substantial rights of
the defendant, and (2) on newly discovered evidence material to the
case. A motion for new trial on the ground of errors of law in the
judgment may be properly called a motion for reconsideration, because
the court is not asked to reopen the case for further proceeding, but
only, to reconsider its findings or conclusions of law and make them
conformable to the law applicable to the case in the judgment the court
has to render anew, as was done by the court in the present case. Such
a motion for reconsideration has, according to Section 6 of Rule 118,
the same effect as a motion for new trial, of interrupting the period
for perfecting an appeal after which the judgment becomes final, in
accordance with the following ruling laid down in the case of Rodriguez
vs. Rovira, applicable by analogy to criminal cases:

“This court has repeatedly held that a motion for
reconsideration based upon any of the causes enumerated in section 145
of the Code of Civil Procedure as a ground for a motion for a new trial
has the same effect as a motion for a new trial, regardless of the fact
that it is styled differently and the ground is stated in a different
manner but with an identical meaning. (Pascua vs. Ocampo, 59 Phil., 48; Blouse vs. Moreno and Garcia, 60 Phil., 741; Lavett vs. Sy Quia, 61 Phil., 847.)” [63 Phil. 476]

If a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the
period of 15 days from the promulgation of the judgment of conviction
of the defendant, as the motion filed in the present case, it may be
decided or passed upon validly at any time thereafter by the court.
Because, although the granting, after said period, of a motion for new
trial would place the defendant in double jeopardy, he waived his right
not to be placed therein by the filing of such a motion. And Sec. 6,
Rule 118, provides that “this period of perfection an appeal shall be
interrupted from the time a motion for new trial is filed until notice
of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the
defendant.”

The dissenting opinion contends that the phrase “during the trial”
used in section 2, Rule 117, of the Rules of Court, is used not in its
general sense, but in its restricted sense limited to the period for
the introduction of evidence. This contention is groundless. It is
obvious that the word during the trial is used in said section 2 in its
general sense, including the rendering of the judgment (Bouvier’s Law
Dictionary, Volume 2, p..3320), because it was taken from section 42 of
the General Orders No. 58, which provided that within a like period
after conviction a case may be reopened on account of errors of law
committed at the trial in its general sense; the word trial covers
sections31 to 41 of said General Orders No. 58 and includes the
rendition of the judgment. The same Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, in
speaking of “the rights of the defendant at the trial,” provides in its
section 1 that “In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be
entitled to be present and defend in person and by attorney at every
stage of the proceeding, that is, from the arraignment to the
promulgation of the judgment.” And American Jurisprudence, “Volume 14,
pp. 898, 900, says: “In common law and under the decisions of many
courts it is the right of the prisoner in a criminal case to be present
throughout the entire trial from the commencement of the selection of the jury until the verdict is rendered and jury discharged. (Italics ours)

To construe the phrase “during the trial” used in section 2(a)
of Rule 117 in its restricted sense, as the dissenter Mr. Justice Jugo
does, would be to circumscribe the first ground for new trial in
criminal cases to only errors of law committed by the court in the
admission or exclusion of evidence. Errors of law or irregularities
committed before and after the introduction of evidence such as those
committed in denying the defendant his right to be informed of the
offense charged, in refusing to grant him a previous preliminary
investigation, in not informing the defendant of his right to be
assisted by an attorney before pleading guilty or not guilty, and in
not giving him at least two days to prepare for trial, could not be
alleged as grounds for a new trial. And the object of a new trial on
errors of law in the judgment, which is to invite the attention of the
trial court to such errors so that they may be corrected in order to
avoid taking an appeal for the same purpose, would be thwarted.

From the fact that Rule 115 treats of trial, and Judgment or
Sentence is treated in Rule 116, it does not follow that the word
“trial” in the phrase “errors of law at the trial or during the trial”
as a ground for new trial used in See. 2(a) of Rule 117 is
used in its limited sense and refers only to the production of
evidence, and not in its general sense which includes every stage of
the trial from arraignment to judgment. In the same way that
arraignment is treated in Rule 112 separately from Motion to Quash treated in Rule 113 and Plea in Rule 114, although arraignment
does not include motion to quash and plea, and plea is a part and
parcel of the arraignment, which consists of the information to a
defendant of the charge against him and his answer to plea to that
charge. It is obvious that the separation of trial from judgment as
subject matter of different Rules of Court was made only for clearness’
sake, and not because the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure uses the
word “trial” throughtout the Rules of Court in its limited sense.

After our reply to the dissenting opinion was inserted in the
majority’s decision, the dissenting opinion was amended by eliminating
the dissenters’ arguments in support of their theory that the errors of
law committed during the trial do not include errors of law in the
judgment, for the alleged reason that the word trial in Section (a)
of Rule 117 is used in its restricted sense limited to the period for
the introduction of evidence, and inserting in the amended dissenting
opinion the following: “It is obvious that the rule Sec. 2 (a)
Rule 177 refers to errors of law committed during the trial, which can
not be corrected except by a new trial, because it would be idle to
pray for a new trial when the errors of law can be corrected without
it. * * * (page 1 of the dissenting opinion), and that “all errors of
law requiring new trial for their correction are deemed errors
committed during the trial. Many examples of these errors, besides the
error in the admission or the exclusion of evidence, are given by Chief
Justice Moran in his Comment on the Rules of Court, Volume II pages
806, 807 3rd edition.”

This new theory advocated in the dissenting opinion has absolutely
no legal basis and runs counter to the contention that the errors of
law committed during the trial refer? to those committed during the
period for the introducing of evidence or trial in the restricted sense
of the word under section 2(a) of Rule 117. The examples of
errors of law given by the former Chief Justice as grounds for new
trial in his comments, such as the trial of an accused without a
preliminary investigation, or without having been informed of the
offense charged, are errors committed during the arraignment and before
the period for the introduction of evidence as we have already pointed
out at the beginning of this decision, and said examples support our
conclusion. Such errors of law require a new trial for their correction
because they affect the validity of the whole proceeding taken after
they have bean committed in accordance with provisions of Section 5 of
Rule 117. But as an errors of Ian in the judgment do not affect or
invalidate the whole proceeding prior to the judgment, but only the
judgment itself, to correct such errors no new trial is required but
only a reconsideration of the original and rendition of a new judgment,
without necessity of granting new trial.

Section 5(a) of Rule 117 provides that:

“(a) When a new trial is granted on the
ground of errors of Ian or irregularities committed during the trial,
all the proceedings and evidence not affected by the commission of such
errors and irregularities shall stand, but those affected thereby shall
be set aside and taken anew. The court may, in the interest of justice,
a11on the introduction of additional evidence?

“(c)
In all cases, the original judgment shall be set aside and a’ new
judgment rendered, and the former shall not be used or referred to in
evidence or argument on the new trial.”

This rule in criminal cases is stated in civil cases in the
following way in Section 3 of Rule 37, which is substantially the same
as the rule above quoted, to wit;

“If the motion is made upon the cause mentioned in sub-section (c),
section 1 of this Rule, and the court finds its judgment to be contrary
to evidence or law, it may amend such judgment accordingly without
granting a new trial, unless the court deems the introduction of
additional evidence advisable.”

In the United States wherefrom the
provisions of our criminal law on new trial have been taken, errors of
law in the judgment or verdict in criminal cases are grounds for new
trial. “A new trial will be granted where the verdict is against the
law.” (16 C. J. Sec. 2706; Wharton’s Criminal Procedure, Sec, 1747.
This principle or doctrine on grounds for a new trial in criminal cases
is applicable by. analogy in these Islands; because “We have always
felt ourselves bound by the rulings of the Supreme Court of the United
States in construing and applying statutory enactments modelled or
borrowed from English or American originals” (Cuyugan vs. Santos, 34 Phil. 100, 107).

And in our resolution of the motion for reconsideration in the case of People vs. Romero, G. E. No. L-4517-20 promulgated on July 31, 1951, we have already laid down the ruling, in which the dissenters concurred,
that in criminal cases a motion for reconsideration on the ground of
errors of law in the judgment is equivalent to a motion for new trial,
and interrupts the period of fifteen days for the perfection of an
appeal.

In view of the foregoing, the respondent judge, did not act in
excess of the court’s jurisdiction in amending its former judgment, and
therefore the present petition fcr certiorari is dismissed for lack of
merits. So ordered.

Pablo, Bengzon and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

Paras C. J., and Reyes J., concur in the result.

TUASON, J.

In People of the Philippines vs. Tamayo, G. R. No. L-2233, we said:

“Judgment in a criminal case may be revised or
modified only within the period to appeal, or fifteen days from the
date of its promulgation. We see no reason why the Government may not
make a motion for reconsideration as distinct from a motion for new
trial before the judgment becomes executory, but such motion can not
operate to suspend or extend the above period; court must act before
that period terminates If the revision, alteration, or modification is
to be valid. Only a motion by the. defendant can interrupt the running
of the period at the expiration of which the judgment becomes final.”

In that decision we drew a distinction between a motion for new
trial and a motion for reconsideration, in a manner that conforms to
Mr. Justice Jugo’s dissenting opinion. However, in the said decision
the motion for reconsideration had been filed by the Provincial Fiscal.
I am inclined to the view that the Tamayo ruling on this aspect of the
case, may and should be relaxed having in mind the policy that penal
statutes ought to be construed liberally in favor of accused in the
absence of explicit provisions which preclude any room for such
interpretation.

If a motion for new trial by the accused suspends the period for
appeal, there is no sufficient reason why a motion for reconsideration
by the same party should not. Both motions are calculated to serve the
same end. Accordingly, the rule that the spirit rather than the letter
of the law determines the construction thereof; that the court looks
less to its words and more to the context, consequence and effect; and
that what is within the spirit is within the law although it is not
within the letter thereof, while that which is in the letter, although
not within the spirit, is not within the law, may be summoned in this
case.

With this observation, I join in the opinion of Mr. Justice Feria for the majority of the Court.

JUGO, J.,

I dissent.

Section 6 of Rule 118 reads as follows:

“An appeal must be taken within fifteen days from
the rendition of the judgment or order appealed from. This period for
perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for
new trial is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion
shall have been served upon the defendant or his attorney.”

Section 2(a) of Rule 117 provides that “the court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:

“(a) That errors of law or irregularities
have been committed during the trial prejudicial to the substantial
rights of the defendant;

* * * * * * *

The fifteen-day “period for perfecting an appeal shall be
interrupted from the time a motion for new trial is filed until notice
of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the
defendant or his attorney.”

A mere motion for reconsideration, which does not contain
allegations necessary for a motion for new trial, does not interrupt
the time to appeal, for otherwise the rule would have so provided.

It is obvious that the rule refers to “errors of law committed
during the trial,” which cannot be corrected except by a new trial,
because it would be idle to pray for a new trial when the error of law
can be corrected without it. The phrase “committed during the trial”
modifies both the nouns “errors of law” and “irregularities,” for the
reason that if said phrase did not refer to «errors of law,” then this
phrase would have no predicate and it would stand alone dangling in the
air. It would read as follows: “That errors of law prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the defendant,” the word “that” being
disconnected. However, in the majority opinion practically all errors
of law are in effect made grounds for new trial. If this were true, the
phrase “committed during the trial” would be useless and meaningless,
for it would not limit anything.

It is out of place to cite decisions regarding new trial in civil
cases for they are based on different provisions of the rules. It is
evident that different statutory provisions cannot be given the same
meaning. It is also inopportune to cite decisions in the United States
regarding new trials and verdicts, for those decisions are based on
different statutes and on the jury system in which the new verdict must
be rendered by a different jury, thus requiring a new trial.

Section 42 of General Orders No. 58 is cited in the majority opinion. The pertinent part of said section reads as follows:

“* * * Within a like period after conviction, a case
may be reopened on account of errors of law committed at the trial* *
* The new hearing, if allowed, shall take place in the court of
original jurisdiction.”

On pages 263 to 265 of Albert’s “The Law of
Criminal Procedure,” the procedure for holding the new trial on account
of errors of law committed at the trial is explained, necessarily
implying that a new trial is to be held, which would not “be essential
if the errors of law can be corrected without a new trial.

All errors of law requiring new trial for their correction are deemed
errors committed during the trial. Many examples of these errors,
besides the error in the admission or the exclusion of evidence, are
given by Chief Justice Moran in his Comments on the Rules of Court,
Volume II, pages 806, 807, 3rd edition.

Padilla, J., concurs