THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ANGELINO PUDPUD, ELEUTERIO CUBELO AND PASTOR CERELIGIA, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

The plea for reversal of appellants Angelino Pudpud,
Eleuterio Cubelo and Pastor
Cereligia, from a judgment of conviction by the lower
court for murder and attempted murder, a
killing motivated by a long-standing grudge caused by a dispute over a
piece of land that brought deep-seated resentment and bitterness in its wake,
is premised on the absence of any culpable act on their part, outside of their
presence at the scene of the crime.  They
would place sole responsibility on one of the other
accused, likewise convicted, Icasiano Pudpud, brother of Angelino and brother-in-law of the two
other appellants, as it was he who fired the shot that resulted in the death of
one of the offended parties and inflicted the
bolo wound on the other victim.^[1] The competent evidence of record, hereafter
to be discussed, point unerringly, however, to the existence of a
conspiracy.  There is no justification
then for a reversal.  We affirm.

As noted in the appealed decision,^[2]
an information for murder and attempted murder was filed on October 29, 1964
against the above-named four accused, worded thus: “That on or about March
27, 1964, in the Municipality of Baganga, Province of
Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Court, the above-mentioned accused, conspiring and confederating together
and helping one another armed with firearms and sharp cutting instrument, with
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, and with
intent to kill did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, shot and hack with said weapon
Alfonso Milagrosa, thereby inflicting upon him
physical injuries which caused his instantaneous death; that on the same
occasion thereof, the above-mentioned accused, conspiring and confederating
together and helping one another, armed with the same weapons, with treachery,
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength and with intent to kill,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, shot and hack with said weapons Federico Postrero, thus the accused commenced the commission of the
crime of murder directly by overt act but did not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause other than
his own spontaneous desistance.”^[3]

The cause for ill-feeling that existed between the Pudpud brothers and the intended victim, Federico Postrero, a close relative, was narrated in the appealed decision thus: “Federico Postrero on one hand and Icasiano
Pudpud, Angelino Pudpud and
the wives of Eleuterio Cubelo
and Pastor Cereligia, on the other, are first degree
cousins.  And all of them are residents
of Mercedes, Mahanob, Baganga.  Postrero and the Pudpuds used to
be in cordial relation until the former filed with this Court, Branch III, in
1956, a complaint for recovery
of possession of a parcel of land situated at Mercedes, Baganga,
Davao, and damages against the Pudpuds.  A judgment by default was rendered against
the defendants, but the same was subsequently amended in that a decision based
upon an amicable settlement was entered. 
‘As a gesture of charity, Postrero bound
himself to pay the Pudpuds the sum of P1,000.00 as ‘additional payment for the land in litigation
containing 2 hectares which defendant agree to vacate and deliver to the
Plaintiffs.’ Postrero paid P1,000.00
to the Pudpuds and they [were on good terms]
then.  But after they had spent the
money, they told him that they wanted to get back the land.  More than that they
threatened to liquidate him.”^[4]
What happened on that tragic day of March 27, 1964, before the actual killing,
was likewise set forth in such decision in these words: “On March 27,
1964, Federico Postrero went to the Poblacion of Baganga, which is
about four kilometers from Mercedes, to file a criminal case of grave threat
against Icasiano Pudpud
committed on March 26, 1964, and another criminal action of arson against Icasiano Pudpud also and Eleuterio Cubelo, likewise
committed on March 26, 1964, in which the house of his mother-in-law Felicisima Legaspi was
burned.  The case of grave threat
[resulting from] Icasiano Pudpud
[threatening] ‘to kill Federico Postrero as soon as
he has a chance to do so’ was decided by the Court, Branch II, on March 8,
1966, convicting the accused.  The case
of arson was tried by this branch of the Court on April 18 and the decision
will be promulgated in the 21st of this month of May.  Postrero took along
with him to Baganga that day of March 27, 1964, Felicito
Langoay, Domingo Nazareno
and Alfonso Milagrosa in order to testify in said
cases.”^[5]
After noting that on the same afternoon the accused appellant Eleuterio Cubelo inquired from
the mother-in-law of Federico Postrero whether he
would be returning to Mercedes from Baganga that
evening, the lower court continued its narration of facts thus: “As stated
above, Postrero went to Baganga
on March 27, 1964, with Langoay, Nazareno
and Milagrosa, to file the grave threats and arson
cases, but only the grave threat case was received or entertained by the chief
of police that day, for he was very
busy.  They left for Baganga
[riding] on carabaos, because the passenger jeeps
plying between Mercedes and Baganga were not
available that day as it was good Friday and returned
at about 6:00 p.m. after they had
attended the good Friday celebration, passing through the carabao-trail
as they did in coming. Postrero and Milagrosa were riding on one carabao
astride, * * * with Postrero in front.  Langoay and Nazareno were following very closely on another carabao,* * *. It was a moonlight night.  At a place in the trail about 30 meters away
from the house of Angelino Pudpud and 50 meters away
from the house of Anacleta Vda,
de Pudpud, Postrero and his
companions ‘heard the creaking of the cogon grasses and [they] looked back our
way and immediately [they] heard shotgun fire.’” The sound came from the
right side of the road and about three meters away from the carabao
on which Postrero and Milagrosa
were riding. The gunshot also came from the same side of the road.  Immediately after the gunshot or explosion,
the eyes of Postrero were ‘somewhat covered with
smoke and [he] could notice that [his] companion [Milagrosa]
was fatally hit because he immediately fell down and [so did he.]’ Both fell
down at the same time. Immediately after, Postrero, Langoay and Nazareno saw Icasiano Pudpud, armed with a
shotgun and a bolo, and Eleuterio Cubelo,
Angelino Pudpud and Pastor Cereligia,
all armed with bolos, come out of the cogon grasses.  Icasiano Pudpud went to where Milagrosa
was, who was lying on the ground, face down. 
Upon noticing that it was Milagrosa, Icasiano Pudpud said: ‘He is not the one hit,’ then proceeded to
where Postrero was and struck him with a bolo but Postrero jumped and ran away.  Icasiano Pudpud and Eleuterio Cubelo chased him. 
As they were chasing Postrero Icasiano Pudpud said: ‘Do not
run, I will finish you, putang Ina mo.’  On the
other hand, Angelino Pudpud and Pastor Cereligia approached Langoay and Nazareno and so the latter two also ran away. Postrero ran as fast as he could through the thick bushes
where he hid until those chasing him had lost him and had left.  Then he went home, passing through thick
bushes and the Mahanob
River.  It was
about 11:00 o’clock that
evening when he reached home and saw Nazareno, who had related to his family what had happened to
them.”^[6]
Alfonso Milagrosa died on the spot, having been hit at the right eyebrow, part of his head
being blown off, with fragments of his brain found scattered near his body.

In their brief, appellants did not dispute the above recital
concerning the actual killing of Milagrosa and the
wounding of Federico Postrero.  They would cast doubt, however, on the
existence of the motive of the accused for wishing harm on Federico Postrero and would not concede that they made threats
against his life.  Stress was laid in
their brief on Icasiano Pudpud,
not the appellants, being the sole culprit, as there was no conspiracy.  Thus, the last paragraph of their narration
of facts reads: “Moments after the shot the four accused emerged from the
cogon bushes. Icasiano Pudpud
was carrying a home­made shotgun
in his left hand a bolo in the right hand. 
The other three accused who followed Icasiano Pudpud were also armed each with a bolo. * *
*Walking ahead of his party, Icasiano Pudpud approached the body of Alfonso Milagrosa
and then went to where Federico Postrero was lying on
the ground.  He made a slash at Postrero with his bolo but the latter was not hit as he was able to get up immediately and run
away.  Icasiano
Pudpud and Eleuterio Cubelo,
gave chase to Postrero but the latter was able to run
and elude his pursuers. * * * In the meantime, Dominico
Nazareno and Felicito Langoay saw Angelino Pudpud and
Pastor Cereligia, approaching them, whereupon they
jumped from their carabao and ran away, heading
towards the poblacion of Baganga.
* * *  Thus
ended the unfortunate incident that befell the four travelers on that night of March 27, 1964 on the road to
Mercedes.”^[7]

On the above facts, the lower court rendered its decision of May
21, 1966 finding the appellants as well as the accused Icasiano
Pudpud guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder of Alfonso Milagrosa and sentencing them to reclusion
perpetua as well as to the penalty of indemnifying the heirs of the deceased
Alfonso Milagrosa in the amount of P6,000.00, and
likewise guilty of the crime of attempted homicide against the person of
Federico Postrero, for which they would be made to
suffer one year of prision correccional.  An appeal was taken to this Court but, as noted at the outset, Icasiano Pudpud had withdrawn his
appeal.  In the brief for
defendants-appellants filed on September 30, 1967, they would assail the appealed decision on the
sole ground that error was committed by the lower court in its finding of
conspiracy, the only other error being a corollary of the above contention that
appellants should not therefore have been convicted as only Icasiano
Pudpud should be held liable for the offenses in
question.  It is not to be lost sight of
that in the lower court, the defense of alibi was interposed, but evidently,
appellants realized how weak and insub­stantial was such a claim, thus
prompting them to rely on the alleged absence of a conspiracy.  Again, as
was made clear at the opening of this opinion, such is not the case at
all.  Reversal is not indicated.

1.  A conspiracy in the
statutory language “exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.”^[8]
The objective then on the part of the conspirators is to perform an act or
omission punishable by law. What is required is assent to the perpetration of
such a misdeed.  That must be their
intent. There is need in the language of Justice Mapa
in the early lead­ing case of United States
v. Magcomot, a 1909 decision,^[9]
for “concurrence of wills” or “unity of action and purpose”.^[10]
The usual phraseology employed in many of
the later cases is “common and joint purpose and design.”^[11] At times, reference is made to
“previous concert of criminal design.”^[12] Its manifestation could be shown by
“united and concerted action.”^[13] Thus, a conspiracy need not be
proved by direct evidence; it may be deduced from the mode and manner in which
the offense was perpetrated.  The
conditions attending its commission and the acts executed may be indicative of
a common design to accomplish a criminal purpose and objective.  If, to use the apt words of Chief Justice Bengzon, there is “a chain of circumstances” to that
effect, then conspiracy has been established.^[14] If such be the case then, the act of one is the act of all the others involved and each is to
be held to the same degree of
liability as the others.  So it has been
our constant ruling from the 1905 decision of United
States v. Maza.^[15]

2. Tested by the above controlling legal doctrines, the lower
court decision, to repeat, cannot be overturned.  The effort of appellants in their brief to
demonstrate that there was no conspiracy is doomed to futility.  They did not deny because they could not deny
that a land dispute existed
among the appellants and Icasiano Pudpud
on the one hand and their near relation, a first-degree cousin of two of them
and cousin-in-law of the two others, Federico Postrero,
dating back to a suit filed against the Pudpuds for
squatting on such property when their uncle, the father of Federico, had
acquired the same as far back as 1935. 
It is true that thereafter the suit was settled amicably with the Pudpuds still getting an additional amount of P1,000.00, but later, as noted in the decision, there was
evidence that dissatisfaction once more rankled in their breast and a feeling
of resentment at what they must have considered to be an unfair advantage taken
by Postrero would not die down.  At any rate, there was competent and credible
testimony of threats being made against Postrero.  Mention was likewise made therein that Icasiano Pudpud was found guilty
of the offense of grave threats and that on or about the time the decision in
this case was rendered, another one was expected from another sala regarding the case of arson filed not only against him
but against appellant Cubelo.  In the face of such incontrovertible
testimony, it thus clearly appears that a denial that no ill-feeling existed
between the parties involved is absolutely bereft of credence.

The brief for appellants would likewise try to make light of the
presence of all of them with Icasiano Pudpud at the place and at the time of the commission of
the criminal acts.  The evidence for the
prosecution clearly showed that they were there for one purpose alone, namely,
to waylay their intended victim, Federico Postrero.  They made certain first that he was going to
return in the early evening of that day from the poblacion
where he filed the action for grave threats. All four of them were together
behind a clump of cogon grasses. 
Significantly, as admitted in their brief, the three appellants were
each armed with a bolo.  What better
proof can there be that all of
the accused were just waiting for the opportunity to ambush the unsuspecting
Federico Postrero. 
When they saw him riding astride a carabao
with the unfortunate Alfonso Milagrosa behind him, Icasiano Pudpud, as was intended, he having the
shotgun, took aim and did fire.^[16]
Fortunately for Postrero and unfortunately for Milagrosa, it was the latter who was hit near the right
eyebrow; death as a result was instantaneous. 
As a further proof of the persistence in giving bent to their hatred of Postrero when they found out that he escaped unharmed, Icasiano Pudpud slashed at him
with his bolo and with appellant Eleuterio Cubelo, chased him after he ran away.  On the other hand, the other appellants
approached menacingly the two other companions of Postrero.  Could there be any doubt then that all the
accused, including the three appellants, did plan to take the life of Postrero? To assert that there was no conspiracy is to
close one’s eyes to the undeniable facts.

WHEREFORE, the appealed
decision of May 21, 1966
is affirmed with the modification that the indemnification to the heirs of the
deceased Alfonso Milagrosa should be in the amount of
P12,000.00. Appellants are sentenced to pay the
proportionate share of the costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., did not take part.

Ruiz Castro, J., on official leave.

^[1]
Under date of September 14, 1966,
this appellant, Icasiano Pudpud,
filed a motion for the withdrawal of his appeal, which motion was granted by
this Court in a reso­lution of October
28, 1966.

^[2]
Criminal Case No. 8782 of the Court of First Instance of Davao.

^[3]
Decision, Annex A, Brief for the Defendants-Appellants.  In connection with the above information, it
was noted by the lower court: “The caption of the information shows that
the criminal action is for the complex crime of murder with attempted murder,
whereas the designation in the body are, and the alle­gations
therein constitute murder and attempted murder. 
And so it is that there is a variance between the designation appearing
in the caption and the facts alleged in the information as constituting the
offenses and in such a case, the crimes charged in the body-murder and
attempted murder-prevail.” Ibid.  It is worth noting that no motion to quash
for duplicity of offenses was filed
by any of the accused. As shown in the appealed decision, the information was
not as accurate as it could have been.

^[4]
Ibid, p. 2.

^[5]
Ibid.

^[6]
Ibid, pp. 2 and 3.

^[7]
Brief for the Defendants-Appellants, p. 2.

^[8]
Art 8. Revised Penal Code, Act No. 3815 (1932).

^[9]
13 Phil. 386.

^[10]
Ibid, p. 389.

^[11]
People v. Abrina, 102 Phil. 695 (1957); People
v. Izon, 104 Phil. 690 (1958); People v.
Monroy, 104 Phil. 759 (1958); People v. Indic,
L-18071-72, Jan. 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 130; People v. Estrada, L-26103, Jan.
17, 1968, 22 SCRA 111; People v. Capito,
L-24466, March 19, 1968, 22 SCRA 1130; People v. Fontillas,
L-25298, April 16, 1968, 23 SCRA 74.

^[12]
People v. Magcamit, L-25555,
March 28,
1969, 27 SCRA 450; People v. Tapitan, L-21492, April 25, 1969,
27 SCRA 959.  It could be
“common accord.” People v. Tiongson, L-9866-7, Nov. 28, 1964,
12 SCRA 402.  Another variation is
“com­munity of purpose or unity design.” People v.
Monadi, 97 Phil. 575 (1955).  It could be “common criminal
design”, as in People v. Bernal, 91 Phil. 619 (1952) or
“sharing of criminal purpose”, as in People v. Abrina, 102 Phil. 695 (1957).

^[13]
People v. Castro, L-17465, Aug. 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 699; People v. Indic, L-18071-72, Jan. 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 130; People v. Tila­on,
L-21406, June
30, 1961, 2 SCRA 653; People v. Zapanta, 79 Phil. 308 (1947).

^[14]
People v.
Villanueva, L-12687, July 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 672.

^[15]
5 Phil. 346. Cf. United States v. Grant, 18
Phil. 122 (1910); United States v. Ipil, 27 Phil. 530 (1914); United States v.
Remigio, 37 Phil. 599 (1918); People v. Cu Unjieng, 61 Phil. 236 (1935); People v. Delgado, 77
Phil. 11 (1946); People v. Zapanta, 79 Phil.
308 (1947); People v. Mendiola, 82 Phil. 740
(1949); People v. Mostoles, 85 Phil. 883
(1950); People v. Colman, 103 Phil. 6 (1958); People v. Monroy, 104
Phil. 759 (1958); People v. Belen, L-13895, Sept. 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 39;
People v. Curiano, L-15256-57, Oct. 31, 1963,
9 SCRA 323; People v. Usab Mohamad,
L-14583, Dec. 28, 1963, 9 SCRA 904; People v. Pedro, L-18997, Jan. 31,
1966, 16 SCRA 57; People v. Akiran, L-18760,
Sept. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 239; People v. Jaravata,
L-22029, Aug. 15, 1967, 20 SCRA 1014; People v. Atencio,
L-22518, Jan. 17, 1968, 22 SCRA 88; People v. Estra­da, L-26103, Jan.
17, 1968, 22 SCRA 111; People v. Fontillas,
L-25298, April 16, 1968, 23 SCRA 74; People v. Condemena,
L-22426, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 910; People v. Jamero,
L-19852, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 206; People v. Ubaldo,
L-19490, Aug. 26, 1968, 24 SCRA 735; People v. Viñas,
L-21756, Oct. 28, 1968, 25 SCRA 682; People v. Peralta, L-19069, Oct.
29, 1968, 25 SCRA 759; People v. Magcamit,
L-25555, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 450; People v. Tapitan,
L-21492, April 25, 1969, 27 SCRA 959; People v. Bautista, L-23303, May
20, 1969, 28 SCRA 184; People v. Tapac,
L-26491, May 20, 1969, 28 SCRA 191; People v. Gomez, L-25815, May 31,
1969, 28 SCRA 440; People v. Pareja, L-21937,
Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 693; People v. Espejo,
L-27708, Dec. 19, 1970, 36 SCRA 400.

^[16]
While no reference was made to People v.
Ampad, L-23513, Jan. 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 750,
where this Court, through Justice Makalintal, held
that where, from the prosecution’s own evidence, the conspi­racy was against a
certain individual alone, but in the course of the commission of the offense,
another person was likewise shot, the liability for the acts done outside the
scope of the plan agreed upon should fall on the actual perpetrator alone, this
doctrine finds no application as it was shown that the shot made by Icasiano Pudpud was precisely in
pursuance of the conspiracy and that the intended victim was Postrero as agreed upon, but it turned out that the person
behind him, Milagrosa, was the one hit.  Clearly, under such circumstances, the
criminal act was part and parcel of the conspiracy agreed upon and all the
conspirators should be held liable.