CARLOS LEE UI, PETITIONER, VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 145, MAKATI CITY, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND IRIS L. BONIFACIO, RESPONDENTS.
BERSAMIN, J.:
- Order dated July 14, 2005, granting the Prosecution’s motion for partial reconsideration (vis-à- vis the order dated May 13, 2005 suspending the criminal action due to a prejudicial question), setting aside such order, and setting the arraignment of the petitioner as an accused;[1] and
- Order dated August 10, 2005, denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.[2]
The antecedents follow.In Criminal Case No. 04-3796, the petitioner is charged with estafa under Art. 315, 1, (b), Revised Penal Code, along with 2 others, under the information dated November 17, 2004, to wit:
That on or about February 17, 2004 and sometime thereafter, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, acting in common accord and helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud complainant of P17.5 million representing the proceeds of the sale of her house and lot located at No. 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa City, committed as follows: that accused Ui, being then the attorney-in-fact of complainant Iris L. Bonifacio for the sale of the latter’s afore-described house and lot, was able to sell it for P19.5 million. Upon receipt of the proceeds of the sale [through check payments], with complainant Iris L. Bonifacio as the sole payee, accused Ui, with the express approval and indispensable cooperation of accused bank officers Cochico and de Leon, was able to open two (2) “UNISA” placement accounts by requesting his co-accused Cochico and de Leon to issue two (2) Metrobank Manager’s Check Nos. 6600001919 and 6600001920, in the amounts of P9,501,451.38 and P8,012,222.22, respectively, both payable under the account name “Carlos Ui” OR “Iris L. Bonifacio”, again without complainant’s knowledge and consent. Worse, accused “Ui” subsequently deposited these two (2) Metrobank Manager’s Checks in the aggregate amount of P17.5 million in his personal account with China Trust Bank under Account No. 015020022130 [to the exclusion of complainant Iris L. Bonifacio] and, thereafter, misappropriated, misapplied and converted the amount of P17.5 million and despite formal demands made upon all the accused, they failed and continue to fail to deliver or remit the amount of P17.5 million to herein complainant Iris L. Bonifacio to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
On January 21, 2005, the petitioner filed a motion to suspend proceedings and arraignment due to prejudicial question,[4] praying that his arraignment and the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 04-3796 be suspended during the pendency of the civil action brought by complainant Iris L. Bonifacio prior to the commencement of Criminal Case No. 04-3796 to declare the nullity of her marriage with the petitioner due to the prejudicial question raised therein that was determinative of whether or not he would be liable for estafa. He contended in his motion that should the marriage be declared valid in said civil action, the regime of conjugal partnership would apply to the parties as spouses due to their marriage having been solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code, rendering the property subject of the information part of the spouses’ conjugal partnership, that he would not be guilty of estafa.
Respondent Bonifacio opposed the petitioner’s motion.[5]
On March 29, 2005, the RTC reset the arraignment on May 24, 2005 without prejudice to the resolution of the motion to suspend proceedings and arraignment due to prejudicial question.
On May 13, 2005, the RTC granted the motion to suspend etc., abating the proceedings as against the petitioner until final adjudication of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Bonifacio.[6]
Consequently, Bonifacio, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, filed a motion for partial reconsideration.[7] After the petitioner submitted his opposition, the RTC issued its first assailed order on July 14, 2005, granting the motion for partial reconsideration and setting aside the order dated May 13, 2005,[8] holding thus:
In support of its partial motion for reconsideration, the prosecution cited the case of Carino vs. Carino, 351 SCRA 126, wherein it was ruled by the Honorable Supreme Court that: “For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy x x x or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.” (Emphasis supplied)
In the light of this pronouncement, it is asserted by the prosecution that the prior declaration of nullity of the void and bigamous marriage between private complainant Iris Bonifacio and accused Ui is only necessarily for purposes of remarriage. Thus, in the case at bar, the validity of such marriage can be determined by this court as it is essential to this case, wherein accused Ui is claiming exception from criminal culpability on the ground that he is the legitimate spouse of the private complainant.
This contention vis-à-vis the arguments advanced by the accused that his marriage to the private complainant is valid and legal, since his first marriage to Lily Sy solemnized on January 24, 1971 was null and void at its inception, even though it was only nullified in 1996, as it retroacts to the date of their marriage in 1971, hence, when he contracted the second marriage to the private complainant on October 22, 1987, there is no more legal impediment to it, is correct.
As aptly pointed out by the prosecution, the principle of retroactivity cannot be applied to the first marriage for the purpose of nullifying it, not on the date when it was actually declared null and void on 1986 but on January 24, 1971, since to do so, will prejudice the vested rights acquired by the private complainant under the Civil Code. This being so, there is more reasons for the court to proceed with the hearing of this case, as it is now essential that the validity of the marriage between the accused and the private complainant should be determined in this proceeding as it is vital and crucial to this case.
In any event, the question as to whether or not the said marriage is void ab initio being bigamous, was already resolved by Branch 140 of this Court in its Resolution of July 5, 2002, declaring the marriage of the petitioner and private complainant Iris Bonifacio to accused Carlos Lee Ui on October 22, 1987, void ab initio for being bigamous in nature.
This finding by Branch 140 of this Court supported by the cited case of Carino promulgated on February 2, 2001, was buttressed further by the earlier case of Engrace Niñal, et. al., vs. Norma Bayadog, 328 SCRA 125, March 14, 2000, wherein it was initially held by the Honorable Supreme Court that: “Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.” (Emphasis supplied)
Additionally, the argument advanced by the accused Ui that even if their marriage is to be declared void ab initio, their property regime is that of co-ownership under Article 144 of the Civil Code and therefore he is not still criminally liable of the offense of Estafa as he is a co-owner of the alleged amount supposed to have been misappropriated, is untenable and specious to say the least, in the light of the insistence of the private complainant that this parcel of land which was sold, the proceeds of which is the subject of this Estafa case, is her exclusive paraphernal property.
In any case, these disparate contentions of the parties are factual issues which should be addressed during the trial proper. Corollarily, the partial motion for reconsideration of the prosecution is apposite, as there is indeed no need for the prior declaration of nullity of the marriage between the accused and the private complainant, before proceeding to the trial of this Estafa case.
Necessarily, the motion for reconsideration filed by accused Cochico and De Leon, which has its entire factual and legal moorings on the suspension of the proceedings as against their co-accused Ui is rendered moot and academic. Their arraignment as well as that of Ui and the ensuing trial are to be set, to afford the prosecution the opportunity to adduce its evidence, first, to establish the fact that there was no valid marriage between the private complainant and accused Ui as it was void from the very beginning it being bigamous and second to prove all the elements of the offense of Estafa as alleged in the information.
On the part of the accused Ui, to adduce evidence primarily to show that his marriage to the private complainant Iris Bonifacio is valid and subsisting and legal, hence, he is exempt from any criminal liability being the legitimate spouse of the private complainant pursuant to Article 332. Second, if need be, to show that no Estafa was committed by him.
On the part of the two accused Cochico and De Leon, they will also be given the chance to present countervailing evidence if prima facie case had already been established against them, on the bases of the evidence presented by the prosecution, otherwise, to present no evidence at all and file a motion for leave to submit demurrer to evidence as the case may be.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration and for dismissal for alleged forum shopping.[9] The Prosecution opposed.[10]
On August 10, 2005, the RTC issued the second assailed order,[11] stating:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration and motion to dismiss due to forum shopping filed by accused Carlos Lee Ui, the opposition to it by the prosecution, and it appearing that the averments in the said motion are mere repetitious of the arguments advanced by movant Ui in his opposition to the motion for partial reconsideration filed by the prosecution, as it is indeed irrefragable that there is no prejudicial question in this case which will warrant the suspension of its proceedings on account of the pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the marriage of the movant-accused and private complainant Bonifacio, in the light of the pronouncement of the Honorable Supreme Court that this court may pass upon the validity of the marriage of the parties herein in this action, as it is essential to the determination of the criminal culpability of the accused, without awaiting for the adjudication of the civil case for petition of declaration of nullity, the motion for reconsideration is without merit and must necessarily fail.
Relative to the motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping, the same is likewise spacious to say the least. As invariably held by the Supreme Court the test to determine whether forum shopping is in existence, is whether in these two cases there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action and reliefs sought.
It is at once obvious that there is no identity of parties between these two cases, the other one pending before Branch 140 of this court has for its parties, the private complainant herein as well as her husband, the accused Ui. In this case at bar, it is the accused Ui and the people of the Philippines who is the principal private complainant.
Ms Iris Bonifacio, the wife of the accused, is only a principal witness in this criminal case. The causes of action are likewise different. In the civil case, the cause of action of Ms Bonifacio is for declaration of nullity of her marriage to accused Ui and the determination of their property relationship once the marriage is declared null and void among others. While in this criminal case, the cause of action is the vindication of the rights of the people of the Philippines which was allegedly violated by the accused when he purportedly committed the imputed offense of estafa, as it disturbs public order. Lastly, the reliefs sought for are likewise dissimilar. In the civil case, it is for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between the parties and that the vested right of the petitioner Bonifacio over the properties in question, be maintained and respected, while in this criminal case it is the imposition of the penal sanction against the accused if his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, conversely, his acquittal in accordance with his constitutional presumption of innocence, if there is no moral certainty of his criminal culpability.
Limpidly, there is no forum shopping which will warrant the dismissal of this criminal case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the motion for reconsideration as well as the motion to dismiss is DENIED for lack of merit. The arraignment of the accused is to proceed as scheduled on August 18, 2005 at 2:00 p.m. pursuant to the Order of July 26, 2005. Furnish the accused of a copy of this Order as well as his counsel through personal service to be effected by the process server of this Branch, immediately, in time for the scheduled arraignment.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari, wherein the petitioner insists that the RTC:
xxx COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED ORDERS ORDERING THE FURTHER PROCEEDING OF THE INSTANT CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER CARLOS LEE UI AND SETTING HIS ARRAIGNMENT THEREFOR DESPITE THE CLEAR PRESENCE OF RPEJUDICIAL QUESTION ARISING FROM THE PRIOR CIVIL ACTION FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF A VOID, BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE INSTITUTED BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER DOCKETED AS CIVIL CASE NO. 04-421 PENDING BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY, BRANCH 140.
The petitioner represents that he and Bonifacio – complainant in the estafa case – contracted marriage in Hawaii, United States of America on October 22, 1987; that before the information in the criminal action was filed, she commenced her action against him, seeking the declaration of the nullity of their marriage for being bigamous; that such prior and pending civil action constituted a prejudicial question to warrant the suspension of the criminal action because the issues for resolution in said prior civil action were (a) whether the marriage between him and Bonifacio was bigamous and void; and (b) what property relations governed him and Bonifacio during their cohabitation, if said marriage was declared void; that he and Bonifacio acquired properties during their cohabitation, including the Alabang property the proceeds of the sale of which were allegedly misappropriated by him; and that the determination of the status of their marriage and their respective rights over the properties acquired during their cohabitation was crucial in the determination of whether the criminal action might proceed against him and whether he was liable for the misappropriation of the sale proceeds.
He contends that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the prior declaration of the nullity of the marriage in the civil action was not necessary before proceeding with the criminal action considering that the petitioner, as an accused, was not thereby precluded from proving in the trial of the criminal action that his marriage with Bonifacio was valid, subsisting and legal.
In contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General avers that there was no prejudicial question because the facts, issues, and also the parties upon which the civil action was based were dissimilar to those of the criminal case; that the civil case involved the petitioner and Bonifacio and arose from the act of the petitioner in contracting a second marriage while his first marriage still subsisted but the criminal action was between the People of the Philippines and the petitioner and was based on his act of misappropriating the proceeds of the sale of the Alabang property; that the relationship of the petitioner and Bonifacio was in no way related to the criminal act alleged in the criminal action, considering that his alleged crime stemmed from the special power of attorney executed in his favor and from his subsequent misappropriation of the proceeds of the sale of the Alabang property, not from his being the spouse of Bonifacio; that the first element imposed for the existence of the prejudicial question by Sec. 7, Rule 111, Rules of Court, that the previously instituted civil action involved an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, was, therefore, absent; that the second element under the rule was also absent, considering that the court trying the criminal action was vested with the authority to determine the validity of the marriage between the petitioner and Bonifacio; that the petitioner could not also rely on Art. 332, Revised Penal Code, under which no criminal liability, but only civil liability, could result from the commission of estafa, among others, if committed by a spouse, considering that such provision set forth an absolutory cause by which the act committed still constituted a crime but the law did not punish the offender for reason of public policy; that, as such, the outcome of the civil action was not determinative of guilt or innocence of the petitioner, but the criminal action should proceed independently of the civil case; and that the petitioner should not hide behind the mantle of prejudicial question to delay his prosecution; otherwise, he would be using his own wrong as a shield from prosecution.
The petition for certiorari has no merit.
Sec. 7, Rule 111, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides the elements of a prejudicial question, viz:
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
In essence, a prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein.[12] It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.[13] It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal case.[14] Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution is determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed.[15]
A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented a single evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.[16] In light of the foregoing, the RTC correctly ruled that no prejudicial question arose in the civil action for declaration of the nullity of the marriage between the petitioner and Bonifacio.
Clearly, the first element imposed in Sec. 7, Rule 111, supra, is absent considering that the facts, issues, and also the parties upon which the civil action is based are notably dissimilar to those in the criminal case. The civil case involved Bonifacio and the petitioner on their marriage but the criminal action concerned the People of the Philippines as the complainant and the petitioner as the accused based on his misappropriation of the proceeds of the sale of the Alabang property. Bonifacio might claim to own the Alabang property and the petitioner might claim to be either a conjugal owner or co-owner, but their relationship as spouses was not decisive of his guilt considering that the crime charged stemmed from his abuse of the trust and confidence reposed in him through the special power of attorney in his favor, not from his being the spouse of Bonifacio, the principal.
Similarly, the second element is absent. It is obvious that the trial court handling the criminal case is vested with authority to determine the validity of the marriage contracted by the petitioner and Bonifacio, assuming that such becomes an issue relevant to the crime charged. Thereby, the trial court of the criminal case need not await the resolution of the issue in the civil case before it can proceed with the prosecution of the petitioner.
Assuming that the validity of the marriage between the petitioner and Bonifacio poses a prejudicial question, the trial court need not suspend the criminal action to await the outcome of the civil action because it can pass upon the validity of the marriage in the criminal action itself. As clarified in Cariño v. Cariño:[17]xxx for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
The petitioner has adverted to Art. 332, Revised Penal Code, to support his plea for suspension of the criminal prosecution.
The provision pertinently reads:
Art. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. – No criminal, but only civil liability, shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouse, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line;
xxx
The provision establishes an absolutory cause, by which the act committed still constitutes a crime but the law does not punish the offender for reason of public policy.[18] Absolutory causes are those where the acts committed are still crimes but for reasons of public policy and sentiment no penalties are imposed.[19] We hold that it is premature for the petitioner to invoke Art. 332, Revised Penal Code. He should first establish the factual bases for his invocation of the provision as a defense in the criminal action before the absolutory cause would apply to him. For such purpose, the criminal action is not suspended. Evidently, the outcome of the civil case for declaration of the nullity of the marriage is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner, inasmuch as the criminal case may proceed independently of the civil case. Regardless of the outcome of the civil case, the petitioner, having committed a crime, should be held for trial in the criminal case.
In denying the petitioner’s prayer for the suspension of the criminal action, therefore, respondent RTC Judge plainly did not act capriciously, arbitrarily or whimsically; hence, he was not guilty of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. It is not sufficient that a tribunal, in the exercise of its power, abused its discretion, such abuse must be grave.[20]
The sole office of an extraordinary writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. For as long as the judge acted within his jurisdiction, an error of judgment that he may commit in the exercise thereof is not correctible through the special civil action of certiorari.[21]
WHEREFORE, the PETITION FOR CERTIORARI is DENIED DUE COURSE and this case is DISMISSED.
Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Villarama, Jr., (Chairman) and Librea-Leagogo, JJ., concur.
[1] Annex A, petition.
[2] Annex B, petition.
[3] Annex D, petition.
[4] Annex E, petition.
[5] Annex F, petition.
[6] Annex G, petition.
[7] Annex H, petition.
[8] Annex A, petition.
[9] Annex C, petition.
[10] Annex L, petition.
[11] Annex B, petition.
[12] Fortich-Celdran v. Celdran, 19 SCRA 502 (1967); Zapanta v. Montessa; 114 Phil. 428 (1962); Merced v. Diez, 109 Phil. 155 (1960); See also People v. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357 (1954).
[13] Yap v. Paras, 205 SCRA 625 (1992); Donato v. Luna, 160 SCRA 441 (1988); Quiambao v. Osorio, 158 SCRA 674 (1988); Mendiola v. Macadaeg, 1 SCRA 593 (1961); Aleria v. Mendoza, 83 Phil. 427 (1949).
[14] Ras v. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125 (1980); Benitez v. Concepcion, Jr., 2 SCRA 178 (1961); De Leon v. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202 (1940).
[15] Yap v. Paras, 205 SCRA 625 (1992)
[16] Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509; July 31, 2000; 336 SCRA 747.
[17] 351 SCRA 127, 132; citing Niñal v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122, 136.
[18] See Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, 9th ed. (1997), pp. 83-84.
[19] Reyes, Revised Penal Code, 14th ed., (1998), p. 299.
[20] Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1, 8th Revised Edition (2002), p. 718.
[21] People v. Sandiganbayan, 447 SCRA 291, 308 (2004).