AVELINO G. GREGORIO AND IRENE J. GREGORIO, SUBSTITUTED APPELLEES FOR THE DECEASED DEFENDANT EUSEBIO GREGORIO, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS[] AND CECILIO PANALIGAN, RESPONDE…

Gregorio versus Panaligan

The Case

This is a petition filed by Avelino Gregorio and Irene Gregorio, who substituted for the deceased defendant Eusebio Gregorio, against the Court of Appeals and Cecilio Panaligan. The dispute began as an action for recovery of possession of land with damages, filed by Panaligan against Eusebio Gregorio, and it turned on a conflict of boundaries between two parcels of land, each covered by a Torrens title. The case matters because it is the Supreme Court's classic statement of the material data rule and of the liberal doctrine that an appellate court may rely on the trial court's approval of a record on appeal, so that a party's right of appeal is not defeated by a rigid technicality.

Procedural History

The action was tried in the Court of First Instance of Zambales, which rendered judgment in favor of the defendant Gregorio and dismissed Panaligan's complaint. Panaligan moved for a new trial and reconsideration, and the trial court denied the motion. Panaligan then filed his notice of appeal and appeal bond, and later his record on appeal, which the trial court approved as in order. After the record was elevated to the Court of Appeals, the Gregorios filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the record on appeal did not show the dates when Panaligan received the adverse decision and the adverse order denying reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied the motion to dismiss and later denied reconsideration. The Gregorios then came to the Supreme Court by petition, invoking a rigid application of the material data rule.

Facts

Cecilio Panaligan sued Eusebio Gregorio for recovery of possession of land with damages. Both parties held Torrens titles to their respective lands, and the case resolved a conflict of boundaries between them. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Zambales rendered judgment in favor of Gregorio and dismissed the complaint.

Panaligan filed a motion for new trial and reconsideration, which the trial court denied. He received copy of the denial order on November 8, 1973, and on the following day, November 9, 1973, he filed his notice of appeal and appeal bond. His motion for extension, dated November 8, 1973, stated that his reglementary period to file the record on appeal would expire on November 9, 1973, and prayed for a thirty-day extension on the ground of absence of clerical assistance. The trial court granted the extension, giving him up to December 9, 1973, and he filed his record on appeal on December 3, 1973, well within the extended period.

No objection to the record on appeal was filed by the Gregorios. The trial court, in its order of January 3, 1974, found the record on appeal to be in order and approved it. After the record was elevated to the Court of Appeals, the Gregorios moved to dismiss the appeal because the record on appeal did not show the dates when Panaligan received copy of the adverse decision and of the adverse order denying reconsideration. Panaligan opposed the motion, showing that the record disclosed the date of service of the denial order and that he had perfected his appeal within the reglementary period. The Court of Appeals denied the motion to dismiss and denied reconsideration.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the motion to dismiss the appeal despite the alleged rigid application of the material data rule.
• Whether or not the record on appeal substantially complied with the material data rule.
• Whether or not the appellate court may rely on the trial court's order approving the record on appeal as in order where the adverse party does not dispute the correctness and veracity of that determination.

Applicable Provisions

Section 6 of Rule 41 provides:

Section 6. Record on appeal. — The record on appeal shall include the full names of all the parties and their attorneys, the date of the filing of the complaint, the date of the receipt by the appellant of notice of the judgment or order appealed from, and the date of the filing of the notice of appeal, and shall contain a certified true copy of the judgment or order appealed from, the notice of appeal, the appeal bond, and the material portions of the record as are referred to in the appeal.

This is the material data rule, which requires the record on appeal to show the date of receipt of notice of the judgment or order appealed from, and the case turns on whether the record substantially complied with it.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals did not err, much less act with grave abuse of discretion, in denying the motion to dismiss the appeal. The petition invoked a rigid application of the material data rule, but the Court refused to apply it rigidly where the record showed substantial compliance.

On the second issue, the Court found substantial compliance. Panaligan's motion for extension stated that his reglementary period to file the record on appeal would expire on November 9, 1973, a fact undisputed by the Gregorios. It was equally of record and undisputed that the extension was granted and that Panaligan filed his record on appeal well within the extended period. These data in the record on appeal showed the perfection of the appeal on time and constituted substantial compliance with the material data rule.

On the third issue, the Court held that even if there had been no substantial compliance, the appellate court properly relied on the trial court's order of approval and determination that the record on appeal was in order, since the correctness and veracity of that determination were not impugned or disputed by the adverse party. The Court explained the reason for the material data rule: to obviate and eliminate the waste of time that would be incurred by the appellate tribunal in requiring the lower court to forward the original record and in examining it to determine the timeliness of the appeal. Where the trial court, in its order approving the record on appeal, finds and declares that the same was timely perfected or in order, and the correctness and veracity of that finding are not disputed by the adverse party, the reason for the rule ceases, because the appellate court can rely thereon without sending for and examining the original records. The Court also rejected the contention that the appeal was manifestly groundless, holding that Panaligan's extensive arguments did not bear this out, and upheld his right of appeal.

Doctrine

The material data rule under Section 6 of Rule 41 requires the record on appeal to state the date of receipt by the appellant of notice of the judgment or order appealed from. Substantial compliance with this rule is sufficient, and a record on appeal that shows the perfection of the appeal on time satisfies it.

Under the liberal doctrine, the appellate court may properly rely on the trial court's order approving the record on appeal and determining that the perfection of the appeal was in order, where the correctness and veracity of that determination are not impugned or disputed by the adverse party. The reason for the material data rule is to spare the appellate court the waste of time in sending for and examining the original record to determine timeliness; where the trial court has already made that determination and it is undisputed, the reason for the rule ceases. The right of appeal should be upheld and the case decided on the merits rather than dismissed on a technicality.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed and the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for proper determination of the appeal on the merits, without costs. Panaligan's right of appeal was upheld.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the material data rule is satisfied by substantial compliance, and the appellate court may rely on the trial court's approval of the record on appeal where its correctness is not disputed. Examiners use this case to test the liberal application of procedural rules and the policy of deciding appeals on the merits.