THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD. EMPLOYEES ASSO­CIATION-NATU, FGU INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS & EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, AND INSU­LAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU…

The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd., FGU Insurance Group,
and Jose M. Olbes, through a motion for
reconsideration filed on April 21,
1971, ask this Court to re-examine its decision dated January 30, 1971.

In the main, the respondents question the review made by this
Court of the determination of facts reached by the Court of Industrial
Relations and the consequent revision of the said findings of fact.  The respondents allege that this Court
“swept into unmerited oblivion the voluminous documentary and testimonial
evidence” they proffered, which
evidence consisted of

“Exhibits ‘1’ to ’38’, and the testimony of Messrs. Felipe Enage, Enrique Clemente, Vicente Abella, Rodolfo R. Encarnacion,
Nestor Cipriano, Mauro Blardoni,
Sr., Ramon Garcia, Ramon M. Zosa, Vicente R. Ayllon, Antonio
L. Castillo, Carlos Valencia, Juan S. Raymundo, Jose Olbes, Calixto S. Fernandez,
Detective Lieutenant Felino Singh of the Manila Police Department, Sergeant Crisanto
Lorenzo of the Manila Police Department, and Felician Morada.”^[1]

Concededly, the findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations,
if supported by substantial evidence, bind this Court.^[2]
This, for the reason that the rule of substantial evidence, rather than the
rule of preponderance of evidence applicable in ordinary civil cases, governs
the Court of Industrial – Relations in its findings of fact.^[3]
And substantial evidence refers to “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”^[4] Then, too, the substantiality of the
evidence depends on its quantitative as well as its qualitative aspects. 
For to be considered as substantial evidence should primarily be credible.^[5]

However, findings of fact
of the Court of Industrial Relations unsupported by substantial and credible evidence do not bind this Court.^[6]
And, certainly, the failure of substantial
and credible proof to sustain the
findings of fact of the
Court of Industrial Relations justifies the review by this Court of the
said factual determination.  Con­comitantly,
the need to revise, reverse or modify the factual findings of the Court of
Industrial Relations arises to enable this Court to draw the appropriate and
correct conclusions for the proper resolution of the questions on the rights
and obligations of the parties involved.

Thus, before coming to the numerous errors which respondents
claim have been committed by this Court in reviewing and reversing the factual
deter­mination reached by the Court of Industrial Relations, we reiterate what
we stated in the decision of January 30, 1971: 
we deemed it necessary to review the entire factual milieu of the case
in controversy and to reverse the factual findings arrived at by the Court of
Industrial Relations because we found the same unsupported by substantial
evidence and, much more, by credible proof.

The errors allegedly committed by this Court in its factual
findings and its conclusions derived therefrom,
properly summed up and grouped, fall into three categories:  (1) those pertaining to findings and
conclusions without basis on record or contrary to the evidence on record; (2) those referring to findings and
conclusions contrary to the factual determination made by and conclusions
arrived at by the Court of Industrial Relations; and (3) those relating to
issues not raised or errors not assigned by the parties.

To the respondents’ first cauldron of steaming objections belong
the following factual findings and conclusions of this Court purportedly
unsupported by the records or contrary to what appears in the same:  (1) that the respondents instructed Ramon
Garcia and Vicente Abella to create the disturbance
which occurred on May 21, 1958; (2) that Garcia issued a circular to dissuade
the members of the Unions from
disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the NATU; (3) that the respondents did
not make counter-proposals to the Unions’ demands and that the said respondents
insisted on the Unions’ dropping their demands for union security,
“promising money benefits if this was done;” (4) that the Court of
First Instance of Manila issued the restraining order “on the basis of the
pendency of the various criminal cases against
striking members of the Unions;” (5) that “more than 120 criminal
charges” were filed against the members of the Unions; (6) that the
respondents hired Felipe Enage and Garcia,
“former legal counsels of the petitioners, as personnel manager and
assistant corporate secretary, respectively, with attractive
compensations;” and (7) that Jose M. Olbes
“brought three truckloads of non–strikers
and others, escorted by armed
men, who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings
occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters wide
and in the process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the
premises of the Insular Life Building.”

1. Anent the first point raised by the res­pondents, this Court,
in the decision of January 30, 1971,
stated:

“There is therefore a reasonable suggestion that they were
sent to work at the latter building to create such an incident and have a basis
for filing criminal charges against the petitioners in the fiscal’s
office and applying for injunction from the court of first instance.”^[7]

Earlier in the decision (Page 4) and in
the preceding statements, this Court briefly recounted the circums­tances
attending the occurrence.  To claim that
this Court, in the above-quoted portion of the decision, found and
categorically stated that Garcia and Abella
participated in some sort of a pre-planned scheme to “create the
disturbance” constitutes but a mistaken impression of the statement of
this Court.  The statement simply
expresses that in the circumstances already
mentioned — which circumstances the records unraveled lurked the distinct
likelihood that Garcia and Abella purposely provided
the provocation for the incident.

2. We find the second objection of the res­pondents well-taken,
for the records offer little to provide sufficient clarity on whether or not
Garcia, as acting president of
the Insular Life/FGU unions and the
Insular Life Building Employees Association, “in a circular issued in his
name and signed by him, tried to dissuade the members of the Unions from
disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade
Unions (NATU).” The transcript of the proceedings before the Court of
Industrial Relations reveals only Garcia’s apparent adeptness at evasion and inability to recall, among other things, whether or not he issued the
circular aforementioned.  Nonetheless,
the foregoing questioned statement of this Court in the narration of facts in
the decision bears no materiality to the conclusions finally arrived at.

3. The respondents claim the statement of this Court that “the Companies did not make any counter
proposals but, instead, insisted that the Unions first drop their demand for
union security, promising money benefits if this was done” as “truly
false” and “an unwarranted deviation from the truth.” Far from
being so, we find that the records precisely support the finding.  The thrust
of the testimony of Enage (Pages 13 to 65, tsn, March 30, 1960; pages 7 to 13, tsn,
April 29, 1960) — the chairman of the negotiating committee for the
respondents — verily points out that the said respondents omitted, without
sufficient reasons, to present counter–proposals to the Unions’ demands.  This, in
addition to the testi­monial evidence offered by Ignacio Lacsina (Pages 56 to 62, tsn,
September 8, 1958) — chairman of the negotiating
panel for the Unions,- supports the finding that, indeed, the respondents
offered no counter-proposals to the demands of the said Unions.  At most, the records reveal, the respondents,
to placate the Unions, indulged in the superficial discussion of the demands,
requiring the said Unions to explain and clarify the import of their
demands.  Then, too, the totality of the
testimonial evidence of Lacsina (Pages 35 to 38, tsn,
October 14, 1958) and the Unions’ panel members Villaruel
(Pages 60 to 61, tsn, November 21, 1958) and Du Timbol (Pages 25 to 26 and 30,
tsn, November 18, 1959) clearly indicates that the
respondents more than persuaded the Unions to drop their union security demands
with the promise of monetary benefits.

4. We consider the objection of the respondents to the statement
of this Court that the Court of First Instance of Manila issued the restraining
order “on the basis of the pendency of the
various criminal cases against striking members of the Unions” as
well-founded.  The records show that the
respondents predicated their petition for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction (Ex­hibit “32-B”) upon certain acts which the
said respondents claimed the picketing members of the striking Unions committed
through “force, threats, intimidation, coercion and violence.” The
res­training order (Exhibit “33-C”) issued by the Court of First
Instance of Manila on May 31, 1958 makes no express mention of the pendency of the various criminal charges already filed
against the picketing members of the striking Unions.  Neverthe­less, the fact remains that on the
day the Court of First Instance of Manila issued the restraining order, several
criminal charges (Exhibits “19,” “20,” “23” to
“29,” inclusive and “31”) had been filed already with the
Office of the City Fiscal of Manila against many of the picketing members of
the Unions.

5. The respondents also question the statement of this Court
giving the impression of the filing of “more than 120 criminal
charges” against the members of the striking Unions.  The evidence
at hand (Exhibits “19,” “20,” “23” to
“31,” inclusive) show, as of June
2, 1958, four complaints for coercion and seven for grave coercion
already filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila.  Each of the preliminary investigation
memoranda, however, except three (Exhibits “26-,” “29” and
“30”) names several members of the striking Unions collectively as
accused.  Counting the charges individually
— prescinding from the fact that a number of the
members of the striking Unions then faced two or more charges, having been
named as accused in more than one memorandum -­- the charges add up to
eighty-four.  On this point, we sustain
the objection of the respondents.

6. The respondents also allege as objectionable the following
statement of this Court:

“It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners’
submission of proposals for an amended renewal of their respective collective
bargaining agreements to the respondents, the latter hired Felipe Enage and Ramon Garcia, former legal counsels of the
petitioners, as personnel manager and assistant corporate secretary,
respectively, with attractive compensations.”^[8]

The respondents claim the “falsity of
the finding” that Enage and Garcia worked as
“legal counsels of the petitioners” and allege this Court as
“unduly unkind” in giving the impression that they enticed Enage and Garcia “from their positions as ‘legal
counsels of the petitioners’ with high salaries.” The records, however,
evince that Garcia served as Secretary-Treasurer of the Federation of Free
Workers (Pages 59 to 61, tsn, August 4, 1961) and that Garcia handled cases for the Federation
of Free Workers (Page 58, tsn, August 4, 1961) with
which the Unions then formed an affiliation (Pages 59 to 62, tsn, August 4, 1961; page 62,tsn, January 16, 1962).  With respect to Enage,
the records show that he worked with the Federation of Free Workers (Page 25, tsn, April 29, 1960).  Even the respondents, in their brief (Page
46), stated that Garcia and Enage worked as counsels
for the Federation of Free Workers. 
Nevertheless, assuming the truth of the respondents’ assertion that
neither Garcia nor Enage served as counsel, directly
or indirectly through the Federation of Free Workers, for the Unions, this passing mention of the disputed former
connection of Garcia and Enage to the said Unions
bears no relevance to the principal merits of the case at bar.  As to the other observations of the respondents,
we deem it unnecessary to discuss the same for only a misreading of the aforequoted portion of the decision gives, in the words of
the respondents themselves, “the unkind impression that respondents
enticed them (Enage and Garcia) from their position
as ‘legal counsels of the petitioners’ with high salaries.”

7. The respondents’ allegation that no evidence supports the
statement of this Court that they, through their president and manager Jose Olbes,

“brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted
by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the three
buildings occupied by the
Companies, entered thru only one gate less then two meters wide and in the
process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of the
Insular Life Building,”^[9]

rounds up the objections of the said
respondents properly falling under the first group.  The res­pondents claim the absence of
evidence showing that:  (1) Olbes held the position of manager; (2) Olbes brought three truckloads of
“non-strikers and others;” (3) armed men escorted the non­strikers and others;” (4) eight entrances provided
access to the three buildings; and (5) that the gate through which the
“non-strikers and others” entered measured “less than two meters
wide.”

Objection number one deals with an inconsequential detail —
whether or not Olbes held, in any capacity, the
position of manager — which bears no materiality to the main issues raised by
the case at hand.

As to number two, the evidence of the res­pondents’ own witnesses
— Ramon Zosa (Page 38, tsn,
December 5, 1960), Nestor Cipriano (Pages 18, 19 and
26, tsn, February 1, 1961) and Olbes
(Pages 7 to 13, 33, 34 and 45 to 50, tsn, October 2,
1962)–more than sufficiently indicate the truth that Olbes
led three busloads of non-strikers and others to the picketed buildings.  To this effect, too, testified some witnesses
of the Unions; parti­cularly Ponciano Abesamis (Pages 57 to 66, tsn,
January 20, 1959) and Jose Victorio (Pages 19 to 25, tsn, June 11, 1959).

Regarding number three, the records miss to evince clearly
whether or not armed men escorted the three JD buses filled with non-strikers
and others to the respondents’ picketed premises.

On number four, a collation of all the evidence bearing on this
Objection reveals the following
means of access to the office premises of the respondents comprised of almost
one block bounded by Plaza Cervantes, Plaza Moraga, Muelle
de la Industria and Juan Luna:  (1) the Plaza Cervantes entrance to the
Insular Life Building (Page 8, tsn, February 8,
1961); (2) the two Plaza Moraga entrances to the Insular Life Building (Page 8,
tsn, September 13, 1960); (3) the basement entrance
to the Insular Life Building (Page 29, tsn, October
2, 1962); (4) the Juan Luna entrance to the Ayala Building (Page 11, tsn, August 4, 1961); (5) the Muelle
de la Industria entrance to the Ayala Building (Page
27, tsn, August 4,
1961); (6) the Plaza Moraga entrance to the Filipinas Building (Page 21,
tsn, August 18, 1959); and (7) the entrance to the
National City Bank of New York the premises of which have a connecting door to
the lobby of the Ayala Building (Page 30, tsn,
October 2, 1962).

As to objection number five, not one of the parties offers any
specific evidence showing the exact measurement of the gate through which the non­strikers and others entered.  The evidence on record relevant to this point
discloses that the gate measures about two to three meters wide.

The respondents further unleash their vigorous exception to the
following findings arrived at by this Court; (1) that the respondents
discriminated against the strikers in the readmission; (2) that the respondents
dismissed thirty-four strikers without
lawful cause; (3) that the respondents omitted to give the dismissed strikers
the opportunity to defend themselves against the supposed charges against them;
and (4) that the respondents’ letter of May 21, 1959 (Exhibit “A”)
contained “promises of benefits to the employees in order to entice them
to return to work” and that the said respondents’ letter of May 31, 1958 (Exhibit “B”) contained “threats to obtain
replacements for the striking employees” in the event of their failure to
report for work on June 2, 1958.  The
respondents strongly protest against the alteration and reversal made by this
Court of the tactual determination reached by the Court of Industrial Relations
on these salient points.

Setting aside the incisive dissection performed by the
respondents on the statements of this Court relevant and related to the
aforementioned findings, the arguments of the said respondents all but lead to
their primary objection that this Court erred in finding that they committed
unfair labor practice.  For, admittedly,
the foregoing findings provided this Court with the unshakeable bases in
arriving at the inescapable conclusion that the respondents committed unfair
labor practice.

In the decision of January 30 1971, this Court, fully cognizant
that the findings now questioned by the respondents constituted the
considerations of importance to the issues involved in the case at bar, sufficiently and clearly, albeit
lengthily, discussed all of them.  And a
consultation with and a combing of the voluminous records disclose the
evidence, substantial and credible, in support of the said, findings.

The respondents labor under the impression that, in the
controversy at hand, the findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations
deserve much weight and consideration. 
The said findings of fact, the respondents
argue should remain conclusive.  However,
the want of substantial evidence, nay, credible proof, to uphold the
findings of the Court of Industrial Relations on the matters now disputed by
the respondents, brought about by the mistaken appreciation of the facts,
prompted this Court to review the facts on record and to alter and reverse the determination reached by
the said Court of Industrial Relations. 
These, consequently, re­sulted in a view rather different from that of
the Court of Industrial Relations.

Not infrequently, the Court of Industrial Relations misapprehends
the facts and, eventually, arrives at erroneous conclusions.  For in the Court of Industrial Relations,
only one judge hears the case and usually, not even a judge hears the same.  Instead, a hearing examiner — an employee of the Court of Industrial Relations — takes
charge of the proceedings and receives the evidence.  After hearing, the hearing examiner submits
his report on the case to the judge.  The
judge then studies the case and, relying on the ability and integrity of the
hearing examiner who saw and heard the witnesses and submitted the report,
renders the decision.  More often than
not, the proceedings before the Court of Indus­trial Relations drag through
years before the case finally becomes subject to study and decision by the
judge.

And even in the reconsideration of the decision asked for by the
aggrieved party, no rehearing takes place before the Court of Industrial Relations en banc.  The individual judges,
if they have the disposition and the time to do so, review the evidence on
record or merely read and rely upon the memoranda submitted by the respective
parties and the decision subject of reconsideration, giving due consideration
to the capability, competency and probity of the judge who penned the said
decision.  And almost, invariably, the
Court of Industrial Relations en banc upholds the decision for
reconsideration.^[10]

The case at bar, this Court notes, passed from the hands of one
hearing examiner — Arsenio Adriano– to another —
Guillermo Medina.  This case also took
more than seven years before its determination by the Court of Industrial
Relations.  These factors, we opine, contributed
to the misapprehension of facts committed
by the Court of Industrial Relations warranting a
review of the factual determination in its totality.

Thus, this Court finds it neither important nor imperative to pursue any
further discussion and resolution of the
matters claimed by the
respondents as contrary to the findings
of the Court of Industrial Relations. 
And for the satisfaction of the respondents, an examination of the
entire evidence on record makes it more apparent that evidence of quantity and
quality sustains the findings of this Court on the aforementioned matters now
disputed by them.

To the third group of the respondents’ object­ions appertain
those findings of this Court on issues not raised or errors not assigned by the
parties.  The respondents question the
action taken by this Court in discussing and resolving the following:  (1) the question as to the nature of the
strike staged by the Unions; (2) the issue as to whether or not the respondents
refused to bargain collectively in good faith; and (3) the question as to the reclassification
of eighty-seven employees as supervisors.

Concededly, the Rules of Court, in proceedings before the
appellate courts, namely, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, require
the party seeking the review of a judgment to set out in his brief the errors
upon which he relies for reversal. 
Otherwise, the appellate courts would not consider those errors not
properly assigned or specified.^[11]
However, the Supreme Court has ample
authority to review and resolve matters not assigned and specified as errors by
either of the parties in the appeal if it finds the consideration and determina­tion
of the same essential and indispensable in order to arrive at a just decision
in the case.^[12] This Court, thus, has the authority
to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors if the unassigned errors
closely relate to errors properly pinpointed out or if the unassigned errors
refer to matters upon which the determination of the questions raised by the
errors properly assigned depend.^[13]

The same also applies to issues not specifically raised by the parties.  The Supreme Court, likewise, has broad discretionary powers, in the resolution of a
controversy, to take into consideration matters on record which the parties fail to submit to the Court as
specific questions for determination.^[14]
Where the issues already raised also rest on other issues not specifically
presented, as long as the latter issues bear relevance and close relation to
the former and as long as they arise from matters on record, the Court has the
authority to include them in its dis­cussion of the controversy as well as to
pass upon them.  In brief, in those cases
wherein questions not particularly raised by the parties surface as neces­sary
for the complete adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties and
such questions fall within the issues already framed by the parties, the
interests of justice dictate that the Court consider and resolve them.

In the case at hand, the questions as to the nature of the strike
staged by the Unions, the re­fusal of the respondents to bargain collectively
in good faith, and the reclassification of eighty-seven employees as
supervisors relate closely to the determination of whether or not the
respondents committed unfair labor practice. 
Thus, this Court found it necessary to resolve these issues, without
confining itself to those tendered by the parties.

In the same vein, we are also constrained to reassess the ruling
in our decision of January 30, 1971 .to the effect that the strikers must receive backwages
from the date of the act of discrimina­tion, that is, from the date of their discharge or their offer to
return to work up to the date of their actual reinstatement, deducting therefrom whatever they have earned pending readmission.

Significant changes have
since supervened as to the method of awarding backwages.  In a line of cases, the Court has established
a policy of fixing the amount of backwages to a just
and reasonable level without qualification or deduction.

Blazing the trail is Mercury
Drug Co. vs CIR,^[15]
L-23357, April 30, 1974,
which enunciated the policy.  The
doctrine is not without justifica­tion, for,
in the same case, it was
stated that the evident aim is “to avoid protracted delay in the execution of the award of backwages due to extended hearings and unavoidable delays
and difficulties encountered in determining the earnings of the laid?off employees ordered to be reinstated with backwages during the pendency of
the case for purposes of deducting the same from the gross backwages awarded.”

Feati University Club vs. Feati University,
L-35103, August 25, 1974,
adopted a consensus policy of pegging the amount of backwages
to their total equivalent for three years
(depending on the circumstances) without deduction or qualification.  The rationale for the policy was stated in the following words:

“As has been noted, this formula of awarding reasonable net backwages without
deduction or qualification relieves
the employees from proving or
disproving their earnings during their lay-off
and the employers from submitting counterproofs, and obviates the twin evils of idleness on the part
of the employee who would ‘with folded arias, remain inactive in the
expectation that a windfall would come to him’ (Itogon
Suyoc Mines, Inc. vs. Sangilo-Itogon Workers Union, 24
SCRA 873 (1968), cited in Diwa Ng Pagkakaisa
vs. Filtex International
Corp., 43 SCRA 217 (1972))
and attrition and protracted delay in
satisfying such award on the part
of unscrupulous employers who have seized upon the further proceedings to
determine the actual earnings of the wrongfully dismissed or laid-off employees
to hold unduly extended hearings for each and every employee awarded backwages
and thereby render practically nugatory such award and compel the
employees to agree to unconscionable settlements of their backwages
award in order to satisfy their dire need. 
(See La Campana Food Products, Inc. vs. CIR, 28 SCRA 314 (1969) and Kaisahan
ng Mga Manggagawa
vs. La Campana Food Products, Inc., 36 SCRA 142
(1970)).”

The above judicial policy became entrenched in our jurisprudence when the Court, in Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation and B.H. Tenefrancia vs. CIR,
et al., L-34300, November, 22, 1974, reiterated the same way of
computation, decreeing the grant of backwages not
exceeding three years without requiring the parties to submit proof of compensation received from other sources from the time of
the illegal dismissal until actual reinstatement.^[16]

 We must now respond to the
pronouncements in the above and related
cases if we are to give our law
on the matter order, direction
and light.

Here, a total of
eighteen (18) years has elapsed from June
2, 1958, date of the commence meet of the backwages.  Considering all the cir­cumstances at bar, viz., the lengthy
procedural and technical manipulations of parties, the delay in the resolution
of the case by the court below, the complexity of the issues raised by the
parties which were resolved only on
January 30, 1971, etc., the
Court considers the fixing and limitation of the backwages
award to their total equivalent of three years without qualification and deduction as applicable to and fully justified in the case at bar.

The Court finds no sufficient or compelling reason to further
depart from its judgment as embodied in the decision of January 30, 1971.

ACCORDINGLY, subject to the above modification as to backwages, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied,
and the judgment of the Court as embodied in its
decision of January 30, 1971
is affirmed in all other respects.  This
denial is immediately executory.

Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino,
Concepcion, Jr., and
Martin, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., in the result.

Fernando, J., concurs with the observation that for him the opinion likewise
signifies that Attorney Felipe Enage had been acting all
the while in accordance with the strict requirements of legal ethics.

^[1]
Motion for Reconsideration, page 3.

^[2]
Laguna Transportation Employees, Union, et al., vs. Laguna
Transportation Co., Inc., 23 SCRA 173; Tanglaw ng Paggawa vs. Court of
Industrial Relations and Red V Coconut Products, Ltd., 25 SCRA 19; Laguna
College vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., 25 SCRA
167; Philippine Educational Institution and Monzon vs.
MLQSEA Faculty Association and Quimosing, 26 SCRA
272; G. Liner and/or de Keyser vs. National Labor Union, et al.,
26 SCRA 282; National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority vs. NWSA
Consolidated Union, et al., 27 SCRA 227; Alhambra Industries,
Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations and Kapisanan
ng mga Manggagawa
sa Alhambra (PAFLU), 29 SCRA 138; Gonzales vs.
Victory Labor Union (VICLU), et al., 30 SCRA 47; Lakas
ng Manggagawang Makabayan (LMM) vs. Court of Industrial Relations
and Federacion Obrera de la
Industrial Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de Filipinas (FOITAF), 36 SCRA 600; and other
numerous cases.

^[3]
Industrial, Commercial, Agricultural Workers Organization (ICAWO) vs.
Bautista, et al., 7 SCRA 907; Sanchez vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, et al., 8 SCRA 654.

^[4]
Gonzales vs. Victory Labor Union (VICLU), et al., ibid; Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan (LMM) vs. Court of Industrial Relations
and Federacion Obrera de la
Industrial Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores
de Filipinas (FOITAF), ibid.

^[5]
Gonzales vs. Victory Labor Union
(VICLU), et al., ibid.

^[6]
Union of the Philippine Education Employees (NLU) vs. Philippine
Education Co., 91 Phil. 93; Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. and
Revilla vs. OSCO Workers Fraternity Labor
Union (OWFLU), et al., 1 SCRA 21; Lu Do & Lu Ym Corporation vs. Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor
Union (PLASLU) and Progressive Employees and Laborers Union (PELU), 11 SCRA
134.

^[7]
Decision, page 19.

^[8]
Decision, page 10.

^[9]
Decision, page 10.

^[10]
Donato vs. Philippine Marine Officers Association and Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-12506, May 18, 1959.

^[11]
Saura Import & Export Co., Inc. vs. Philippine Inter­national
Surety Co., Inc. and Philippine National Bank, 8 SCRA 143.

^[12]
Miguel and Miguel vs. Court of
Appeals and Reyes, 29 SCRA 760.

^[13]
Paterno, et al. vs. Jao Yan, 1 SCRA 631; Saura Import & Export Co., Inc. vs. Philippine
International Surety Co., Inc. and Philippine National Bank, supra.

^[14]
Baquiran vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 2 SCRA 873.

^[15]
Applied in NASSCO vs. CIR, L-31852 and L-32724, June 28, 1974 and Almira, et al. vs. B.F. Goodrich
Phil., Inc., L-34974, July 25,
1974.

^[16]
Invoking practically the same theory is the case of Radio Communications of the
Philippines vs.
Philippine Communications Electronics and Electricity Workers’ Federation
(FCWF), L-37662, July 15, 1975.