G.R. No. L-31084. May 29, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. WESTRIMUNDO TABAYOYONG ALIAS “WESTRING”, ELIGIO CACAYAN, JULIAN AGUILAR AND FRANCISCO GARLEJO, DEFENDANTS, ANTONIO BAUTIST…
GUERRERO, J.:
In an Information dated May 15, 1967 filed with the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, Westrimundo
Tabayoyong, alias “Westring“,
Antonio Bautista, alias “Bucot“, Antolin Castro, Eligio Cacayan, alias “Cadio”
Julian Aguilar, Miguel Begenio, alias “Aning“, and Francisco Garlejo,
were charged with the crime of murder alleged to have been committed as
follows:
“That on or about 21st day of January, 1966, at about 11:30
o’clock in the evening, in the municipality of Manaoag,
Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with bolo, knives and
hard piece of bamboo, conspiring and mutually helping one another, with evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength, treachery, in consideration of a
prize or reward and in utter disregard of the respect due the offended party,
MARCELO GUICO y JACOB, a Barrio Captain of Barrio Cabilaoan, Manaoag, Pangasinan, and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
strike with said bolo, knives and hard piece of bamboo MARCELO GUICO Y JACOB thereby inflicting upon him wounds and
injuries which caused his death.
“That in attacking, assaulting and striking said MARCELO GUICO y JACOB, the above-named accused took advantage of
nighttime besides superior strength to insure the success of their acts and
plans.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”[1]
Upon arraignment, all of the above-named
accused pleaded “not guilty”.
Before trial commenced, the court, upon petition of the Special Counsel
handling the prosecution of the case, discharged the accused Francisco Garlejo from the Information in order that he may be
utilized as a government witness.[2]
During the progress of the trial, accused Eligio Cacayan who was then released on bail, disappeared and was believed to be dead, while accused
Julian Aguilar escaped from jail and was never found again. Thus, the trial continued only as to the other
four accused, Westrimundo Tabayoyong,
Antolin Castro, Miguel Begenio
and Antonio “Bucot” Bautista.[3]
The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies
of: (1) the discharged accused Francisco
Garlejo, (2) Dr. Florencio Mangaliman, the Municipal Health Officer of Manaoag, Pangasinan who conducted
the necropsy examination on the body of the deceased Marcelo Guico, (3) Mrs.
Encarnacion Guico, widow of
the deceased, (4) Municipal Judge Marcelino Andrada who conducted the preliminary investigation, and
the autopsy report (Exhibit
“A”), photographs of the victim after his death (Exhibits
“B” to “B-1-b”), the extra-judicial statements of Francisco Garlejo
(Exhibit “C”), Julian Aguilar (Exhibit “D”) and Eligio Cacayan (Exhibit
“E”), and the transcript of the second stage of the hearing during
the preliminary investigation (Exhibit “F”).
The substance of the testimony of the principal witness for the
prosecution, former accused Francisco Garlejo, is
summarized by the lower court, thus:
“x x x In
the night of January 21, 1966, he, Eligio Cacayan, Julian Aguilar, Antolin
Castro, Miguel Begenio and Antonio ‘Bucot‘ Bautista killed Marcelo Guico
in Bo. Cabilaoan, Manaoag, Pangasinan. He
declared that they killed Marcelo Guico at the
instance of the accused Westrimundo Tabayoyong who promised them a reward of P1,000.00 after
killing Marcelo Guico. According to this witness it all began one
late afternoon in January, 1966, when he and the accused Julian Aguilar and Eligio Cacayan were together,
walking in a barrio road of Inamotan, Manaoag, Pangasinan, which
adjoins barrio Camantiles of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, the four other accused, Westrimundo Tabayoyong, Antolin Castro, Miguel Begenio
and Antonio ‘Bucot‘ Bautista arrived and approached
the witness and his companions. The
accused Westrimundo Tabayoyong
greeted them by saying: ‘So you are
here.’ In that occasion, Westrimundo Tabayoyong proposed to them to kill Marcelo Guico, Bo. Captain of Cabilaoan, Manaoag, Pangasinan, offering to
pay them P1,000.00 if they
succeeded. The said witness declared
that in the conversations that day, the accused Westrimundo
Tabayoyong and Antonio ‘Bucot‘
Bautista did most of the talking.
Knowing that the proposal was a bad one, the witness said that he and
his companions did not agree. Before
they separated, however, Westrimundo Tabayoyong allegedly told the witness and his two
companions to think it over and to be at the same place on another day to give
their decision.
“The witness and his two companions went to the same place on
the designated day and there they met again their four co-accused. Altho the proposal
was renewed, the witness and his companions did not agree. So the latter were told to be at the same
place on another day designated for them to talk over the proposal some
more. On this third meeting when the
witness and his companions hesitated to agree to the proposal of Westrimundo Tabayoyong, the
accused Antonio ‘Bucot‘ Bautista forced them to
accept the said proposal by threatening them with bodily harm if they did not
agree. Before they parted the witness
and his companions were told to meet with their co-accused once more so that
they would know the other details of their plan to kill Marcelo Guico. And so, about
three days before the execution of their agreement, all the accused met on the
same place and the witness and his companions were told to gather in the house
of the accused Eligio Cacayan
in the afternoon of January 21, 1969 (sic), where the other accused would meet
them.
“In the afternoon of that day, the accused, Julian Aguilar
passed for the witness and, together, they went to the house of the accused Eligio Cacayan in Bo. Barrientos, Manaoag, Pangasinan. When
they arrived there Eligio Cacayan
told them that their co-conspirators were not yet in. After sometime, however, the accused Antolin Castro, Miguel Begenio
and Antonio ‘Bucot‘ Bautista arrived. Around seven
o’clock that evening all six of them proceeded to the house of the
accused Antonio ‘Bucot‘ Bautista in Bo. Cabilaoan, also in Manaoag, Pangasinan. On the
way they stopped by a small store owned by a certain Sito
Escritor where Antonio ‘Bucot‘
Bautista bought four bottles of wine.
There they drank three of the four bottles and moved on. On their way they met the accused Westrimundo Tabayoyong who
reminded them that if they succeeded in killing Marcelo Guico
he would pay them P1,000.00. When they reached the house of Antonio
‘Bucot‘ Bautista the latter served them dinner and
let them drink the fourth bottle of wine which was left of the four bottles
they got from the store of Sito Escritor. Then, Antonio ‘Bucot‘
Bautista told them that it was time to go.
They proceeded to Bo. Cabilaoan. At a certain point in the barrio road of Cabilaoan Antonio ‘Bucot‘
Bautista stopped them and told them that there they would wait for their
intended victim, Marcelo Guico. The time was between eight and nine o’clock that night.
“They sat by the road side and waited. About two and a half hours later, they saw a
man riding on a bicycle with lights coming down the road. Antonio ‘Bucot‘
Bautista stopped him. The man was
Marcelo Guico, their intended victim. Antonio ‘Bucot‘
Bautista held him by pointing a
gun at him. Then he thrust a bamboo club
to Eligio Cacayan and
ordered: ‘Club him.’ Marcelo Guico pleaded for his life saying: ‘Please do not kill me for the sake of my
children.’ Eligio Cacayan
hesitated but because he feared Antonio
‘Bucot‘ Bautista, he got the bamboo club and
struck Marcelo Guico at the back of the latter’s
head. The victim was thrown towards
Antonio ‘Bucot‘ Bautista and grappled with the
latter. Antonio ‘Bucot’
Bautista ordered his companions to held him.
Miguel Begenio went behind the victim and held
him by the legs. Antolin
Castro held one hand of the victim and the witness helped also by holding the
other hand of Marcelo Guico. Antonio ‘Bucot‘ Bautista
then got the bamboo club from Eligio Cacayan and struck the victim’s head at the back. Marcelo Guico put
his right hand on his head just as Antonio ‘Bucot‘
Bautista hit him anew right where the victim placed his hand. The victim became limp and he was dropped on
the ground. Antonio ‘Bucot‘
Bautista drew a bolo which he carried by his side, held the victim by the head
and bolowed him several times slashing his neck and
hacking him on the head and face. Then
he gave the bolo to Eligio Cacayan
and ordered him to do likewise. Eligio Cacayan, out of fear,
hacked and slashed the victim on the face.
Antonio ‘Bucot‘ Bautista, Miguel Begenio and Antolin Castro pulled
the deceased and deposited him by the roadside while Julian Aguilar took the
victim’s bicycle farther down the road.
Then Antonio ‘Bucot‘ Bautista ordered them to
go home, with assurance to pay them later their share of the P1,000.00 promised
to them by Westrimundo Tabayoyong. The foul deed was all over before 11:30 o’clock that night.’[4]
The post-mortem findings of Dr. Florencio
Mangaliman showed that the deceased sustained the
following injuries:
1. A mortal slash wound about 10-1/2 inches
long across the neck just above the Adam’s apple, from the left side of the
neck to the right side, about 2 inches wide and about 5 inches deep, severing
the cervical bone, by means of a sharp instrument, thus injuring the spinal
cord.
2. A slash wound about 10 inches long
from
the lower eyelid of the left eye, cutting the bridge of the nose and the zygomatic
or cheek bone of the right side of the face, about 1 inch wide and about 3 inches deep, by means of a sharp instrument.
3. Another cut wound about 8 inches long from the vicinity of the right nostril
to the center of the nape, right side.
4. A cut wound at the level of the mouth
located near its outer canthus, right side, cutting
the right lower jaw and connected to the first wound above mentioned.
5. A shattered lacerated wound, star shaped,
over the occipital region of the head about 3 inches long and about 2 inches
wide, produced by a blunt instrument.
6. Another lacerated wound about 1 inch long
just behind the right ear or mastoid area.
7. Another lacerated wound of about 1-1/2
inches long, located about 2 inches above the right ear.
8. A compound fracture with laceration of the
terminal phalanx bone of the right little finger, by a blunt instrument.
9. A chop wound somewhat circular in shape,
about 1 inch in diameter, over the first knuckle of the middle finger of the
right hand, produced by a sharp instrument.[5]
The
necropsy report further stated that the cause of death was “an
irreversible shock due to the injury of the spinal cord and vertebrae of the
neck, cerebral concussion and profuse bleeding.”[6] At the witness stand, Dr. Florencio Mangaliman testified
that wounds nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 located at the face and neck could have
been caused by a bolo; wound no. 5 in the occipital region or at the back of
the head could have been caused by wood or bamboo; wounds nos. 6 and 7 and
fracture no. 8 could have been caused by a blunt instrument; and wound no. 9 was caused by chopping.[7]
The widow of the deceased, Mrs. Encarnacion
Guico, testified inter alia: that the accused Antolin
Castro was the defeated opponent of her late husband Marcelo Guico for the office of Barrio Captain of Bo. Cabilaoan, Manaoag, Pangasinan; that she did not know the party affiliation of
her husband, but since his opponent Castro
was a Nacionalista, then the deceased could have
belonged to the Liberal Party; that as Barrio Captain elected in 1963, the
deceased was very strict in the enforcement of regulations against stealing,
gambling and cattle rustling, thus he made many enemies; that several times
during his lifetime, the deceased told her (Mrs. Guico)
that he had apprehended and issued warnings to the accused Antolin
Castro, Antonio Bautista and Miguel Begenio several
times for their gambling activities; that on one occasion, she was present when
the accused Antolin Castro and Antonio Bautista were
investigated for gambling (playing cards) but the case was settled amicably
after they were warned by the deceased not to play gambling again; and, that
the wife of accused Miguel Begenio was her first
cousin. Mrs. Guico
also stated that her deceased husband mentioned to her that he had an
altercation with the accused Westrimundo Tabayoyong during which the latter almost shot the deceased
on account of his strictness in enforcing
regulations.[8]
The then Municipal Judge of Manaoag, Pangasinan, Marcelino Andrada, who conducted the preliminary investigation of
the three original accused, namely, Francisco Garlejo,
Julian Aguilar and Eligio Cacayan,
testified that he personally typed the statements given by said accused which
the witness identified as Exhibits “C”, “D” and
“E”, respectively. Judge Andrada also identified the records of his preliminary
investigation presented in the lower Court as Exhibit “F”. He further stated that during the preliminary
investigation, he purposely planted one Bernabe Manlepes[9]
the janitor of the Mayor of the town, whom former accused Francisco Garlejo pointed to as one of his companions in the
execution of the gruesome murder. He,
however, also admitted that said Bernabe Manlepes looked very much like the real accused Miguel Begenio.[10]
To the accusation filed against them, the accused Westrimundo Tabayoyong, Antonio
“Bucot” Bautista, Antolin
Castro and Miguel Begenio, with respect to whom the
trial proceeded, all interposed the defense of alibi, independently of each
other as follows:
Accused Westrimundo Tabayoyong
alleged that on the night the heinous crime was committed, he was in the
company of Assistant Fiscal Leon Zabala, former
Vice-Mayor Legaspi, Atty. Ireneo
Salinas, one Atty. Aquino and then Governor Conrado Estrella, at the Carbungco Restaurant in Quezon
City where the latter invited and took them to dinner. The said accused claimed that he left Pangasinan for Manila
on January 19, 1966 with Zabala, Legaspi and Salinas,
and returned to Pangasinan only on January 22, 1966, or the day after
Marcelo Guico was killed.[11]
Corroborating the allegations of Tabayoyong was the
testimony of his witness, Assistant Fiscal Leon Zabala.[12]
Accused Antonio “Bucot” Bautista
accounted for his whereabouts on the fateful night of the murder as
follows: On January 19, 1966, he went to
Barrio Toledo, Ramos, Tarlac to collect the debt of
P50.00 owed to him by his uncle, Eusebio Melegrito, and stayed in
that place up to January 22, 1966.[13]
Melegrito, who was presented as a defense witness,
confirmed the testimony of Bucot Bautista. This witness also averred that the accused
Bautista had to stay for three days in Toledo
because he (Melegrito) was able to sell his palay only on January
21, 1966 and paid Bautista only on that night, so that the latter
left for Pangasinan only at dawn of the following
day, January 22, 1966. This witness further declared that during the
three days that the accused Bautista waited to be paid, he helped the witness
in the piling of his palay, and never left the
witness’ house in Bo. Toledo.[14]
Accused Antolin Castro testified that
from January 13 to January 20, 1966,
he was in Manila following up his
application papers in connection with his intended trip to Vietnam.[15]
He presented his uncle-in-law, Simon Bilog, who
claimed to have visited the accused Castro and conversed with him in the
evening of January 20, 1966
up to midnight.[16]
The same accused, however, failed to account for his whereabouts and activities
on the night of the murder, and when interrogated on his alleged participation
in the conspiracy to kill Marcelo Guico, he merely
denied having any knowledge of it and averred that the accusation against him
was untrue.[17]
Lastly, accused Miguel Begenio
testified that in the evening of January
21, 1966, he was in his own house at Barrio Cabilaoan,
Manaoag, Pangasinan
sleeping with his wife and children, and that he learned of the death of
Marcelo Guico only on the next day, January 22, 1966. He further testified that he was even present
during the embalming of the deceased, and together with his wife, he attended
for several nights the vigil over the remains of the murdered man and the
nightly prayers after the burial with the family of deceased, the latter’s
widow being a first cousin of his (Begenio’s) wife.[18]
After trial, judgment was rendered on July 24, 1969, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused WESTRIMUNDO TABAYOYONG not guilty
of the crime charged, his guilt not having been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. The bond he has filed for his
provisional liberty is hereby cancelled.
“The accused Antolin Castro, Miguel Begenio and Antonio ‘Bucot‘
Bautista are hereby found to have conspired and caused the death of Marcelo Guico and are, therefore, guilty of the crime of murder as
charged in the information. In the
commission of the said offense, the aggravating circumstances of:
1) that the crime was committed in
consideration of a price or reward, or at least a promise thereof;
2) abuse of superior strength;
3) nighttime, purposely sought to facilitate
its commission; and
4) that the wrong done was deliberately
augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission when, after
the victim was killed, the accused deliberately slashed his throat and sliced
his face several times on several places,
were found to be present. No mitigating circumstance has been offered
by the accused. Pursuant to the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, the said accused, each and all of them,
are hereby sentenced to death. They are
likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Marcelo Guico in the amount of P12,000.00. May God have mercy on their souls.
“SO ORDERED.”[19]
On August 29, 1969, the accused Miguel Begenio
moved for reconsideration and/or new trial on the grounds of: (1) insufficiency of evidence to sustain a
finding of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) newly discovered
evidence. The motion, however, was
denied on September 9, 1969.
On October 13, 1969, the records of the case were elevated to Us
for an automatic review of the
death penalty imposed on the accused Antolin Castro,
Miguel Begenio and Antonio “Bucot”
Bautista, herein appellants, who have filed their respective briefs.
Appellant Miguel Begenio raises the
following Assignment of Errors:
I. The lower Court erred in accepting the
testimony of the discharged accused Francisco Garlejo
without any convincing corroborative evidence.
II. The lower Court erred in finding that the
evidence established a positive identification of the accused Miguel Begenio.
III. The lower Court erred in denying the motion
for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
IV. The lower Court erred in not accepting the
defense of alibi interposed by the accused Miguel Begenio.
Appellant Antonio Bautista alias “Bucot” makes the
following Assignment of Errors:
I. The trial Court erred in attaching full
complete and absolute credence to the testimonies of Francisco Garlejo the liberated accused turned witness for the
prosecution, against the herein defendant-appellant Antonio Bautista, notwithstanding that, aside from coming from a
polluted source, his testimonies were so apparently forced, unreliable,
uncorroborated and contrary to the common sense and the ordinary course of
things.
II. The trial Court erred in attaching any more significance,
weight or value to the rest of the testimony of Francisco Garlejo
against the herein appellant, after having rightly and correctly found, held
and dismissed as mere “second thought” and “someone else’s idea
not Garlejo’s” those portions thereof against
the accused Westrimundo Tabayoyong.
III. The trial Court erred in finding and holding that there was
sufficient motive for the appellant to commit the cold-blooded murder as
charged in the information.
IV. The trial Court erred in completely disregarding
and in not giving any credit, weight or value to the testimony of the appellant
to the effect that, at the time of the incident, he was in Toledo, Ramos, Tarlac, in the house of his uncle Eusebio
Melegrito, who corroborated his testimony simply on
the ground that, in the words of the trial court itself, “It is too good
and too perfect to be true,” a conclusion which is not only biased, unjust,
unreasonable and apparently malicious, but also absolutely without any real
basis in fact, in evidence and in law.
V. The trial Court erred in not declaring the
appellant absolutely innocent of the charge and, accordingly, in not ordering his complete and
absolute acquittal for the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
all reasonable doubt.
Appellant Antolin Castro interposes the following Assignment of Errors:
I. The trial Court erred in giving any weight to the testimony of
Francisco Garlejo.
II. The trial Court erred in not acquitting Antolin Castro in the face of a reasonable doubt in the
guilt, if any, of herein appellant.
A perusal of the foregoing assignments of errors shows that a
common error is assigned, that is, that the trial Court erred in according
credence to the testimony of the accused-turned-State-witness Francisco Garlejo. Herein
appellants Miguel Begenio, Antonio “Bucot” Bautista and Antolin
Castro join together in seeking to discredit and cast doubt on the testimony of
the aforenamed discharged accused and in assailing
the latter’s credibility. At this point,
it is important to mention the significant fact that in convicting herein
appellants and sentencing them to death, the trial Court relied heavily and
principally, if not solely, on the testimony of Garlejo. For purposes of this automatic review,
therefore, it is imperative that Garlejo’s testimony
be carefully studied and meticulously scrutinized.
The main thrust of the arguments of herein appellants in support
of their common assigned error is that Garlejo’s
testimony comes from a polluted source and the same was not validly and
convincingly corroborated in any of its material points by any other witness or
witnesses, nor by any other evidence for the prosecution, hence it cannot and
should not be legally accepted and made the basis for the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death.
We
find the contention meritorious.
However, before delving into the merits of appellants’ arguments, a
brief discussion on the pertinent rules and applicable jurisprudence governing
the discharge of an accused to become a state witness is in order.
In allowing the discharge of a defendant who is a participes criminis
to become a witness for the prosecution and against his co-defendants,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
“Sec. 9. Discharge of
one of several defendants to be witness for the prosecution.- When two or more
persons are charged with the commission of a certain offense, the competent
court, at any time before they have entered upon their defense, may direct one
or more of them to be discharged with the latter’s consent that he or they may
be witnesses for the government when in the judgment of the court:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony
of the defendant whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available
for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of
said defendant;
(c) The testimony of said defendant can be substantially corroborated in its
material points;
(d) Said defendant does not appear to be the most
guilty;
(e) Said defendant has not at any time been
convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.”
A competent court within the above
section means the court before which the trial is held.[20]
The discharge of an accused who may turn a state witness is expressly left to
the sound discretion of the trial court which has the exclusive responsibility to see that the conditions prescribed
by the rule exist.[21]
A discharge amounts to an acquittal and is a bar to future prosecution for the
same offense, unless the released defendant fails or refuses to testify
against the other remaining accused,[22]
and such failure is attributable to the former’s will or fault.[23]
Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the testimony of a
discharged defendant, though admissible, is still subject to the tests on
credibility as any other testimonial evidence.
Thus, although an order of discharge of an accused issued by the trial
Court may raise a presumption that all the requisites for its issuance in fact
exist, and therefore that the discharge is in order, the same Court is not duty
bound to believe the testimony of the discharged defendant and pronounce a
judgment of conviction against the remaining accused merely on the strength of
such testimony. The Court must be
satisfied that the State evidence consisting of the testimony of a liberated participes criminis
is credible.
Furthermore, it is also a well-settled rule that the testimony of
a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame for the
killing and implicating his co-accused cannot by itself and without
corroboration, be considered as proof to a moral certainty that the latter had
committed or participated in the commission of the crime. Thus it is required that the testimony be
substantially corroborated by other evidence in all its material points.
“The true doctrine which should govern the testimony of
accomplices, or what may be variously termed principals, confederates, or
conspirators, is not in doubt. The
evidence of accomplices is admissible and competent. Yet such testimony comes from a ‘polluted source.’ Consequently,
it is scrutinized with care. It
is properly subject to
grave suspicion. If not
corroborated, credibility is affected.
Even then, however, the defendant may be convicted upon the unsupported
evidence of an accomplice. If
corroborated absolutely or even to such an
extent as is indicative of trustworthiness, the testimony of the
accomplice is sufficient to warrant a conviction. x x x
“To quote from one of many decisions of this court, which
concerns both the credibility of witnesses as determined by the trial court
and the competency of testimony by an accomplice, we turn to the case of The
United States vs. Ambrosio and Falsario
(1910, 17 Phil., 295), wherein it is said:
“‘It is unquestionably true that the testimony of an
accomplice must be taken with great care and caution. It must be assayed and weighed with scrupulous care. The corroborating testimony must be strong
and convincing. It is also true,
however, that when the testimony of an accomplice is corroborated by
unimpeachable testimony and by strong circumstances, it may be given its due
weight and force against the person in regard to whom it is presented. x x x'”[24]
“Counsel for the appellants assigns as error the action of the
trial court in dismissing the information as to some of those who were
included in the same charge upon which they were convicted and permitting the
Government to make use of the persons thus discharged as witnesses; having admitted
their guilt of the crime of which appellants were convicted, their evidence
should not have been taken into consideration.
While it is true that the evidence of witnesses of this character is subject
to the gravest suspicion and, taken by itself, might not be sufficient to
justify a conviction, nevertheless, the proceeding subjected to is specifically
authorized x x x; and in
this case the evidence offered by these witnesses were substantiated
by that of many others, both as to the existence of the band of brigands
and the connection of the accused with the same, and there was no error in the
proceedings prejudicial to the interests of the accused.”[25]
“x x x The
witnesses who testified were those released from prosecution for that
purpose. Such testimony, while under
proper circumstances entirely acceptable, is at the outset always subject to
suspicion and it requires only very little credible evidence
to ripen that suspicion into a certainty.”[26]
“It is elementary law that a defendant in a criminal action
cannot be convicted on the evidence of an accomplice only, and that
to sustain such a conviction, there must be other evidence corroborating
that of the accomplice, which tends to show the guilt of the defendant.”[27]
“x x x But
this witness was evidently a party in the conspiracy and his testimony should
not be accepted without corroboration, of which there is none; for it is a
well recognized rule that the testimony of one of several conspirators should not
be accepted, as against his fellows, without some corroboration. This is especially applicable in a
situation where the facts testified to would, if fully accepted, necessarily
result in the imposition of the death penalty.”[28]
“Defendant and appellant Rufo Dizon in this case complains that he was convicted by the
lower court, mainly on the strength of the testimony of his cousin and
co-accused Tomas Dizon. In this jurisdiction, a co-accused or a
co-defendant who has been found guilty or innocent in the same case, is always
a competent witness for, or against, any of his co-accused (United States vs.
Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122, 170).
And it has even been held that the uncorroborated testimony of a
co-accused, when satisfactory and convincing, may be the basis for a judgment
of conviction (United States vs. Wayne Shoup, 35
Phil. 56; United States vs. Remigio, 37 Phil. 610);
although the better rule is that to serve as a legal basis for conviction, the testimony of an
accomplice must always be corroborated by some of other witness
or evidence (People vs. Asinas, 53 Phil. 59;
People vs. Bantagan, 54 Phil. 834). And the testimony of defendant Tomas Dizon, a cousin of herein defendant and appellant, as a
witness for the prosecution, as to the taking
of the carabaos in question from the municipality of
Labrador to the municipality of Mabini, where
defendants disposed of them, has been fully corroborated by said witness
Domingo Victorio and by the chief of police and the justice of the peace, who testified as to
the admissions made by herein defendant and appellant as to their taking and
disposition of the carabaos in question, and his plea
of guilty.”[29]
“And although it is true that the declarations of an
accomplice should be taken with caution, coming as they do from a polluted source, we are satisfied
from a reading of the whole record that his version, corroborated on
important points by the circumstances disclosed, may be made the basis or
one of the bases of a judgment of conviction.
The contention is not true that the Faltados
are convicted ‘solely and exclusively on the strength of the testimony’ of Aquilino Agno. They were identified among others by the
offended parties, Angel Biscocho, Raymunda Perez and Silveria Biscocho.”[30]
“x x x Such
testimony may warrant conviction if corroborated to such an extent that its trustworthiness becomes manifest (People
vs. Riparip, 86 Phil. 526; 47 Off. Gaz. (12th Supp.) 159.).
In the present case, Tomas Carandang’s
testimony finds ample corroboration in the written confessions of Eugenio Mendoza and Eliseo Carandang, as well as in that of Modesto Leviste, who confirmed the truth of their contents in open
court.”[31]
The requirements of credibility and corroboration in material points
apply with greater reason to the testimony of a defendant discharged under Rule
119, section 9 above-quoted considering that the condition of a discharge is
that the liberated defendant should testify against his former co-defendants. As succinctly elucidated in the case of Bernardo
vs. Del Rosario[32]:
“When a defendant is discharged from the information, a
contract is entered between him and the State.
The discharge will be secured if the defendant will honestly and fairly
make a full disclosure of the crime. It
is incumbent upon him to keep his part of the contract if he hopes to receive
the promised immunity; and if his testimony is corrupt or his disclosure is
only partial, he gains nothing but forfeits his rights under the contract (15
Am. Jur. sec. 32, p. 17; U.S. v. Grant & Kennedy,
18 Phil. 122; V. Francisco’s Rules of Court, par. II, p. 330, Rev. Ed.). Courts should not give a premium to a culprit
who worked himself into gaining his acquittal, upon a deception and a
contumacious disregard of an agreement validly entered into.”
Thus, “(i)f the testimony of the
accomplice is corrupt or his disclosure is only partial, he gains nothing but
forfeits his right to exemption.”[33]
Stated otherwise, the benefits of acquittal and freedom from further prosecution
may be enjoyed fully and completely by a discharged defendant only if he
testifies for the prosecution and against the rest of the accused. “(I)t is a notorious fact in human
nature that a culprit, confessing a
crime, is likely to put the blame on others rather than himself. Even though a court may well credit the
statement of such a witness that other particular persons were engaged in the
crime, it is unsafe to accept without corroborating evidence, his statements concerning the relative blame to be
attached to different members of his gang.”[34]
It is for this reason that the Rules of Court require that several conditions be met before an accused may be
discharged to act as a government witness.
The very nature of a discharge makes it more imperative that the
testimony of a discharged defendant be received with utmost care, caution and
circumspection.
Guided by the principles laid down by the law and jurisprudence
set forth above, We shall now proceed to consider the facts and circumstances
at bar.
There is no question as to the correctness of the premise of
appellants’ contention that the testimony of Garlejo
comes from a polluted source. We fully
agree. As earlier stated, Garlejo was one of the original defendants in this murder
case, hence one of those whom the Municipal Judge who conducted the preliminary
investigation found reasonable ground to believe was guilty of the crime
charged. Not only that. This State witness also unconditionally,
unmistakably and voluntarily admitted his participation in the conspiracy to
commit the murder and the actual killing of the deceased Marcelo Guico, both in the preliminary investigation, as evidenced
by his Extrajudicial Statement (Exhibit “C”) and the record of the
proceedings of said investigation (Exhibit “F”), and during the
trial itself, when he was presented as the prosecution’s star witness. His testimony is, therefore, regarded as the
testimony given by an accomplice or co-conspirator.
Alerted by this fact, the next inquiry is whether Garlejo’s testimony withstands the test of
credibility. We hold in the
negative. Even the lower Court was not
absolute in giving credence to the whole testimony of Garlejo. The decision under review states:
“x x x The
principal evidence laid against Westrimundo Tabayoyong is found in the testimony of Francisco Garlejo. This
witness testified that altho he used to see the
accused Westrimundo Tabayoyong
on several campaign meetings, he and the accused were never acquainted and have
never spoken together until one day in early January, 1966, while the witness
and Eligio Cacayan and
Julian Aguilar were walking on the roadside in Bo. Inamotan,
Manaoag, Pangasinan, Westrimundo Tabayoyong, in
company with Antolin Castro, Miguel Begenio and Antonio “Bucot”
Bautista, allegedly accosted them, Westrimundo Tabayoyong saying to them:
‘So you are here.’ Right on that occasion this witness testified that Westrimundo Tabayoyong proposed
to them the killing of Marcelo Guico for the
consideration of P1,000.00. This story is hard to believe. It could not be imagined how Westrimundo Tabayoyong, a
municipal councilor and budding politician could propose to people he has never
known before and whom he was meeting for the first time, right then and there
by the roadside, the liquidation of a barrio captain. Francisco Garlejo
testified that he and his companions have met with Westrimundo
Tabayoyong and also his companions three times more
afterwards, and in all these meetings Westrimundo Tabayoyong has proposed to them the liquidation of Marcelo Guico for reward. If
we have to stretch our imagination to believe Francisco Garlejo’s
testimony on this point, no matter how stupid Westrimundo
Tabayoyong would be, the Court cannot just believe
that he would himself personally propose to people he was meeting for the first
time the killing of Marcelo Guico. Matters of this kind are not done except in
secrecy and only after the proponent has the confidence of the persons to whom
he makes the proposal.”[35]
We agree with the trial court’s holding that
Francisco Garlejo’s testimony to the effect that Westrimundo Tabayoyong proposed
and was the mastermind in the killing of the victim Marcelo Guico by offering a reward of P1,000 to all the accused is inherently improbable, and
accordingly, We find as justified the acquittal of the accused Tabayoyong based on the ground that, in the words of the
Court, “(i)ndependent
of Westrimundo Tabayoyong
weak defense of alibi, the latter can not be convicted because the evidence
given against him was weak, unreliable and even unbelievable. No motive was given by the prosecution for Westrimundo Tabayoyong to wish
the killing of Marcelo Guico. No evidence was given why he should pay
P1,000.00 to have Marcelo Guico killed. It is not on the weakness of an accused’s alibi that he should be convicted but it should
be on the showing beyond reasonable doubt that he is guilty (upon which) a
conviction must be made.” (CFI Decision, p. 47, Records).
The reasoning for Tabayoyong’s
acquittal however was ignored or brushed aside by the Court in convicting the
three remaining
accused Antonio Bautista, Antolin Castro and Miguel Begenio. For while the trial court acquitted the
accused Tabayoyong because it refused to give credence
to the evidence given by the discharge defendent
Francisco Garlejo as Tabayoyong’s
alleged participation in the conspiracy to commit the murder, the said Court
nevertheless convicted the remaining three accused on the very same testimony
of the defendant Garlejo. Rationalizing its decision of conviction, the
Court said:
“But altho the testimony of
Francisco Garlejo on the conspiracy allegedly
broached to them by Westrimundo Tabayoyong
were to be detached from the facts in this case, this does not impair the
testimony of Garlejo against the other accused. For, as this Court has already observed,
implicating Westrimundo Tabayoyong
appears more to be some one else’s idea than Garlejo’s. And, as also observed earlier in this
decision, the more probable time a conspiracy to kill Marcelo Guico was made was in the afternoon of January 21, 1966,
either in the house of Eligio Cacayan
or in the house of Antonio “Bucot” Bautista. The Court recalls that on that day, Julian
Aguilar picked up Francisco Garlejo from his house
and together they went to the house of Eligio Cacayan. Julian
Aguilar was with a guitar and thought they might do some serenading on that
night (Exhibit “D”). It is
therefore clear that murder was not in their minds. But Francisco Garlejo
in his preliminary investigation stated that in the house of Antonio “Bucot” Bautista that evening, after they were wined
and fed, the agreement to kill Marcelo Guico was
‘cooked’. In that occasion all the
accused, Westrimundo Tabayoyong
excepted, were present. While this
finding may perhaps affect the credibility of Francisco Garlejo,
it still remains believable considering that this Court finds this charge
reconcilable with probability and the truth.” (CFI Decision, pp. 48-49,
Records).
In convicting the accused Antolin
Castro, the trial court said:
“Evidence exists that this accused was the rival of the
deceased in the election of a barrio captain.
He lost to the deceased for this position. The next election of a barrio captain was
coming up. This is a plausible cause to
make the accused want the deceased eliminated.
Evidence also exists that this accused and Miguel Begenio
and Antonio “Bucot” Bautista were seen
several times by the witness Francisco Garlejo in
gambling dens and were also connected with thefts in the neighborhood. The wife of the deceased testified that her
deceased husband as barrio captain has been quite strict against gambling and
cattle rustling. She has testified that Antolin Castro, Miguel Begenio
and Antonio “Bucot” Bautista had in fact
been apprehended by the deceased and were released only after warning them
against a repeated violation of law. To
cap it all, the accused was positively identified as one of those who were
present and who cooperated when Marcelo Guico was
mercilessly murdered. His alibi that on January 20, 1966, he arrived from Manila
where he worked out his travel papers for Vietnam
and that his relatives and his father-in-law visited him and stayed with him
until midnight of that day, did not
make an accounting of his whereabouts on the day and in the night of the murder
of Marcelo Guico.
However, Francisco Garlejo positively
tagged him as one of those who arrived in the house of Eligio
Cacayan in the afternoon of January 21, 1966, went
with them to the house of Antonio “Bucot”
Bautista, drank wine with them along the way and was with them when they left
the house of Antonio “Bucot” Bautista to
that part of the barrio road in Cabilaoan where they waited for almost two hours
for the deceased. Francisco Garlejo also positively testified that when Marcelo Guico was being murdered the accused Antolin
Castro gave aid by holding the deceased Marcelo Guico.”
(CFI Decision, pp. 49-51, Records).
In the case of the accused Miguel Begenio
his conviction by the trial court is reasoned out in the decision
under review as follows:
‘”In the case of Miguel Begenio
after making a lame denial of his implication by Francisco Garlejo,
he alleged that on the night Marcelo Guido was killed he and his family went to
sleep at 8:00 o’clock. He came to know of the death of Marcelo Guico only the following morning when he followed people
who went to see the body of the deceased which was lying by the roadside. He also said that his wife and the wife of the deceased are second cousins that
he watched the embalming of the body of Marcelo Guico
and attended the vigil of the deceased.
Beyond saying that he did not know the witness Francisco Garlejo and the accused Eligio Cacayan and Julian Aguilar before they were accused
together in this case, he did not have explanation to offer why he was implicated in
so serious an offense which carries the penalty of death. Close at he claimed to be to the widow of
Marcelo Guico, he never denied to her his alleged
participation in the killing of her husband or asked her why he was ever accused of the same. This circumstance is quite unnatural because
if he was innocent the usual thing for him to have done was to remonstrate
with the deceased, denying his alleged participation therein and asked why he
was ever implicated in the murder of Marcelo Guico. Unfortunately, he was likewise identified to
be with the group that ambushed and murdered Marcelo Guico. Even when
he was not in the court-room when the Municipal Judge of Urdaneta
was conducting the preliminary investigation of this case, the witness
Francisco Garlejo readily pointed to the one in the
court, admittedly planted therein by the judge to test the witness, who was
strikingly similar in appearance with the accused Miguel Begenio,
as one of the murderers of Marcelo Guico. This spontaneous identification of someone
who looked very much like Miguel Begenio convinced
this Court that the accused was one of the plotters and was there on the road
when Marcelo Guico was killed. Miguel Begenio like
his co-accused does not only belong to but is an assistant auditor of the party
against which the deceased campaigned and won as a barrio captain. Altho he claimed he
was in good terms with the widow of the deceased and attended the vigil for the
latter, he has never talked with the said widow about the death of her husband
or told her of his vaunted innocence. He
has not rebutted the testimony given against him by the widow of the deceased
that he, in company with his co-accused Antolin
Castro and Antonio “Bucot” Bautista, was on
several occasions apprehended by the deceased for gambling and warned against
repeated violations of the law. Finally,
the Court cannot find any explanation, unless it was true why Francisco Garlejo in his preliminary investigation and in the court
charged the accused Miguel Begenio as a
co-conspirator and co-principal in murdering Marcelo Guico,
a very serious offense which carries with it the penalty of death. When Miguel Begenio,
denied that he never knew Francisco Garlejo, he
practically affirmed the truth of the testimony of Francisco Garlejo because it is inconceivable that the latter should
testify against the former if they did not know each other at all.” (CFI
Decision, pp. 51-53, Records).
As to the accused Antonio Bautista, the Court after discrediting
his alibi, relied on “the fact that Francisco Garlejo
unmistakably placed him in the scene of the killing,” so his defense of
alibi becomes weaker still. Thus, said
the Court:
“Finally, Antonio ‘Bucot‘ Bautista,
like his co-accused, also sought the defense of alibi. He said that the day before Marcelo Guico was killed he went to Toledo, Ramos, Tarlac, to collect P50.00 which his uncle has borrowed from
him and he stayed until 4:00 o’clock in the morning of January 22, 1966,
alleging that when he was finally paid it was only in the night of January 21,
1966. His testimony was corroborated by
his alleged debtor who was his uncle, Eusebio Meligrito, who testified that Antonio ‘Bucot‘
Bautista went to his house on January
19, 1966 to collect what he owed from him. He became indebted to the accused at a time
when the accused was his visitor. As a
reason for the prolonged stay of the accused in his house, the witness said
that the accused arrived only when he was piling up his harvest and had to wait
until he was able to sell his palay on the 21st of
January and, having arrived late in his house, he was able to pay the said
accused only that night.
This defense appears too good to be true. First the obligation was unusually
created.-The witness borrowing money from the accused when the latter was his
visitor. The Court knows that borrowing
does not usually happen that way. The
accused had to go and collect just before the crime was committed. He had to wait there for barely three days
without going anywhere, apparently to preclude the possibility of being placed
in the vicinity where the incident occurred.
Even the payment has been timed to be in the night of the crime so that,
considering the distance between Toledo, Ramos, Tarlac
and Manaoag, Pangasinan, it
could not be said of the accused that he was in Manaoag
when Marcelo Guico was killed. This new-fangled defense is too perfect to be
true but it cannot fool anyone. It was
corroborated only by his uncle who cannot even tell at once the name of the
alleged buyer of his palay who gave him the money
with which to pay the accused. So the
Court says that this defense of alibi is weak and unreliable because it easily
fabricated and concocted without much opportunity of checking or rebutting it
and when we consider the fact that Francisco Garlejo
unmistakably placed him in the scene of the killing this defense of alibi
becomes weaker still. The accused
appalled perhaps by the evidence against him even neglected to file his own
memorandum.
Francisco Garlejo testified on the way to
the house of Antonio ‘Bucot‘ Bautista early in the
evening of January 21, 1966, all the accused, excluding Westrimundo
Tabayoyong stopped in the store of Sito Escritor in Paitan where Bautista bought four bottles of wine and where
they drank the first three bottles. Why
did not the accused even as much as cite – let alone present – Sito Escritor as their witness if
only to show that they were not together that night? No reason was given for such fatal
omission.” (CFI Decision, pp. 53-56, Records).
Summarizing the reasons of the trial court in convicting the
three accused, it can easily be discerned that the conviction was based on (1)
the identification of each of the accused by the discharged or liberated
defendant Garlejo; (2) the possible motives of each
of the accused and (3) the weakness of their respective alibis.
After a careful analysis of the evidence on record, We find the
conclusions of the trial court to be without factual and legal basis.
The identification of the accused Bautista made by the defendant Garlejo whose testimony “unmistakably” placed him
(Bautista) at the scene of the killing,” and the identification of the
accused Begenio who was “unfortunately
identified to be with the group that ambushed and murdered Marcelo Guico,” and that of the accused Castro who, according
to Garlejo “when Marcelo Guico
was being murdered the accused Antolin Castro gave
aid by holding the deceased Marcelo Guico” is
not worthy of credence and belief, not only because the evidence relied upon
comes from a polluted source but also because it is not supported by any other
material evidence on record. The legal
principles heretofore cited earlier in this decision as to the probative value
of evidence given by an accomplice, unsupported by corroborating evidence on
the material points are clearly applicable to the case at bar. We reject Garlejo’s
testimony incriminating the three (3) remaining accused not merely because it
is polluted, corrupt and contaminated.
It is highly improbable, unnatural and far out of the common experience of man
whether in doing what is good and lawful or what is evil and wrong.
The defendant Garlejo has been accused
of stealing a cow and farming equipment worth Fifty Pesos (P50.00) in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, which
case is still pending in court (t.s.n., p. 4, 8, July 27, 1967) and he has also
admitted having escaped from jail. (t.s.n., p. 7, July
27, 1967, cited in Brief for accused Castro, p. 7). From this evidence, Garlejo’s
character is open to grave suspicion and doubt.
The only evidence on record tending to prove herein appellants’
complicity in the crime charged, aside from Garlejo’s
unbelievable and incompetent testimony, are the extrajudicial confessions of the missing original
co-accused, Julian Aguilar and Eligio Gacayan, marked Exhibits “D” and “E”,
respectively. As a matter of fact,
before the actual trial could commence in the lower court, and while the
prosecuting fiscal was arguing his petition for the discharge of then accused
Francisco Garlejo which was met with energetic
protests and objections from the respective counsel of the other accused, said
fiscal admitted:
“I should be frank with the defense
that the evidence of the prosecution in this case are only the three confessions
of the three accused (referring to Francisco Garlejo,
Julian Aguilar and Eligio Gacayan),
and we have no more. There is a need for
us to get the testimony of one of these accused x x x” (t.s.n., Ceralde, July 5, 1967, p. 4).
Pursuant to Rule 130, Section 29 of the Rules of Court, the
declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged may be given in evidence against him.
The corollary rule is that the confession of one of several co-accused
is not competent evidence against his co-accused, the reason being that the
confession of one of the defendants is hearsay evidence with respect to the
rest, as the latter had no opportunity to cross-examine the former[36]
and since appellants’ respective counsels interposed
timely and vigorous objections during the trial to the admission of the aforementioned Exhibits
“D” and “E” (t.s.n., Ceralde, August 2, 1967, pp. 103-105), the same being
hearsay are inadmissible as evidence against the appellants.
There is, therefore, no other evidence to corroborate the
unreliable, unconvincing and unsatisfactory testimony of Garlejo
as far as herein appellants are concerned.
We
agree with the argument of the accused Antolin Castro that it would be illogical and unfair for the trial
court to convict appellants on the basis of the testimony of Francisco Garlejo which was discredited by the court and so acquitted
the alleged mastermind of the killing, the accused Westrimundo
Tabayoyong, citing the case of People vs. Chaw Yaw
Shun, et al., 23 SCRA 127 and reiterating the holding
in People vs. Aquino, et al., L-13789, June 30, 1960, 108 Phil. 814, thus
–
“Since the widow appears to be the star witness of the
prosecution whose testimony was given much weight in pinning liability on the
accused, the Supreme Court would not be consistent and true to logic and
fairness if it would now reach a verdict of conviction against them on the
strength of the same testimony which was discredited by the trial court insofar
as one of their co-accused in the same case is concerned.” (Syllabus)
As to the possible motives pointed out in the judgment under
review, We rule that the evidence in support thereto are, to Our considered
view, very flimsy and weak. For assuming
that the accused Antolin Castro was the rival of the
deceased in the election of barrio captain and said accused lost to the
deceased for the position; that the next election for barrio captain was coming
up and this was a plausible cause for the accused Castro to eliminate the
deceased, it has not been shown that said accused was a candidate or interested
in running
for said position. Assuming also that
the accused Begenio “does not only belong to but
is an assistant auditor of the party against whom the deceased campaigned and
won as a barrio captain and that he was apprehended by the deceased on several
occasions for gambling with his co-accused Bautista and warned against repeated
violations of the law, there is also no showing that Begenio
and Bautista were charged in court or convicted for said offenses.
But basically, the testimony of the widow as to these motives,
however plausible, is essentially hearsay, the probative value of which is open
to grave doubts and suspicion, especially in a capital accusation such as the
case at bar.
Moreover, while proof of motive is not necessary where there is a
positive identification of the accused, in the instant case where the
identification of the accused-appellants as the authors of the crime charged
proceeds from unreliable and unsatisfactory evidence, evidence of motive
becomes necessary. (People vs. Salas, 66
SCRA 126; People vs. Madera,
57 SCRA 349; People vs. Dorico,
54 SCRA 172).
Indeed, the lack of motive to kill the offended party which has become
apparent from the rejection of Garlejo’s testimony
that the killing was motivated in consideration of a price or reward allegedly
offered by the accused Tabayoyong, may be taken or
considered as a further basis for acquitting the remaining accused. (People vs. Padirayon,
67 SCRA 135).
The remaining errors assigned by herein appellants which all
revolve around their respective defenses of alibi need not be lengthily
discussed for there can be no dispute of the well-known and oft-repeated
rulings of the Supreme Court on the inherent weakness of this particular
defense interposed by said appellants.
However it must also be admitted that in quite a number of cases where
the evidence for the prosecution against the accused as author of a crime
charged is weak, doubtful, unconvincing, unreliable or unsatisfactory, the
defense of alibi assumes importance and acquires commensurate strength, and
therefore, may be given credence.[37]
Indeed, We must “emphasize the fact that courts should not at once look
with disfavor at the defense of alibi. x x x When an accused puts up the defense of alibi, the court
should not at once have a mental prejudice against him. For, taken in the light of all the evidence
on record, it may be sufficient to acquit him x x x.”[38]
In People vs. Bartolay,[39]
We held: “The alibis of the three
appellants, while weak in themselves, yet when coupled with the improbabilities
and uncertainties of the prosecution evidence and the absence of adequate proof
of conspiracy, suffice to raise reasonable doubts as to their
responsibility.”
Appellant Bautista’s allegations that on the night of the murder
he was in Barrio Toledo, Ramos, Tarlac in the house
of his uncle, Eusebio Melegrito,
was sufficiently corroborated by the latter who testified in open Court.
For his part, appellant Begenio simply
testified that on the fateful night of January
21, 1966, he was in his own house in the same barrio where the
murder was perpetrated, and that he was then sleeping with his wife and
children. The simplicity of this accused’s defense of alibi ought to be commended rather
than disbelieved. As a defendant in a
murder case, he could have offered to establish a concocted alibi which would
bring him to a place far from the scene of the killing so as to make it
impossible for him to have participated in the commission of the crime, rather
than declare as the truth his presence in the very same barrio where the
victim met his death in the hands of assassins.
We are, therefore, persuaded to take Begenio’s
declarations regarding his whereabouts as aforestated
to be true.
With respect to appellant Castro, it is true that he has failed
to account for his whereabouts at the time of the murder for his evidence
consisted of proof tending to show where he was, what he was doing and whom he
was with on the day before the murder.
Nevertheless despite this failure as well as the weakness of appellants’
evidence, their acquittal or conviction should be based on all the
evidence on record because “the accused cannot be convicted by reason of the
weakness of their alibi. The prosecution
must prove their guilt upon the strength of its evidence and not by the
weakness of that of the accused.”[40]
As We said in People vs. Fraga, et al.,
speaking through Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes;
“(A)n accused cannot be convicted on the basis of evidence
which, independent of his alibi, is weak, uncorroborated, and
inconclusive. The rule that alibi must
be satisfactorily proven was never intended to change the burden of proof in
criminal cases; otherwise, we will see the absurdity of an accused being put in
a more difficult position where the prosecution’s evidence is vague and weak
than where it is strong.”[41]
(See also People vs. Cunanan, et al., supra; People vs. Bulawin, supra;
People vs. Basuel, supra; People vs. Dayag, supra; and People vs. Lim and Lim, supra.)
In fine and essence, the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused-appellants beyond
peradventure of doubt, not because of the weakness of their alibi but due to
the reliance of the government on evidence
that is polluted and corrupt. The
innocence of the three accused which is presumed by constitutional mandate has
not been successfully rebutted or overthrown, hence their acquittal must
necessarily result from and be ordered by virtue of this review.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
judgment of conviction is hereby reversed and the accused Antonio Bautista alias “Bucot“,
Antolin Castro and Miguel Begenio
alias “Aning” are hereby acquitted and
ordered released from confinement, unless otherwise detained for another offense. Cost de
oficio.
Judgment reversed.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee,
Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Fernandez*, Abad Santos, De Castro, and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave.
[1]
CFI Record, p. 189.
[2]
CFI Decision, p. 3; CFI Record, p. 484.
[3]
Ibid., pp. 11-12; CFI Record, pp.
492-493.
[4]
Ibid., pp. 3-8; CFI Record, pp. 484-489.
[5]
Exhibit “A”; Folder of
Exhibits, p. 1.
[6]
Ibid.
[7]
t.s.n., Navarro, July 27, 1967, pp. 85-94.
[8]
t.s.n., Ceralde, Aug. 2, 1967, pp. 77-100.
[9]
t.s.n., Austria, July 28, 1967, pp. 116, 118; but
“Bernabe Manlapas”
in lower Court’s decision, p. 14, CFI Record, p. 495, while “Bernabe Marquez” in Exhibit “F” (t.s.n. second stage of preliminary investigation, Jan. 27,
1967), p. 84.
[10]
t.s.n., Austria,
July 28, 1967, pp. 96-118.
[11]
t.s.n., Navarro, March 1, 1968, pp. 123-127.
[12]
Ibid., pp. 112-119.
[13]
t.s.n., Mabutas, Aug. 22, 1968, pp. 42-43 and pp.
48-52.
[14]
t.s.n., Navarro, April 25, 1968, pp. 149-155.
[15]
t.s.n., Navarro, Oct. 24, 1968, pp. 170-174 and pp. 179-184.
[16]
Ibid., pp. 159-164.
[17]
Ibid., pp. 169-170.
[18]
t.s.n., Mabutas, March 1, 1968, pp. 25, 32.
[19]
CFI Decision, pp. 39-40; CFI Record, pp. 520-521.
[20]
U.S. vs.
Inductivo, 40 Phil.
84, 88-89.
[21]
U.S. vs. Barredo, et al., 32 Phil. 444, 451;
U.S. vs. Abanzado, et al., 37 Phil. 658,
664-668; People vs. Ibañez, et al., 92 Phil.
933, 936; Guiao vs. Figueroa, 94 Phil. 1018, 1023; People vs. Mendiola, et al., 46 O.G. 3629,
3633; People vs. Bautista, et al., 106 Phil. 39, 44; People vs. Manigbas, et al., 109 Phil. 469, 478.
[22]
Section 11, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Court.
[23]
People vs. Mendiola, et al., supra,
p. 3634.
[24]
U.S. vs. Remigio, et al., 37 Phil. 599,
610-611 (Underscoring supplied); also quoted in People vs. Lanas, et al., 93 Phil. 147, 154-155, and in People vs.
Cañete, 43 SCRA 14,
26. See also People vs. Aquino, 57 SCRA 43, 48.
[25]
U.S. vs.
Aguasa, et al., 4 Phil. 274, 275-276 (Underscoring
supplied).
[26]
U.S. vs.
San Juan, 25 Phil. 513, 521 (Underscoring
supplied).
[27]
People vs. Asinas, et al., 53 Phil. 59, 67
(Underscoring supplied); also quoted in People vs. Lanas,
et al., supra, p. 155.
[28]
People v. Bumanglag, et al., 56 Phil. 10,
14-15 (Underscoring supplied); also quoted in People vs. Lanas, et al., supra, p. 155.
[29]
People vs. Dizon, et al., 76 Phil. 265, 271
(Underscoring supplied).
[30]
People vs. Faltado, et al., 84 Phil. 89, 94
(Underscoring supplied).
[31]
People v. Manigbas, et al., supra,
478-479 (Underscoring supplied).
[32]
L-18237, Jan. 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 140, 147.
[33]
14 Am. Jur., p. 845.
[34]
People vs. Mandangan, et al., 52 Phil. 62, 64.
[35]
CFI Decision, pp. 25-27 (Underscoring supplied).
[36]
U.S. vs. Candelaria, et al., 4 Phil. 543, 544;
U.S. vs. Macalalad, et al., 9 Phil. 1, 5;
People vs. Durante, et al., 47 Phil. 654, 658;
People vs. Amajul, et al., 1 SCRA 682, 687.
[37]
People vs. Cunanan, et al., 19 SCRA 769, 783; People vs. Bulawin,
29 SCRA 710, 721-722; People vs. Cruz, 32 SCRA 181, 187, quoting from People vs. Baquiran, 20 SCRA 451, 460-461;
People vs. Basuel, 47 SCRA
207, 222-223; People vs. Beltran, 61 SCRA 246,
255-256; People vs. Salas, et al., 66 SCRA
126, 132-133; People vs. Lim and Lim, 80 SCRA
496.
[38]
People vs. Villacorte, et al., 55 SCRA 640, 655.
[39]
42 SCRA 1, 6.
[40]
People vs. Dayag, 56 SCRA 439, 450.
[41]
109 Phil. 241, 250.
* Fernandez, J., signed
the decision prior to his departure for abroad.