MARY LARDIZABAL, PETITIONER, VS. ALFONSO FELIX, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, AND PURA KALAW LEDESMA, RESPONDENTS.

PERFECTO, J.:

Petitioner seeks the annulment of the order of respondent Judge Alfonso Felix
dated August 26, 1946, denying a petition to annul the judgcaent in civil case
No. 71278 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Pura law Ledesma
vs. Mary Lardizabal, the petition for new trial, declaring petitioner’s
right to appeal abandoned, anfl. ordering that execution be issued on September
8, 1946.

In adverse decision having been rendered in the above mentioned civil case,
petitioner alleged that she decided to appeal to the Supreme Court, “depositing
with the attorney contracted by her mother to defend the case the necessary fees
and expenses for the due appeal of her case, and that she never knew, until July
25, 1946, that the decision against her had became final and executory, “by
virtue of an alleged agreement entered into between the plaintiff’s attorney on
the one hand, and the attorney of her mother, on the other, and to which
agreement her mother was made to affix her thumbmark 2nd was made to understand
that the ease was settled amicably—nobody lost and nobody won” —and “petitioner
has never been informed of, nor has she authorized, much less consented to, the
aforesaid agreement.”

The case in question, which is one for ejectment, began in the 1-Iunioipal
Court of ilanila; and. the Court of First Instance of the City, on appeal,
rendered decision on January 8, 1946, ordering petitioner to vacate house No.
1094-B of R. Hidalgo street not Later than March 31, 1946, and to pay a monthly
rental of P16.50 from July 1, 1945.

Petitioner tried to appeal to the Supreme Court, but she filed her notice of
appeal on February 14, 1946, three days after judgment had become final and
executory. A question having been raised as to petitioner’s right to appeal to
the Supreme Court, the parties entered into an ami cable settlement, approved by
the court, under which petitioner desisted from appealing, while the plaintiff
allowed her to continue occupying the premises in cuestion up to June 30, 1946,
and, as a result, petitioner’s attorney, Agustin Alvarez Salazar, returned to
her the amount of P140 which he received to defray the expenses of the
appeal.

Upon failure of petitioner to pay the agreed rents for some months, plaintiff
pm.yed for the issuance of a writ of execution, which was not issued because of
a new amicable settlement between the parties. On July 6, 1946, plaintiff prayed
again for the issuance of a writ of execution in view of the fact thgt the
second extension granted to petitioner to regain in the premises expired on June
30. 1 new attorney appeared for petitioner and, in answer to the petition, filed
a motion to vacate the judgment of January 8, 1946, and for new trxal, alleging,
for the first time, that the decision was rendered upon an agreement entered
into by her mother, without her knowledge or consent.

After proper hearing, the respondent judge concluded that petitioner’s motion
was without merit and was based on allegations not borne by the facts.

Petitioner alleged in her motion that it was only on July 25, 1246, when she
happened to learn about the existence of the ejectment case filed against her by
Pura Salaw ledesma and of the decision rendered therein by the Court of First
Instance of Manila on January 8, 1946; but in the record it appears thst it was
petitioner herself who signed on September 11, 1945, her notice of appeal
against the decision of the municipal court and her answer to the complaint
filed with, the court of first instance dated October 6, 1945.

Petitioner’s allegation that the decision was rendered by virtue of ah
agreement signed on March 30, 1946, not by herself but by her mother, is belied
by the fact that the decision was rendered on January 8, 1946, and upon the
facts as proved at the hearing.

It is also stated by respondent judge that, although the agreement dated Marh
30, 1946, appears to have been signed by ilacaria lontok, mother of petitioner,
it is a fact that what was agreed upon therein has been stipulated in open court
by Mary Lardizabal herself then assisted by her attorney, Alvarez Salazar.

All the above facts are stated in the order of respondent judge, dated August
26, 1946, which is reproduced in toto in the petition, and we do not find
anything in the record why we should not give credit to the respondent’s
narration of facts, which petitioner did not even attempt to dispute before
us.

Upon the facts above stated, petitioner’s allegation that respondent Judge,
in issuing the order of August 26, 1946, acted with abuse of discretion and
without, and in excess of, his jurisdiction, appears to be completely
gratuitous, the order is well supported by the facts and by the law.

Petitioner’s whole claim is based upon her alleged lack of knowledge of and
consent to the agreement which her mother, liacaria lontok, had signed, by
virtue-of which, the decision in the ejectment case was rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Manila, on the existence of whicsh she happened to learn only
on July 25, 1946; but petitioner’s allegation appears to be based, on
misstatements of fact. Petitioner’s action is aggravated by the fact that she
did not stop at trying to disauthorize her own attorney, Agustin Alvarez
Salazar, but even to expose her mother as having assumed an authority not
granted to her and make false representations in the name of petitioner, her
daughter, thereby deceiving not only the other party, Pura Kalaw ledesma, who
was induced to grant an extension to petitioner to remain in the premises in
question—extension of which petitioner had taken all advantage—but the court
itself which approved the agreement. The fact that Macaria Lontok is represented
by petitioner as illiterate does not attenuate petitioner’s conduct, because her
mother’s illiteracy, if it is to be considered, should be taken as an additional
reason for petitioner to show greater respect for the person to whom she owes
her existence, never to trifle with her good name, much less to represent her as
an ignorant or an impostor. Each time a woman gives birth she puts her life in
jeopardy, and after coming out safely from the lancinating ordeal, she has to
endure unnumbered sleepless nights and long years of hardships and sacrifices
for the sake of her offspring’s health and happiness. That is the reason why a
mother should always be held sacred by all her children. A mother must be
enshrined in our heart as a holy thing to be always loved with, devotion,
honored and venerated. There is no function more sublime than maternity.

The petition is denied and the writ of preliminary injunction issued in this
case dissolved. Petitioner shall pay the costs.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Padilla, and Tuason,
JJ., concur.