MANUEL U. DEL ROSARIO, ESPERANZA DEL ROSARIO, NICOLAS KALUBIRAN, ADELAIDA KALUBIRAN, COMPLAINANTS, VS. JOSE T. BASCAR, JR., DEPUTY SHERIFF, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES (MTCC…

In  a verified letter –
complaint Manuel U. del Rosario, et. al. charged Deputy Sheriff Jose Bascar,
Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City for
“Gross Ignorance of the Law, Levying Properties Unreasonably and
Unnecessarily Levying Properties with Malice and Abuse of Authority and
Gross/Wilful Violation of Law.”

This case originated from a complaint filed with the then Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission, Region VII, Cebu City in HSRC Case No.
REM-0006-210685, entitled “Angel Veloso, et al. vs. Esperanza del Rosario,
et al.” for violation of P.D. No. 957, otherwise known as the Subdivision
and Condominium Buyer’s Protective Decree.

A decision was rendered on the aforesaid case on June 10, 1986,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations
respondents Esperanza Del Rosario, Manuel del Rosario, Adelaida Kalubiran and
Nicolas Kalubiran are hereby ORDERED, – jointly and severally –

1.       to
apply for and secure a Certificate of Registration from this Commission within
two (2) months from receipt hereof;

2.       to
accept installment payments from complainants with interest at the legal rate
of twelve per cent (12%) per annum and to execute a Deed of Sale over subject
lots once full payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase price is effected;

3.       to
register the Contract of Sale executed on March 1, 1974 (Annex “A”)
with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cebu City within one (1) month from
receipt hereof;

4.       to
pay a fine of P2,000.00 for failure to secure a certificate of registration and
a license to sell from this Commission within one (1) month from receipt
hereof;

5.       to
develop the subdivision open space, parks and playgrounds as advertised within
six (6) months from receipt hereof; and

6.       to
complete development of subdivision roads and underground drainage facilities
up to lot lines within six (6) months from receipt hereof.” (pp. 24-25,
Records)

Complainants alleged that respondent Deputy Sheriff is grossly
ignorant of the law in implementing the writ of execution of the dispositive
portion of the aforecited case which orders specific performance and hence, is
governed by Section 9 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. They said that under this Section, no levy
of personal or real properties is required but through gross ignorance,
respondent executed the writ pursuant to Section 15 of Rule 39 and proceeded to
levy on execution three (3) parcels of land having a total market value of
P1,236,600.00 of Miradel Development Corporation wherein Esperanza del Rosario
has alleged shares, interests and participation, in order to satisfy the
judgment involving specific performance. Complainants alleged further that the levy on execution involved
registered lands and hence, must be in accordance with Section 71, R.A. 496
which requires that levy on execution of registered lands must contain a
reference to the number of the Certificate of Title of the land to be affected
and the volume and page in the registry book where the certificate is
registered.

It is contended by the complainants that respondent is grossly
ignorant of the law considering that the dispositive portion of the decision is
for specific performance and the fine of P2,000.00 is not payable to the
prevailing parties but to the Commission. Complainants asserted that the levy on the three (3) parcels of land
belonging to the Miradel Corporation with a value of more than 1 million pesos
is excessive considering that, apparently, the levy is for the payment of the
fine of P2,000.00 and the
implementation of the writ was tainted with malice and abuse of authority
because he could have just levied on the personal properties of the herein
complainants which could satisfy the alleged judgment and costs.

Pursuant of a Resolution of this Court dated November 23, 1988,
respondent filed his comment on the complaint (pp. 31-37, Rollo). Respondent contended that the levy was not
made to satisfy the fine of two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) but to protect the
rights of the prevailing parties considering that complainants refused to
comply with the decretal portion of the decision. He stated that the lots he levied upon which are portions of the
lots in controversy covered by TCT Nos. 55606 and 55607 are vacant and there
was malice and bad faith in the transfer of the lots in question to Miradel
Development Corporation wherein complainant Esperanza del Rosario is the
treasurer.

In the resolution of this Court dated December 5, 1990, this case
was referred to Executive Judge; Regional Trial Court, Cebu City for
investigation, report and recommendation. Executive Judge Godardo A. Jacinto in
his report dated October 10, 1991, came up with the following findings
and recommendation.

“It was on 8 September,
1988 that respondent Bascar, accompanied by Angel Veloso’s lawyer, went to
herein complainant [Manuel del Rosario’s residence and office in order to serve
the writ]. Manuel del Rosario is one of
the respondents in the HSRC case and the attorney-in-fact of therein
correspondent Esperanza del Rosario. Upon being requested to comply with the dispositive portion of the
judgment, complainant Manuel del Rosario informed respondent Bascar that the
lots subject of the HSRC case were no longer available. Thereupon, respondent Bascar went to the
Office of the HSRC to check on the titles of the lots, after which he went to
the Register of Deeds to look into the status of the lots and their
titles. There he discovered that the
lots subject of the HSRC case which were previously covered by TCT Nos. 55606
and 55607 had already been consolidated and then subdivided into sublots. Respondent Bascar then made a levy on three
(3) of the derivative lots whose combined area would more or less approximate
the area of the lots subject of the HSRC judgment. These lots happen to be registered in the name of Miradel
Development Corporation.

“On 12 September, 1988 respondent Bascar made a Return of the
writ (Exh. B-1), in which he gave an account of the steps he took in
implementing the writ. He further explained
why he levied on the three (3) lots that were registered in the name of the
Corporation. His act of levying on the
Corporation’s lots led to the present administrative case filed by Manuel del
Rosario and his co-respondents in the HSRC case. x x x.

“Findings and
Recommendations;

“Respondent Bascar admitted in his testimony that he erred in
levying on the lots of Miradel Development Corporation, but as soon as his
attention was invited to such mistake, he filed a Notice of Withdrawal of said
levy with the Register of Deeds (Exh. 11). When he was asked why he chose to levy on the three (3) lots that were
registered in the name of the Miradel Development Corporation, respondent
Bascar explained that it was his honest belief that the said entity was a
family corporation of the del Rosarios who were the judgment obligors in the
HSRC case. He further stated that his
purpose was to preserve the lots subject of the HSRC case so that they could
not be disposed of in avoidance of the judgment in favor of the Velosos. Respondent Bascar also testified that his
purpose in levying on the lots was not to satisfy the fine of P2,000.00 but
only to protect the interests of the prevailing parties in the HSRC case by
securing the lots against possible disposition to other persons. In the perception of the undersigned,
respondent Bascar acted in good faith and further, the alleged malice and abuse
of authority which the complainants claimed to have visited his acts have not
been established. It is important to
note that Miradel Development Corporation whose lots were erroneously levied
had not complained against respondent Bascar. And there is no showing that the Corporation suffered any damage or
prejudice by reason of respondent’s act of levying on its lots which was later
on rectified by his withdrawal or lifting of the notice of levy (Exh. 11).

“The allegation in the complaint that respondent Bascar did
not observe the prescribed procedure for execution and that his act of levying
on Miradel Development Corporation’s lots worth over a million pesos to satisfy
a fine of only P2,000.00 was unnecessary, unreasonable and abusive is not quite
tenable. As amply explained by
respondent Bascar, his purpose in levying on the three (3) lots was to keep
them from being disposed of. He felt it
was important to do it since the judgment ordered therein respondents to accept
installment payments from the Veloso spouses and to execute the corresponding
document of sale as soon as the lots were paid in full. Certainly, the favorable judgment for the
Veloso spouses would be frustrated if in the meantime subject lots were
transferred to others. According to
respondent the lots subject of the contract of sale between the Veloso spouses
and the del Rosarios were covered by TCT Nos. 55606 and 55607 and in the
Register of Deeds he was informed that the lots had been consolidated and then
subdivided and sold to other persons. In levying on the three (3) lots of the Corporation, respondent Bascar honestly
believed that said lots were derived from those that had been sold on
installment in favor of Angel Veloso and unless these were secured from further
disposition the judgment in favor of the latter could no longer be
executed. Respondent Bascar might have
been wrong in his belief and conclusion, but he cannot be faulted for having
done so under the circumstances of the case. It is noteworthy that complainant Manuel del Rosario exhibited an
uncooperative if not antagonistic attitude as he made no attempt to conceal his
intention not to abide by the HSRC judgment. In fact, as admitted by complainant Manuel del Rosario he filed a
petition for certiorari against the HSRC, et al. praying to have its
judgment annulled (Exh. 1), which action was dismissed by Branch 10 of the RTC
of Cebu (Exh. 2). Not satisfied, he
filed a complaint for the same purpose before Branch 12 of the same Court (Exh.
3), which also dismissed it (Exh. 4). From there, complainants went up to the Court of Appeals in a Petition
for Certiorari that was dismissed by said Court (Exh. 5). A similar complaint filed by complainants
questioning the HSRC judgment was filed before Branch 24 of the RTC of Cebu but
it was likewise dismissed (Exh. 6). Finally,
even as the herein complainants were ordered under the final judgment of the
HSRC to accept installment payments for the lots from Angel Veloso (par. 2,
Exh. 9), complainant Manuel del Rosario refused to receive such payment, and in
his letter of refusal (Exh. 9) he made it clear that he did not recognize the
HSRC judgment (tsn, pp 8-9, July 12, 1991). And not only that. Complainants
also did not pay the fine as ordered by the HSRC. As hinted earlier, respondent Bascar’s unsolicited act of digging
into the papers of incorporation of the Miradel Development Corporation and in
proceeding to levy on its lots may have been in reaction to complainant Manuel
del Rosario’s seeming disregard for the final judgment of the HSRC which it was
his (Bascar’s) duty to enforce. Certainly, such an act does not amount to gross ignorance of the law,
negligence and abuse of authority.

“It is then respectfully recommended that respondent Jose T.
Bascar be merely admonished arid warned to be more prudent or discreet in the
performance of his duties.

“Cebu City, Philippines, 10 October, 1991.” (pp. 2-4,
report).

We disagree. The Court
does not subscribe to mere admonition of respondent deputy sheriff as recommended by the investigating
Judge. His unjustifiable acts demand
sanction. Respondent acted with gross
ignorance of the law in making an unreasonable and unnecessary levy in the
process of enforcing the writ of execution of a decision ordering specific
performance and payment of a fine of P2,000.00. He deviated from what was decreed in the writ by making an
unnecessary levy on execution of three lots allegedly forming part of the lots
in controversy which were already sold to the Miradel Development Corporation
by the complainants.

The manner in which respondent conducted the levy leaves no room for
doubt that he was unmindful of the rule that in the exercise of his ministerial
duty of enforcing writs, it was incumbent upon him to ensure that only that
portion of a decision decreed in
the dispositive part should be the subject of execution, no more, no less. He made no effort to limit the levy to the
amount called for in the writ.

Respondent had no reason to make a levy of three parcels of land
belonging to Miradel Development Corporation after having found that Esperanza
del Rosario, one of the respondents in the HSRC case, was treasurer thereof on
the pretext of protecting the prevailing parties whom he claims could
eventually lose the lots by reason of the sale thereof by complainants to the
said corporation. “It should be
recalled that a purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, on a prescribed manner in
obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to the exercise of
his own judgments, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done (Lamb v.
Phipps, 22 Phils.456). Discretion, on
the other hand, is a faculty conferred upon a court or official by which he may
decide the question either way and still be right (Asuncion v. De Yriarte, 28,
Phil. 67).”^[1]
There is no doubt that respondent acted beyond the bounds of his duty by
allocating unto himself the power of the Court to pierce the “veil of
corporate” entity and improvidently assuming that since complainant
Esperanza del Rosario is the treasurer of the Miradel Development Corporation,
they are one and the same. It is
well-settled doctrine both in law and equity that as a legal entity, a corporation has a personality
distinct and separate from its individual stockholders or members. The mere fact that one is president of a corporation does not render the
property he owns or possesses the property of the corporation, since the
president, as individual, and the corporation are separate entities (Cruz v.
Dalisay, 152 SCRA 483). More importantly,
it was not incumbent upon him as sheriff to determine for himself the means how
to safeguard the rights of the prevailing party in a case for specific performance. All that he was called upon to do in such instance was to serve
the writ of execution with a certified copy of the judgment requiring specific
performance upon the party/parties against whom the same was rendered and in
case of failure to abide, it is at the prevailing party’s instance not the
sheriff’s that the aid of the court may be sought.

There was failure, however, to establish with certainty that the
actuation of respondent deputy sheriff was attended with malice and was done so
as to prejudice a third party. As the
respondent explained, he wanted to protect the interest of the prevailing
parties over the lots in controversy. Though he erroneously made the levy, the same cannot be looked upon with malicious intent although
effected unreasonably. The withdrawal
of notice of levy on execution dated June 9, 1989, filed by the respondent
sheriff to rectify his error shows his lack of malice and serves to mitigate
his liability.

This Court had said before, and reiterates it here, as it has
done in other cases, that the conduct and behavior of every one connected with
an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding justice
to the lowest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. His conduct, at all
times, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but above all
else be above suspicion.^[2] Respondent’s actuations in enforcing the Writ of Execution in
HSRC Case No. REM-0006-210685 did not live up to this strict standard.

ACCORDINGLY, a fine of P5,000.00 is hereby imposed on
respondent Deputy Sheriff Jose Bascar, Jr., Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 4, Cebu City, for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, payable within thirty (30) days from notice. Respondent is hereby warned that a repetition of the same or of
any act calling for disciplinary action,
will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Cruz, and
Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Yoeng v. Monblan, A.M. No. P-89-367, January 9, 1992.

^[2]
Jereos, Jr. v. Reblando; Sr., Adm. Matter No. P-141, May 31, 1976, 71
SCRA 126; Anang v. Garampil Vda. de Blas, A.M. No. P-91-602, Oct. 15,
1991.