OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. BENJIE V. ORE, PROCESS SERVER, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, PASAY CITY, RESPONDENT.

Office of the Court Administrator versus Ore

The Case

This is an administrative disciplinary case brought by the Office of the Court Administrator against Benjie V. Ore, a former process server of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City. The complaint arose because Ore had been convicted in two criminal cases for failure of an accountable officer to render accounts, after he received two cash advances for official travel and never liquidated them. The case matters because it fixes the line between simple neglect and gross neglect of duty, and because it teaches what happens to a court employee who resigns after disciplinary proceedings have already begun.

Procedural History

The criminal cases were filed by the Office of the Ombudsman with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City. That court suspended Ore pending resolution, later convicted him in both cases, and imposed a straight penalty of imprisonment of six months and one day of prision correccional in its minimum period in each case. Ore was separately charged with malversation of public funds before the regional trial court, but was acquitted there for failure of the prosecution to prove the fourth element of the crime.

When the Office of the Court Administrator received a copy of the conviction, the administrative machinery began. The Office of the Executive Director recommended that the matter be re-docketed, that Ore be found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude, and that he be dismissed. The Judicial Integrity Board modified that recommendation: it held that the offense was not a crime involving moral turpitude, but that the failure to liquidate amounted to gross neglect of duty. Because dismissal could no longer be imposed after Ore's resignation, the Board recommended forfeiture of benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office. The matter then came to the Supreme Court as an administrative matter, and the Court adopted the findings and recommendations of the Judicial Integrity Board.

Facts

Ore served as process server in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City. In 2011 he received two checks as cash advances for travel expenses. The first, for 17,896 pesos, was for his travel to Palawan to attend a regional assembly from April 27 to May 1, 2011. The second, for 15,000 pesos, was for his travel to Davao City to attend the national convention of the Process Servers Association of the Philippines from April 12 to April 16, 2011. Under Commission on Audit Circular Number 97-00, he was duty-bound to liquidate each advance within thirty days after his return to his official station. He liquidated neither.

On April 4, 2016, the Office of the Ombudsman filed two Informations charging him with failure of an accountable officer to render accounts under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code. In April 2017 the trial court suspended him pending resolution, and he stopped reporting for work; his salaries and benefits were withheld beginning July 13, 2017. In December 2018 the trial court convicted him in both cases.

A copy of that decision reached the Office of the Court Administrator in March 2019, while Ore was still in the plantilla of personnel. He resigned from the service in September 2019. The records show that his cash advances remained unliquidated as of December 31, 2013; that the trial court cancelled his cash bonds and issued a warrant of arrest after he failed to appear at the hearings of his criminal cases; and that he remained at large and could not be contacted by the Judicial Integrity Board for his comment on the administrative charges.

Issues

• Whether or not Ore's resignation from the service ousted the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over the administrative case against him.
• Whether or not Ore's failure to liquidate his cash advances constitutes gross neglect of duty.
• Whether or not the penalty of dismissal may still be imposed on him despite his supervening resignation, and if not, what penalty may be meted in lieu of dismissal.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2, paragraph 2 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:

Once disciplinary proceedings are instituted, the respondent's supervening separation from service shall not preclude or affect the continuation of the same.

This is the provision that keeps the case alive despite Ore's resignation.

Canon I, Section 5 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel provides:

Court personnel shall use the resources, property and funds under their official custody in a judicious manner and solely in accordance with the prescribed statutory and regulatory guidelines or procedures.

This is the standard Ore violated when he failed to liquidate funds under his official custody.

Canon IV, Section 1 of the same Code provides:

Court personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and with diligence. They shall commit themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their office during working hours.

This is the diligence standard against which his omission is measured.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that Ore's resignation did not oust its jurisdiction. Disciplinary proceedings were instituted as early as March 2019, when the Office of the Court Administrator was notified of his criminal conviction, and under Section 2, paragraph 2 of Rule 140, a supervening separation from service does not preclude or affect the continuation of the proceedings.

On the second issue, the Court held that Ore was liable for gross neglect of duty. The cash advances formed part of the court's funds, and by failing to submit the required liquidation he was remiss in his duty to observe the prescribed guidelines in the use of funds under his official custody, violating Canons I and IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. The Court distinguished gross from simple neglect:

Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected.

Three circumstances showed more than carelessness. He never attempted to correct his misdeed by belatedly submitting liquidation documents. He stopped appearing at his criminal trial without notice or justification, a flagrant violation of his bail conditions and a show of disrespect for court processes. And he went completely incognito and could not be contacted for his comment. The Court distinguished the case from Samonte versus Jumawak, where a health officer who liquidated late, amid heavy duties, was held liable only for simple misconduct, and found it closer to Hallasgo versus Commission on Audit, where the totality of the respondent's acts showed a pattern of negligence and wanton disregard for public service.

On the third issue, the Court noted that gross neglect of duty is a serious charge punishable by dismissal, but that dismissal could no longer be imposed because of the resignation. Under Rule 140, where the offense merits dismissal but the same can no longer be imposed due to supervening resignation, the respondent may be meted forfeiture of all or part of the benefits and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, and a fine. The Court imposed forfeiture and perpetual disqualification.

Doctrine

First, resignation does not moot an administrative case. Once disciplinary proceedings are instituted, the respondent's supervening separation from service does not preclude or affect the continuation of the same, under Section 2, paragraph 2 of Rule 140.

Second, gross neglect of duty is negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to the consequences. It is a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness to perform a duty, as opposed to simple neglect, which is a disregard of duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.

Third, the failure of court personnel to liquidate cash advances within the prescribed period violates Canons I and IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, and the totality of the respondent's acts, not any single one, determines whether the neglect is gross.

Fourth, where dismissal can no longer be imposed because of supervening resignation, the Court may impose forfeiture of benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government agency or instrumentality.

Disposition

The Court found Benjie V. Ore guilty of gross neglect of duty and ordered the forfeiture of his retirement and other benefits, except accrued leave credits, and his perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or government financial institution.

Remember This

Memorize the line that resignation does not erase accountability: once disciplinary proceedings are instituted, supervening separation from service does not preclude their continuation. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between gross and simple neglect of duty, and the penalties available in lieu of dismissal when the respondent has already left the service.