BERNARDA NAZAL, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND CEFERINO NAZAL, PETITIONER, VS. HON. FELICIANO BELMONTE, JUDGE CFI OF BAGUIO AND JUANA F. CATBAGAN, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND BERNARDINO CA…

Original petition for certiorari and prohibition, with
preliminary injunction, against respondent, Hon. Feliciano Belmonte,
as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio
City, to stay the execution of a decision of said court.  Upon the filing of said petition and of the
posting and approval of the requisite bond, we issued the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for.

The pertinent facts are: 
Many years ago, a strip of land – commonly known as the MRR Lot – in Baguio City
had been reserved for a right-of-way of the Manila Railroad Company –
hereinafter referred to as the Company – in connection with a proposed
extension of its railroad line.  Pending
implementation of the proposed extension, several people squatted on the MRR
Lot, and, when the line was eventually abandoned, a scramble for the possession
of portions of the Lot ensued among the squatters.  Herein respondent Juana F. Catbagan and one Faro Cabading
had conflicting claims to the possession of a portion known as Lot No. 24-A.  Acting as arbiter thereon, the Company
granted permission to Catbagan to build north of a
path dividing said Lot No. 24 A and to Cabading to
build south of said path.

This, notwithstanding, Cabading
constructed his house north of the path, in view of which Catbagan
filed, against him, Civil Case No. 743 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio, an accion publiciana to recover possession of the northern
portion of Lot No. 24-A, as well as damages. 
In due course, judgment was rendered on June 7, 1960, sentencing Cabading
to vacate said portion and remove his building thereon, as well as to pay Catbagan the sum of P500.00, as attorney’s fees, in
addition to the costs.  Cabading sought a review of this decision by the Court of
Appeals, but while the appeal was pending before the latter, he sold his
aforementioned house to herein petitioner, Bernarda Nazal, who thereafter introduced additional improvements
thereon.

Meanwhile, the Company, which claimed ownership over the MRR Lot,
dealt with the former squatters as its tenants and collected rentals therefrom until the year 1954, when it stopped its
collections.  Years later, heeding a
clamor from the occupants of said Lot for a direct sale
of the portions occupied by them, on May
28, 1963, the City Council of Baguio
passed a resolution declaring that the MRR Lot is a public land, disposable
through townsite sales applications.  Inasmuch as the Company had failed to
establish its claim of title to the MRR Lot, on March 30, 1964 a body designated as “Baguio Coordination Committee”^[1]
recommended to the Director of Lands that the lot be subdivided and its actual
occupants allowed to file “the proper public land
application.” Accordingly, Cabading applied for
the purchase of the area on which his house was and, upon its sale to
petitioner Bernarda Nazal,
the latter took over and pursued the application.

Meanwhile, or on November
9, 1964, the Court of Appeals^[2]
had affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio
in its Civil Case No.  743, and upon the
remand of the records thereof to the lower court, then presided over by Judge
Feliciano Belmonte, respondent Catbagan
moved, on March 4, 1965, for the execution of said decision.  Forthwith, or on March 12, 1965, petitioner Nazal
filed Civil Case No. 1497 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio
against respondent Catbagan, to stay said execution,
upon the ground that the land in question is the
object of an application of Cabading, whose interest
had been conveyed to petitioner, then being processed by the Bureau of
Lands.  Subsequently, or on March 18, 1965, Nazal
filed in Case No. 743 an opposition to Catbagan’s
motion for execution.  This opposition
was, on March 29, 1965,
overruled by respondent Judge, who then ordered the is­suance of the writ prayed
for by Catbagan.

On or about March 24,
1965, the Director of Lands filed a motion to intervene in case No.
1497, but before the motion was acted upon, or on April 7, 1965, Nazal instituted
the present action against Judge Belmonte and Catbagan.  At an
auction sale held on November 11,
1965, the disputed area was awarded to peti­tioner Nazal, and on February
9, 1966, Original Certi­ficate of Title No. P-566, covering said
area, was issued to her.

The question for determination in this case is whether or not the
judgment in Civil Case No. 743 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio, which is final and executory,
ordering Cabading to vacate the land in question and
remove his building thereon, as well as to pay sums of money to respondent Catbagan, may be executed against herein petitioner Nazal, as successor-in-interest of Cabading,
despite the subsequent sale of the land by the Government to Nazal and the Torrens title to said land issued in her
favor.

Although once a decision has become final and executory,
it is the ministerial duty of the proper court to order its execution,
this rule is subject to exceptions. 
Indeed, it is well-settled that when, after a judgment has become final
and executory, facts and circumstances transpire
which render its execution impossible or unjust, the interested party may ask a
competent court to stay its execution or prevent its enforcement.^[3]

Thus, the stay of execution of a final judgment for a sum of
money has been sanctioned to give the judgment debtor an opportunity to set off
a money claim that had subsequently accrued in his favor and against the
judgment creditor,^[4]
or where the indebted­ness or obligation arising from said judgment had been novated by subsequent agreement.^[5]

More directly in point is the case of Hernandez vs. Clapis,^[6] a
forcible entry and detainer case in which a decision
was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.  Although the decision was affirmed by the
Supreme Court, the execution thereof was objected to upon the ground that,
during the pendency of the appeal before said Court,
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources had rejected the sales
application of the plaintiffs and allowed the defendants to purchase the land
in dispute.  In reversing the order of
execution issued by the lower court, we said:

“x x x
While the decision in the forcible entry and detainer
case is final, it can  no longer be
executed at least in so far as  the
possession of the land in question is concerned, because, under section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No.  141, the Director
of Lands has direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease,
sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of the lands
of the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact are conclu­sive
when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture; and because the latter had
already cancelled the right of plaintiff Maria L. Hernandez to administer the
land in question and rejected both her sales application and that of her
husband, plaintiff Antonio Hernandez, at the same time giving the defendants
the preferential right to apply for said land in virtue of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 65.  The correctness of
the final decision of the Secretary of Agriculture is not herein involved, but it
is valid and binding until reversed in a proper proceeding by the court.  The situation is not that the judgment in the
forcible entry and detainer case has lost its virtuality, but that the plaintiffs had subsequently
ceased to be entitled to the relief awarded by said judgment.

“However, the money judgement
in favor of the plaintiffs not being within the scope of the administrative
control granted by law to the Director of Lands with reference to public land, may still be enforced by execution.”
(Underscoring supplied.)

This view was adhered to in Realiza vs.
Duarte^[7]
in the following language:

“The situation of appellant Gaspar
Duarte, however, is different.  On May 31, 1954, or after the entry
of judgment, his homestead application was approved by the Director of
Lands.  In view of this supervening event
which occurred after the entry of judgment, it be­hooved the court a quo
to have ascertained if the relationship between appellee
and Duarte was changed.  In the case of Compañia
General de Tabacos vs. Martinez,
et al., 29 Phil., 515, 521, which involved an action for revival of judgment,
this Court, through Justice, Trent, stated:

‘There is by no means any pre­sumption in his (judgment creditor)
favor that he is entitled to no less than the exact relief set forth in the
first judgment.  During a period of five
years or more, many events or transactions may have transpired to change the
relations of the parties or the right of the judgment creditor to demand the enforcement
of his judgment.  It is the duty of the
court before which the second action is tried to examine any such defenses
presented by the defendant and allow their just effect.’

xx                         xx                         xx                       xx

“The land on which Duarte
settled may be initially presumed as public land, his home­stead application
over it having been approved by the Director of Lands.  It is our considered opinion that the
approval of his homestead application legalized his possession, and such
approval constitutes a justiciable defense against
the action for revival of judgment as it necessarily affects the appellee’s right of possession of the land from which
Duarte was ordered ejected.” (Underscoring supplied.)

To the same effect is De los Santos
vs. Rodriguez, et al.^[8] We quote from the decision therein rendered:

“It the time of the rendition of the decision in CA-G.R. No.
18912-R, the question whether or not said portion was to be part of her
homestead had not as yet been definitely settled.  Accordingly, it became necessary to determine
in that case who shall meanwhile be in possession.  The aforementioned question was finally
decided in favor of Rodriguez, in the order of the Director of Fisheries, dated
February 27, 1959.  There­after he is, therefore, the party
entitled to said possession.  In other words, the decision in CA-G.R.
18912-R may no longer be
executed, not because the decision in CA-G.R.
32970-R has annulled it, but because
of events subsequent to the first decision, which events have changed
materially the situation between the parties.  x x
x.

“As early as Molina vs. De la Riva (8 Phil.,
569. See, also, Behn Meyer & Co. vs. McMicking, 11 Phil., 276; Warner, Barnes & Co. vs. Jaucian, 13 Phil. 4; Espiritu vs.
Crossfield and Guash, 14
588; Flor Mate vs. Lichauco
and Sali­nas, 36 Phil., 809; De la Costa vs. Celofax,
67 Phil., 685) the principle has been laid down that, when, after judgment has
become final, facts and circumstances transpire which render its execution
impossible or unjust, the interest­ed party may ask the court to modify or
alter the judgment to harmonize the same with justice and the facts.

“For this reason, in Amor vs. Judge
Jose (77 Phil. 703), we used the following language:

‘The Court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution upon a final
and executory judgment, or quash it, or order its
stay, for, as a general rule, parties will not be allowed, after final
judgment, to object to the execution by raising new issues of fact or of law, except
when there had been a change in the situation of the parties which makes such
execution inequitable; or when it appears that the controversy has never
been submitted to the judgment of the court; or when it appears that the writ
of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance,
or issued against the wrong party, or that judgment debt has been paid or
otherwise satisfied; or when the writ has been issued without authority.’

“Since, events posterior to the rendition of the decision in
CA-G.R.18912-R have reversed the legal position of the parties therein, the
trial Court committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess
of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of execution complained of, insofar
as Lot 880 is concerned.  x x
x.” (Underscoring supplied.)

Moreover, in the administrative proceedings relative to the
disposition of the land of the public domain involved in the present case,
respondent Catbagan neither object to the sales
application of Faro Cabading nor applied for the
purchase of said land.  He did not even
notify the Director of Lands of the suit regarding the possession of said
land.  Considering that said proceedings
bind all claimants of lands they admit to be part of the public domain, and that an original certificate of title has already been
issued in favor of petitioner Bernarda Nazal, it is obvious that respondent Catbagan
is now barred from asserting and/or enforcing the possessory
right previously adjudged in her favor, although the money portion of the
judgment in question may still be executed.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for should be as
it is hereby granted and the order of respondent Judge of March 29, 1965, annulled, but only in so far as
the ejectment from and the recovery of possession of
the disputed land is concerned, without special pronouncement as to costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, and Angeles, JJ.,
concur.

^[1]
Composed of the Director of Lands, the Baguio City
Mayor, its City Engineer, the Director of Parks and Wild Life, a representative
of the Chairman of the Baguio City Planning Board, a
representative of the Director of Forestry, and the Chief, Land Manage­ment
Division, Bureau of Lands.

^[2] T.s.n CA-G.R. 
No.  28601-R.

^[3] Ocampo vs. Sanchez, 97 Phil., 473; City of 4 Butuan vs. Judge Ortiz, -18054, December 22, 1961.

^[4] Chua
A.H.  Lee vs. Mapa,
51 Phil., 624.

^[5] De
la Costa vs. Cleofas, 67 Phil., 687.

^[6] 98 Phil., 684.

^[7] L-20527,
August 31, 1967.

^[8] L-23170,
January 31, 1968.