MANUEL ARTIGAS LOSADA, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. JUAN ACENAS, AS SUPERINTENDENT OF DAVAO PENAL COLONY AT INAGAWAN, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from an order, dated July 20, 1946, of the justice of the
peace of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, who, in the absence of the judge of first
instance (Act No. 2131), directed the release on habeas corpus, of Manuel
Artigas Losada, Getulio Geocada, Santiago Aguda, and Francisco Danao, inmates of
the Davao Penal Colony at Inagawan, Palawan.

The first is undergoing a maximum sentence of 15 years, 2 months and 2 days
for estafa, and estafa through falsification. Such term is due to
expire, with good conduct allowance, on July 16, 1947.

The second, Getulio Geocada, doing time for illegal possession of counterfeit
money is due for release April 25, 1947.

The third, Santiago Aguda, serving a sentence of 12 years and 1 day for
homicide, would be entitled to his liberty about January 7, 1948, should he
observe good conduct in the meantime.

The last, Francisco Danao, jailed for abduction with rape, will complete the
service of his sentence, with good conduct allowance, about June 19, 1948.

As above stated, the court decreed in July, 1946, that these four penal
colonists should forthwith be freed from restraint. Reason for the decree was
their allegation, and the court’s opinion, that they had earned a special time
allowance in the form of a deduction of one-fifth of their respective sentences
under articles 98 and 158 of the Revised Penal Code, which for convenience are
quoted below:

“A deduction of one-fifth of the period of his sentence shall be granted to
any prisoner who, having evaded the service of his sentence under the
circumstances mentioned in article 158 of this Code, gives himself up to the
authorities within 48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation announcing
the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe referred to in said article.”
(Article 98, Revised Penal Code.)

“A convict who shall evade the service of his sentence, by leaving the penal
institution where he shall have been confined, on the occasion of disorder
resulting from a conflagration, earthquake, explosion, or similar catastrophe,
or during a mutiny in which he has not participated, shall suffer an increase of
one-fifth of the time stilt remaining to be served under the original sentence,
which in no case shall exceed six months, if he shall fail to give himself up to
the authorities within forty-eight hours following the issuance of a
proclamation by the Chief Executive announcing the passing away of such
calamity.

“Convicts who, under the circumstances mentioned in the preceding paragraph,
shall give themselves up to the authorities within the above mentioned period of
48 hours, shall be entitled to the deduction provided in article 98.” (Article
158, Revised Penal Code.)

The judge a quo made these observations in support of his action.

“* * * in the opinion of this Court, those prisoners who, having all the
chances to escape and did not escape but remained in their prison cell during
the disorder caused by war have shown More convincingly their loyalty than those
who escaped under the circumstances specifically enumerated in article 158 and
give themselves up within 48 hours. After the executive proclamation for the
latter, that is, the prisoner who escaped might have been persuaded to give
themselves up merely because they could see but a slim chance to avoid capture
inasmuch as the government then was functioning with all its normal efne-ency.
And if those who are loyal merely in times of conflagration, earthquake,
explosion and other similar catastrophe are considered loyal and are for that
reason given in their favor one-fifth reduction of their sentence, with more
reason that those who stayed in their places of confinement during the war * *
*.”

These are considerations that more properly belong to the legislative
department, should an amendment to the law be proposed. They are likewise
equitable pleas, which the executive department could properly entertain in
connection with petitions for parole or pardon of the prisoners. But they may
not authorize the courts to read into the statute additional conditions or
situations. The special allowance for loyalty authorized by articles 98 and 158
of the Revised Penal Code refers to those convicts who, having evaded the
service of their sentences by leaving the penal institution, give themselves
up within two days. As these petitioners are not in that class, because they
have not escaped, they have no claim to that allowance. For one thing there is
no showing that they ever had the opportunity to escape, or that having such
opportunity they had the mettle to take advantage of it or to brave the perils
in connection with a jailbreak. And there is no assurance that had they
successfully run away and regained their precious liberty they would have,
nevertheless, voluntarily exchanged it later with the privations of prison life
impelled by that sense of right and loyalty to the Government, which is sought
to be rewarded with the special allowance. Wherefore, it is not plain that their
case comes within the spirit of the law they have invoked. It must be observed
in this connection that the only circumstance favorable to petitioners is the
admission of the respondent that they “remained in the penal colony and did not
try to escape during the war.”

The appealed decision is reversed and the petition for habeas corpus
denied. No costs. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado,
Briones, Hontiveros, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

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PERFECTO, J.:

The legal controversy in this case centers upon the interpretation and
application of articles 98 and 158 of the Revised Penal Code. We are inclined to
follow the liberal interpretation adopted by the lower court and, therefore, to
affirm its judgment, dated July 20, 1946, ordering the release of appellees
Manuel Artigas Losada, Santiago Aguda, Getulio Geocada and Francisco Danao.

Under the two above-mentioned articles of the Revised Penal Code, a convict
who shall evade the service of his sentence by leaving the penal institution
where he is confined, on the occasion of disorder resulting from conflagration,
earthquake, explosion or similar catastrophe, or during a mutiny in which he has
not participated, shall suffer an increase of one-fifth of the period still
remaining to be served under his sentence, or a deduction of one-fifth of his
sentence if, in the first case, he shall fail to give himself up to the
authorities or, in the second case, he gives himself up to the authorities
within forty-eight hours following the issuance of a proclamation announcing the
passing away of the calamity or catastrophe.

There is no question that war is a calamity or catastrophe similar to those
specifically mentioned by law. It is a fact that appellees behaved well during
the last war and remained loyal to the prison authorities in spite of the
disorder occasioned by the war. As they did not escape, their cases apparently
do not fall within the letter of articles 98 and 158 of the Revised Penal Code.
But the spirit embodied in said articles offers no doubt that appellees’ cases
fall within the substantial purview of the law.

Under the provisions of articles 98 and 158 of the Revised Penal Code, the
convict who shall evade the service of his sentence and does not give himself up
to the authorities within forty-eight hours following the issuance of a
proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity, shall be punished with
an increase in his sentence, but if he gives himself up he will be granted, as a
reward, a reduction of his sentence, a reduction that in appellees’ cases will
entitle them to freedom.

Appellant and the majority of this Court, instead of following the clear
intention of the, law, would sacrifice it for the sake of an application ad
pedem litere. Such attitude will lead us to absurd conclusions.

For example, the articles in question contemplate the issuance of a
proclamation by the Chief Executive announcing the passing away of the calamity.
In the hypothesis that such a proclamation is never issued, a convict who shall
have evaded service of sentence under the circumstances contemplated by the law
but later gives himself up to the authorities, will not be entitled to the
one-fifth deduction. In another hypothesis, a convict who, on the occasion of
disorder resulting from a calamity or catastrophe, had opportunity to evade the
service of his sentence, instead of escaping, voluntarily continues to submit
himself under the custody of authorities who might not have the force to make
effective said custody, will be in a worse situation than the one who evaded his
sentence. The absurd consequences of the narrow-minded interpretation that
sticks to the letter of the law, instead of following the clear intention of the
lawmaker, compels us to reject it.

The liberal interpretation adopted by the lower court is in consonance with
the modern trend of the law. That interpretation is in accordance with the
spirit which should pervade all criminal laws, that is, that any doubt or
controversy should be resolved in a way that will be more beneficial to the
accused.

For all the foregoing, we vote to affirm the appealed
decision.