JESUS LANCITA, ET AL., PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. GONZALO MAGBANUA ET AL, RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.

On March 21, 1951 , respondents Gonzalo Magbanua and Alfredo
Magbanua filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Buluan, Cotabato,
a complaint (Civil Case No. 7), for Forcible Entry, against Jesus
Lancita, et al., now the petitioners. On July 17, 1951 , said Court
rendered judgment, to wit:

“This case having been called to trial after
several postponements made by the defendants, the court after meting
out justice to the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs took basis for the
continuation of the trial or the postponement of the trial not well
grounded. The Court under Rule 4, Section 13, of the Rules of Court
declared the defendants in default and proceeded to hear the
testimonies of the plaintiffs and their witnesses.

The Court
found in accordance with the facts alleged in the complaint that the
plaintiffs had prior physical possession over the land in question. The
Defendants are hereby ordered to vacate the land in question and
deliver upon the plaintiffs the possession of the land. The Defendants
are also hereby ordered to pay damages jointly and severally in the
amount of TWO hundred (P200.00) pesos, and also to pay the costs.”

On August 21, 1951 , the Lancitas presented a Motion for
Reconsideration of the above judgment. On the same date also, without
waiting for the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration, they
filed a Notice of Appeal, which was abandoned, for failure to file the
requisite bond. Under date of October 24, 1951 , the JP Court granted
the motion for reconsideration and notified the parties to appear on
November 15, 1951 , for trial of the case and ordered the stay of the
decision. On November 27, 1951 , the JP Court promulgated the following
Order, stating—

“* * *. Considering the fact that this case has
been dragging for almost a year already, and five to six postponements
having already granted to the defendants, delay of Justice have already
been tremendously felt by the parties.

In view of the foregoing, the decision dated July 17, 1951 , is hereby revived and to take effect immediately.”

On November 26, 1956, counsel for respondent Magbanua presented
with the Justice of the Peace Court a Motion for an Alias Writ of
Execution, pointing out the fact that the Provincial Sheriff repeatedly
failed to eject the defendants (now petitioners), from the premises in
question. A written opposition thereto, was filed claiming that (1) the
judgment of July 17, 1951 cannot be executed now by merely filing a
motion, as the period of five (5) years within which to execute said
judgment by motion, had already expired; and (2) admitting for the sake
of argument that the aforesaid judgment can be executed by mere motion,
the issuance of the writ, will cause irreparable damage to the
defendants and to others who were not parties to the case. The JP Court
issued the alias writ of execution on March 27, 1957 .

Defendants therein, now Petitioners, presented with the CFI of
Cotabato on April 22, 1957, a Petition for Certiorari with Injunction
Ex-Parte and Damages in the sum of P2.000.00 alleging that the
respondent JP acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion in entertaining the motion for Execution.

Petitioners maintained that the period of five years had already
elapsed, since the judgment in the Forcible Entry case became final and
executory immediately on July 17, 1951 , and the same judgment was
being executed only on November 26, 1956 . Respondents contended that
the judgment in the Forcible Entry case became final only on November
27, 1951 , or thereabouts, because the effects of the July 17, 1951
judgment was stayed by the JP Court , upon motion for reconsideration
by petitioners. On July 12, 1957 , the trial court rendered judgment,
the pertinent portions of which recite—

“It appears on record that under date of October
24, 1951 , the Justice of the Peace of Buluan, Cotabato, under whose
court was then pending: Civil Case No. 7, issued a directive ordering
the stay of the decision of the Court of July 17, 1951; it appears
further that under date of November 27, 1951, the court in its order
affirmed its decision of July 17, 1951.

In the light of the
above stated facts, and in the light of the facts stated in the
pleadings of the parties, the Court has formed the opinion and so holds
that for the present there exist no reasons why the writ of execution
issued by the Justice of the Peace Court of Tacurong, one of the
respondents in this petition, of November 26, 1956, should be
disturbed. Plainly expressed, the writ of execution issued by the
respondent Justice of the Peace of Tacurong petitioned on November 26,
1956 remain in full force and should be implemented by the respondent
Provincial Sheriff of Cotabato, without delay.”

Petitioners therein presented a Motion for Reconsideration of the
above Order, alleging that (1) the same is not in accordance with the
law and the evidence of record; and that (2) they have been denied
their day in court. This motion having been denied, the respondents
therein interposed the present appeal direct to Us.

The appeal present the singular issue as to “whether or not the
alias writ of execution given on March 21, 1957 , pursuant to a Motion
presented on November 26, 1956 , was issued within the five (5) year
prescriptive period for execution of judgment by mere motion.”

It is the theory of the petitioners-appellants that since judgment
arose from a forcible entry case, execution thereof shall issue
immediately (Sec. 8, Rule 72), and that the failure of
respondents-appellees to have an immediate execution thereon
constituted a waiver, which did not suspend the period for the finality
of the said judgment. Petitioners also claim that having been declared
in default the said judgment of July 17, 1951 , became final
immediately, so that the motion for a writ of execution presented on
November 26, 1956 , was outside the period provided for the execution
of judgment by mere motion.

The contention of petitioners is not sustained by the facts duly
established and is contrary to the well entrenched rulings and
doctrines on the finality and execution of judgments. The records of
the case clearly show that while the judgment in the Forcible Entry
case was promulgated on July 17, 1951, and could have been, executed at
the instance of the plaintiffs therein (now respondents), the effects
of the same were delayed due to the motion for reconsideration
presented by herein petitioners. As a matter of fact said motion was
set for hearing and’ it was only on November 27, 1951 , that an

Order reviving the judgment of July 17, 1951 was promulgated, after
the petitioners had failed to appear on the hearing of the Motion to
Dismiss presented by them and which was denied by the JP Court . It can
not be successfully disputed, therefore, that it was only on November
27, 1951 , that the judgment in the forcible entry case became final.
The records reveal that the execution of the judgment had been asked
several times after the rendition of the decision and before the filing
of the motion for a writ of execution in question, but the provincial
sheriff invariably failed to carry out or enforce the orders of the JP
Court .

The trial court in its order of November 25, 1958 , said:

“It appears also from the said order (page 12 of
the record) that the said alias writ of execution was issued because
the previous orders for execution issued by the Justice of the Peace
have not been properly executed because the provincial Sheriff has
repeatedly failed to eject the defendants from the litigated premises.
The existence of a previous writ of execution was also confirmed by the
Provincial Sheriff’s return, copy of which appears on pages 101, 102
and 103 of the record herein. It is stated therein, among other things,
that the defendants were furnished, copies of the alias order of
execution on June 1, 1956 by Deputy Sheriff Silvestre L. Roda.”

If the method of computation is, as it should be, to start from
November 27, 1951 , the date of the finality of the judgment to
November 26, 1956 , the filing of the motion for an alias writ of
execution, 4 years, 11 months and 29 days had elapsed. The motion,
under consideration, therefore, is well within the prescribed period.
If the computation should commence from July 17, 1951, the date of the
original decision in the justice of the peace court, the alias order of
execution on June 1, 1956 (of the several already issued) the
corresponding motion of which must have been filed on or before said
date, such filing was likewise within the prescribed period. Moreover,
these orders of execution which could not be enforced because of the
contumacy or failure of the obligor to comply, had deferred or
suspended the running of the period. It is to be noted that as late as
April 20, 1957 , the defendants had presented in the JP Court a
petition asking extension of time within which to vacate the premises
(Annex 3, Answer).

“Where judgments are for money only and are wholly
unpaid, and execution has been previously withheld in the interest of
the judgment debtor, which is in financial difficulties, the court has
no discretion to deny motions for leave to issue execution more than
five years after the judgments are entered.” (Application of Molnar,
Belinsky, et al. vs. Long Is. Amusement Corp., 1 N.Y.S. 2d 866).

“In computing the time limited for suing out of an execution, although
there is authority to the contrary, the general rule is that there
should not be included the time when execution is stayed, either by
agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the
taking of an appeal, or writ of error so as to operate as a
supersedeas, by the death of a party, or otherwise. Any interruption or
delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the
writ may be issued without scire facias.” (23 C. J. 378).

There has been no indication that respondents herein had ever slept
on their rights to have the judgment executed by mere motions, within
the reglementary period. The statute of limitations has not been
devised against those who wish to act but cannot do so, for causes
beyond their control.

In view hereof, the appeal is hereby dismissed, and the orders
subject thereof, being in conformity with the evidence and the law on
the matter, are affirmed. Costs taxed against herein petitioners.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador , Concepcion , Reyes, J.B.L., and Barrera, JJ., concur.