ABRAHAM F. MALIC, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE), RESPONDENTS.

Petition for review of the decision dated July 18, 1973 of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission which reversed the award of the Regional Office No. VII, Workmen’s
Compensation Unit, Iloilo City,
granting petitioner disability compensation benefits under Sections 13 and 14
of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended.

On August 14, 1972,
petitioner, a Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Iloilo
City, filed with the Regional
Office, a claim for compensation by way of reimbursement of his medical and
hospitalization expenses after having undergone an operation of an ulcerated newgrowth at the middle third of jejunum, second portion of
the small intestine which resulted in his incapacity for work.  The referee sent a copy of said claim to the
Department of Justice which was received by the latter on September 1, 1972. 
The then Undersecretary of Justice Catalino Macaraig, Jr. sent a Letter of Controversion
on September 8, 1972 to the Regional Office in Iloilo City opposing the claim
on the ground that there is no causal connection between the illness of
claimant and the nature of his employment. 
On September 14, 1972,
the Solicitor General mailed to the Regional Office a second indorsement dated September
13, 1972 together with copies of the Employer’s Report of Accident
or Sickness controverting the claim on substantially
the same ground.  (p. 104, WCC, Original
Records).

The referee, finding the Notice of Controversion
by the Solicitor General as out of time, treated the claim as non-controverted and rendered an award on October 17, 1972,
granting claimant a total amount of P3,261.41 representing disability
compensation benefits and reimbursement of expenses for medical services,
appliances and supplies, and ordering respondent employer to pay P33.00 as
administration fees pursuant to Section 55 of the Act.  The Solicitor General sent by registered mail
on November 10, 1972 a “Motion to Set Aside Decision” on the
following grounds:  (1) that the claim
was duly controverted by respondent; (2) that the
decision (award) was not supported by substan­tial evidence; and (3) that
claimant was not entitled to reimbursement of medical expenses for failure to
comply with the penultimate paragraph of Section 13 of Act 3438, as
amended.  Said motion was denied and the
records were elevated to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission for review.

The respondent commission on July 18, 1973 reversed the award and absolved the Republic
from whatever liability under the aforementioned statute.  The claimant moved for a reconsideration of
said decision but the motion was denied by the Commission.  Hence, the instant petition for review.

The first issue raised is whether the claim was properly controverted or not, notice of controversion
by the Solicitor General having been admittedly filed beyond the reglementary period, although the Undersecretary of Justice
sent a letter of controversion within the said
statutory period.  Under the ruling of
Republic vs. Hernando^[1]
it would seem that the Solicitor General is the proper official to file the controversion, he being the one called upon to “act
for and represent the Government, its officers and agents in any official
investigation, proceedings or matter requiring the services of a lawyer.”
However, in Lizardo vs. Republic,^[2]
it was said that the duty to controvert the claim for compensation devolves
upon the employer, or the heads of the departments, bureaus and offices
concerned, not their counsel.

Whether ruling in the earlier case of Republic vs. Hernando has
been superseded by the recent case of Lizardo vs.
Republic, on the question of who can effectively controvert a claim for
compensation, as between the employer or the counsel, is a question We need not
now pass upon squarely, it appearing that the present petition is of sufficient
merit on the basis of the presumption of compensability which has not been
rebutted.

In reversing the referee’s award, the Commission ruled that
contrary to petitioner’s belief, his ailment is not peptic ulcer but some kind
of a new growth of the small intestine and that his case does not fall within
the pro­tective mantle of the Act.  It
was stressed that there is yet no clear medical proof of petitioner’s ailment
so much so that whether he worked or not, the new growth would have progressed,
and that the theory of presumption cannot apply in this case, considering that
the nature of work of petitioner as Deputy Sheriff cannot even remotely
contribute to the causation and/or aggravation of a new growth inside the
abdominal cavity.  (See Decision, p. 29, Rollo).  Section 44
of the Act expressly provides that in the absence of substantial evidence to
the contrary, it is presumed that the claim comes within the provisions of this
Act.  It is established in a long line of
cases, that an employee is freed from the burden of proving that his ailment
was caused or aggravated by the nature of his work, as long as death or illness
supervened in the course of employment. 
It is not, therefore, necessary for the Court to inquire into the exact
cause of petitioner’s ailment, for what is important is that said ailment
occurred or was aggravated in the course of employment.^[3]
Thus, Justice Makasiar speaking for the Court,
stated, “that it has applied with pedantic rigor the aforesaid legal
presumption of compensability even in the absence of a definite finding or knowledge
of the precise medical cause of claimant’s illness as long as the illness
and/or death supervened in the course of employment.  For precisely, the vital function of legal
presumption is to dispense with the need for proof.”^[4]

Failing as it did to overturn this legal presumption of
compensability by adducing clear and convincing evidence that petitioner’s
ailment was not attributable to the nature of his employment, respondent
employer may not be absolved from its liability to pay the compensation sought
by the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated July 18, 1973 of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission is hereby set aside, and the Award dated October 17, 1972 of the referee is hereby
reinstated in toto.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Acting Chief Justice,
(Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
99 Phil. 687.

^[2]
G.R. No. L-42995, March 14, 1979.

^[3]
G. B. Francisco, Inc. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al.,
L-42565, November 21, 1978;
Aguirre vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al., L-44115, November 17, 1978; Sison vs. Work­men’s Compensation Commission, et
al., L-42817, November 29, 1978.

^[4] Mulingtapang vs. Workmen’s Compensation Com­mission,
et al., 80 SCRA 610, 615.