IN RE: ADOPTION OF CHILD BAPTIZED UNDER THE NAME OF ROSE. MARVIN G. ELLIS AND GLORIA C. ELLIS, PETITIONERS, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.

Appeal taken by the
Government from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
granting the petition of Marvin G. Ellis and Gloria C. Ellis for the
adoption of a Filipino baby girl named Rose.

Petitioner Marvin G. Ellis, a native of San Francisco,
California, is 28 years of age. On September 8, 1949, he married Gloria
C. Ellis in Banger, Maine, United States. Both are citizens of the
United States. Baby Rose was born on September 26, 1959 at the Caloocan
Maternity Hospital. Four or five days later, the mother of Rose left
her with the Heart of Mary Villa&mdashan institution for unwed
mothers and their babies—stating that she (the mother) could not take
care of Rose without bringing disgrace upon her (the mother’s) family.

Being without issue, on November 22, 1959, Mr. and Mrs. Ellis filed a
petition with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the adoption
of the aforementioned baby. At the time of the hearing of the petition
on. January 14, I960, petitioner Marvin G. Ellis and his wife had been
in the Philippines for three (3) years, he being assigned thereto as
staff sergeant in the United States Air Force Base, in Angeles,
Pampanga, where both lived at that time. They had been in the
Philippines before, or, to be exact, in 1953.

The only issue in this appeal is whether not being
permanent residents in the Philippines, petitioners are qualified to
adopt Baby Rose. Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
provides that:

“The following cannot adopt:

* * * * * * *

“(4) Non-resident aliens;”

* * * * * * *

This legal provision is too clear to require interpretation. No matter
how much we may sympathize with the plight of Baby Rose and with the
good intentions of petitioners herein, the law leaves us no choice but
to apply its explicit terms, which unqualifiedly deny to petitioners
the power to adopt anybody in the Philippines.

In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem,
which no court may entertain, unless it has jurisdiction, not only over
tho subject matter of the case and over the parties, but, also, over
the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of
petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that
jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the
latter’s nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction
over the status of Baby
Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status
of the petitioners, who are foreigners. Under our political law, which
is patterned after the Anglo-American legal system, we have, likewise,
adopted the
latter’s view to the effect that personal status, in general, is
determined by and/or subject to the jurisdiction of the domiciliary law
(Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, p. 86; The Conflict of
Laws by Beale, Vol. I, p. 305, Vol. II, pp. 713-714). This, perhaps, is
the reason why our Civil Code does not permit adoption by non-resident
aliens, and we have consistently refused to recognize the validity of
foreign decrees of divorce—regardless of the grounds upon which the
same are based—involving citizens of the Philippines who are not bona
fide residents of the forum, even when our laws authorized absolute
divorce in the Philippines (Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Gonayeb vs. Hashim, 50 Phil. 22; Cousine Hix vs. Fleumer, 55 Phil. 851; Barretto Gonzalez vs. Gonzalez, 58 Phil. 67;
Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427).

Inasmuch s petitioners herein are not domiciled in the
Philippines,—and, hence, non-resident aliens—we cannot assume and
exercise jurisdiction over their status, under either the nationality
theory or the domiciliary theory. ln any event, whether the
above-quoted provision of said Art. 335 is predicated upon lack of
jurisdiction over the, res, or merely affects the cause of action, we
have no authority to grant the relief prayed for by petitioners it—
herein, and it has been so held in Caraballo vs. Republic, L-15080 (April 25, 1962) and Katancik vs. Republic, L-
15472 (June 30, 1962).

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered denying the petition in this case.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.