WILFREDO NAVARRO, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SIXTH DIVISION), LABOR ARBITER LOURDES BARICAUA, AND RODRIGO PREZA, RESPONDENTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions April 24, 2012 EIGHTH DIVISION REYES, JR., J.C., J.:


REYES, JR., J.C., J.:


Assailed in the instant petition filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are the following:

a) The NLRC (Sixth Division) Decision (Rollo, pp. 17-27) dated April 24, 2012 which Denied the appeal of petitioner;

b) The Resolution (Rollo, pp. 25-27) dated June 29, 2012 which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration likewise issued by public respondent NLRC (Sixth Division) in NLRC LAC NO. 10-002781-11; NLRC RAB II CASE NO. 04-0131-11.

The facts:

The case for illegal dismissal, non-payment of 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay and overtime pay, attorney’s fees arose from herein private respondent Rodrigo P. Preza’s complaint against herein petitioner, Wilfredo D. Navarro, owner and general manager of Navarro Construction.

Private respondent alleged that he worked for petitioner company as a Dump Truck Driver and all around helper for ten (10) years with a fixed monthly salary amounting to Php 6,000.00. He was employed in January 2000, working from Monday to Saturday without a fixed working hour. Private respondent renders service whenever he is needed however, he usually stays in the construction site due to the nature of his work.

On February 13, 2011, Sunday, private respondent did not report for work believing that it was his day off from work. When he reported back for work the following day, his co-workers told him that he was already dismissed. Thinking that it was just hearsay, he continued reporting for work. When he claimed his salary from the secretary of petitioner company, Ms. Lulette Aguinaldo, he was informed verbally that he was already dismissed. No reason or cause was given to him for the said termination.

Private respondent went back to Ms. Aguinaldo to inquire about the status of his employment on whether petitioner has reconsidered his decision of dismissing him, but he was informed by Ms. Aguinaldo that they will just inform him through text message regarding the matter. Private respondent further alleged that for two months, he constantly visited his workplace in the hope that he will be reinstated back to work, but he was not. Hence, a complaint for illegal dismissal was filed.

Petitioner on the other hand denied illegally dismissing private respondent. Petitioner alleged that private respondent is a contractual employee and not a permanent employee. Private respondent was given a fixed salary in spite of the flexibility of his working hours as he reports for work whenever he wishes. Further, private respondent was allegedly suspended for engaging in illegal activities such as delivering gravel, sand and crushed aggregates without the company’s authority and its proceeds went to his own pocket. Hence, petitioner company sanctioned private respondent with suspension from work twice on August 25, 2008 and June 18, 2010.

Private respondent was required to work on February 13, 2011 however, he did not report for reasons only known to him. He was allegedly absent during the first two weeks of February 2011 and reported only from February 16 to 28, 2011. Petitioner company averred that private respondent was not illegally dismissed instead, he voluntarily abandoned his post. In fact, private respondent was summoned to report for work for the month of March 2011 but he only reported on March 9, 2011 to claim his salary for the month of February.

Petitioner also claimed that private respondent voluntarily resigned when he deliberately refused to report to work without any apparent reason. Hence, private respondent is not entitled to any money claims.

On October 6, 2011, Labor Arbiter Ma. Lourdes Baricaua rendered her decision in favor of the private respondent. The Labor Arbiter ruled that private respondent is a regular employee since the petitioner company had no proof whatsoever that private respondent was hired for a specific project only. Termination reports for every project completion were also not submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring complainant illegally dismissed and ORDERING respondents Navarro Construction and/or Wilfredo Navarro to pay complainant the amount of P30,000.00 as separation pay and P18,000.00 as 13th month pay or a total of FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND (P48,000.00) PESOS, within ten (10) calendar days from receipt hereof.

The claims for overtime pay, service incentive leave pay and attorney’s fees are dismissed for lack of basis.

SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, p. 33)

Petitioner filed an appeal. On April 24, 2012, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) issued the appealed decision affirming the Labor Arbiter’s decision. According to the NLRC, petitioner company failed to prove that private respondent abandoned his job and it had conflicting statements whether private respondent’s absence was due to abandonment of his post or was suspended for his illegal activities. The dispositive portion of the NLRC decision states:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED and the Decision of Labor Arbiter Ma. Lourdes R. Baricaua dated October 6, 2011 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, p. 23)

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that the public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied and affirmed the decision dated October 06, 2011, of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioner argued that private respondent abandoned his work and was not illegally dismissed.

The petition is without merit.

In a special civil action for certiorari, the petitioner carries the burden of proving not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent for its issuance of the impugned decision. (Suliguin v. Commission on Elections, 485 SCRA 219, 233 [2006]) The term grave abuse of discretion, in its juridical sense, connotes capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be of such degree as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and capricious manner by reason of passion and hostility. The word capricious, usually used in tandem with the term arbitrary, conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective hand of certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is imperative. (Torres v. Abundo, Sr., 512 SCRA 564, 565 [2007])

Applying the foregoing criterion in the case at bench, this court finds no grave abuse of discretion committed by the public respondent.

In the case at bench, petitioner pleads that he did not terminate private respondent and that the latter in its own volition abandoned his employment. Petitioner also argued that there was no termination letter to prove the claim of private respondent. On the other hand private respondent submits that there was illegal dismissal and he did not abandon his job.

Petitioner’s argument that since there was no notice of dismissal, private respondent was not dismissed is without merit. It is to be noted that both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that private respondent was dismissed by petitioner thru the latter’s secretary Ms. Lulette Aguinaldo. The rule is settled that the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are accorded not only great respect but also finality, and are deemed binding upon this Court so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. (Calipay v. National Labor Relations Commission, 626 SCRA 409, 421 [2010]) Moreover, petitioner could have presented an affidavit from Ms. Aguinaldo denying the allegations of private respondent if it were not true. However, the factual circumstance of private respondent’s dismissal by Ms. Aguinaldo remains undisputed until now.

Since petitioner based his defense on abandonment by private respondent, it is likewise incumbent upon him, as employer, to prove that private respondent clearly, voluntarily, and intentionally abandoned his work. If it were true that private respondent abandoned his job, petitioner should have presented proof that he required private respondent to report to work or that petitioner could have filed an administrative action against private respondent to protect his right and interest. The inaction of petitioner for two (2) months, from the time of the alleged abandonment up to the filing of the case, bellies their defense that private respondent abandoned his employment.

Abandonment is a form of neglect of duty, one of the just causes for an employer to terminate an employee. It is a hornbook precept that in illegal dismissal cases, the employer bears the burden of proof. For a valid termination of employment on the ground of abandonment, the employer must prove, by substantial evidence, the concurrence of the employee’s failure to report for work for no valid reason and his categorical intention to discontinue employment. (Martinez v. B&B Fish Broker, 600 SCRA 691, 696 [2009])

Petitioner failed to show any valid or authorized cause under the Labor Code which allowed it to terminate the services of private respondent. Neither was it shown that private respondent was given ample opportunity to contest the legality of his dismissal. No notice of termination was given to him. Clearly, private respondent was not afforded due process. Having failed to establish compliance with the requirements of termination of employment under the Labor Code, the dismissal of private respondent was tainted with illegality. Jurisprudence provides that the burden of proof to show that the dismissal was for a just cause is on the employer.

Furthermore, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that Ms. Aguinaldo informed private respondent that he was already dismissed from the company. This is a finding of fact, which we shall no longer disturb. Private respondent filed a case for illegal dismissal against petitioner. Employees who take steps to protest their dismissal cannot logically be said to have abandoned their work. (Megaforce Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Lactao, 559 SCRA 110 [2008]). A charge of abandonment is inconsistent with the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. The filing thereof is proof enough of one’s desire to return to work, thus negating any suggestion of abandonment.

As previously discussed, it is clear from the evidence on record that petitioner failed to discharge this burden. As we have consistently affirmed, if the evidence presented by the employer and the employee are in equipoise, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.

Thus, considering that petitioner basically presented an issue of fact, its petition for certiorari crumbles in view of the identical findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. To repeat, well settled is the rule that factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies such as the labor arbiter and NLRC are generally accorded not only respect, but at times, even finality because of the special knowledge and expertise gained by these agencies from handling matters falling under their specialized jurisdiction. (Eureka Personnel & Management Services, Inc. v. Valencia, 593 SCRA 36, 44 [2009]). Absent any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness, the findings of fact by the labor arbiter and NLRC, as in this case, are binding and conclusive upon the Court. Having found none, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the challenged decision. Accordingly, the finding of illegal dismissal must be upheld.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The NLRC Decision dated April 24, 2012 and Resolution dated June 29, 2012 issued by public respondent NLRC (Sixth Division) in NLRC LAC NO. 10-002781-11; NLRC RAB II CASE NO. 04-0131-11 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Lopez, M.V., and Inting, S.B., JJ., concur.