RUPERTO SANCHEZ, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF PRESERVER SHOE COMPANY AND MODESTO SANCHEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, PRESERVER SHOE WORKER…

In line with the statutory mandate that once an unfair labor
practice was shown to have been indulged in, there should be reinstatement with
back pay of the aggrieved employees,^[1]
petitioners were required by our ruling in the parent case,^[2]
affirming a decision of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations, to
reinstate the workers mentioned in the petition therein filed and the payment
to them of their back wages from May 18, 1958, until the date of compliance
therewith.  Our decision having become
final, the respondent Court of Industrial Relations took the necessary steps
for the enforcement thereof, the order for reinstatement, however, remaining
ineffectual due to the fact that as of November 2, 1963, petitioners’ business
firm, the Preserver Shoe Company, had ceased to operate.  Back pay in the amount of P49,774.11 was
actually paid though to the employees in question except for ten persons who,
as admitted in the petition, “could not be included in the computation
because their names did not appear in the payrolls and time cards
examined.”^[3]

The present incident deals with the right, if any, of such
individuals to the back pay and the amount thereof.  According to the petition, on December 7, 1965, these ten,
originally excluded for the reason above set forth, filed with the respondent
Court of Industrial Relations a motion seeking the issuance of an order
directing its Examining Division to compute their back wages from May 18, 1958.^[4]

It was then alleged that at the time of the hearing of such
motion on January 25, 1966, petitioners made of record their opposition on the
ground that there had been full compliance with the original decision of
respondent Court as affirmed by us, that three of the ten persons seeking the
back pay, Beato (Viato) Rendon, Eleizar Roxas and Vicente Roxas,^[5]
were among those specifically excluded from the benefits of such decision, as
they had been convicted of crimes against petitioners, and that the rest of the
employees could not in any event be entitled to back wages from November 2,
1963, as admittedly the petitioners’ business had ceased operation for
sometime.^[6]
It was then asserted that after a number of hearings with two witnesses
testifying for the aforesaid employees, respondent Court, on September 24,
1966, issued an order, the dispositive portion of
which reading thus: “[Wherefore], the Examining Division is hereby
directed to compute the back wages of the following persons based on the rate
opposite their respective names of six (6) days a week, (and per week in the
case of Bolinen), from May 21, 1958, up to November
2, 1963, and to submit its report within fifteen days from receipt of this
Order: 1. Milagros Ambac – P3.00/day; 2. Eugenia Bernabe P5.50/day; 3. Gregorio Bolinao
– P35.00/week; 4. Salvacion Curillo
– P4.00/day; 5. Adela Jacobe
P4. 50/day; 6. Arsenio Ordoñez
P4.00/day; 7. Gregoria Polequet
– P4.00/day.  The claims of co-movants Beata Rendon,
Eleizar Roxas, and Vicente Roxas are hereby, [dismissed].”^[7]  There was the further allegation that this
order of respondent Court “rejected the claim for back wages from November 3, 1963, upon the ground of
lack of evidence that there had been any work in Preserver since said
date.”^[8]

There was a motion for reconsideration filed on October 4, 1966, within the reglementary five-day period.  On October 6, 1966, petitioners were served a
copy of the report of the examiner, in compliance with the aforesaid order of
September 27, 1966, computing for the seven employees involved, duly
represented by respondent Preserver Shoe Workers’ Union – NAFLU, total back
wages in the sum of P52, 705.83 from May 21, 1958 to November 2, 1963.  Petitioners then moved, on October 10, 1966, to set aside the
examiner’s report on the plea that it was not only premature but completely
erroneous, and on October 14, 1966,
filed their arguments in support of their motion for reconsideration.  On November
3, 1966, a resolution was issued by respondent Court denying such
motion for reconsideration, there being no sufficient justification to alter or
modify its order of September 27, 1966.  Hence this petition for review.

What we have to inquire into in this proceeding is the validity
of the above order of September 27,
1966 of respondent Court, the reconsideration of which was denied
on November 3, 1966; it
furnished the basis for the pecuniary liability of petitioners in the amount of
P52, 705. 83.

1. It is alleged in the first assigned error that respondent Court
“erred in ordering the computation complained of as such act constitutes a
virtual reversal and setting aside of its own previous and long-final
orders.”^[9]  Referring to what had previously taken place
after our decision of July 31, 1963, peti­tioners would invite attention to the
order of respondent Court of December 11, 1964, which after reproducing the
terms of the report of its hearing examiner, was expressly given the sanction
of its approval.  Then came this portion
of their brief: “The union and its members never sought any
reconsideration of the Order of December
11, 1964.  It was, in fact,
the petitioners herein who did so, resulting in the amendatory Order of March
2, 1965, excluding from the benefits of the original decision 6 of the 9
persons who had been convicted of offenses against Preserver.  Except for that, none of the other terms or
dispositions of the Order of December
11, 1964 were in any way touched upon or modified.”^[10]

Petitioners would then stress that accordingly the amount of
P49,774.11 adjudged in the concept of back wages was there­after fully paid to
the 33 persons entitled to such benefits. 
Then they would conclude: “It, therefore, clearly appears from the
foregoing circumstances that the computation directed and authorized in the now
questioned CIR Order of September 27, 1966, as a new attempt to reopen and readjudicate matters already specifically disposed of and
ruled upon in previous orders not only long become final but already fully
satisfied, can find no sanction or justification in any rule of law or pro­cedure.”^[11]

What petitioners failed to take into account was that, as decided
by us, what was decreed by respondent Court was affirmed in our decision in the
main case of which this incident is an offshoot.  In the dispositive
portion thereof, mention was expressly made of the reinstatement of the workers
involved as well as the right to the back wages from May 18, 1958 until such reinstatement.  Then came, on November 7, 1963, as noted in the petition for review
itself, an order from the respondent Court directing the computation of the
back wages in question.^[12]  When such report was submitted by the chief
examiner of the respondent Court on January 10, 1964, an express mention was
made of the fact that ten of the workers involved, whose claims are now the
subject of this incident, could not be included in the computation
“because their names did not appear in the payrolls and time cards
examined.”^[13]

It would be farfetched, to say the least then, that the order of
September 27, 1966 of respondent Court, now complained of, would constitute a
virtual reversal and setting aside of its own previous order allegedly
impressed with finality.

Nor should petitioners ignore the principle uninterruptedly
adhered to from the time of its pronouncement by Justice Laurel in 1939,^[14]
that the statutory provision empowering respondent Court to alter, modify in
whole or in part or set aside any such award, order or decision, or reopen any
question involved thereof^[15]
should be liberally construed to give full effect to its purpose and policy.^[16]  Only recently we had occasion to emphasize
the generous scope accorded such prerogative of respondent Court.  Thus: “The power of the Court of
Industrial Relations which, as thus phrased, is comprehensive in character, has
been given an interpretation by us consistent with the well-nigh sweeping reach
of the language.  It has never been
construed in a niggardly sense; the recognition of such authority has been full
and sympathetic, never grudging.”^[17]
It would thus appear undeniable that the first error assigned affords no basis
for reversing respondent Court.

2.  We postpone consideration
of the second error and deal with the third error allegedly committed.  It would impugn the conclusion reached by
respondent Court as to the amount thus arrived at in view of what petitioners
considered the total failure of the seven claimants to prove their right to the
back wages.

To quote from the brief of petitioners: “Only 2 of the 7
persons in whose favor the Order of September 27, 1966 was issued testified at
the hearings.  Upon this consideration,
it is at once evident that the testimony of these 2 as to the remaining 5 is,
for all practical purposes, hearsay and un­acceptable, and cannot form the
basis of a true verdict.”^[18]  Petitioners would impute to one of the
witnesses, a certain Eugenia Bernabe, the commission
of perjury in view of what they considered to be differing versions as to the
date when she stopped working.^[19]  The testimony of the other witness, a certain
Adela Jacobe, petitioners
would discredit as for them her possession of full knowledge of the wages of
the other claimants as well as the nature of their duties^[20]
appeared to be lacking in credibility. 
Even if full force be accorded to the above attempt to discredit in
their entirety such testimonial evidence, still in the light of the controlling
doctrine that a grave abuse of discretion must be shown in order to warrant our
disturbing the findings of fact of the lower court, no reversal of the
challenged order of September 27, 1966 is called for.

Moreover, petitioners appear to be oblivious of the statutory
mandate that respondent Court in the hearing, in­vestigation and determination
of any question or controversy and in the exercise of any of its duties or
powers is to act “according to justice and equity and substantial merits
of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be
bound by any technical rules of legal evidence” informing its mind
“in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.”^[21]  Again, this Court has invariably accorded the
most hospitable scope to the breadth and amplitude with which such provision is
couched.  So it has been from the
earliest case decided in 1939^[22]
to a 1967 decision.^[23]

To the reproach hurled against the challenged order in the brief
of petitioners, in view of only two of the seven claimants testifying, a
statement by this Court in Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. v.
OSCO Workers Fraternity Labor Union^[24]
would suffice by way of refutation. 
Thus: “This Court fully agrees with the respondent that quality and
not quantity of witnesses should be the primordial consideration in the
appraisal of evidence.”  Barely
eight days later, in another decision,^[25]
the above statement was given concrete expression.  Thus: “The bases of the wards were not
only the respective affidavits of the claimants but the testimonies of 24
witnesses (because 6 were not given credence by the court below), who
identified the said 239 claimants.  The
contention of petitioner on this point is therefore unfounded.” Moreover,
in Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU) v. Sy
Indong Company Rice & Corn Mill,^[26]
this Court, through the present Chief Justice, rejected as untenable the theory
of the Court of Industrial Relations concerning the imperative need of all the
claimants to testify personally and prove their charges in the complaint.  As tersely put: “We do not share the
view taken in the resolution appealed from.”

3. The second alleged error is not so easily disposed of.  Petitioners invite our attention to the fact
that in the computa­tion followed in the order of respondent Court of December
11, 1964, which was the basis of the amounts paid to the workers whose claims
had been fully satisfied, the number of working days would reach only
803.47.  The challenged order of September 27, 1966, however, would
fix the number of working days at 1,653. 
That would follow from the explicit requirement therein that the
computation for the seven workers entitled should be on the basis of six days a
week from May 21, 1958 up
to November 2, 1963.  To quote from petitioners’ brief: “In
other words, not only does the CIR now unnaturally assume that those 7 could
have worked uninterruptedly during said period, without getting sick or late or
finding any other necessity or occasion for absence, it also reverses its
former ruling that Preserver was not in continuous operation during that
period.”^[27]

It would appear that such an objection on the part of the
petitioners could not be considered as totally bereft of plausibility.  It is not devoid of persuasive force.  As more emphatically set forth in
petitioners’ brief: “The disparity between the benefits obtained by the original
33 workers and those computed for the 7 now in question is shocking and un­conscionable.  The former were credited with total back
wages of only P63,057.50 (later reduced to P49,774.11 for 27 workers), while
the latter are credited with fully P52,705.83. 
Accordingly, while the first-mentioned sum of P49, 774.11 averages out
at only some P1,844.00 for each of the 27 workers, the second sum of P52,705.83
averages out at no less than P7,817.00 for each of 7 persons, a ratio of more
than 4 to 1.”^[28]

It is to be admitted that the mere fact that there was such
disproportionate increase in the financial liability to be assumed by
petitioners did not of itself suffice to indicate that an error was committed
by respondent Court.  Considering,
however, that such a result was arrived at due to the failure of respondent
Court to observe with fidelity what was decreed by us in the parent case as
previously implemented and that on its face the element of arbitrariness
manifested itself, petitioners did have a valid cause for complaint, as set
forth in this particular assignment of error.

Only last month, in a labor case, far from dissimilar,^[29]
we had occasion to reaffirm the doctrine that primacy should be accorded the
law of the case.  Quoting an opinion of
Justice J. B. L. Reyes, in People v. Olarte,^[30]
we emphatically observed that a ruling of that character “even if
erroneous, * * * may no longer be disturbed or modified since it has be­come
final * * *.”  It does not admit of
doubt that with reference to our final judgment in labor matters, which insofar
as the back wages due the aggrieved workingmen could require further action
from respondent Court, the law of the case does not apply solely to what is
embodied in our decision but likewise to its implementation carried out in
fealty to what has been by us decreed. 
To be more specific, in the matter before us, the first group of 27
employees were paid the amount of P49, 774.11 in accordance with our July 1963
decision.  The respondent Court did, in
pursuance of our mandate, follow a criterion for com­puting such back
wages.  It deviated from it when the back
wages due the present respondents were computed.  As a result, 7 employees would be entitled to
P52,705.83.  Clearly, that is not to
follow the law of the case.  In that
sense, respondent Court committed error.

Such an error was impressed with more gravity in view of the
failure of respondent Court to submit to the controlling force of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations.^[31]  In that leading case, Justice Laurel,
speaking for this Court, made clear that one of the “cardinal primary
rights” embraced in the procedural due process that must be observed by
adminis­trative agencies is the necessity for substantial evidence to support
the decision reached by it.  This
particular assignment of error pointed out the lack of evidence on which to
predicate the holding that the employees now before us were supposed to have
worked six days a week during the period in question, thus resulting not only
in the much greater number of days on which they were presumably rendering
service as distinguished from the first group of employees but also in the
unwarranted in­crease in the financial liability to be assumed by
petitioners.  There was thus a manifest
failure to observe the requirement that the evidence be substantial.  For thereby the actuation of respondent Court
was marred by arbitrariness.  That was to
deprive petitioners of due process which requires reasonable­ness and fair
play.^[32]

This particular assignment of error must be sustained.  It suffices for the case being remanded to
respondent Court so that in ascertaining the back pay to which the workingmen
now before the Court are entitled, the same basis for the computation thereof
should be followed as in the case of their co-employees, whose claims had
already been satisfied in accordance with our decision.

WHEREFORE, the challenged order of respondent Court of
September 27, 1966 as well as the resolution of respondent Court of November 3,
1966 denying reconsideration are set aside and the case remanded to respondent
Court for disposition in accordance with this opinion.  Without costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Republic Act No. 875, Section 5(c).

^[2] Ruperto Sanchez and Modesto
Sanchez v. Court of Industrial Relations, L-19000, July 31, 1963.

^[3]
Petition for Review, p. 4.

^[4] Ibid,
p. 6.

^[5] Ibid,
p. 5.

^[6] Ibid,
pp. 5 and 6.

^[7] Ibid,
p. 6.

^[8] Ibid,
p. 6.

^[9]
Brief for the Petitioners, p. 10.

^[10] Ibid,
p. 13.

^[11] Ibid,
pp. 13-14.

^[12]
Petition for Review, p. 3.

^[13] Ibid,
p. 4.

^[14] Goseco v. Court of Industrial Relations, 68 Phil.
444.

^[15]
Section 17, Commonwealth. Act No. 103 (1936).

^[16]
Cf. Luzon Brokerage Co. v. Luzon Labor Union, 83 Phil. 801 (1949);
Church v. La Union Labor Union, 91 Phil. 163 (1952); Hotel &
Restaurant Free Workers v. Kim San Cafe, 102 Phil. 470 (1957); National
Development Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 106 Phil. 307 (1959)
and San Pablo Oil Factory v. Court of Industrial Relations, L-18270,
November 28, 1962.

^[17]
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Salvador,
L-29471 & L-29487, September 28,
1968.

^[18]
Brief for the Petitioners, p. 25.

^[19] Ibid,
pp. 25-28.

^[20] Ibid,
p. 29.

^[21]
Sec. 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103 (1936).

^[22] Goseco v. CIR, 68 Phil. 444.

^[23]
Phil. Sugar Institute v. CIR, L-18930, February 28, 1967. 
The other cases decided in between such dates follow: International
Hardwood and Veneer Co. v. Pañgil Federation,
70 Phil. 602 (1940); Leyte Land Trans. Co. v. Leyte Farmers’ and Laborers’ Union, 80 Phil. 842 (1948); Gotamco Lumber Co. v. CIR, 85 Phil. 291 (1950);
Church v. La Union Labor Union, 91 Phil. 163 (1952); Caltex
v. Phil. Labor Org., 92 Phil. 1014 (1953); National City Bank of New
York v. National City Bank Employees Union, 98 Phil. 301 (1956); Luzon
Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Luzon Marine Dept. Union, 101 Phil. 257 (1957);
Cano v. CIR, L-15594, Oct. 31, 1960; Luzon Brokerage Co. v. Luzon
Labor Union, L-17085, Jan. 31, 1963; and Free Employees and Workers As so. v.
CIR, L-20862, July 30, 1965.

^[24]
L-15826, January 23, 1961.

^[25]
Luzon Brokerage Co. v. Luzon Labor Union,
L-17085, January 31, 1963.
Cf. Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Kapisanan,
L-18336, May 31, 1963;
National Shipyards and Steel Corp. v. CIR, L-21675, May 23, 1967.

^[26]
L-18476, May 30, 1964.

^[27]
Brief for Petitioners, p. 22.

^[28] Ibid,
p. 23.

^[29]
National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority v. NWSA Consolidated Union,
L-26894-96, February 28, 1969.

^[30]
L-22465, February 28, 1967.

^[31]
69 Phil. 635 (1940).  The Ang Tibay was followed in the
subsequent cases of Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v.
CIR, 70 Phil. 340 (1940); Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. PLU, 71
Phil. 124 (1940); Mindanao Bus Co. v. MBC Empls.
Asso., 71 Phil. 168 (1940); Manila Trading &
Supply Co. v. PLU, 71 Phil. 578 (1941); Leyte
Land Trans. Co. v. Leyte Farmers &
Laborers’ Union, 80 Phil. 842 (1948); Shell Co. v. NLU, 81 Phil. 315
(1948); Philippine Education Co. v. CIR, 94 Phil. 73 (1953); Lakas ng Pagkakaisa
sa Peter Paul v. CIR, 96 Phil. 63 (1954); Dimayuga v. CIR., et al. , 101 Phil. 590 (1957); NLU
v. Sta. Ana, 102 Phil. 302 (1957); Ormoc Sugar
Co., Inc. v. OSCO Workers Frater­nity Labor Union, L-15826, Jan. 23,
1961; NDC v. Collector of Customs, L-19180, Oct. 31, 1963; Timbangaya v. Vicente, L-19100, Dec. 27, 1963; Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. v. PDC, L-19850, Jan.
30, 1964; Lustre, et al. v. CAR, L-19654, Mar.
31, 1964; Commissioner of Immigration v. Hon. Fernandez, L-22696, May
29, 1964; Borja v. Moreno, L-16487, July 31,
1964; Santos v. Secretary of Public Works, L-16949, March 18, 1967;
Philippine Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, L-24321, July 21, 1967; Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Ope­rators Asso. v. City Mayor, L-24693, July 31, 1967; Caltex-(PHIL.) Inc. v. Castillo, L-24657, Nov.
27, 1967; Palanan Lumber & Plywood Co., Inc. v.
Hon. Arranz, L-27106, Mar. 20, 1968; Caltex Filipino Mgrs. & Supvs.
Asso. v. CIR, L-28472; April 30, 1968;
Philippine Air Lines v. CAB, L-24219, June 13, 1968; Alalayan
v. NPC, L-24396, July 29, 1968; Serrano v. PSC, L-24165, Aug. 30,
1968; and Gracilla v. CIR, L-24489, Sept. 28,
1968.

^[32] Ermita-Malate Hotel Asso. v.
City Mayor, L-24693, July 31, 1967;
Morfe v. Mutuc,
L-20387, Jan. 31, 1968; Santiago
v. Alikpala, L-25133, September 28, 1968.