ARTHUR MEDINA Y YUMUL, PETITIONER, VS. MARCELO F. OROZCO, JR., ACTING CITY WARDEN OF CALOOCAN CITY, RESPONDENT.

Medina versus Orozco

The Case

This is a petition for the writ of habeas corpus filed by Arthur Medina against the acting city warden of Caloocan City, arising from his arrest and detention on a charge of murder. Medina does not deny that a serious crime has been laid at his door; he attacks instead the manner of his detention, the supposed absence of a preliminary investigation, and the supposed denial of a speedy trial. The case matters because it draws a clean line between an illegal detention at its inception and a lawful detention under a valid information, and because it shows how the Supreme Court weighs the right to speedy trial against a record of postponements sought by the accused himself.

Procedural History

Medina was arrested on November 7, 1965, and an information for murder was filed against him and two co-accused in the Caloocan branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal on November 10, 1965. By court order the accused were promptly committed to jail, and upon arraignment they stood trial, which had not yet terminated when the petition was decided. Medina then came directly to the Supreme Court on an original application for habeas corpus, impleading the acting city warden of Caloocan City as respondent. The Supreme Court resolved the petition in the first instance, there being no intermediate appellate ruling to review.

Facts

On October 31, 1965, one Marcelo Sangalang died in Caloocan City. About noon on November 7, 1965, Arthur Medina was arrested as one of those allegedly responsible for the death, and he was thereafter incarcerated in the Caloocan City jail. Earlier that same morning, at about nine o'clock, the case against Medina and two others for murder was referred to a fiscal, who forthwith conducted a preliminary investigation in Medina's presence.

At about 3:40 in the afternoon of November 10, 1965, an information for murder was filed against Medina and his two co-accused in the Caloocan branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. By court order they were promptly committed to jail. Arraigned, Medina and his co-accused stood trial, and that trial had not yet terminated.

From the arrest at noon of November 7 to the filing of the information at 3:40 in the afternoon of November 10, more than 75 hours elapsed. But November 7 was a Sunday, November 8 was an official holiday, and November 9, election day, was also an official holiday. On the question of delay, the record shows that the arraignment set for December 1, 1965 was postponed to December 20, 1965, then to February 28, 1966, and then to March 14, 1966, all upon the petition of counsel for the accused, including Medina. On April 14, 1966, Medina's counsel moved to reset the hearing on the merits. The hearing scheduled for July 26, 1966 was transferred to September 6, 1966 on motion of a co-accused with the conformity of Medina's counsel, and finally, on motion of Medina's own counsel, the September 6, 1966 hearing was recalendared for December 6, 1966.

Issues

• Whether or not Medina was arbitrarily detained, in violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, given that more than 75 hours elapsed from arrest to the filing of the information.
• Whether or not Medina's release may be ordered on the assumption that his original detention was arbitrary, he being now held under a court order of commitment upon a murder indictment.
• Whether or not the absence of a preliminary investigation entitles him to discharge, and whether that question may be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding before the Supreme Court.
• Whether or not Medina was deprived of his right to a speedy trial.

Applicable Provisions

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 17 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, fixes the duty of the arresting officer and is the provision against which the claim of arbitrary detention is measured. The Court states the rule thus:

The arresting officer's duty under the law was either to deliver him to the proper judicial authorities within 18 hours, or thereafter release him.

Section 5, paragraph m, of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court supplies the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, which the Court invokes against the claim that no preliminary investigation was conducted:

That official duty has been regularly performed.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court refused to declare that Medina was arbitrarily detained. It counted the more than 75 hours, but it took stock of the fact that November 7 was a Sunday and that November 8 and November 9 were both official holidays. In those three no-office days, it was not an easy matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and stenographer, draft the information, search for the judge to act thereon, and get the clerk of court to open the courthouse, docket the case, and prepare the order of commitment. These considerations deterred the Court from finding arbitrary detention, for Medina was brought to court on the very first office day following arrest.

On the second issue, the Court held that discharge from custody could not be justified even on the assumption that the detention was originally arbitrary. Medina was then jailed because of the court's order of commitment of November 10, 1965 upon a murder indictment, and no bail was provided because the charge is a capital offense. The Court drew the distinction sharply:

Because, detention under a valid information is one thing, arbitrary detention anterior thereto another. They are separate concepts.

Simply because at the inception detention was wrong is no reason for letting the petitioner go scot-free after the serious charge of murder has been clamped upon him and his detention ordered by the court. The first is illegal; but the second is not. Thus the petition for habeas corpus came too late.

On the third issue, the Court found the claim of no preliminary investigation unavailing. Other than the averment in the petition, Medina had nothing to show for it, while the assertion that the investigation was made on the day of his arrest and in his presence was confirmed by his own motion of November 12, 1965 for a reinvestigation, which was held on December 1, 1965. With the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, the question was well nailed down. Besides, the Court held that the proper forum for ventilating the absence of a preliminary investigation is the Court of First Instance, not the Supreme Court, because such absence does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings, and it could even be waived.

On the fourth issue, the Court gave the cry of deprivation of a speedy trial but scant consideration. Every postponement in the record was sought by the defense, including Medina's own counsel. In this factual environment, the Court saw no denial of the right to speedy trial, and it laid down the governing rule:

Delay of his own making cannot be oppressive to him.

Doctrine

First, the duty under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to deliver the arrested person to the judicial authorities within 18 hours, or else release him, is applied with regard for the practical realities of weekends and official holidays; where the accused is brought to court on the very first office day following arrest, there is no arbitrary detention.

Second, detention under a valid information is one thing and arbitrary detention anterior thereto is another; they are separate concepts. An illegal detention at its inception does not infect a subsequent lawful detention under a court's order of commitment, and habeas corpus will not lie to release an accused held under a valid information for a capital offense.

Third, the absence of a preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings; it may be waived, and it is properly raised before the Court of First Instance, not the Supreme Court. The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed stands against a bare averment that no investigation was held.

Fourth, the right to speedy trial may be waived, and the waiver is clearest when the accused himself or his counsel asks for the postponements; delay of the accused's own making cannot be oppressive to him.

Disposition

The petition to set Arthur Medina at liberty was denied, with costs against him.

Remember This

Memorize the line that detention under a valid information is one thing and arbitrary detention anterior thereto another, for the two are separate concepts. Examiners use this case to test the 18-hour rule under Article 125, the scope of habeas corpus after a valid commitment, and the waiver of the right to speedy trial by the accused's own motions for postponement.