PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. GORGONIO SERDEÑA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte finding the defendant-appellant Gorgonio Serdeña (sometimes
spelled in the records as “Cerdeña”) guilty of the crime of murder for
the death of Genaro Roldan and sentencing him therefor to life
imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P6,000.00, with costs.

The information reads as follows:

“The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses GORGONIO SERDENA of the crime of murder, committed as follows:

“That on or about the 9th day of January, 1959, in the municipality of
Santa Fe, province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate
intent and with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and
treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and wound one GENARO ROLDAN with a bolo while the
latter was sleeping, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds on the
left side of his body which caused his instantaneous death.

“CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

“Tacloban City, January 15, 1959.

(SGD.) ALFREDO M. SABATER Provincial Fiscal

The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: the district health
officer who performed necropsy on the victim, two eyewitnesses to the
incident, Gregorla Palamos and Vicente Valera, and Vicente Palamos who
testified on the antecedent and subsequent facts of the incident.

From the testimony of the above-named eyewitnesses, at about 6:00
o’clock in the evening of January 9, 1959, several persons gathered at
a store in Barrio Katipunan, Sta. Fe, Leyte to play checkers or “dama”
as the game is known in the locality. Among them were the appellant
herein, Genaro Roldan, Vicente Palamos, Vicente Valera, Bonifacio
Cerdena, Clemente Berden, Igmedio Carba, Dominador Valera and Jesus
Roldan. Shortly after they were thus gathered, however, Genaro Roldan
apparently lost interest in the game because he bought a tarrifa
of tuba, equivalent to about a dozen glassful, and invited two of the
men in the store, Vicente Palamos and Gorgonio Serdeña, the
defendant-appellant, to join him. Palamos and Serdeña accepted the
invitation and it was not long before the three of them consumed the
wine. All became intoxicated.

So, Vicente Palamos and
Gorgonio Serdeña left the store and went home. Genaro Roldan, however,
was too sleepy and affected by the drink for he reclined by a bench in
the store, pillowed his head with his right arm, and dozed off to a
deep sleep.

Genaro Roldan was still sleeping at around 8:00
o’clock that same evening when the appellant herein returned with an
18-inch bolo in his hand. After briefly viewing the sleeping figure on
the bench, the said appellant declared, “You will not be saved anymore,
Pacanap” and forthwith stabbed the man to death.

The
appellant does not deny having stabbed Genaro Roldan to death. On the
contrary, he admits it. He maintains, however, that he did it in
defense of his wife’s honor because at the time of the incident, the
victim was forcing some unchaste or criminal desire upon her.

According to the appellant, his wife was alone in the store earlier
mentioned in this decision at around eight o’clock of the evening in
question while he was in their house across the street taking his
supper. Suddenly, he heared his wife screaming for help and when he
rushed to the store, he saw Genaro Roldan trying to flee from the
store’s improvised bedroom. The appellant ran after him and on catching
up with him, stabbed the latter twice. Thereafter, he went to a nearby
barrio to request some relatives of his to raise his bail bond and, on
the third day after the incident, surrendered himself to the Chief of
Police of Sta. Fe who happened to be his nephew.

In support
of the foregoing, the appellant presented his wife and two policemen of
Sta. Fe. In the main, his wife corroborated the appellant’s claim that
the victim had attempted to attack her that evening and that the said
appellant came to her rescue in the course of which the killing took
place. The policemen, on the other hand, merely testified on the
results of their investigation.

This Court is unable to see
any reason for disturbing the findings of the trial court. In the first
place, the truth and veracity of the appellant’s defense have been
explicitly rejected by the trial court with the observation that the
witnesses for the defense who vouched for the appellant’s plea of
“defense of a relative” were related to the accused and could not be
impartial in their testimony. Moreover, the trial court observed that
the appellant and his wife were nervous, unconvincing and hesitating in
their answers to questions propounded during the trial, in sharp
contrast with the conduct of the prosecution witnesses. In other words,
the appellant’s plea of “defense of relatives” has been denied by the
trial court as a factual issue. Time and again, this Court has said
that it will not alter determinations of facts by trial courts
precisely because they are in a better position to assess the same than
appellate tribunals. We have not been shown any special or compelling
reason why this rule should not now be followed.

What this Court is actually being asked in this appeal is to revise the
trial court’s assessment of the relative credibility of the prosecution
and defense witnesses. But as has already been explained, it is wisest
to entrust the judgment to the trial judge who has had the opportunity
to observe and weigh the demeanor, attitude and conduct of the
witnesses on the stand. And, unless his conclusions thereon are
seriously contradicted by the records and the evidence, the same ought
to be sustained.

As accepted by the trial court upon the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses, the incident occurred at around
eight o’clock in the evening in front of a barrio store which was then
with several habitues. Consequently, it would have really been
foolishly reckless and unreasoning of Genaro Roldan to have made an
attempt on the appellant’s wife under the circumstances. Not only would
that have been contrary to all plain instinct, it would have also
provoked retaliation not only from the offended party’s husband but
from all those present too. We fully agree with the court a quo, therefore, that the appellant’s defense is simply incredible.

The appellant questions the correctness of his conviction on the ground
that the prosecution has not shown any motive for the killing.
Considering, however, that he has admitted the deed, the failure to
establish motive was completely inconsequential (People vo Ramirez, G.
R. No. L-10951, October 23, 1958).

The records of this case
do not sustain the claim of the appellant that he surrendered
voluntarily to the authorities (jo the end that he might be accorded
that mitigating circumstance. According to him, he surrendered on
January 12, 1959. And yet, the warrant for his arrest was issued only
on January 17, 1959. If he had already surrendered on the 12th, then
there would not have been any need for the issuance of the warrant for
his arrest on the 17th. And, as noted in the said warrant, the
appellant surrendered on January 27, 1959. There is no basis
whatsoever, therefore, for sustaining his claim that he should have
been extended the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

FINDING NO ERROR in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in full.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.