RE : TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 14123. TIRSO T. REYES, AS GUARDIAN OF THE MINORS. AZUCENA, FLOR-DE-LIS AND TIRSO, JR., ALL SURNAMED REYES Y BARRETTO,PETITIONERS AND APPEL…

This is an appeal prosecuted in this court against two orders of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, issued in Case No. 116, G. L. R. O.
Record No. 12908, requiring the oppositor-appellant Lucia Milagros
Barretto to surrender Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14123, issued
in the name of Bibiano Barretto, so that the same may be cancelled and
a new one issued in lieu thereof in the name of Azucena, Flor-de-lis
and Tirso, Jr., all surnamed Reyes, co-owners of an undivided one-half
share, and Lucia Milagros Barretto as the owner of the other half. The
circumstances leading to the issuance of the said orders may be briefly
stated as follows:

Bibiano Barretto died on February 18, 1936, and in the testate
proceedings for the settlement of his estate, Salud Barretto and Lucia
Milagros Barretto were declared as his children and heirs. Lucia
Milagros Barretto was at that time a minor, 15 years of age, and
proceedings were instituted in the same court (Case No. 49881) for the
appointment of her guardian. In the testate proceedings a project of
partition was submitted, which was signed by Salud Barretto, Lucia
Milagros Barretto (minor) and Maria Gerardo (surviving spouse), the
latter signing “on her own behalf and as guardian for the minor,
Milagros Barretto.” The project of partition was approved by the court.
It was filed in the office of the register of deeds of Bulacan on May
22, 1940 but the transfer certificate of title over the property in
question was never cancelled. His widow, Maria Gerardo, died on March
5, 1948, and in the testate proceedings for the settlement of her
estate, Lucia Milagros Barretto submitted a will purporting to be of
said deceased for probate, in accordance with which Maria Gerardo had
only one child with the deceased Bibiano Barretto, namely, Lucia
Milagros Barretto. This will submitted by Lucia Milagros Barretto was
declared to be the last will and testament of the deceased Maria
Gerardo.

Reyes presented the petition for the cancellation of the transfer
certificate of title in the name of Bibiano Barretto on March 19, 1951
in Case No. 116, G. L. R. O. Record No. 12908. Lucia Milagros Barretto
filed an opposition, claiming (a) that the project of
partition approved by the court in the proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of Bibiano Barretto is null and void, because it appears
therefrom that Lucia Milagros Barretto was a minor at the time she
signed the said project of partition, and Maria Gerardo was not
authorized to sign said project on her (Milagros Barretto’s) behalf;
and (b) that in accordance with the will of the deceased Maria
Gerardo, Salud Barretto was not a daughter of Bibiano Barretto and
Maria Gerardo, because only Lucia Milagros Barretto was the daughter of
the said spouses. The lower court overruled the above objections and
issued the orders mentioned; so Lucia Milagros Barretto prosecuted this
appeal.

Under our rules of procedure, the validity of a judgment or order of
the court, which has become final and executory, may be attacked only
by a direct action or proceeding to annul the same, or by motion in
another case if, in the latter case, the court had no jurisdiction to
enter the order or pronounce the judgment (section 44, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court). The first proceeding is a direct attack against the
order or judgment, because it is not incidental to, but is the main
object of, the proceeding.

The other one is the collateral attack, in which the purpose of the
proceedings is to obtain some relief, other than the vacation or
setting aside of the judgment, and the attack is only an incident. (I
Freeman on Judgments, sec. 306, pages 607-608.) A third manner is by a
petition for relief from the judgment or order as authorized by the
statutes or by the rules, such as those expressly provided in Rule 38
of the Rules of Court, but in this case it is to be noted that the
relief is granted by express statutory authority in the same action or
proceeding in which the judgment or order was entered. In the case at
bar, we are not concerned with a relief falling under this third class,
because the project of partition was approved in the testate
proceedings in the year 1939, whereas the petition in this case is in a
registration proceeding and was filed in the year 1951.

In the case at bar, the respondent Lucia Milagros Barretto is
objecting to the petition by the second method, the collateral attack.
When a judgment is sought to be assailed in this manner, the rule is
that the attack must be based not on mere errors or defects in the
order or judgment, but the ground that the judgment or order is null
and void, because the court had no power or authority to grant the
relief, or no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties
or both. (Ibid., sec. 326, p. 650.) In case of collateral attack, the
principles that apply have been stated as follows:

“The legitimate province of collateral impeachment
is void judgments. There and there alone can it meet with any measure
of success. Decision, after decision bears this import: In every case
the field of collateral inquiry is narrowed down to the single issue
concerning the void character of the judgment and the assailant is
called upon to satisfy the court that such is the fact. To compass his
purpose of overthrowing the judgment, it is not enough that he show a
mistaken or erroneous decision or a record disclosing
non-jurisdictional irregularities in the proceedings leading up to the
judgment. He must go beyond this and show to the court, generally from
the fact of the record itself, that the judgment complained of is
utterly void. If he can do that his attack will succeed for the cases
leave no doubt respecting the right of a litigant to collaterally
impeach a judgment that he can prove to be void.” (I Freeman on
Judgments, sec. 322, pp. 642.)

Is the order approving the project of partition absolutely null and
void, and if so, does the invalidating cause appear on the face of said
project or of the record? It is argued that Lucia Milagros Barretto was
a minor when she signed the partition, and that Maria Gerardo was not
her judicially appointed guardian. The claim is not true. Maria Gerardo
signed as guardian of the minor, and her authority to sign can not be
questioned (Sees. 3 and 5, Rule 97, Rules of Court). The mere statement
in the project of partition that the guardianship proceedings of the
minor Lucia Milagros Barretto are pending in the court, does not mean
that the guardian had not yet been appointed; it meant that the
guardianship proceedings had not yet been terminated, and as a
guardianship proceedings begin with the appointment of a guardian,
Maria Gerardo must have been already appointed when she signed the
project of partition. There is, therefore, no irregularity or defect or
error in the project of partition, apparent on the record of the
testate proceedings, which shows that Maria Gerardo had no power or
authority to sign the project of partition as guardian of the minor
Lucia Milagros Barretto, and, consequently, no ground for the
contention that the order approving the project of partition is
absolutely null and void and may be attacked collaterally in the
proceedings.

That Salud Barretto is not a daughter of the deceased Bibiano
Barretto, because Maria Gerardo in her will stated that her only
daughter with the said deceased husband of hers is Lucia Milagros
Barretto, does not appear from the project of partition or from the
record of the case wherein the partition was issued. It appears in a
will submitted in another case. This new fact alleged in the opposition
may not be considered in this registration case, as it tends to support
a collateral attack which, as indicated above, is not permitted. The
reasons for this rule of exclusion have been expressed in the following
words:

“The doctrine that the question of jurisdiction is
to be determined by the record alone, thereby excluding extraneous
proof seems to be the natural unavoidable result of that stamp of
authenticity which, from the earliest times, was placed upon the
‘record,’ and which gave it such uncontrollable credit and verity that
no plea, proof, or avertment could be heard to the contrary.* * * *.
Any other rule, * * *, would be disastrous in its results, since to
permit the court’s records to be contradicted or varied by evidence
dehors would render such records of no avail and definite sentences
would afford but slight protection to the rights of parties once
solemnly adjudicated. * * * (I Freeman on Judgments, sec. 376, p. 789.)

Finding no error in the orders appealed from, we hereby affirm them, with costs against the oppositor-appellant So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.