PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. REMIGIO ESTEBIA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT. IN THE MATTER OF ATTORNEY LOPE E. ADRIANO, MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR.

Once again, this Court is confronted with the unwanted task of
ascertaining whether certain acts and conduct of a member of the Bar deserve
disciplinary action.

The problem arose because of facts that follow:

One Remigio Estebia was convicted
of rape by the Court of First Instance of Samar,^[1]
and sentenced to suffer the capital punishment. 
His case came up before this Court on review.

On December 14, 1966, Lope E. Adriano, a member of the Bar, was
appointed by this Court as Estebia’s counsel de oficio.  In the notice of his appointment, Adriano was
required to prepare and file his brief within thirty days from notice.  He was advised that to enable him to examine
the case, the record would be at his disposal. 
Adriano received this notice on December 20, 1966.  On January
19, 1967, Adriano sought for a 30-day extension to file appellant’s brief in
mimeographed form.  On February 18,
Adriano again moved for a 20-day extension (his second).  This was followed by a third filed on March
8, for fifteen days.  And a fourth on
March 27, also for fifteen days.  He
moved for a “last” extension of ten days on April 11.  On April 21, he even sought a special
extension of five days.  All these
motions for extension were granted.  The
brief was due on April 26, 1967.  But no
brief was filed.

On September 25, 1967,
Adriano was ordered to show cause within ten days from notice thereof why
disciplinary action should not be taken
against him for failure to file appellant’s brief despite the lapse of the time
therefor.  Adriano did not bother to give
any explanation.

For failing to comply with the September 25, 1967 resolution,
this Court, on October 3, 1968, resolved to impose upon him a fine of P500
payable to this Court within fifteen days from notice with a warning that upon further
non-compliance with the said resolution of September 25, 1967 within the same
period of fifteen days, “more drastic disciplinary action will be taken
against him.” Still, counsel paid no heed.

Finally, on December 5, 1968, this Court ordered Adriano to show
cause within ten days from notice thereof why he should not be suspended from
the practice of law “for gross misconduct and violation of his oath of
office as attorney.” By express order of this Court, the resolution was
personally served upon him on December 18, 1968.  He ignored the resolution.

Upon the facts just
narrated, we now pass judgment.

1.  By specific authority,
this Court may assign an attorney to render professional aid to a destitute
appellant in a criminal case who is unable to employ an attorney.  Correspondingly, a duty is imposed upon the
lawyer so assigned “to render the required service.”^[2]
A lawyer so appointed “as counsel for an indigent prisoner,” our
Canons of Professional Ethics demand, “should always exert his best
efforts” in the indigent’s behalf.^[3]

No excuse at all has been offered for non-presentation of
appellant’s brief.  And yet, between
December 20, 1966, when he received notice of his appointment, and December 5,
1968, when the last show-cause order was issued by this Court, more than sufficient time was afforded counsel to
prepare and file his brief de oficio.  The death sentence below imposed was upon a
plea of guilty.  The record of the
proceedings leading to the lower court’s sentence consists of but 31 pages.  Counsel had the record since January 19,
1967.  In fact, in his third motion for
extension of time, he manifested that the drafting of appellant’s brief
“is more than half-way through” and that “additional time is
needed to review, effectuate the necessary corrections, put in final form and
print the said brief.” In his motion for fourth extension, he intimated
that the preparation of the brief “is almost through” and that
“additional time is needed
to redraft and rehash some significant portions of said brief and have the same
stencilled and mimeographed upon completion of a definitive text.” His
motion for last (fifth) extension of time came with the excuse that he
“suddenly got sick (influenza) in the course of redrafting and rehashing
some significant portions of said brief, which ailment hampered and interrupted
his work thereon for sometime.” Finally, in his “Special Extension of
Time” to file brief, he claimed that he needed only five days from April
21, 1967 to put said brief in final form and have the same stencilled and
mimeographed.

In the face of the fact that no brief has ever been filed,
counsel’s statements in his motions for extension have gone down to the level
of empty and meaningless words; at best, have dubious claim to veracity.

It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel.  But we do say that as such counsel de oficio,
he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant
himself.  Because, as in the case of the
latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of
the person assigned to his care.  His is
to render effective assistance.  The
accused defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation.  We do not accept the paradox that
responsibility is less where the defended party is poor.  It has been said that courts should
“have no hesitancy in demanding high standards of duty of attorneys
appointed to defend indigent persons charged with crime.”^[4]
For, indeed, a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected
to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of
self-interest.  Because of this, a lawyer
should remain ever conscious of his duties to the indigent he defends.

Worth remembering is the 1905 case of In the matter
of Jose Robles Lahesa.^[5] He was counsel de oficio
before the Supreme Court in two cases: one for robo en cuadrilla
and the other for homicide.  He failed to
take any action in behalf of the defendants in both cases.  This Court imposed
upon him a fine of P200.  Signifi­cant is
the pronouncement we there made that: 
“This court should exact from its officers and subordinates the
most scrupulous per­formance of their official duties, especially when
negligence in the performance of those duties necessarily results in delays in the
prosecution of criminal cases and the detention of accused persons
pending appeal.” The validity of the foregoing observation remains to the
present day.^[6]
It applies to the present case.

Here, appellant was without brief since December 20, 1966.  The effect of this long delay need not be
essayed.  We, therefore, find that
Attorney Lope E. Adriano has
violated his oath that he will conduct himself as a lawyer according to the
best of his “know­ledge and discretion”.

2.  An attorney’s duty of
prime importance is “[t]o observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice and judicial officers.”^[7]
The first Canon of the Code of Ethics enjoins a lawyer “to maintain
towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance.” By his oath of office, the lawyer undertook to “obey the
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities.” In People vs. Carillo,^[8] this Court’s pointed observation was
that as an officer of the court, it is a lawyer’s “sworn and moral duty to
help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards
the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.”

Here, we have a clear case of an attorney whose acts exhibit
willful disobedience of lawful orders of this Court.  A cause sufficient is thus present for
suspension or disbarment.^[9]
Counsel has received no less than three resolutions of this Court requiring com­pliance
of its orders.  To be recalled is that on
September 25, 1967, this Court directed him, in ten days from notice, to show
cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for his failure
to file appellant’s brief despite the lapse of the time therefor.  Nothing was done by counsel for over a
year.  To impress upon counsel the
gravity of his repeated failure to obey this Court’s orders, on October 3,
1968, a fine of P500 was clamped upon him. 
He was directed to pay that fine in ten days.  He was in that order also required to file
his brief in fifteen days.  He was warned
that more drastic discip­linary action would be taken upon his failure to do
either.  Still he remained unmoved.  Then, this
Court issued the peremptory order of December 5, 1968 commanding him to show
cause within ten days from notice thereof why he should not be suspended from
the practice of law for gross misconduct and violation of his oath of
office.  The Court made it certain that
this order would reach him.  He personally
acknowledged receipt thereof.  He has not
paid the fine.  He has done nothing.

This is 1969.  No brief has
as yet been filed.  And this, inspite of
the fact that as early as March 27, 1967, when he moved for a fourth extension of time to file his brief de
oficio, he repre­sented to this Court that all that was needed was to
redraft and to rehash some significant portions of the brief which was almost
through and to have the same stencilled and mimeographed upon completion of a
definitive text.

Disrespect is here present. 
Contumacy is as patent.  Dis­ciplinary
action is in order.

Controlling here is the 1961 decision In the Matter
of Atty. Filoteo Dianala Jo.^[10]
There, as here, counsel failed to file appellant’s brief (in a criminal case)
despite extensions of time granted him by this Court.  Likewise, this Court issued a show-cause
order why disciplinary action should not be taken against him.  The explanation was considered
unsatisfactory.  This Court imposed a
fine of P50 payable in ten days from notice. 
Attorney Dianala Jo did not pay that fine.  Came the subsequent resolution of this Court
advising him to pay the fine, otherwise, he would be arrested and confined to
jail.  This warning was not heeded.  On November 18, 1960, the Court resolved to
give him ten days from notice within which to explain why he should not be
suspended from the practice of law. 
Despite receipt of this notice, he did not care to explain his behaviour
which this Court considered as “contumacy and unwillingness to comply with
the lawful orders of this Court of which he is an officer or to conduct himself
as a lawyer should, in violation of his oath of office.” He was suspended
from the practice of law for three months.

In the present case, counsel’s pattern of conduct, it would seem
to us, reveals a propensity on the part of counsel to benumb appreciation of
his obligation as counsel de oficio and of the courtesy and
respect that should be accorded this Court.

For the reasons given, we vote to suspend Attorney Lope E.
Adriano from the practice of law throughout the Philippines for a period of one
(1) year.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal record,
in this Court, of Lope E. Adriano as member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and
Barredo, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Criminal Case C-1331, entitled “People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus
Remigio Estebia, Accused.”

^[2]
Section 31, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

^[3]
Canon 4.

^[4]
State vs. Delaney, 351 P. 2d. 85, 90.

^[5]
4 Phil. 298, 300.

^[6]
See: Javellana vs. Lutero, 20 SCRA 717; Blanza vs.
Arcangel, Adm. Case 492, September 5, 1967, 21 SCRA 1.

^[7]
Section 20(b), Rule 138, Rules of Court.

^[8]
77 Phil. 572, 580.

^[9]
Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

^[10]
1 SCRA 31.