EFREN V. PEREZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. ELADIA T. CUNTING, CLERK OF COURT IV, MTCC-OCC, ZAMBOANGA CITY, RESPONDENT.

Perez versus Cunting

The Case

This is an administrative matter arising from a complaint filed by Efren V. Perez, the owner and manager of a lending establishment in Zamboanga City, against Eladia T. Cunting, Clerk of Court IV of the Office of the Clerk of Court in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Zamboanga City. What began as a simple written inquiry into the legal basis for the sheriff's fees being collected in civil cases became an administrative charge of discourtesy after the respondent clerk answered the inquiry with a sharply worded letter that attacked the complainant's character and business. The case matters to a reviewee because it fixes the standard of conduct owed by court personnel to the public, and it illustrates how a single discourteous reply, even one provoked by a persistent litigant, can ripen into an administrative offense with a defined penalty.

Procedural History

The matter began not as a complaint but as a letter, dated April 26, 2001, from the complainant to the Office of the Court Administrator, asking for information on the authority of a sheriff to collect expenses in serving court processes. The Office of the Court Administrator indorsed the letter to the Clerk of Court of the Office of the Clerk of Court in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Zamboanga City for comment. The respondent filed her comment on November 14, 2001. Finding that comment arrogant, the complainant wrote a letter dated November 26, 2001, seeking administrative sanctions against the respondent. The respondent filed a further comment dated April 5, 2002. On July 25, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted its evaluation and recommendation, finding merit in the complaint and recommending that it be redocketed as a regular administrative matter and that the respondent be admonished, with a warning. The Supreme Court then resolved the matter as a regular administrative proceeding, adopting the recommendation except as to the penalty.

Facts

Efren V. Perez, owner and manager of SLR Lending Haus in Zamboanga City, wrote to the Office of the Court Administrator on April 26, 2001, requesting information on the authority of a sheriff to collect expenses in serving court processes from client agencies. He noted that a deputy sheriff assigned to a Metropolitan Trial Court was collecting 100 pesos as sheriff's fees for the service of summons to each respondent in a civil case, 600 pesos for the implementation of a writ of execution, and 700 pesos for the extrajudicial foreclosure of a chattel mortgage. The letter was indorsed to the respondent clerk for comment.

In her comment dated November 14, 2001, the respondent denied that the sheriffs were collecting fees in excess of those authorized under the Rules of Court and the circulars of the Supreme Court. She explained that the 100 pesos was for transportation and other expenses in serving summons and may vary with distance; that the 600 pesos for a writ of execution covered transportation, labor, security escorts, and storage; and that the Municipal Trial Court in Cities had no jurisdiction over extrajudicial foreclosures, which belong to the Regional Trial Courts. She stressed that these amounts were cash advances spent in actual service and did not go to the sheriffs' pockets. She then went further, stating that the complainant, who runs a lending business, must not be allowed to enrich himself at the expense of lowly paid court employees, that he was widely known in Zamboanga City for collecting exorbitant interests, that most of his collection cases involved loans whose principal had mostly been paid, and that he had filed capricious, whimsical, and dilatory cases before the Ombudsman, the Civil Service Commission, and other quasi-judicial bodies, most of which were dismissed for lack of merit.

Taking the comment as arrogant, the complainant sought administrative sanctions, insisting that his letter merely asked for the legal basis of the collections and that the respondent had failed to cite any specific issuance authorizing them. In her later comment dated April 5, 2002, the respondent cited the rule authorizing the sheriff to collect 50 pesos for the service of summons and 20 pesos for the service of subpoenas, and pointed out that in addition the party requesting any process must pay the sheriff's expenses in serving or executing it, in an amount estimated by the sheriff and approved by the court. She justified her defense of the sheriffs on the ground that they are under her direct supervision, denied any hidden agenda, and maintained that her statements were based on existing facts.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent clerk of court is administratively liable for discourtesy in the performance of her official duties for the manner in which she answered the complainant's written inquiry.
• Whether or not the penalty recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator, that of admonition, is the appropriate penalty, or whether a different penalty should be imposed.

Applicable Provisions

Section 23 of Rule XIV of the Civil Service Law and Rules, found in Book Five of Executive Order Number 292, provides:

A first offense of discourtesy, which is a light penalty, in the course of one's official duties shall be meted the penalty of reprimand.

This provision supplies the specific penalty for the offense the Court found, and it is the reason the Court departed from the recommended admonition.

Section 9 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as discussed in the decision, provides:

The sheriff and other persons serving court processes are authorized to collect 50 pesos for the service of summons and 20 pesos for the service of subpoenas to each witness in a civil action or proceeding.

This is the provision the respondent should have cited in her first reply, and its omission is what made her answer appear to be mere personal opinion rather than a statement of the governing rule.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent is administratively liable for discourtesy. As a public officer, she is bound, in the performance of her official duties, to observe courtesy, civility, and self-restraint in her dealings with the public. The Court noted that the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees directs all public officials to extend prompt, courteous, and adequate service to the public, and at all times to respect the rights of others and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public order, public policy, public safety, and public interest. Her comment of November 14, 2001 appeared on its face discourteous. There was no reason for her to write a strongly worded letter in response to an inquiry that merely called for an explanation of the legal basis for the collection of certain fees. The Court observed that, assigned as she was to the Office of the Clerk of Court, she would inevitably deal with party-litigants inquiring on the status of their cases or requesting information on legal questions, and it behooves her to observe courtesy, keeping in mind always that arrogance and discourtesy reflect adversely on the good image of the judiciary.

On the second issue, the Court agreed with the Office of the Court Administrator that the complaint had merit, but disagreed as to the penalty. It applied the Civil Service rule on discourtesy and, noting that this was the respondent's first offense, found the penalty of reprimand appropriate. It recalled its earlier rulings in which a deputy sheriff was reprimanded for gross discourtesy, a clerk was reprimanded for discourtesy and conduct unbecoming a court employee, and a clerk of court was censured for discourtesy. The Court thus rejected the recommended admonition in favor of reprimand.

Doctrine

First, a public officer is bound, in the performance of official duties, to observe courtesy, civility, and self-restraint in dealings with the public, and this duty is reinforced by the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, which requires prompt, courteous, and adequate service and respect for the rights of others. Second, discourtesy in the course of official duties is an administrative offense, and under Section 23 of Rule XIV of the Civil Service Law and Rules a first offense carries the light penalty of reprimand. Third, when a litigant asks for the legal basis of a fee collected by court personnel, the proper response is to cite the specific provision of the Rules of Court, here Section 9 of Rule 141, and not to answer with personal opinion or with irrelevant attacks on the inquirer's character. Fourth, arrogance and discourtesy reflect adversely on the good image of the judiciary, and court personnel must therefore be circumspect in their comments regarding official matters.

Disposition

The Court found the respondent, Eladia T. Cunting, Clerk of Court IV, guilty of discourtesy in the performance of her official duty and reprimanded her, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely, and ordered that the decision be noted in her personal record.

Remember This

The one line to memorize is that a first offense of discourtesy in the course of official duties is meted the penalty of reprimand, because courtesy and self-restraint are duties every public officer owes the public. Examiners like to use this case in administrative law and judicial ethics questions on the conduct of court personnel toward litigants, and on the correct penalty for discourtesy as a light offense.