THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. WALDO CASIGURAN, WALLY CASIGURAN AND JUANITO CASIGURAN, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

Ismael Bato, a forty-three-yeaR-old driver of a sand and gravel
truck, was assaulted at around three o’clock in the afternoon of June 27, 1976
near his house in the compound at Barrio Malanday, San Mateo, Rizal.

He sustained a mortal wound in the chest which affected his lungs
and heart, an incised wound in his right earlobe, lacerated wounds on his head
and face, and contusions and abrasions on his head, chest and left
forearm. He died upon arrival at the
hospital.

This case, like its congeners, poses the ever-recurring question
as to whether the killing was murder, as held by the trial court which imposed
the death penalty, or justifiable homi­cide, as contended by the
accused-appellants.

Waldo Casiguran, a twenty-four-year-old helper in a trucking
business and a neighbor of Bato, the victim, admitted that he inflicted the
fatal wound. In his nebulous and hazy
testimony he invoked self-defense and defense of a stranger as the
justification for wounding Bato.

Waldo testified that on that afternoon, when he saw Bato stabbing
Dario Adriatico, he (Waldo) approached them and tried to pacify them. When Bato turned towards him and was going
to stab him with an ice pick, he grabbed the weapon and stabbed Bato (15 tsn
August 31, 1976). Waldo said that his
brothers, Juanito (Doming), 43, and Wally, 20, were not in the vicinity when he
stabbed Bato.

The trial court rejected Waldo’s plea of self-defense and alleged
defense of Adriatico. It reasoned out
that if Waldo tried to defend Adriatico, then he should have presented the
latter as a witness. Adriatico is at
large or is in hiding.

On the other hand, the lower court gave credence to the version
of the prosecution that while Bato was fixing his chicken coop near his house,
Adriatico and the three Casiguran brothers, each carrying stones (there is a
gravel pit near the scene of the crime) suddenly assaulted Bato.

Waldo stabbed Bato with an ice pick owned by the latter. The victim’s wife, Trinidad, placed herself
on top of her fallen husband and implored the assailants to stop the assault
but they ignored her supplication. They
pulled her and kicked her.

Pablo Santos, a neighbor, tried to take Bato to the hos­pital but
the assailants stoned him and foiled his efforts. The record does not show the motive for the killing.

The Casiguran brothers were charged with murder. Trea­chery and evident premeditation were
alleged as aggravating circumstances. At the trial, Bato’s wife and his two neighbors, Santos and Lilia
Zaragosa, testified on the assault perpetrated by the accused.

The defense presented as witnesses Waldo Casiguran and Juanito
Casiguran. Wally Casiguran, the third
accused, did not take the witness stand. A doctor testified that he treated at the hospital the wound in the neck
sustained by Wally and the wound in the head sustained by Waldo. However, there is no clear evi­dence as to
how those wounds were inflicted upon them, who in­flicted the same and the
motive which impelled the infliction thereof.

The trial court did not give credence to the defense of Juanito
Casiguran, a compadre of the victim, that he had no com­plicity
in the killing, that Bato assaulted him without any known motive, that he and
his brother Wally were pursued by the com­panions of Bato, and that he and his
brother fled to the river.

The trial court convicted the Casiguran brothers of murder and,
as already noted, sentenced them to death but sus­pended the execution of the
death sentence as to Wally Casiguran, who was assumed to be nineteen years old
at the time the crime was committed, and ordered his confinement at the Camp
Sam­paguita Youth Rehabilitation Center in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila.

The accused were further ordered to pay solidarily to the heirs
of Ismael Bato a total indemnity of twenty-two thousand pesos (Criminal Case
No. 1671).

The Casiguran brothers appealed. Their counsel de oficio assailed the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses and argued that the accused should be acquitted.

We hold that the trial court did not err in giving credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Appellants Waldo Casiguran and Juanito Casiguran did not testify in a
coherent, candid and straight-forward manner. Their disjointed declara­tions do not disclose what transpired exactly
on the occasion when Bato was mortally wounded by Waldo.

Alevosia was not present in the killing of Bato. Before he was attacked, he saw the four
malefactors approaching and he said to them: “Do not come near because I am not going to fight.”
(“Huag kayong lalapit. Hindi ako
lalaban.”) According to the victim’s wife, before the four assailants
commenced the assault, Bato asked them what they wanted. He was face-to-face with them. The assault was not sudden nor unexpected.

There was abuse of superiority but this aggravating circumstance
was not alleged in the information. It
is not qualifying; it is only generic aggravating in this case. Evident premeditation was alleged but that
circumstance cannot be considered as aggravating because the evidence does not
show that the accused planned the killing and that there was sufficient time to
allow their con­science to overcome the resolution of their will if they desired to hearken to its
warnings (U. S. vs. Gil, 13 Phil. 530, 547).

The killing was homicide aggravated by abuse of superior
strength. Since conspiracy to kill was
not proven, only Waldo Casiguran should be held liable as a principal. It is deducible from the evidence that the
Casiguran brothers and their confe­derate, Adriatico, intended to castigate
Bato, but it was not proven that they intended to kill him outright. They were not armed with deadly or bladed
weapons. They just carried stones. The ice pick used by Waldo in the killing
belonged to the victim (13 tsn August 30, 1976). The stabbing was impelled by a momentary impulse.

But Wally and Juanito, in joining their brother in stoning Bato
and in preventing the victim’s wife and neighbor from giving succor to him, cooperated in the commission of the
killing. Since that cooperation was not
indispensable, they should be regarded as accomplices (People vs. Tamayo, 44
Phil. 38; People vs. Cortes, 55 Phil. 143; People vs. Babiera, 52 Phil. 97;
People vs. Azcona, 59 Phil. 580; People vs. Templonuevo, 106 Phil. 1003; U. S.
vs. Domingo 1st, 37 Phil. 446).

The trial court’s assumption that Wally Casiguran was nine­teen
years old at the time the crime was committed is not substantiated by the
record. Exhibit 1 of the defense, the
medical certificate as to Wally’s wound in the neck, shows that he was twenty
years old (5 tsn September 10, 1976). He would be twenty-three
years old now. Hence, he is not
entitled to a sus­pended sentence.

Originally, the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which took effect
six months after December 10, 1974 or on June 8, 1975 and which repealed article
80 of the Revised Penal Code, con­sidered as a youthful offender a person over
nine years but under twenty-one years of age at the time of the commission of the offense (Art. 189).

Presidential Decree No. 1179, which took effect on August 15,
1977, lowered the age limit to eighteen years (the same age limit provided for
in article 80 of the Revised Penal Code before it was amended by Republic Act
No. 47).

Article 192 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (before it was
amended) provides that “if after hearing the evidence in the proper
proceedings, the court should find that the youth­ful offender has committed
the acts charged against him, the court shall determine the imposable penalty,
including any civil liability chargeable against him. However, instead of pronounc­ing judgment of conviction, the
court shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such minor to the
custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare, or to any training
institution operated by the government, or duly licensed agencies or any other
responsible person, until he shall have reached twenty-one years of age or, for
a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports
and recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare or the agency or responsible
individual under whose care he has been committed.”

Under Presidential Decrees Nos. 1179 and 1210, the youthful
offender should apply for a suspended sentence.

The purpose of articles 189 and 192 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code is the same as that of article 80 and that is to avoid a situation
where juvenile offenders would commingle with ordinary criminals in
prison. So, instead of imposing a
condemnatory sentence on them, they are confined in a benefi­cent institution
for their care, correction and education (People vs. Estefa, 86 Phil. 104,
110).

Article 192 should be interpreted in the same manner as article
80. Under the original provisions of
article 80 (before it was amended by Republic Act No. 47 which reduced the age
of eighteen years to sixteen years), it was held that if at the time the crime
was committed the accused was below eighteen years but at the time of the trial
or conviction he was no longer a minor, he is not entitled anymore to a
suspended sentence because he is not a juvenile offender but already an
adult. The reason for the suspended
sentence does not apply to him (People vs. Celespara, 82 Phil. 399; People vs.
Nuñez, 85 Phil. 448; People vs. Estefa, supra; People vs. Lingcuan, 93
Phil. 9; People vs. Doria, L-26189 and two other cases, January 31, 1974, 55
SCRA 435, 450; People vs. Pedro, L-18997, January 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 57, 67).

WHEREFORE, Waldo Casiguran is guilty as principal in
homicide. He is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of twelve years of prision mayor as minimum
to eighteen years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to
indemnify the heirs of Ismael Bato in the sum of twenty-two thousand pesos.

Wally Casiguran and Juanito Casiguran are guilty as accomplices
in the same homicide. They are each
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six years of prision correctional
as minimum to ten years and one day of prision mayor as maxi­mum
and to pay solidarily to the heirs of the victim an indemnity of three thousand
pesos.

This judgment supersedes the trial court’s judgment which is
hereby set aside. Costs against the
appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio,
Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.