G.R. Nos. L-24444 & L-24445. July 29, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROMEO DORIQUEZ, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
RUIZ CASTRO, J.:
The appellant Romeo Doriquez, on August 28, 1964, was charged with the
offense of grave oral defamation before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
by virtue of an information which recites
“That on or about April 22, 1964, in the municipality of Batad, province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named defendant, with deliberate intent
of bringing Attorney Sixto Demaisip
into discredit, disrepute and public contempt, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously speak and utter in a loud voice and in the presence
of many persons against the said Attorney Demaisip
the following insulting and defamatory words and expressions, to wit: ‘Tonto ka nga klase
sang tao, quin pierde mo ang asunto
ko, nagastohan ako sing linibo sang ulihi nag pabakal ikaw kay Purita;
pasuguiron ka P30.00 lang ang nabayad ko
pero linibo ang gasto ko,’
which, translated into English’ runs as follows: ‘You are a foolish class of
person, you had to lose my case, I spent thousands of pesos and later you
allowed yourself to be sold to Purita; you had been
telling people that I paid you only
P30.00 when I spent thousand of pesos for my case,’ and other similar
words of import.”
Six days later, or on September 3, 1964, the same Doriquez was indicted before the same court for discharge
of firearm, committed, in the language of the information, as follows:
“That on or about April 22, 1964, in the municipality of Batad, province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused, armed with a revolver and without
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
discharge twice said revolver at one Attorney Sixto Demaisip.”
Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the two indictments. On December 3, 1964 he moved to dismiss both informations, claiming that (1) the court a quo
has no jurisdiction over the offense of grave oral defamation in virtue of
Republic Act 3328 which enlarged the original exclusive jurisdiction of city
and municipal courts; and (2) the institution of the criminal action for
discharge of firearm places him in double jeopardy for he had already been in
jeopardy once in the municipal court of Batad, Iloilo
which dismissed, without his consent, the information charging him with the
offense of alarm and scandal, allegedly based on the self-same facts/relied
upon by Fiscal Simeon A. Barranco in support of the
aforesaid information for discharge of firearm.
In its order of March 8,
1965 the court a quo denied the motion to
dismiss. The subsequent motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied by the trial court in its order of March 20, 1965. From these two orders, the present appeal was
interposed.
It is our view, in the first instance, that the appeal is premature.
Section 2 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
“Only final judgments or orders shall be subject to
appeal. No interlocutory or incidental
judgment or order shall stay the progress of an action, nor shall it be the
subject of an appeal until final judgment or order is rendered for one party or
the other.”
Construing the aforequoted
section, this Court has repeatedly and uniformly held that a judgment or order
may be appealed only when it is final – in the sense that it completely
disposes of the cause and definitively adjudicates the respective rights of the
parties, leaving thereafter no substantial proceeding to be had in connection
with the case except the proper execution of the judgment or order; and that,
conversely, an interlocutory order or judgment is not appealable
for it does not decide the action with finality and leaves substantial
proceedings still to be had.[1]
It is an elementary rule of adjective law that an order denying a motion to
dismiss is interlocutory, hence not appealable,
because it “does not terminate the proceedings, nor finally dispose of
the contentions of the parties.”[2]
An order, for example, rejecting a motion to dismiss based on lack of
jurisdiction[3]
is interlocutory because after such denial proceedings of substance are still
to be had by the trial court, such as hearing of the case on the merits and
rendition of final judgment.
The latest unequivocal restatement of the rule that interlocutory
orders are not appealable was made in Ramos vs. Ardant Trading Corporation.[4]
Concluding that the appeal therein was premature, Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion emphasized that “the orders denying
defendant’s motion for dismissal and its subsequent motion for reconsideration
are interlocutory in nature, and hence, not appealable
until after the rendition of judgment on the merits. Defendant’s appeal contravenes the explicit
provisions of Rule 41, Section 2, of the Rules of Court . . . which, moreover,
incorporates a well-established rule of practice and procedure, constituting
one of the main tenets of our remedial law.” In order to stress its
disapproval of appeals from interlocutory orders, this Court, in the
aforementioned case, assessed treble costs against the appellant therein,
jointly and severally, with its counsel.
The rationale underlying the rule that an interlocutory order is
not appealable is, basically, the avoidance of
“multiplicity of appeals in a single case.” If every interlocutory
order or judgment may be appealed, and the appeal stays the progress of the
action, there could arise countless appeals in a single case, and the magnitude
and extent of the delay in the final disposition thereof will be such that,
conceivably, in a number of instances, the parties may not survive the case.[5]
This Court has consistently frowned upon – and has firmly stricken down – piece-meal
appeals, “because it [piece-meal appeal] delays the speedy disposition of
the case, and is often resorted to as a means of draining the resources of the
poorer party and of compelling it to submit out of sheer exhaustion, even if
its demands should be conformable to reason and justice.”[6]
Two alternative remedies were forthwith available to Doriquez after the denial of his motion for
reconsideration, namely, (1) proceed immediately to trial on the merits and
interpose as integral part of his defense the grounds stated in his motion to
dismiss, and, in the event of an adverse decision, appeal to the proper Court
for resolution of all pertinent issues, including those he has posed in the
present appeal; (2) interpose a petition for certiorari to enable this
Court to dispose, on the merits, the issues raised herein, anchoring said
petition on the twin grounds that (a) the court a quo acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
the offense of grave oral defamation, and (b) the trial judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the information for discharge of
firearm in the face of his avowal that the said indictment places him in peril
of a second jeopardy. This latter action
should of course be availed of with candor and absolute absence of deviousness,
with no intention (howsoever disguised) of causing undue delay.
Because, however, all the cogent issues are now before us, we
will treat the instant appeal as a petition for certiorari. This positive and pragmatic approach will
definitively resolve the contentions of Doriquez and
thus dissipate any and all speculation on the part of all concerned as to the
correctness of their respective positions.
1. Doriquez maintains that the municipal
court of Batad, Iloilo, not the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, has original exclusive jurisdiction over the offense of
grave oral defamation which, under article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, is
punishable by arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correcional
in its minimum period, reasoning that the exclusive original jurisdiction of
municipal and city courts has been enlarged by Republic Act 3828 to include
offenses for which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not more
than three years, or a fine of not more than three thousand pesos, or both such
imprisonment and fine.
The appellant is in error.
The rule is now beyond all area of dispute that in view of the
latest amendment to section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 and also taking
into account the unaltered provisions of section 44(f) of the same Act, the
zone of concurrent jurisdiction of municipal and city courts and courts of
first instance has been considerably widened.
This jurisdictional parity embraces all offenses for which the penalty
provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months but not exceeding
three years (or six years with respect to city courts and municipal courts in
the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces vis–a–vis
the courts of first instance), or a fine of more than two hundred pesos but not
exceeding three thousand pesos (or six thousand pesos in the proper cases), or
both such imprisonment and fine. This
confluence of jurisdiction was first clearly etched in Esperat
vs. Avila et al, [7] and
the rule in that case was affirmed in Le Hua Sia vs. Reyes [8]
and Andico vs. Roan, et al.[9]
In Esperat vs. Avila, Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes delineated with specificity the respective jurisdictional
boundaries of the various trial courts.
Said Mr. Justice Reyes:
“The fallacy in petitioner’s argument lies in his failure to
consider section 44(f) of the same Judiciary Act of 1948, in, conjunction with
its section 87(c). Note that
notwithstanding the various amendments received by section 87, section 44(f) remained
unaltered, thereby indicating the intention of the legislators to retain the
original jurisdiction of the court of first instance in certain cases. The fact that the jurisdiction of the
municipal or city courts was enlarged in virtue of the amendment of section
87(c), cannot be taken as a repeal or withdrawal of the jurisdiction conferred
on the court of first instance. Not only
is implied repeal disfavored by the law, but also, it is a cardinal principle
that a statute must be so construed as to harmonize all apparent conflicts, and
give effect to all its provisions whenever possible.
“Actually, there is nothing irreconcilable between sections
44(f) and 87(c) of the Judiciary Act.
“As therein provided, the court of first instance was given
original jurisdiction over cases where the penalty prescribed by law is
imprisonment for more than 6 months or fine of more than P200.00; the
justices of the peace and municipal or city courts of chartered cities, over
cases where the penalty is imprisonment for not more than 3 years, and
fine of not more than P3,000.00.
In other words, where the prescribed penalty is imprisonment for more
than 6 months, but not exceeding 3 years, or fine of more than P200.00 but not
exceeding P3,000.00 the justice of the peace or municipal court only has
concurrent (and not exclusive) original jurisdiction with the court of first
instance. And, it may be stated that
this concurrent jurisdiction between the inferior courts and the court of first
instance was not provided for the first time in Republic Act No. 3828. Under Republic Act 2613, crimes the penalties
for which do not exceed 3 years, or fine of not more than P3,000.00, were
specifically placed within the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and
municipal courts, concurrent with the court of first instance.
“It follows, therefore,
that the exclusive original jurisdiction of the justice of the peace
and municipal courts is confined only to cases where the prescribed penalty
is imprisonment for 6 months or less, or fine of P200.00 or less,
whereas, the exclusive original jurisdiction of the court of first
instance covers cases where the penalty is incarceration for more than 3 years
(or 6 years in the case of city courts and municipal courts in provincial capitals),
or fine of more than P3,000.00 (or P6,000.00 in proper cases), or both such
imprisonment and fine. Between these
exclusive jurisdictions lies a zone where the jurisdiction is concurrent. This is the proper construction to be placed
on the provisions involved herein, regardless of what may have been the prior
rulings on the matter.”
The offense of grave oral defamation which carries a maximum
penalty of prision correccional
in its minimum period (or incarceration not exceeding 2 years and 4 months)
falls within the above-described zone of concurrent jurisdiction. Consequently, the court a quo
did not err in assuming jurisdiction.
2. Doriquez likewise contends that the
filing a the information for discharge of firearm has placed him in peril of double
jeopardy as he had previously been charged with the offense of alarm and
scandal in a complaint filed in the municipal court of Batad,
Iloilo, upon the same facts which constitute the basis of the indictment for
discharge of firearm. The said complaint,
which was allegedly dismissed without his consent, recites
“That on or about 12:00 p.m., April 21, 1964, at the gate in
front of the Municipal Building, Poblacion, Batad, Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with deliberate
intent to cause alarm in the public, discharge his License Revolver caliber .22
SN-368383 one on the ground and one into the air within the town limits and
without any justifiable purpose thus causing alarm upon the general
public.”
This plea of Doriquez is obviously
untenable.
For double jeopardy to attach in his favor, the accused must
prove, among other things, that there is “identity of offenses,” so
that, in the language of section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court,
his “conviction or acquittal x x x or the dismissal of the case [without his express
consent] shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense charged or
for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the former complaint or information.” It is altogether evident, however, that
the offense of discharge of firearm is not the crime of alarm and scandal, nor
is it an attempt or a frustration of the latter felony. Neither my it be asserted that every crime of
discharge of firearm produces the offense of alarm and scandal. Nor could the reverse situation be true, for
the less grave felony of discharge of firearm does not include or subsume the
offense of alarm and scandal which is a light felony.
Although the indictment for alarm and scandal filed under article
155(1) of the Revised Penal Code and the information for discharge of firearm
instituted under article 258 of the same Code are closely related in fact (as
the two apparently arose from the same factual setting, the firing of a
revolver by the accused being a common element), they are definitely diverse in
law. Firstly, the two indictments do not
describe the same felony – alarm and scandal is an offense against public order
while discharge of firearm is a crime against persons. Secondly, the indispensable element of the
former crime is the discharge of a firearm calculated to cause alarm or danger
to the public, while the gravamen of the latter is
the discharge of a firearm against or at a certain person, without intent to
kill.
The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit,
as the two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law howsoever closely
they may appear to be connected in fact.[10]
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy
may be invoked only for the same offense[11]
or identical offense.[12]
A single act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of
the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other.[13]
Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or
articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them
is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from
the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an
essential element of the other.[14]
In the case at bar granting that the two indictments arose from
the same act – a contention traversed by the State – they describe and
constitute, nevertheless, essentially different felonies having fundamentally
diverse indispensable elements. Hence,
there can be no such “identity of offenses” as would support
the suggestion that double jeopardy has ensued.
The trial judge, therefore, did not commit abuse of discretion in
refusing to dismiss the information for discharge of firearm.
In sum, we hold that the instant appeal is premature, and that –
even if it were treated as a petition for certiorari – the contentions
and arguments of the appellant cannot be accorded credit.
ACCORDINGLY, the present appeal is dismissed. This case is hereby ordered remanded to the
court of origin for immediate trial on the merits. Costs against the appellant.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles, and
Fernando, JJ., concur.
[1] Bairan vs. Tan Siu Lay, et
al., L-19460, December 28, 1966,
18 SCRA 1235; People vs. Manuel, L-6794 & L-6795, August 11, 1954; Antonio vs. Samonte, L-15410, April
26, 1961.
[2]
Harrison Foundry and Machinery and Chua vs. Harrison Foundry Workers’
Association, L-18432, June 29, 1963;
see also Fuster vs. Johnson, 1 Phil. 670;
Philippine Refining Co., Inc. vs. Ponce,
et al, 99 Phil. 269.
[3]
Hodges vs. Villanueva, 90 Phil. 255; Goat vs. Hugo, 93 Phil.
613; People vs. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357, 360.
[4]
L-21975, June 13, 1968.
[5]
Moran (1963 edition), p. 353, citing Sitchon vs.
Sheriff of Occidental Negros, 80 Phil. 397.
[6]
Harrison Foundry and Machinery and Chua vs. Harrison Foundry Workers’
Association, supra, note 2.
[7]
L-25922, June 30, 1967,
1967E PHILD 771, 20 SCRA 597.
[8]
L-21686, April 16, 1968.
[9]
L-26563, April 16, 1968.
[10] Gavieres vs. U.S.,
41 Phil. 961, citing Burton vs.
United States
(202 U.S. 344).
[11]
People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 82; U.S. vs. Vitog,
37 Phil. 42; U.S. vs. Capurro, 7 Phil. 24;
U.S. vs. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578; People vs.
(avieres, supra, note 10.
[12]
See 4 Moran (1963 edition), pp. -212-220.
[13]
See People vs. Bacolod,
89 Phil. 621; People vs. Capurro, supra,
note 11.
[14]
People vs. Alvarez, 4??? Phil. 472.