THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BONIFACIO ADORNA Y QUINTO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

People versus Adorna

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Bonifacio Adorna y Quinto, a criminal prosecution for the complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with double murder. Two grade one pupils, seven year old Marites Unday and her eight year old cousin Wilfredo Unday, were taken from their school, held for ransom, and later found stabbed to death. The case matters to the reviewee because it is a clean illustration of how the Supreme Court weighs an extrajudicial confession against a claim of third degree maltreatment, and how it treats an uncorroborated alibi in the face of interlocking circumstantial evidence.

Procedural History

An information for kidnapping for ransom with double murder was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch Thirty One, sitting in Quezon City, against Bonifacio Adorna and two co-accused, Sotero Abaratique and Rodrigo Gayo. Only Adorna was apprehended; the two others remained at large. Adorna was arraigned on February 21, 1972, entered a plea of not guilty, and was tried. On April 8, 1974, the trial court convicted him and imposed the death penalty twice, once for the death of Marites and once for the death of Wilfredo, with civil indemnity and moral damages for each set of heirs. Because the penalty was death, the records were forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction in full.

Facts

In the afternoon of October 29, 1971, Marites and Wilfredo, both first grade pupils of the San Jose Elementary School in Quezon City, failed to return home after classes. The prosecution's evidence showed that Adorna and his co-accused took the children on the pretext that their parents had sent them to fetch the children from school, and brought them to the north bank of the Tullahan River in Barrio Capri, Novaliches, Quezon City.

Ransom notes began to appear. On October 31, 1971, the fathers of the two children found a note near the Ong Chu Tokwa Factory where they worked, demanding ten thousand pesos for the release of the children. A second note raised the demand to fifteen thousand pesos because the kidnappers believed the parents had gone to the authorities. A third note reiterated the demand. The notes were written by Adorna, who had lived and worked with the Unday brothers at the factory, and who had ample opportunity to know their handwriting and they his. The parents, cooperating with the Quezon City police, left faked money bills in a pail at the second bridge in Balintawak, but the person who picked up the pail escaped, although a detective identified him as Adorna. On November 5, 1971, the parents heard over the radio that the children had been found dead on the bank of the Tullahan River. The autopsy showed that each child suffered four stab wounds, all fatal.

Adorna gave an extrajudicial confession in which he admitted that he and his co-accused picked up the two children after school hours, kept them for a few days, and on November 1, 1971 stabbed them and left them dead on the river bank. The motive traced to the fact that Diomedes Unday, father of Marites and overseer of the factory, had caused the dismissal of the three accused for complicity in losses at the factory, after which the three threatened that something would happen to the Unday family. In his defense, Adorna offered an uncorroborated alibi that on October 29, 1971 he was in Calawaan, Pasig, catching shrimps and fish with a certain Mang Pitong, and he claimed that he signed the confession only because he was maltreated by the police.

Issues

• Whether or not the extrajudicial confession was executed voluntarily, and therefore admissible against the appellant.
• Whether or not the appellant's uncorroborated alibi can overcome the prosecution's evidence.
• Whether or not the appellant's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the totality of the prosecution evidence.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote a specific codal article, but it applies the settled rule on the voluntariness of a confession, which the Court states as follows:

The vital issue to the determination of the innocence or guilt of the appellant is the voluntariness in the execution of the confession.

This rule bears on the case because, in the absence of direct evidence, the confession was the centerpiece of the prosecution's proof, and its voluntariness had to be established before it could be used.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the confession was voluntary. The appellant's claim of third degree maltreatment stood uncorroborated. Detective Marcos Viñas testified on rebuttal that no maltreatment occurred and that it was not he who investigated the appellant. The confession was signed and sworn to before Fiscal Juanson of Quezon City, and no evidence was presented to show why these officials would falsely testify. The Court found it significant that the appellant himself admitted that during the investigation and when he signed the confession there were many persons coming in and going out of the room, and it reasoned that it is very difficult to believe that investigators would maltreat a suspect in public. The appellant never told anybody of the alleged maltreatment, never sought medical aid, could show no physical signs of it, and raised it for the first time at trial. The Court also noted that the confession contained many minor intimate details that could not have been known to, much less supplied by, the police investigators.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the alibi. The alleged Mang Pitong was never produced as a witness, and no reason was given for his absence. The friend said to be living with the appellant did not corroborate him. The appellant could not explain why, if he were truly living and working in Calawaan, Pasig, he was arrested in Sta. Cruz, Manila. And even if the alibi were credited, Calawaan, Pasig is easily accessible by many forms of transportation to the scene of the crime in Quezon City.

On the third issue, the Court held that guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The voluntary confession was supported by interlocking circumstantial evidence: the appellant's long employment with the Unday brothers at the factory, the parents' positive identification of his handwriting on the ransom notes, the established motive arising from his dismissal and the threats against the Unday family, and his admissions about his co-accused and the places and persons involved, all of which harmonized with his statements in the confession. The Court held that guilt was established not by the weakness of the defense evidence but by the overwhelming strength and credibility of the prosecution evidence, and that the appellant could not claim denial of due process by reason of poverty, since the record showed he was defended by competent counsel.

Doctrine

A confession is presumed voluntary, and the burden is on the accused to prove that it was extracted by force or intimidation. A bare, uncorroborated claim of maltreatment, raised for the first time at trial, without medical evidence, without physical signs, and without any report to anyone, cannot overcome the presumption. An alibi, to be believed, must be corroborated and must show that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime; where the place of alibi is easily accessible to the scene, the alibi fails. Finally, a voluntary extrajudicial confession, when supported by interlocking circumstantial evidence, is sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court in full, with costs de oficio, and the appellant's conviction for kidnapping for ransom with double murder and the death penalty imposed for each death stood.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a confession is presumed voluntary, and an uncorroborated claim of maltreatment raised only at trial cannot defeat it. Examiners use this case to test the requisites of a valid alibi and the weight of an extrajudicial confession supported by circumstantial evidence.