LIM SE AND BENITO LIM, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. MANUEL A. ARGEL, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, CALOOCAN CITY BRANCH XXXV, JUANA SAN PEDRO-OCAMPO, FRANCIS…

Lim Se versus Argel

The Case

This is a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus brought by Lim Se and his son Benito Lim against Judge Manuel Argel of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City Branch Thirty-Five, and against the private respondents Juana San Pedro-Ocampo and Francisco San Pedro. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to annul a summary judgment that ejected them from Door Number 72 of the Venancia Building on Session Road in Baguio City, and to stop the enforcement of the writ of possession issued under it. The case matters because it is the Court's clean statement of the venue rule for real actions, and of what happens when a party dresses an ejectment suit as an ancillary third-party complaint in order to litigate possession of Baguio property in a Caloocan court.

Procedural History

Genaro Bulotano filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance at Caloocan City against Juana San Pedro-Ocampo and Francisco San Pedro, praying for delivery of possession of Door Number 72, its mezzanine and the basement of the Venancia Building. In that same Caloocan case, the defendants Juana and Francisco filed an unverified third-party complaint against Lim Se and Benito Lim, in reality an ejectment action, praying that the two be ordered to vacate the premises and to pay back rentals. Lim Se and Benito Lim moved to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue, lis pendens and lack of jurisdiction over the res. The trial court denied the motion, and the same grounds were pleaded as affirmative defenses in their answer. Juana and Francisco then filed an urgent motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, ordering the petitioners to vacate. The trial court denied reconsideration, declared its summary judgment final and executory, and directed the issuance of a writ of possession, under which the deputy sheriff ejected the petitioners. The petitioners came to the Supreme Court by these special civil actions, and the Court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction restoring them to possession.

Facts

Venancia Chiombon owned the Venancia Building in Baguio City. In 1965, Lim Se leased premises in that building from Francisco San Pedro, acting as attorney-in-fact of his mother Venancia. The lease contract contained a stipulation that in case of suit arising out of the contract, the venue shall be the City of Baguio. That lease was terminated in 1970.

In May 1975, Genaro Bulotano filed a complaint in Caloocan City against Juana San Pedro-Ocampo and Francisco San Pedro, the children of Venancia, alleging that Venancia had sold the building to Juana, who in turn had sold it to him. He prayed for possession of Door Number 72. No reason was given why an action to recover possession of realty located in Baguio was filed in Caloocan. The Court noted that Bulotano had earlier filed a similar case in Cavite against Juana, Lim Se and others, over the same building, showing a wanton disregard for the venue of real actions.

Within the Caloocan case, Juana and Francisco filed the third-party complaint against Lim Se and Benito Lim, seeking their ejectment and back rentals. The petitioners answered that they had leased the premises from the administrator of the estate of Florencio Reyes, Senior, who claimed ownership of the building after the expiration of the lease of the lot, and that a case was pending in Baguio, filed by that estate against Bulotano, Venancia, Juana, Francisco, Lim Se and others, to settle once and for all the ownership and possession of the Venancia Building. They also alleged that the sale to Juana, and Juana's sale to Bulotano, were simulated and fraudulent. The trial court nonetheless rendered the summary judgment of ejectment.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction in not dismissing the third-party complaint, which was an ejectment suit pure and simple, on the ground of improper venue.
• Whether or not the third-party complaint was maintainable given the pendency in Baguio of a case involving the ownership and possession of the same building, that is, on the ground of lis pendens.
• Whether or not the trial court's jurisdiction over the principal action carried with it jurisdiction over the third-party complaint as an ancillary proceeding.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides:

Forcible entry and detainer actions regarding real property shall be brought in the municipality or city in which the subject matter thereof is situated.

This fixes the venue of the ejectment suit against the petitioners in Baguio, not in Caloocan.

Section 2 of Rule 4 provides:

Actions affecting title to, or for recovery of possession of real property shall be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof is situated.

This governs the principal action, which was in reality a real action to recover possession of Baguio property.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction in not dismissing the third-party complaint, which was an ejectment suit pure and simple. The venue of that real action was improperly laid in Caloocan City. The Court explained that the rules on venue of real actions are designed to prevent courts sitting elsewhere from taking cognizance of actions regarding possession or ownership of property, are dictated by convenience, and forestall conflicting decisions by different courts.

On the second issue, the Court held that the action was not maintainable because of the pendency in Baguio of the case involving the ownership and possession of the Venancia Building. All the parties in the Caloocan case were impleaded in the Baguio case, together with the estate of Florencio Reyes, Senior, which asserted ownership adverse to the private respondents and their predecessor-in-interest.

On the third issue, the Court rejected the argument that jurisdiction over the principal action carried jurisdiction over the third-party complaint. The principal action was denominated specific performance with damages, but actually it was a real action to recover possession of Baguio property, and should have been brought in Baguio. The Court reasoned that if the venue of the principal action was improperly laid, then the venue of the third-party complaint, which was in reality a variant of the main action, was likewise improperly ventilated in Caloocan. The Court also found that the private respondents deliberately sought to avoid the Baguio courts as the legitimate forum, and that to sanction such evasion would be to tolerate a palpable, manipulatory abuse or perversion of the right to litigate.

Doctrine

A real action to recover possession of real property must be brought in the municipality or city, or the province, where the property is situated, as Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 4 require. A court that has jurisdiction over the principal action does not thereby acquire jurisdiction over a third-party complaint that is in reality an independent real action; if the venue of the principal action is improperly laid, the venue of the ancillary complaint is likewise improper. And where a case involving ownership and possession of the same property is pending in the court of the place where the property lies, with all the parties impleaded, the ejectment suit elsewhere is barred by lis pendens.

Disposition

The Court set aside the summary judgment and the writ of possession, directed the lower court to dismiss the third-party complaint on the grounds of improper venue and lis pendens, made the preliminary mandatory injunction final and permanent, and taxed costs against the private respondents.

Remember This

Memorize the line: real actions over possession of land belong where the land lies, and a court cannot stretch its jurisdiction over the principal action to cover an ejectment suit dressed as a third-party complaint. Examiners use this case to test venue of real actions under Rule 4 and the bar of lis pendens against forum-shopping ejectment suits.