DOLORES T. OCAMPO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ABELARDO SUBIDO, COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE, HON. JOSE YULO, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND LEONARDO T. JOSON, RESPONDENTS.

Ocampo versus Subido

The Case

This is the case of Ocampo versus Subido, decided by the Supreme Court in August 1976. Dolores Ocampo, a stenographer in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, brought suit against the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Secretary of Justice, and the appointee Leonardo Joson, to annul Joson's promotional appointment as Deputy Clerk of Court and to have herself declared entitled to that position. The case matters because it gathers in one place the rules every reviewee must know on promotional appointments in the civil service: the next-in-rank rule under the old Civil Service Act, the discretion of the appointing authority, and the narrow reach of certiorari and mandamus in appointment disputes.

Procedural History

Ocampo first protested the proposed appointment by letter to the Secretary of Justice. The Commissioner of Civil Service returned the appointment without action, and later, on reconsideration, approved it. Ocampo moved for reconsideration of that approval, and the Commissioner denied her motion. She then commenced a suit for mandamus and certiorari in the Court of First Instance of Manila to annul the appointment and to declare her entitled to the position. On a motion to dismiss filed by Joson, the trial court dismissed the complaint for absence of cause of action, holding that under the amendatory law she lacked the legal qualification for the position and therefore stated no cause of action. Ocampo appealed that order directly to the Supreme Court, which resolved the appeal on the merits.

Facts

In 1962, the position of Deputy Clerk of Court in the cadastral section of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija fell vacant through the promotion of the incumbent. Leonardo Joson, a Docket Clerk, a high school graduate, and a second grade eligible, applied. Ocampo opposed the appointment, claiming she was more senior, next in rank, and better qualified. She held a Bachelor's degree in Commerce with units in Education, and was a first grade eligible.

On the first of September 1964, the Secretary of Justice appointed Joson as Deputy Clerk of Court. Because of Ocampo's protest, the Commissioner of Civil Service returned the appointment. The Secretary of Justice referred the protest to the Executive Judge of the Nueva Ecija court, who recommended Joson's promotion, citing his long government service, experience, efficiency, honesty, and dedication. The Secretary concurred, saying the rule on seniority had been observed, and endorsed the appointment.

The Commissioner again returned the appointment without action. He ruled that neither Joson nor Ocampo was next in rank to the position, so neither could claim preference, and that Joson, a high school graduate, did not meet the proposed qualification standard calling for a Bachelor of Laws degree with appropriate eligibility. On reconsideration, however, the Commissioner accepted the Secretary's position that the standard should apply only to original appointments and that Joson's experience offset his lack of legal education, and he approved the appointment. Ocampo's motion for reconsideration was denied, and she went to court.

Issues

• Whether or not Ocampo's complaint states a cause of action, notwithstanding that she is not a member of the Bar.
• Whether or not the principle of seniority and the next-in-rank rule were violated in the promotional appointment of Joson.
• Whether or not Joson's qualifications were insufficient for the position of Deputy Clerk of Court.
• Whether or not certiorari and mandamus lie to annul the appointment and compel Ocampo's appointment to the position.

Applicable Provisions

Section 46 of the Judiciary Act, as amended by Republic Act 4814, provides:

The clerks of court, assistant clerks of court and branch clerks of court of Courts of First Instance shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. No person shall be appointed to any of these positions unless he is duly authorized to practice law in the Philippines: Provided, however, That this requirement shall not affect persons who, at the date of the approval of this Act, are holding any of the positions of clerk of court, assistant clerk of court, branch clerk of court or deputy clerk of court actually performing the work of a clerk of court assigned as such to a branch of the Court of First Instance, and who shall continue in office and be considered as clerks of court, assistant clerks of court, and branch clerks of court, respectively, in their corresponding courts or branches thereof without the need of new appointments.

This is the provision the trial court used to bar Ocampo, and the Court had to construe whether it covers the position of deputy clerk of court.

Section 23 of the Civil Service Act of 1959, as amended, provides:

Whenever a vacancy occurs in any position in the competitive service in the government, the officer or employee next in rank preferably in the same office, who is competent and qualified to hold the position and who possesses an appropriate civil service eligibility shall be appointed thereto. If the vacancy is not filled by promotion as provided herein, then same shall be filled by transfer of present employees in the government service, by reinstatement, by re-employment of persons separated through reduction in force, or by appointment of persons with the Civil Service eligibility appropriate to the position.

This is the provision that supplies the next-in-rank rule on which Ocampo anchored her claim of preference.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court erred. The amendatory law did not automatically convert the position of deputy clerk of court into branch clerk of court. Joson remained Deputy Clerk of Court after the amendment took effect, and the requirement of membership in the Bar applies only to the positions of clerk of court, assistant clerk of court, and branch clerk of court. Since the disputed position is that of deputy clerk of court, the amendatory law does not apply, and Ocampo's lack of a law degree is no reason to bar her from questioning the appointment.

On the second issue, the Court held that the next-in-rank rule was not transgressed. The Secretary of Justice expressly represented that the rule on seniority had been observed, and the Commissioner dismissed the protest precisely because Ocampo's position of stenographer is not next in rank to that of Deputy Clerk of Court. The Court ruled that not being next in rank, she could not claim preference under Section 23, even assuming she had better qualifications and education than Joson.

On the third issue, the Court found no existing law or regulation specifically enumerating the qualifications for the position. In the absence of a qualification standard, the department head enjoys the clear prerogative to resolve who can best discharge the functions of the vacant office, because he is in the most favorable position to determine who can best fulfill them. The exception lies where a law, ordinance, or regulation specifies the qualifications, compliance with which is mandatory. The Court also held that the power to appoint is a matter of discretion, and no rigid or mechanistic formula is imposed by law upon it.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that certiorari does not lie to annul the appointment, and mandamus does not lie to compel Ocampo's appointment. Mandamus never issues in doubtful cases; it issues only where there is a clear legal duty on the officer and a clear legal right in the party seeking appointment. Ocampo failed to show such a legal right.

Doctrine

A vacancy in the competitive service is filled by promotion of the officer or employee next in rank, preferably in the same office, who is competent and qualified and possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility. An employee who is not next in rank cannot claim preference under Section 23, even on the assumption of superior qualifications. The power to appoint is discretionary, and the appointing authority has wide latitude of choice as to who is best qualified, unhampered by any rigid or mechanistic formula, and generally free from judicial intervention. Where no law, ordinance, or regulation fixes the qualifications for a position, the department head may determine who can best discharge its functions; the exception is where such qualifications are specified, in which case compliance is mandatory. Certiorari and mandamus do not lie to control that discretion, for mandamus never issues in doubtful cases and requires a clear legal duty and a clear legal right.

Disposition

The Supreme Court sustained the order dismissing Ocampo's complaint, declared Joson's appointment as Deputy Clerk of Court to be in accordance with law, and imposed no costs.

Remember This

The line worth memorizing is that the appointing power has a wide latitude of choice as to who is best qualified, and no rigid or mechanistic formula is imposed by law upon it. Examiners use this case on the next-in-rank rule, on the discretion of the appointing authority in the absence of a qualification standard, and on the requisites of mandamus in appointment disputes.