PELAGIA NATIVIDAD, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND CANLUBANG SUGAR ESTATE, RESPONDENTS.

Petition for review on certiorari
of the November 19, 1975 decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission
reversing the December 6, 1974 decision of the acting referee awarding
disability benefits to petitioner.

Petitioner is the
surviving spouse of the late Cirilo Andres, who was employed by respondent
Canlubang Sugar Estate as a coconut caretaker, until his disability retirement
by reason of chronic peptic ulcer in November, 1969 at the age of 52. He died of bronchial asthma on December 22,
1973 at the age of 56 (p. 71, WCC rec.).

Before his death, or on
October 29, 1973, Cirilo Andres filed with the Workmen’s Compensation Unit,
Department of Labor, at San Pablo City, a claim for disability benefits based on his chronic peptic
ulcer. He stated in his claim that while he was employed by
respondent employer, he got sick of chronic peptic ulcer and was treated at the Canlubang Sugar
Estate Hospital and at the Philippine General Hospital, Manila, where he was
operated on at the expense of the respondent; that he stopped working in
November, 1969 by reason of his aforesaid illness; and that he notified
respondent employer of his illness upon his retirement.

During the
pendency of the claim or on December 22, 1973, claimant died; hence, he was
substituted by his surviving spouse, herein petitioner (p. 70, WCC rec.).

After several hearings, the acting referee found the claim
meritorious and ordered respondent employer to pay petitioner the amount of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos as
disability benefits under Section 14 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as
amended. The acting referee found that:

“Claimant Cirilo Andres, now deceased, used to be an employee
of the respondent Canlubang Sugar Estate as coconut caretaker for so many
years. As such, he was earning an
average weekly wage of P60.00 based on his salary 12 weeks next preceding his
cessation from work. That in his capacity as caretaker, he was
in his jurisdiction Block 54 at Bo. Putol, Canlubang Sugar Estate consisting of
24 hectares in area. At times, he used
to harvest coconuts even during rainy season. As to his tour of duty, it is not at all the same. It was sometimes observed in the morning,
some­times in the afternoon and sometimes in the evening. These, for several years, were the everyday
life of the late Cirilo Andres. Then
came the year 1962 when he was brought to the Philippine General Hospital where
he was operated for chronic peptic ulcer at the expense of the respondent
company. After having been declared
fully fit, he returned to work again. It only took few years and his illness recurred again. At this juncture, it was found out that his
illness was more severe hence, the respondent retired him x x x. Reason, due to physical disability.

“The only issue to be resolved is whether the illness of chronic peptic ulcer of the late Cirilo
Andres is due to or aggravated by the nature of his work with the respondent.

“We can readily
conclude that with the kind of work being performed by this claimant Cirilo
Andres, now deceased, his illness of chronic peptic ulcer could have been
directly caused by it or at least, aggravated by it. Eating irregularly, coupled with mental stress, getting afflicted
with such illness is very likely. Granting without admitting that other outside factors were attendant to
it, we have to admit that it is still a supervening illness or it could have
aggravated during the course of employment. Under the present jurisprudence, it is now laid down at the door of the
respondent to disconnect by substantial evidence, the injury or sickness from
the employment (Magalona vs. 21 SCRA 1203) [sic]. In the present case, the respondent miserably failed at this
point hence, we have no other alternative but to rule in favor of
compensability” (pp. 27-28, WCC rec.).

Respondent employer filed
a motion for reconsideration which was denied on February 20, 1975 by the
acting referee. The entire records of
the claim were however elevated to the Commission for review.

On November 19, 1975, the
Commission reversed the decision of the acting referee in this wise:

“Section 8 of the Act provides that if the disease contracted
or injury received by the employee as provided in Section 2 hereof causes his
death within two years from the date of such injury or sickness, the employer
shall pay to person entitled thereto, the death benefits provided thereunder.

“In other words, for death to be compensable under the Act,
such death must occur within two years from the date of the compensable illness
or injury which caused the death. And
in determining the two year period, the date of onset of disability shall be
the proper starting point. Accordingly,
the instant claim cannot be considered compensable for the simple reason that
the deceased died in 1973, more than two years from his disability, which
started in 1969 due to illness. Granting that deceased retired in
1969 due to illnesses. (sic)
Records show that these illnesses were contracted way back in 1962 and 1963 and
when deceased filed his claim for disability compensation on November 9, 1973
more than 10 years had lapsed, hence the action has already prescribed.”

I

1.  The instant claim was
filed under Section 14 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, and not under
Section 8 thereof. In other words, the
claim was for disability compensation and not one for death benefits. While claimant Cirilo Andres died during the
pendency of his claim, such death does not absolve respondent employer from
liability for disability compensation; nor does said death authorize the
respondent Commission to treat, motu proprio, as
it did, the disability claim as one for death compensation.

Consequently, the respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion when it treated the subject
disability compensation claim as one for death benefits and in the process
dismissed the same on the ground that death having supervened after two (2)
years from the disabling illness, the same is already barred. Even the favorable decision of the Acting Referee which was reversed by
the respondent Commission clearly shows that the subject of the instant case is
one for disability compensation benefits and not for death benefits. Thus what was awarded to herein petitioner
in the aforesaid decision was disability benefits under Section 14 of the Act,
as amended.

2.  The records show that the
late Cirilo Andres anchored his compensation claim on his chronic peptic ulcer
which he first contracted in 1962, but which recurred seven years after or in
1969 which ultimately forced him to retire at the early age of 52. No evidence to the contrary had ever been
presented by the respondent employer. Moreover, petitioner, surviving spouse of Cirilo Andres, confirmed in
her testimony that her late husband stopped working in 1969 due to his ulcer as
he then frequently complained of stomach ache (p. 46, WCC rec.). Her further testimony to the effect that her
late husband stopped working by reason of asthma cannot adversely affect the
claim for such declaration is not totally irreconcilable with her previous
statement that her husband ceased working by reason of his ulcer, considering
that petitioner is but a layman, not a doctor. The fact remains, however, that per petitioner’s testimony, her husband
stopped working by reason of illness. Thus:

“Q
– Will you try to remember the month or
year when your husband ceased working?

A – 1969, sir.

“Q
– Do you remember the month?

A –  I
cannot remember.

“Q – But can you tell us why he
ceased working?

A – He had ulcer, he often complained of
stomach ache.

“Q – Was he treated in a hospital
outside CSE?

A – Yes, sir.

“Q – Where was the operation held?

A – At the Philippine General Hospital.

“Q – Who sent him at the PGH?

A –  Dr.
Bunyi of CSE.

“Q – How many months or weeks, did
he work after he was operated on?

A – For a long time.

“Q – How many years?

A –  7
years more.

“Q – And after 7 years what made
him stop working?

A –  He
got asthma.

“Q – Was he treated by the company
physician for his asthma?

A – Yes, sir.

“Q – Who treated him?

A – Dr. Garcia.

“Q – How long was he treated for
asthma?

A – For a long time.

“Q – Can you remember how many months?

“Atty. de los Reyes – Objection,
your Honor, the illness as stated in the claim is peptic ulcer and not asthma
….

“Mr. Reyes: What we have asked here is the real ailment
– – which is work-connected.

“x x x” (pp.
45-56, WCC rec.).

And counsel for
petitioner explained the apparent conflict in the aforesaid testimony,
thus: “Nowhere in her whole
testimony did she say that chronic peptic ulcer was not the disabling ailment
of her late husband in November, 1969, nor did she testify on the development
of his asthma to the exclusion of his ulcer. In fact, to reiterate, the deceased claimant himself on October 9, 1973,
nearly 4 years from date of disability and only 74 days prior to his death on
December 22, 1973, disclosed in his claim that he was disabled of chronic
peptic ulcer. The only logical
inference therefore that could be drawn is that deceased’s ulcer was complicated by the development later on of
asthma. Whether the cause of death was
asthma, or ulcer, or both ailments, is of no moment. The uncontroverted fact remains that Cirilo Andres was disabled
in November, 1969, by his chronic peptic ulcer” (pp. 37-38, rec.).

WE agree with the
aforestated observations and conclusion of petitioner’s counsel in the light of
the circumstances of the claim. Furthermore, respondent employer, as earlier stated, did not present any
evidence to disprove the factual basis of the claim; nor did it successfully
discharge even at this late stage, its burden of overthrowing the presumption
of compensability arising from the uncontroverted fact that the chronic peptic
ulcer of the late Cirilo Andres and his disability by reason thereof, all
supervened in the course of this employment with respondent employer. Such failure rendered the aforesaid presumption,
rebuttable at its inception, conclusive (Landicho vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission and Canlubang Sugar Estate, G.R. No. L-45996, March 26, 1979).

3.  The respondent Commission’s
ruling that the claim of petitioner had prescribed is without factual and legal
basis. The reckoning point of time is
not the onset of the illness, but the date of effective disability by reason of
the illness (see Magpantay vs. WCC, 73 SCRA 533, 537-538 [1976];
Earnshaw Docks and Honolulu Iron Works vs. Surtijas, 66 SCRA 566 [1975]; and
Hernandez vs. WCC, 14 SCRA 219, 220, 224 [1965]); because disability
compensation accrues only from the time the workman’s earning power is lost or
impaired (Alatco Transportation Inc. vs. WCC, 42 SCRA 391 [1971]). It is clear, therefore, that while the late
Cirilo Andres acquired his peptic ulcer in 1962, the same caused his effective
disability from labor only in 1969.

Consequently, the respondent Commission likewise gravely abused
its discretion in ruling that the instant claim has prescribed.

II

Moreover, it appears that
the employee’s right to compensation was not effectively controverted by the
respondent employer.

There is nothing in the
record to show that respondent employer timely complied with Section 37 of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, with respect to employee’s illness of peptic ulcer contracted on December 8, 1962,
which necessitated his operation on December 9, 1962 and January 18, 1963 at
the Philippine General Hospital, Manila. It is undisputed that respondent employer had, on the aforestated dates,
knowledge of the aforesaid illness and operation, as one of the attending
physicians of the employee was a doctor of respondent employer’s hospital,
Canlubang Estate Hospital (pp. 67, 73, WCC rec.), and the expenses of the operation were also shouldered by the respondent
employer (pp. 37-38, WCC rec.). By
reason of the said illness and operation, he was confined in the Philippine
General Hospital from December 8, 1962 to February 12, 1963, and his disability
retirement in November 1969 was precisely because of chronic peptic ulcer. Section 37 in relation to Section 45 of the Act, as amended, requires the employer, within 14 days from the
occurrence or within 10 days from knowledge of an injury resulting in absence
from work for a day or more, to give written notice thereof to the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission.

Consequently, the Employer’s Report of Accident or Sickness filed
by respondent employer only on February 15, 1971 (p. 64, WCC rec.) pursuant
to afore­said Sections 37 and 45 was too late; which delay resulted in the
renunciation of the right to
controvert the claim, barring all defenses available (Bautista vs. WCC, 88 SCRA
121 [1979]; National Development Co. vs. WCC, 10 SCRA 696 [1964]), thereby
constructively admitting the compensability of the illness or injury (General
Shipping Co., Inc. vs. WCC, 109 Phil. 60 [1960]). As emphatically declared in Vda. de Calado vs. WCC (38 SCRA 577
[1971]),

“x x x this Court wants to make it clear now, that in line
with the spirit and purpose of the Compensation Act and consistent with the
public policy therein voiced that claims for compensable injuries or death are
not waivable, any employer who, having actual notice or knowledge, directly or
indirectly, of any compensable injury or death suffered by any of his employees
or workers, violates Section 37 of the Act by failing to report the same and to
con­trovert its liability therefor within the period stated in said section is
under an inescapable obligation to pay the corre­sponding compensation in full
whenever and howsoever a demand therefor is made by the party entitled thereto,
the failure of such party to give the notice or to file the claim required by
Section 24 of the Act notwithstanding. WE hold that unless this view is adopted the public policy declaring
claims for compensation non-waivable would be open to facile circumvention and
might just as well be cast aside.”

III

Petitioner was
represented by counsel only before this Court, hence, attorney’s fees to be
awarded must be limited to 5%.

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT WORKMEN’S
COMPENSATION COMMISSION IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, AND RESPONDENT
EMPLOYER IS HEREBY ORDERED

1.   TO PAY PETITIONER THE SUM OF SIX THOUSAND
(P6,000.00) PESOS AS DISABILITY COMPENSATION;

2. TO REIMBURSE PETITIONER THE MEDICAL AND
HOSPITAL EXPENSES INCURRED BY THE DECEASED EMPLOYEE, DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER
RECEIPTS;

3.   TO PAY ATTORNEY’S FEES EQUIVALENT TO 5% OF
THE TOTAL AWARD; AND

4.   TO PAY THE SUCCESSOR OF THE DEFUNCT
COMMISSION, ADMINISTRATIVE FEES.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.