GREGORIO R. SYQUIA, PETITIONER, VS. THE SHERIFF OF ILOCOS SUR AND FILADELFO DE LEON, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Sheriff of the
Province of Ilocos Sur to proceed with a chattel mortgage foreclosure sale.

It appears from, the record that on February 3, 1915, Miguel Aglipay
Cheng-Laco and Feliciano Reyes Cheng-Kiango executed a chattel mortgage in favor
of the petitioner Gregorio R. Sy-Quia on their mercantile establishment, with
all the merchandise therein contained, as security for a debt of P6,000. The
chattel mortgage was duly recorded on the date of its execution and fell due on
February 3, 1917. From its terms it may be inferred that it was the intention of
the parties that the mortgagors were to be permitted to sell the merchandise
replenishing their stock from time to time and that the new stock brought in
should also be subject to the mortgage.

On May 5, 1924, Miguel Aglipay Cheng-Laco executed another chattel mortgage
on the same establishment and all its contents in favor of the respondent
Filadelfo de Leon as security for the sum of P4,900, which mortgage was recorded
on May 14, 1924.

On the latter date the petitioner, in writing, requested the sheriff to take
possession of the mortgaged property and to sell it at public auction under the
provisions of section 14 of the Chattel Mortgage Law (Act No. 1508).

The sheriff seized the establishment in question as well as its contents and
fixed the date of the sale at June 2, 1924. In the meantime Filadelfo de Leon
presented an adverse claim to the property by virtue of his chattel mortgage,
alleging that all the goods on which the chattel mortgage pf Gregorio R. Sy-Quia
was given had been sold long before the chattel mortgage in favor of De Leon was
executed and that, therefore, the earlier chattel mortgage was of no effect.

The sheriff being in doubt as to the priority of the conflicting claims,
suspended the foreclosure proceedings and brought an action under section 120 of
the Code of Civil Procedure requiring the two claimants to interplead.
Thereupon, the present proceeding in mandamus was instituted, the petitioner
alleging that the duty of the sheriff to proceed with the sale was a ministerial
one and praying that the sheriff be commanded to proceed.

Though it, perhaps, would have been better practice for the sheriff to sell
the property and hold the proceeds of the sale subject to the outcome of the
action of interpleader, we, nevertheless, are of the opinion that the facts
shown do not justify our interference by mandamus. The sheriff might lay himself
open to an action for damages if he sold the goods without the consent of the
holder of the last mortgage, and it does not appear that the petitioner offered
to give bond to hold him harmless in such an event. In these circumstances, his
action in suspending the sale pending the determination of the action of
interpleader seems justified.

We may say further that in cases such as the present, the petition for
mandamus should be addressed to the Courts of First Instance rather than to this
court.

The petition is denied with the costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Avancena, Villamor, and Romualdez,
JJ., concur.