ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, PETITIONER, VS. HON. VIVENCIO M. RUIZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (BRANCH XV), INOCENCIO BERNARDO, …

This is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
With Preliminary Injunction seeking to annul the Order of
respondent Court dated August 13, 1971 and to prohibit respondent Court from
proceeding in any manner with Civil Case No. 678-M (15043) for alleged lack of
jurisdiction.

The dispositive portion of the
questioned Order (Rollo, p. 57) reads as
follows:

“WHEREFORE, let a restraining order be issued directing the
defendant Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership,
not to fence the land in question or continue with the fencing thereof or, from
threatening and actually obstructing, molesting and/or preventing by force the
entry to, and/or exit from, the said land the plaintiffs and their families, or
from constructing network of roads, streets and canals thereon, or from
introducing any other improvements thereon, or otherwise exercising rights of
possession and dominion thereon until further orders from this
Court.

“In the meantime, let the petition for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction be set for hearing on August 28, 1971, at 8:00 a.m.”

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner is the duly registered owner of several adjacent
parcels of land situated in Ugong Sur, Pasig, Rizal, bounded by Ortigas Ave., E.
Rodriguez, Jr. Ave. and Escarpment Road, containing an area of 162 hectares,
more or less, consolidated into one parcel, under TCT-No. 227758 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal.  Said parcel is a portion of the
Mandaluyon Estate (also sometimes known as
“Hacienda de Mandaloya“, “Hacienda de Mandaloyen“,
“Hacienda de Mandaloyoa”, etc.) over which Petitioner, thru its
predecessor-in-interest, the “Provincia
del Santisima Nombre de Jesus de
Agustinos Calzados,” has been in
continuous possession since 1862 or 125 years ago, as confirmed by the
Court in Compañia Agricola de Ultramar v. Marcos Domingo, et
al., 6 Phil. 246 (1906), when it affirmed the decision of the Court of Land
Registration declaring the Compañia Agricola de Ultramar, also one of petitioner’s
predecessors-in-interest, owner of the lands in question to the exclusion of the
claims of contestants or any persons holding under them.

Sometime in 1967, Civil Case No. 7-M (10339) was filed against
petitioner by a certain Pedro del Rosario and three others, in their own behalf
and in behalf of 104 others, as a class suit, in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, seeking, among other things, the declaration of
petitioner’s titles null and void, allegedly for lack of publication in the land
registration proceeding from which they were derived and for alleged fraud
employed in registering under Act No. 496 certain parcels of agricultural land
in Quezon City and Pasig,
Rizal (Rollo, p.
63) which form part of the Mandaloyon Estate (Rollo, p. 9) and the declaration of plaintiffs
thereon as lawful owners and possessors of their respective landholdings. 
In this case, respondent Court issued a restraining order
ex-parte, still in force and effect when the instant petition was
filed.

In view of the adverse decision rendered by respondent Court,
petitioner filed a motion for new trial within the reglementary period on the ground of newly discovered
evidence (Rollo, p. 9) which motion was
denied by respondent Court.  As a result, petitioner was
constrained to go up on certiorari to the Court of
Appeals, which enjoined respondent Court from taking any further action
in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339) (Rollo, p.
76).  As of the filing of this petition here in the Supreme Court,
the case was still pending decision with the Court of Appeals, as to whether
respondent Court should be ordered to grant a new trial for the reception of new
evidence (Rollo, p. 10).

On August 10, 1971, Civil Case No. 678-M (15043) was filed by
Inocencio Bernardo and five others for and in their
own behalf and in behalf of 37 others against petitioner, filed as a class suit
concerning another portion of the Mandaloyon Estate,
containing an aggregate area of 1,923,454 sq. meters.  The
complaint is generally identical to that of Civil Case No. 7-M (10339), and
seeks, as in the aforementioned case, that the original certificates of title
nos. 13, 33, 336, 337 and 344 be declared null and void for lack of publication
in the land registration proceeding and certain transfer certificates of title
of petitioner derived therefrom, more specifically TCT
Nos. 227758, 35749, 35750 and 100110, and for alleged fraud in registering the
parcels of land being claimed by plaintiffs therein; and that the plaintiffs be
declared as lawful owners and possessors of their respective landholdings (Rollo, p. 48).

An urgent ex-parte motion of private respondents
(plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 678-M [15043]), opposing among others,
petitioner’s construction of fences and high walls, roads, streets and canals on
the land in dispute, having been filed (Rollo, p. 60), respondent Court issued the
afore-quoted questioned Order of August 13, 1971.

Hence, this
petition.

Petitioner filed its petition on August 23, 1971 (Rollo, p. 14).  Respondents filed a
motion to dismiss the petition on August 24, 1971 for being premature and for lack of merit
(Rollo, p. 110) which motion was opposed by
petitioner by motion filed on August
24, 1971 (Rollo, p. 120).

Meanwhile, petitioner as defendant in Civil Case No. 678-M
(15043), filed with respondent Court their Answer with Counterclaim dated August
24, 1971 (Rollo, p. 174) and an Opposition to
plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction with counter-motion for issuance
of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against plaintiffs dated
August 26, 1971.  On the same date, petitioner filed with the lower
court an omnibus motion praying for the Court to order the dropping of persons
as plaintiffs, except Inocencio Bernardo for improper
class suit pursuant to Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, and the payment
by plaintiff of the correct amount of filing fees based on the assessed value of
the property involved which is P2,242,150.00. 
Petitioner also filed in the lower court a motion to lift restraining
order of August 13, 1971,
dated August 26, 1971
also.

On August 24,
1971, respondents filed a motion to dismiss (Rollo, pp. 110-111) but the Court required them in
the resolution of August 25,
1971 to file an answer to the petition and set the case for hearing
on September 3,
1971 (Rollo, p.
132).  In compliance thereof, respondents filed their Answer to the
petition on September 1,
1971 (Rollo, p.
137).

At the hearing the parties argued their respective causes and
petitioner was required to file a reply to respondents’ answer (Rollo, p. 240).

On September 6,
1971, petitioner filed a manifestation informing this Court of the
incident report from its security guard with pictures showing the extent of the
damage caused by respondents to petitioner’s walls on the property in question
for record purposes in view of their materiality and pertinence to the instant
petition (Rollo, p. 241).

On the same date, petitioner filed with the lower court an urgent
manifestation and motion asking respondent Court to resolve petitioner’s pending
motions, especially its motion to lift restraining order of August 13, 1971 and the omnibus motion (Rollo, p. 398).

On September 8, 1971, petitioner filed a
Reply to the Answer of respondents to the petition (Rollo, p. 255).  On the same date,
respondents filed a manifestation containing their proposals in compliance with
the Order of the Court during the hearing of the case on September 3, 1971, that
parties execute an agreement between themselves that would govern the status
quo in their
relationship over the land in question while still litigating against each other
under Civil Case No. 678-M (15043) in the Court of First Instance of Rizal and Civil Case Nos. 2028 to 2098 For Forcible Entry in
the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal (Rollo, p.
379).  On the same date, petitioner filed its manifestation
informing the Court that parties failed to enter into such agreement (Rollo, p. 246) for which reason the Court resolved
to require respondents to comment thereon (Rollo, p. 391).

On September 10, 1971, defendant Company (petitioner herein) filed
another urgent manifestation and motion with respondent Court, reiterating its
urgent manifestation and motion of September 6, 1971, urging respondent Court to
immediately resolve the urgent questions pending before it, most especially
petitioner’s motion to lift respondent Court’s restraining order, and the
omnibus motion, both dated August 26, 1971 (Rollo, p. 402).

On September 16, 1971, petitioner filed another manifestation
informing the Court, among others, that it is not waiving its petition on file
with the Court and that respondent Court had not yet acted upon its motion to
lift the restraining order of August 13, 1971, dated August 26, 1971 for which
inaction petitioner has been definitely restrained from performing
any act of ownership and dominion over almost 200 hectares of land (Rollo, p. 394).

On October 2,
1971, petitioner filed a manifestation explaining why it failed to
enter into an agreement with respondents as required by the Court
(Rollo, p. 404).

In the resolution of October 12, 1971, the Supreme
Court directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction upon petitioner’s filing of a bond in the sum of ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00), enjoining respondent Court from
enforcing the restraining order issued by it on August 13, 1971 and from
proceeding in any manner with Civil Case No. 678-M (15043) until further orders
by the Court (Rollo, p. 421). 
The corresponding writ was issued on October 14, 1971 (Rollo, p. 422).

The only issue in this petition is:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING ITS ORDER OF
AUGUST 13,
1971.

The petition is impressed with merit.

It is undisputed that petitioner is the duly registered
owner of the land in dispute as evidenced by OCT Nos. 13, 33, 334, 336 and 337
by virtue of Decrees Nos. 240, 1942 and 1425 issued in GLRO Record Nos. 699, 875
and 917 of the Philippine Government.  In fact, private respondents
admitted that much in their complaint in Civil Case No. 15043 entitled
“Bernardo et al. v. The Director of Bureau of Lands, et al.” filed in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Rollo, p. 50), although they claim that the present
title of petitioner TCT No. 227758 is itself void, regardless of source (Rollo, p. 141).

Likewise undisputed is the fact that respondent Judge has
declared that GLRO Record No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 are null and void in Civil
Case No. 7-M (10339) entitled “Pedro del Rosario, et al. v. Ortigas and
Company Ltd. Partnership, et al.” for alleged lack of publication (Rollo, p. 50).  Nonetheless such
decision has not become final, because of a petition for injunction filed in the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 10339-R where respondent Judge was
immediately enjoined by said appellate court from proceeding in the
aforesaid case and the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City and Rizal to desist from taking any action
involving the Original Certificates of Titles of the petitioner (Rollo, p. 76).

Furthermore, the fact of continuous possession by the
petitioner thru its predecessor-in-interest, Provincia
del Santisima Nombre de
Jesus de Agustinos Calzados
since 1862 or 125 years ago has as aforestated, been
confirmed by the Supreme Court in Compañia
Agricola de Ultramar v. Marcos
Domingo, et al. (6 Phil. 246 [1906]).  That
decision is without question, decisive in the instant case.  As
held by the Court some years ago, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes “a ruling
constituting the law of the case, even if erroneous … may no longer be
disturbed or modified since it has become final…” (NWSA v. NWSA
Consolidated Union, et al., 27 SCRA 227 [1969], citing People v.
Olarte, 19 SCRA 494 [1967]; Balmes
v. Suson, 28 SCRA 304 [1969]; Mangayao v. Guzman, 55 SCRA 540 [1974];
National Mines and Allied Workers Union [NAMAWU-MIF] v. Luna, 83
SCRA 607 [1978]; Solis v. People,
84 SCRA 377 [1978]).  The law of the case does not apply to
what is embodied in the decision solely but also to its implementation carried
out in fealty to what has been decreed (Libudan v. Panma Gil, 45 SCRA 17
[1972]).

On the basis of such facts, it is clearly evident that the
restraining order issued by the lower court is improper and without
basis.

But just as important is the well-settled rule that injunction
will not lie to take the property out of the control of the party in possession
(PNB v. Adil, 118 SCRA 117 [1982]).  In a similar case,
the Court ruled that in actions involving realty, preliminary injunction will
lie only after the plaintiff has fully established his title or right thereto by
a proper action for the purpose.  To authorize a temporary
injunction, the complainant must make out at least a prima facie
showing of a right to the final relief.  Preliminary injunction
will not issue to protect a right not in esse (Buayan Cattle Co. Inc. v. Quintillan, 128
SCRA 286-287 [1984]).

Two requisites are necessary if a preliminary
injunction is to issue, namely,
the existence of the right to be protected, and the facts against
which the injunction is to be directed are violative
of said right.  In particular, for a writ of preliminary injunction
to issue, the existence of the right and the violation must appear in the
allegation of the complaint and a preliminary injunction is proper only when the
plaintiff appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in his complaint. 
Furthermore, the complaint for injunctive relief must be construed
strictly against the pleader (Buayan
Cattle Co. Inc. v. Quintillan, supra).

Respondents anchor their claim on the
decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339), (Rollo, p. 89) which, however, has not become final,
apart from the fact that as petitioner pointed out both groups of plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 7-M (10339) and Civil Case No. 678-M (15043) are claiming the
same lots, Lots 49 and 50, PSU-25901.  (Rollo, p. 52-A, par. [d] and pp. 66-67 [b]).

Thus, the existence of a “clear positive right” especially calling
for judicial protection has not been shown.  As held by the Court,
injunction is not to protect contingent or future right; nor is it a remedy to
enforce an abstract right (Yaptinchay v.
Torres, 28 SCRA 489 [1969]).

Another factor which militates against the validity
of the restraining order issued is the fact that said order was issued
ex-parte.

Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court makes it clear that
no preliminary injunction may issue
ex-parte, except where the delay made necessary by the
giving of notice would prevent effective relief and might be productive of
serious damage (National Mines Allied Workers Union (NAMAWUMIF) v.
Valero, 132 SCRA 578 [1984]).

What the restraining order of respondent Judge enjoins, is the
fencing of the property by the petitioner, a titled owner, its construction of a
network of roads, streets and canals thereon or its
introduction of improvements or exercise of acts of possession.

A careful study of the records reveals no case of extreme urgency
which bears strongly in respondents’ favor, much less any impending damage that
they may suffer because of petitioner’s actuations.  The area of
the land in question as described in the
complaint is 192 hectares, more or less.  The census made by the
Philippine Constabulary per agreement of April 16, 1971, Annex “E” of the Answer
found 89 incomplete structures occupying areas of between 2.5 to 10 sq.
meters scattered in the premises.  Only 71 of the structures were
claimed by persons appearing in the list.  Of the 43 parties to the
case filed in the court a quo only twenty eight (28) appear in said
list.  Therefore, fifteen (15) of the said parties are not in
possession of any portion of the land in question.

In sharp contrast, it is admitted
that petitioner is in possession of the portions not occupied by the
structures.  Petitioner’s possession is of
more than 99% of the land in question (Reply, Rollo, pp. 299-300).  Unquestionably,
therefore, it is the petitioner who stands more to suffer from the invasion of
the land in dispute by speculators, squatters, and other unscrupulous persons
who were led to believe that the decision of the lower court nullifying
petitioner’s titles is already final (Rollo,
pp. 406-407).

On this issue, the Supreme Court adopted a resolution on
October 12,
1971, which reads:

“L-33952 (Ortigas & Co.
Ltd. v. Hon. Vivencio M. Ruiz, et al.) — Upon consideration of the
pleadings filed by the parties in this case as well as the annexes thereto, it
appearing that petitioner is the registered owner of the land involved herein
and that it has the right, at least prima facie, to exercise rights of
ownership and possession over said land:  As prayed for, let a writ
of preliminary injunction issue, upon the filing of a bond in the sum of ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to be approved by this Court, enjoining respondent
Judge from enforcing the restraining order issued by him on August 13, 1971 and
from proceeding in any manner with Civil Case No. 678-M (15043), until further
orders by this Court.” (Rollo, p. 418).

Finally, under Section 5, Batas Pambansa Blg. 224, a judge may
issue a temporary restraining order with a limited life of twenty (20) days from
date of issue.  If before the expiration of the 20-day
period the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary
restraining order would thereby be deemed automatically vacated. 
If no action is taken by the judge on the application for
preliminary injunction within the said 20-days, the temporary restraining
order would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no
judicial declaration to that effect being necessary.  A temporary
restraining order can no longer exist indefinitely for it has become truly
temporary (Board of Transportation v. Castro, 125 SCRA 417 [1983]
citing Dionisio, et al. v. Court of First
Instance of South Cotabato, Branch II, G.R. No. 61048 promulgated on August
17, 1983).  In the same case, the Court ruled that respondent Judge
committed a grave abuse of discretion in failing to resolve without considerable
delay petitioner’s motion for the dissolution of the restraining order.

Petitioner argues further, that a class suit is not proper
in this case as such presupposes a common and general interest by several
plaintiffs in a single specific thing (Section 12, Rule 3, Rules of Court).  Consequently, it cannot be
maintained when each of those impleaded as alleged
plaintiffs “has only a special or particular interest in the specific thing
completely different from another thing in which the defendants have a like
interest.” (Berces v. Villanueva, 25
Phil. 473).  (Rollo, p. 24).

Petitioner’s contention is
meritorious.

It is not a case where one or more may sue for the
benefit of all (Mathay v.
Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559) or where the
representation of class interest affected by the judgment or decree is
indispensable to make each member of the class an actual party (Borlaza v. Polistico, 47 Phil. 348;
Newsweek, Inc. v. The Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No.
63559, promulgated May 30,
1986).

In the case at bar, a class suit would not lie because each of the
defendants has an interest only in the particular portion of the land he is
actually occupying, and not in the portions individually occupied by the other
defendants.  (Berces v. Villanueva, supra; Rallonza v. Evangelista, 15 Phil.
531).  They do not have a common or general interest in the
subject matter of the controversy (Newsweek, Inc. v. The Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al., supra).

Hence, there is merit in petitioner’s contention that only the
principal plaintiff named in the complaint Inocencio
Bernardo can remain as party plaintiff, and all the rest must be dropped from
the case, pursuant to Section 11, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. 
And since Bernardo does not pretend to own almost two million square
meters involved in the case, the restraining order of respondent Judge granting
that it could be maintained must be co-extensive with the boundaries of
Bernardo’s claim.  Otherwise stated, respondent Judge cannot
restrain petitioner from performing acts of ownership or dominion over the
entire 200 hectares involved in this case.

But more than the foregoing, it will be noted that in
respondents’ complaint, they pray among other things that the Original
Certificates of Titles in question be declared null and void and the land in
dispute, except that portion being claimed as their own, be declared as
properties of the public domain (Rollo,
p. 55).

On this point, the Supreme Court has already ruled that
in all actions for the reversion to the Government of
lands of the public domain or improvements thereon, the Republic of the
Philippines
is the real party in interest.  The action shall be instituted by
the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in behalf of the
Republic of the
Philippines
(Director of Lands v. Lim, et al., G.R. No. L-4372, April 30,
1952).

It will be noted that respondents themselves allege that the
Director of Lands refused to be a party plaintiff (Rollo, p. 49).  Consequently, as to
the portion of land being claimed for the government by respondents, the case
has to be dismissed.

On the other hand as to the portions claimed by respondents for
themselves, it is evident that their action is already barred by laches.

In a line of decisions, the Court has uniformly held in favor of
the registered owner who had been in possession of the property in dispute for a
considerable period of time, as follows:

“Having been registered owners of lot for more than 40 years and
having possessed it during said period, their title had become indefeasible and
their possession could not be disturbed.  (Sinoan v. Soroñgon, 136 SCRA
407).

“Failure of the deceased or his predecessors-in-interest to take
steps to assert any rights over the disputed land for 20 years from date of
registration of title is fatal to their cause of action on the ground of laches.  (133 SCRA 718,
[1984], Caragay-Layno v. Court of
Appeals).

“Cause of action to recover possession of property is barred by
laches due to petitioner’s inaction for more than 50
years.” (Alarcon v. Bidin, 120 SCRA
390).

On the other hand, private respondents lay stress on the
alleged fact that the instant petition of certiorari is not
proper as the petitioner is not without any remedy, speedy and adequate in the
lower court itself.  They say petitioner could and should have
moved for a reconsideration of the restraining order of the lower court (Rollo, p. 111).

This contention is untenable.

The Supreme Court has categorically ruled that a motion for
new trial or reconsideration is not a prerequisite to an appeal, a petition for
review or a petition for certiorari.  The
amendments to the Rules of Court by the Judiciary Reorganization Act, (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129) and by
the interim Rules have been held to apply prospectively,
(Habaluyas Enterprises Inc. v.
Japson, 142 SCRA 211-212 [1986]).

This case was brought before the Supreme Court for the
resolution of an incident in Civil Case No. 678-M (15043) and the normal cause
of action to take thereafter, would be to remand this case to the trial court
for further proceedings.  However, in line with jurisprudence, that
such time consuming procedure may be properly dispensed with to resolve the
issue (Quisumbing v. Court of
Appeals, L-60364, June 23, 1983, 122 SCRA 709-710) where there is enough
basis to end the basic controversy between the parties here and now, dispensing
with procedural steps which would not anyway affect substantially the merits of
their respective claims (Velasco v. Court of Appeals, L-47544,
January 28, 1980, 95 SCRA 621-622), We will now resolve this entire
controversy.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the restraining order issued by
the lower court is hereby SET ASIDE; Civil Case No. 678-M (15043) is dismissed;
and the injunction issued by this Court in the resolution of October 12, 1971 is hereby made
PERMANENT.

SO
ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, and Cortes,
JJ., concur.

Alampay, J., on leave.

Padilla, J., Took no part, because I am a limited partner in
petitioner-partnership.