G.R. No. L-34666. October 30, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, MERCEDES L. JAVELLANA, PETITIONER, VS. ITONG AMISTAD, RESPONDENT.
DE CASTRO, J.:
The legal question raised in this petition for certiorari
is whether from a decision of acquittal, the complainant in a criminal action
for estafa, may appeal with respect to the civil
aspect of the case.
The criminal action in this case was commenced in the Court of
First Instance of Baguio and Benguet,
under an information which reads:
“I
N F O R M A T I O N
“The undersigned Acting 1st Assistant City Fiscal accuses ITONG AMISTAD of the crime of Estafa penalized under Article 316 Paragraph 2, of the
Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
‘That on or about January 30, 1965, October 11, 1965, and December
23, 1965, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously –
(1) (January 30, 1965) sell, convey, transfer and
deliver by way of a deed of sale in favor of Ben Palispis
an unsegregated portion of 42,326 square meters of
that parcel of land described in –
ORIGINAL
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE No. 0-105
‘A parcel of land (Lot 1, plan Psu-203086- Amd.,
Civil Reservation Case No. 1, L.R.C. Civil
Reservation Record No. 211), situated
in the Res. Sec. ‘J’, City of Baguio. Bounded on the
NE., by property of Honor Kingdome; on the SW., by Lot 2; on the W and NW.,
by Public Land.
x x x containÂing an area of
EIGHTY FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTY THREE (84,653) Square meters, more
or less, x x x’ in the names of spouses Itong
Amistad and Luisa Tengdan;
(2) (October 11, 1965) sell, convey, transfer and deliver by way of a deed of
sale in favor of Teodoro Mat-an the remaining 42,326 square meters of the
above-described parcel of land; and
(3) (December 23, 1965) execute a supplemental deed of sale over the entire
area covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-105 in favor of vendees Ben
Palispis and Teodoro Mat-an
which effected the issuance of two separate titles in favor of said vendees –
knowing fully well and purposely
withholding the information that on or about February 10, 1962, he had previously entered into an agreement with one
MERCEDES L. JAVELLANA to convey to her an area of
10,000 square meters from the above-described parcel of land for the sum of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS and had already received from her the sum of FIVE
THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, thereby causing damage and prejudice to said
Mercedes L. Javellana in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND
(P5,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.
All contrary to
law.”
After trial, decision was
rendered dated February 8, 1971, and promulgated on
March 18, 1971
acquitting the accused, respondent herein, the Court holding that “the
case of the prosecution is civil in nature” and that “the guilt of
the accused has not been proven beyond reasonÂable doubt.”
From the judgment of
acquittal, the complainant, the petitioner herein, appealed to the Court of
Appeals insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. WithÂout awaiting the completion of the
transcript of the stenoÂgraphic notes in the case, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal merely on the legal proposition that an appeal by the complainant from a judgment of acquittal should be disallowed.
The Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated December 1, 1971, is set forth in full as
follows:
“This refers to an appeal against the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Baguio, in Criminal Case No. 4205,
wherein the accused Itong Amistad
who was prosecuted for the crime of estafa (paragraph
2, Article 316 R.P.C.), was acquitted. The decision
was promulgated on March 18, 1971
and on that same day, the complainant, through counsel, filed a Notice of
Appeal from said judgment, ‘insofar as the civil liability of the accused is
concerned.’ Apparently the appeal was approved by the trial court, the records
of the case were elevated to this Court, and this Court required the completion
of the same.
“Now, while the right of the offended party to intervene in
the criminal action (Section 15, Rule 110, Rules) as well as to appeal from a
final judgment or ruling or from an order made after judgment affecting the
substantial rights of the appellant (Section 2, Rule 122, Rules) is recognized,
the offended party however, canÂnot appeal if the accused is acquitted as
matters are (People vs. Herrera, 74 Phil. 21).
Indeed, the trial court in acquitting the herein defendant stated:
‘In the mind of the court, the case of the prosecution is civil
in nature. In fact, the supervening
acts of the parties after the execution of Exhibit A until the execution of
Exhibit D are clear and unequivocal which ineluctably lead this court to
believe that the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.’
“An appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance
would perforce require a new deterÂmination of defendant’s criminal
liability. This cannot be done. Besides, the offended party has the remedy of
bringing a civil action independently of the criminal action.
“Indeed, this question is not new. It has already been so ruled by the Supreme
Court in several cases (People vs. Flores, G.R. No. L-7523, December 18, 1957, citing People vs. Velez,
77 Phil. 1026; People vs. Benjamin Liggayu, et al.,
No. 8224, October 31, 1955; People vs. Joaquin Lipana,
72 Phil. 166; People vs. Florendo, 73 Phil. 679
[decided under the new Rules of Court]; Ricafort vs. Fernan, 101 Phil. 575, 572).
“Considering that the complainant is appealing from a judgment
acquitting the accused in a crimÂinal case, her appeal should be disallowed.
“WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby ordered dismissed. The stenographers who were required to submit
their respective transcripts of stenographic notes in this case are hereby
excused therefrom.
(pp. 6-7, Brief for the Respondent, p. 78, Rollo).
A motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals was filed but was denied on January
4, 1972. From both aforesaid
Resolutions dismissing the appeal and the order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration, the petiÂtioner came to this Court on a petition for certiorari
with prayer that the Resolution of the Court of Appeals be reversed, and that
judgment be rendered in favor of petitioner and against respondent insofar as
the latter’s liability is concerned –
“(a). ordering respondent to pay to petitioner such
sum as this Court shall adjudge to rightfully represent the value of the
one-hectare portion of the land involved agreed to be conveyed to petitioner by
respondent in accordance with the Agreement to Convey Real Property (Exhibit
‘A’);
“(b). Ordering respondent to pay to petitioner the
expenses of litigation actually incurred by the latter; and
“(c). Ordering respondent to pay the costs of
suit.” (p. 28, Brief for the PetiÂtioner, p. 60, Rollo).
The sole legal question for determination as stated at the outset, is whether an
appeal by the complainant for estafa, may be allowed
from a decision acquitting the acÂcused of the crime charged, only insofar as
the latter’s civil liability is concerned.
In support of her affirmative position on the issue above stated,
petitioner cites Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court which provides:
“SEC. 2. Who may appeal.- The People of the Philippines
can not appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double
jeopardy. In all other cases either
party may appeal from a final judgment or ruling or from an order made after
judgment affectÂing the substantial rights of the appellant.” (p. 12, Brief for the Petitioner, p. 60, Rollo).
Additionally, she cites Section 3 of Rule 111, from which she
quotes the following:
“SEC. 3. Other civil actions arising
from offenses.- In all cases not included in the
preceding section the following rules shall be observed:
” x x x;
“(c) Extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise
did not exist. In other cases, the
person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in
the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution
of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered.” (Rule
111, Rules of Court in the Philippines.)
(pp. 13-14, Id.)
Finally, she cites Article 29 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
which reads:
“ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may
require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the
complaint should be found to be malicious.
“If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare.
In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred
from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground.” (p. 14, Id.).
From the aforequoted provisions,
petitioners contend that the remedy of appeal is expressly granted to her
inasmuch as the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, Criminal Case No. 4205 of the Court of
First Instance of Baguio and Benguet,
there having been no reservation to file a separate civil action or a waiver of
the right to file one. She had in fact
hired a private prosecutor to handle, primarily the civil aspect of the case,
the prosecution of the crime remaining under the direction and control of the
prosecuting Fiscal. The private
prosecutor presented evidence bearing on the civil liability of the
accused. In a memorandum he filed, he
also discussed extensively the civil liability of the accused, despite which,
the trial court failed to rule on the latter’s civil liability to the
complainant.
It is this omission, as alleged by petitioner herein, that
constitutes the thrust of her first assignment of error, the only one We feel
called upon to rule on, among her three assigned errors, the other two having
relation to how the trial court evaluated the evidence, and the extent of
damages petitioner alleges to be entitled to under such evidence, which
evidently may not be passed upon in the instant
proceedings, the evidence presented during the trial not having been
elevated to this Court, nor even to the Court of Appeals, at least not fully or
completely.
Confining ourselves, therefore, to the first assigned error, We
find no ground to reverse the Resolution of the Court of Appeals on the purely
legal question of whether the petitioner, as complainant in Criminal Case No.
4025 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, for estafa, can appeal
from the judgment acquitting the accused, because the trial court failed to
declare the latter’s civil liability to the complainant, which was allegedly
proven by the evidence.
The provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code relied upon by the
petitioner clearly requires the institution of a separate action by the filing
of the proper complaint. To such
complaint, the accused as the defendant therein, may file the appropriate responsive
pleading, which may be an answer or a motion to dismiss. In a criminal action, notÂwithstanding that
the action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted
therewith, if not reserved or waived, the accused is not afforded the same
remedy. Neither is the mandatory
pre-trial held as is required of all civil actions. The obvious reason is that the civil
liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon
conviction, because said liability arises from the offense, with respect to
which pre-trial is never held to obtain adÂmission as to the commission
thereof, except on the occasion of arraignment.
This is the kind of civil liability involved in the civil action deemed
filed simultaneously with the filing of criminal action, unless it is reserved
or waived, as so expressly provided in Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court and as held in People vs. Herrera, 74 Phil. 21.
If the civil liability arises from other sources than the
commission of the offense, such as from law or contract or quasi-delict, its enforcement has to be by an ordinary civil
action, which, as expressly provided in Article 29 of the Civil Code may be
disposed of as a mere preponderance of evidence would warrant. Then, all the defenses available, such as
prescription, lack of jurisdiction, set-off, and the other grounds for a motion
to dismiss may be availed of, as may be proper under the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case, complete with pre-trial after issues have been
joined. Upon these considerations, it
becomes clear that the argument of petitioner invoking the rule against
multiplicity of action may not forcefully or convincingly be put forth.
In the Resolution of the Court of Appeals several cases have been
cited which held that an appeal from the disÂmissal of the criminal case on
motion by the fiscal may not be taken by the offended party (People vs. Lipana, 72 Phil. 168; People vs. Florendo,
73 Phil. 679). In the case of People vs.
Herrera, et al., 74 Phil. 21, the accused was acquitted without the court
making any pronouncement as to his civil liability, in exactly the same manner
that the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet in Criminal Case No. 4025, was charged with a
similar omission in the case at bar. The
Supreme Court did not permit an appeal by the offended party, the Court saying:
“The decision of the justice of the peace court which
acquitted the defendant of the charge and did not make any pronouncement
holding the defendant civilly liable put an end to the case, not only by
freeing the defendant from criminal responsibility but also by rejecting all
liability for damages arising from the alleged crime of malicious
mischief. The offended parties not
having reserved their right to bring a separate civil action, the aforesaid
decision of acquittal covered both the criminal and the civil aspects of the
case under Rule 107, section 1(a) of the new Rules of Court. An appeal from that decision to the Court of
First Instance, as intended by the offended parties, would reopen the question
of defendant’s civil liability arising from the alleged crime. And considering that such civil liability
must be based on the criminal responÂsibility of the defendant (art. 100,
Revised Penal Code), any review or re-examination of the question of civil
liability would perforce require a new determination of defendant’s criminal
liability. But another trial upon
defendant’s criminal responsibility cannot be held, in view of his previous
acquittal in the justice of the peace court.
So the appeal from the decision of the justice of the peace court is not
authorized by law.”
Brought out in bold relief in the aforequoted
ruling is that what is impliedly brought simultaneously with the criminal
action is the civil action to recover civil liability arising from the
offense. Hence, the two actions may
rise or fall together. However, if the
civil action is reserved, or if the ground of acquittal is reasonable doubt as
to the guilt of the accused, a separate civil action may be filed, the complainant
alleging a cause of action independent of, and not based on, the commission of
an offense. Only preÂponderance of
evidence would then be required.
The futility of petitioner’s instant recourse becomes all too
evident upon consideration of the principles enunciated, particularly in the
Herrera case, since if the civil liability recoverable in a criminal action is
one arising from the crime charged, no longer may the respondent be found
criminally liable upon a review of the evidence, after the verdict of acquittal
has been handed down by the trial court.
Again, petitioner tries to show that the cases cited by the Court of
Appeals are not in point. But she has
not cited one single case faintly supporting her position as she has tried to
maintain in the instant case.
Nevertheless, petitioner may not complain, as she does of being
denied due process for disallowing her appeal.
She can institute a separate civil action if her cause of action could
come under the category of quasi-delict or one
arising from law, contract or any other known source of civil liability, but
certainly not anymore from the offense of which petitioner had already been
acquitted. It is but fair to require
petitioner to take this course of action, not only because she would have to
pay for the lawful expenses for instituting the action to obtain the relief she
seeks from respondent, from which she is spared in the prosecution of a
criminal case, but also for the respondent or defendant to avail of all
defenses and remedies as are open to him in a separate civil action not
otherwise available in a criminal action that carries with it the civil action
when deemed simultaneously filed with it, to recover civil liability arising
from the crime charged.
For all the foregoing, the Resolution appealed from is affirmed,
and the instant petition is, accordingly,
dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ.,
concur.
Teehankee (Chairman), J., takes no part.