G.R. No. L-3362. March 20, 1953
TESTAMENTARIA DE D. CARLOS GIL, DECEASED. ISABEL HERREROS VDA. DE GIL, ADMINISTRATRIX-APPELLEE, VS. ROBERTO TOLEDO Y GIL, III, OPPOSITOR-APPELLEE, PILAR GIL VDA. DE MURCIANO, OP…
TUASON, J.:
Court’s decision. Whereas formerly six Justices voted for reversal and
five for affirmance of the probate court’s order admitting the will to
probate, the vote upon reconsideration was six for affirmance and five
for reversal, thereby making the dissenting opinion, which had been
filed, the prevailing rule of the case. Under the circumstances, this
resolution will largely be confined to a restatement of that dissenting
opinion.
The will in question was presented for probate in the Court of
First Instance of Manila in 1943 with Roberto Toledo y Gil, decedent’s
sister, opposing the application. Toledo’s legal right to intervene was
questioned by the proponent of the will, and the objection was
sustained in an order which was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No.
L-254. As a result of the latter decision, Toledo was eliminated from
the case and did not appear when the trial was resumed.
The proceeding seems to have been held in abeyance pending
final disposition of Toledo’s appeal, and early in 1945, before the
application was heard on the merit, the record, along with the will, was
destroyed, necessitating its reconstitution after liberation. In the
reconstitution, a stipulation of facts was submitted in which, according
to the appealed order, “both parties x x x agreed that the will as
transcribed in the record on appeal in Case G. R. No. L-254 is true and
correct copy.”
The will consisted of only two pages, and the attestation
clause as thus copied reads:
“NOSOTROS los que suscribimos, todos mayores de edad,
certificamos: que el testamento que procede escrito en la lengua
castellana que conoce la testator, compuesto de dos paginas utiles con
la clausula de atestiguameineto paginadas correlativamente en letras y
numeros en la parte superior de la casilla, asi como todos las hojas del
mismo, en nuestra presencia y que cada uno de nosotros hemos
atestiguado y firmado dicho documento y todas las hojas del mismo en
presencia del testador y en la de cada uno de nosotros.
“(Fdo.) ALFREDO T. RIVERA (Fdo.) RAMON MENDIOLA “(Fdo.) MARIANO OMANA”
It will be noted from the above copy that the last of the compound
sentenced is truncated and meaningless. This defect is the main basis
of the appellant’s sole assignment of error.
Counsel for appellee contend that the phrase “han sido firmadas
por el testador” or equivalent expression between the words “del mismo”
and the words “en nuestra presencia” should be inserted if the
attestation clause is to be complete and have sense. With this
insertion the attestation clause would read “x x x, asi como todas las
hojas del mismo han sido firmadas por el testador en nuestra
presencia x x x.” The point is well taken.
It seems obvious that the missing phrase was left out from the
copy. The probabilities of error in the copy are enhanced by the fact
that the form of the will was not in controversy in Toledo’s appeal.
The form of the will being immaterial, it is easily conceivable that
little or no care was employed in transcribing the document in the
agreement or record on appeal. The absence of the signature of the
testator on the first page of the copy is an additional proof that
little or no pain was taken to insure accuracy in the transcription.
The appearance of “la testadora” in the copy instead of “el testador” is
another indication of haste and carelessness in the transcription.
Quite aside from all this, the testator was presumed to know
the law, as the trial court says. Certainly, Attorney Mariano Omaña,
who drew the instrument and signed it as an attesting witness, knew the
law and, by the context thereof, has shown familiarity with the rules of
grammar and ability to express his idea properly. In the light of
these circumstances and of the further fact that the clause was brief
and, by its importance, must have been written with utmost concern, so
important an omission as to make the clause or sentence senseless could
not have been made, intentionally or otherwise, in the original.
There is insinuation that the appellee in agreeing that the
will read as it was “reproduced in the Record on Appeal” is bound by the
agreement. This is not an absolute rule. The binding effect of a
stipulation on the parties does not go to the extent of barring either
of them from impeaching it on the score of clerical error or clear
mistake. The mistake just pointed out clearly brings the case within
the exceptions to the rule. The able counsel for the proponent of the
will could not possibly have subscribed to the agreement if they had
noticed the incomplete sentence in the copy without making an objection
or reservation.
The problem posed by the omission in question is governed, not
by the law of wills which requires certain formalities to be fulfilled
in the execution, but by the rules of construction applicable to
statutes and documents in general. And this rule would obtain whether
the omission occurred in the original document or in the copy alone. In
either case, the court may and should correct the error by supplying
the omitted word or words.
In Testamentaria del Finado Emiliano Alcala, a similar
situation arose and the Court said:
“Es evidente que leyendo la clausula de atestiguacion se
note a simple vista que en su redaccion se ha incurriae en omisiones que
la razon y el sentido comun pueden suplirlas sin alterer ni tergiversar
la intencion tanto del testador como la de los tres testigos que
intervinieron en el otorgamiento de la misma. Teniendo en cuenta la
fraseologia de la segunda parte de la clausula se observara que las
omisiones, aunque son substanciales, consisten en meros errores
gramaticales que los tribunales, en el ejercicio de su discrecion y en
la aplicacion de las reglas de interpretacion de documentos, pueden
subsanarlos para dar efectividad a la intencion y hacer que el conjunto
de los terminos de la clausula de atestacion surtan sus efectos.”
“La interpretacion que se acaba de dar a la clausula de
atestacion y la correccion de los errores gramaticales de que la misma
adolece, incluyendo la insercion del verbo “firmamos” que se omition
involuntariament, esta de acuerdo con las reglas fundamentales de
interpretacion de documentos segun las cuales se debe hacer prevalecer
siempre la intencion del que haya redactado el instrumento (art. 286,
Cod. de Proc. Civil; Pecson contra Coronel, 45 Jur. Fil., 224; 28
R.C.L., Sec. 187, pags. 225, 226.)”“La solucion que se acaba de dar al asunto es la que se halla mas
conforme con la justificia en vista de que no se ha presentado prueba
alguna que insinue siquiera que en el otorgamiento del testamento se ha
cometido dolo o fraude con el animo de perjudicar a cualquiera.
(Testamentaria de Emiliano Alcala, 40 G.O., 14.o Suplemento, No. 23,
pags. 131, 132.)”
From 69 C. J. 82, 83, we quote: “Words omitted from a will may be
supplied by the court whenever necessary to effectuate the testator’s
intention as expressed in the will; but not where the effect of
inserting the words in the will would alter or defeat such intention, or
change the meaning of words that are clear and unequivocal.” On pages
50 and 51, the same work says: “To aid the court in ascertaining and
giving effect to the testator’s intention in the case of an ambiguous
will, certain rules have been established for guidance in the
construction or interpretation to be placed upon such a will, and in
general a will should be construed according to these established rules
of construction.” And referring to construction of statutes which, as
has been said, is applicable to construction of documents, C. J. S. in
Vol. 59, p. 992, tells us that “Where it appears from the context that
certain words have been inadvertently omitted from a statute, the court
may supply such words as are necessary to complete the sense, and to
express the legislative intent.”
Adding force to the above principle is the legal presumption that
the will is in accordance with law. (2 Page on Wills 840, 841, Am.
Jur. 720.)
But let it be assumed, for the sake of this decision only, that
the attestation clause was drawn exactly as it was copied in Toledo’s
record on appeal, was the mistake fatal? Was it, or was it not, cured
by the testator’s own declaration? to wit: “En testimonic de lo cual,
firmo este mi testamento y en el margen izquierdo de cada una de sus dos
paginas utiles con la clausula de atestiguamiento en presencia de los
testigos, quienes a su vez firmaron cada una de dicha paginas y la
clausula de atestiguamiento en mi presencia cada una de ellos con la de
los demas, hoy en Porac, Pampanga, I. F., el dia 27 de marzo de mil
novecientos treinta y nueve.” The answer is in the negative.
As early as 1922 a similar case, in which the validity of the
will was sustained, found its way into this Court. See Aldaba vs.
Roque, 43 Phil. 378. That case was more than foursquare behind the
case at bar. There the departure from the statutory formality was more
radical, in that the testator took charge of writing the entire
attestation clause in the body of the will, the witnesses limiting their
role to signing the document below the testator’s signature. Here, at
the most, the testator took away from the witnesses only a small part of
their assigned task, leaving to them the rest.
Referring to “the lack of attestation clause required by law,”
this Court, in a unanimous decision en banc, through Mr. Justice
Villamor said in the Aldaba-Roque case (Syllabus):
“When the attestation clause is signed by the witnesses to the
instruments, besides the testator, such attestation clause is valid and
constitute a substantial compliance with the provisions of section 1 of
Act No. 2645, even though the facts recited in said attestation clause
appear to have been made by the testator himself.”
That ruling should set the present case at rest unless we want to
revert to the old, expressly abandoned doctrine in a long line of what
we believe better-considered decisions.
This Court noted in Dichoso de Ticson vs. De Gorostiza (1922), 57
Phil. 437, “that there have been noticeable in the Philippines two
divergent tendencies in the law of wills – the one being planted on
strict construction and the other on liberal construction. A late
example of the former views may be found in the decision in Rodriguez
vs. Alcala (1930), 55 Phil. 150, sanctioning a literal enforcement of
the law. The basic case in the other direction, predicated on
reason, is Abangan vs. Abangan (1919), 40 Phil. 476,
oft-cited approvingly in later decisions.”
In the Abangan case, a unanimous court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Avanceña, later Chief Justice, observed:
“The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills
is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution
of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way
as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one
must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to
restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when
an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other
interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites
entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator’s last
will, must be disregarded.”
Subsequent decisions which followed and adopted the Abangan
principle were: Avera vs. Garcia (1921), 42 Phil. 145; Aldaba vs.
Roque (1922), 43 Phil. 378; Unson vs. Abella (1922), 43 Phil.
494; Pecson vs. Coronel (1923), 45 Phil. 216; Fernandez vs.
Vergel de Dios (1924), 46 Phil. 922; Nayve vs. Mojal (1924), 47
Phil. 152; De Gala vs. Gonzales (1929), 53 Phil. 104; Rey vs.
Cartagena (1931), 56 Phil. 282; Ticzon vs. Gorostiza (1932), 57
Phil. 437; Testamentaria de N. Ozoa (1933), 57 J. F., 1007; Sebastian vs.
Pañganiban (1934), 59 Phil. 653; Rodriguez vs. Yap (1939), 40
Off. Gaz. 1st Suppl., No. 3, p. 194; Grey vs. Fabia (1939), 40
Off. Gaz. 1st Suppl., No. 3, p. 196, Leynes vs. Leynes (1939), 40
Off. Gaz. 35d Suppl. No. 7, p. 51; Martir vs. Martir (1940), 40
Off. Gaz., 7th Suppl. No. 11, p. 215; Sabado vs. Fernandez
(1941), 40 Off. Gaz., 1844; Mendoza vs. Pilapil (1941), 40 Off.
Gaz. 14th Suppl. No. 23, p. 131; and Lopez vs. Liboro (1948), 46
Off. Gaz., Suppl., No. 1, p. 211.
It is objected that “If we cure a deficiency by means of
inferences, when are we going to stop making inferences to supply fatal
deficiencies in wills? Where we are we to draw the line?” These same
questions might well have been asked by the opponents of the new trends
in the cases above cited. But the so-called liberal rule does not offer
any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the door to serious
consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and where to stop;
they draw the dividing line with precision. They do not allow evidence aliunde
to fill a void in any part of the document or supply missing details
that should appear in the will itself. They only permit a probe into
the will, an exploration within its confines, to ascertain its meaning
or to determine the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of
law. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought to
banish any fear of dire results.
The case at hand comes within the bounds thus defined. If the
witnesses here purposely omitted or forgot to say that the testator
signed the will in their presence, the testator said that he did and the
witnesses by their signatures in the will itself said it was so. No
extraneous proof was necessary and none was introduced or taken into
consideration.
To regard the letter rather than the spirit of the will and of
the law behind it was the thing that led to unfortunate consequences.
It was the realization of the injustice of the old way that impelled
this Court, so we believe, to forsake the antiquated, outworn worship of
form in preference to substance. It has been said, and experience has
shown, that the mechanical systems of construction has operated more to
defeat honest wills that prevent fraudulent ones. That, it must be
conceded, would be the effect in this case if the will under
consideration were rejected. For the adverse party now concedes the
genuineness of the document. At any rate, the genuineness in
superobvious, and there is not the slightest insinuation of undue
pressure, mental incapacity of the testator, or fraud.
It is said that for the testator to certify that he signed the
will in the witnesses’ presence “would be like lifting one’s self by his
own bootstraps.” The simile does not look to us quite well placed.
There is no impossibility or impropriety in one attesting to his own act
unless forbidden by rules of positive law. The rationale of this
decision is that he is not. If we were to make a metaphorical
comparison, it would be more correct to say that a man can and generally
does himself pull the bootstraps when he puts his boots on.
Coming to execution of wills, we see no legitimate, practical
reason for objecting to the testator instead of the witnesses certifying
that he signed the will in the presence of the latter. The will is of
the testator’s own making, the intervention of attesting witnesses being
designed merely to protect his interest. If the sole purpose of the
statute in requiring the intervention of witnesses is to make it certain
that the testator has definite and complete intention to pass his
property, and to prevent, as far as possible, any chance of substituting
one instrument for another (1 Page on Wills, 481), what better guaranty
of the genuineness of the will can there be than a certification by the
testator himself in the body of the will so long as the testator’s
signature is duly authenticated? Witnesses may sabotage the will by
muddling and bungling it or the attestation clause. For the testator,
who is desirous of making a valid will, to do so would be a
contradiction. If the formalities are only a means to and end and not
the end themselves, and that end is achieved by another method slightly
different from the prescribed manner, what has been done by the testator
and the witnesses in the execution of the instant will would satisfy
both law and conscience.
A second ground of attack on the questioned will is that the
first page or sheet thereof does not bear the testator’s signature. The
discussion on the correctness of the copy of the attestation clause
amply answers this objection. In fact, the appellee’s case is much
stronger on this point for the reason that there is not only speculative
but also positive basis for the conclusion that the testator’s
signature was affixed to the first page of the original. Both the
testator and the attesting witnesses stated in the will and in the
attestation clause, respectively, that the former signed both pages or
sheets of the testament.
Upon the foregoing consideration, the order of the probate
court is affirmed with costs.
A motion dated February 17, 1953 was filed after the motion for
reconsideration was deliberated and voted upon, in behalf of the minor
children of Carlos Worrel, who was a residuary legatee under the will
and who is alleged to have died on February 6, 1949. The motion prays
that a guardian ad litem be appointed for the said children, and
allowed to intervene and file “A Supplementary Memorandum in Support of
Appellant’s (Appellee’s?) Motion for reconsideration.” Counsel for the
appellant objects to the motion on the ground that the movants having
only a contingent interest under the will are not of right entitled to
intervene.
As this case has already been considerably delayed and
thoroughly considered and discussed from all angles, it is the sense of
the Court that the children’s intervention with the consequent further
delay of the decision would not serve the best interest of the parties.
For this reason, the motion is denied.
Paras, C. J., Feria, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, and Labrador,
JJ., concur.
Jugo, J., I dissent on the grounds set forth in my opinion
rendered in this case.
Padilla and Reyes, JJ., dissents.
Pablo and Bengzon, JJ., join the dissent of J.
Jugo.