REYNALDO JIMENEZ, ET AL., REPRESENTED BY THEIR LEGITIMATE MOTHER, TERESITA VILLARAMA-JIMENEZ, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS. ARTURO T. JIMENEZ, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, EQUITABLE BANKING…

Appeal from a decision of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 63697,
absolving the defendant Equitable Banking Corporation from the complaint but
condemning its co-defendant Arturo T. Jimenez to restore certain bank deposits,
pay moral damages, attorney’s fees and costs in favor
of the plaintiffs.

In their complaint, filed with the court a quo, the plaintiffs – appellees, Reynaldo, Maria Teresa, Arturo Jr., Alfredo, Maria Luisa, Maria Cristina, all
surnamed “Jimenez”, represented by their mother, Teresita Villarama-Jimenez,
alleged inter alia that they are the legitimate minor children
of the defendant Arturo T. Jimenez; that during the Sweepstakes Christmas Draw
on 20 December 1964, the defendant won the whole second prize in the amount of
P400,000.00; that as a gift to his children, he deposited in their names
the sum of P5,000.00 each or a total of P30,000.00 in the Quiapo Branch of the other defendant Equitable Banking Corporation; that as a fatherly
gesture of natural love and to assuage somewhat his long neglect and abandonment of them, the defendant Arturo Jimenez gave as a
Christmas present the corresponding
passbooks to his wife, Teresita Villarama-Jimenez for the future security of the children;
that the plaintiffs gratefully and readily accepted the passbooks; that on 22
November 1965, when the mother of the plaintiffs, in behalf of the children,
went to the defendant bank to have the interest of the deposits entered in the
passbooks, the bank re­fused, on the ground that all the deposits had already
been withdrawn by Arturo T. Jimenez; that such withdrawal was without the
knowledge el the plaintiffs and their mother and contrary to a provision of the
passbooks which requires the presentation of the said passbooks; that despite
several demands, the de­fendants refused to pay or restore the total amount of
P30,000.00; that on account thereof, they suffered moral damages and were
compelled to hire the services of counsel.

In due time, defendant
Jimenez filed his answer, denying that the plaintiffs are his legitimate
children.  He averred that it was his
brother who won the sweepstakes, not himself (the defendant); that his brother
donated to him P50,000.00 of the prize money; that the deposits he made in the names
of each of the plaintiffs were not donated but were given for safekeeping in
order to protect himself from opportunists, “”balato”
-seekers and borrowers; that deposits were made with the understanding of
the Equitable Banking Corporation that defendant Jimenez alone could withdraw
the deposits; that it is not true that he abandoned the plaintiffs, but that he
was the one who was de­serted; that his having given the passbooks to Teresita de la Rosa-Villarama was
not in the sense of transferring ownership; that the plaintiffs did not accept
he money since it was not donated to them; and that the rest of the plaintiffs’
allegations are not true.  By way of
affirmative defenses, defendant Jimenez alleged that the complaint states no
cause of action; that Teresita de la Rosa Villarama is an unfit mother and guardian; that she had
squandered P10,000.00 that was entrusted to her for
the support of the children; that she had maltreated the defendant and caused
him moral torture, humiliation and the like.

Defendant Equitable
Banking Corporation answered with admissions and denials.  It averred that it admits the lack of
knowledge of the plaintiffs of the withdrawals made by defendant Jimenez; that
the regulation requiring the presentation of the passbooks to effect
withdrawals is subject to exceptions, such as upon proof of loss of said
passbooks; and that the acts of the defendant-bank in permitting the
withdrawals was in accordance with accepted banking practice and the rules and
regulations printed in the passbooks and in compliance with the express
instructions of depositor Jimenez that he alone was to effect withdrawals from
the deposit accounts.  Defendant bank
alleged affirmative defenses, and included in its answer, a cross-claim against
Arturo Jimenez.

In a pre-trial conference
held on 20 April 1966,
the lower court issued the following order:

“ORDER

“At the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed that the only
issue to be determined by the Court in this case is whether the defendant was
justified in withdrawing the deposits he
made in the names of his six minor children, the plaintiffs herein.

“For this purpose, let the trial of this case on the merits
be, as it is hereby, set for May 31,
1966, at 8:30 a.m.”

“SO ORDERED.

“Manila, Philippines
April 20, 1966.

‘AGUSTIN P. MONTESA

“Judge”

On the date set for trial
on the merits, which, pursuant to the above order was 31 May 1966, the counsel
for the plaintiffs did not appear, and trial was net carried on and no evidence
was adduced before the court; this notwithstanding, the court issued the following
order:

“ORDER

“It appearing in this case that the only issue involved herein
is whether Arturo Jimenez withdrew illegally the money deposited in his own
name and that of the plaintiffs by executing an affidavit to the effect that
the passbook issued in favor of the depositors was lost, the parties are hereby
given fifteen (15) days from today within which to submit memoranda in support
of their respective contentions, after which this case will be deemed submitted.

“SO
ORDERED.

“Manila, Philippines,
May 31, 1966.

“AGUSTIN P.
MONTESA

 “Judge”

Pursuant to the above
order, the parties filed their respective memoranda.

On 9 July
1966, the court a quo rendered a decision,
making findings of fact and law and sentencing the defendant Arturo T. Jimenez
to restore the bank deposit that he had withdrawn, pay P10,000.00 for moral
damages, P3,000.00 for
attorney’s fees and costs.

Defendant Jimenez
appealed to this court assailing
the validity of the judgment for having been rendered without trial and without
evidence to support the court’s findings of fact.

A case substantially
similar to the one at bar is Asuncion et al. vs. Benalisa et al., 100 Phil.
840, where suit was filed for recovery of title to and possession of real property on the basis of a
donation where the defendant,
although admitting the fact of the donation, alleged the defense of prescription.  There, the lower court rendered judgment without receiving evidence on
prescription.  In setting aside the judgment, this Court held:

“X x x x, the defense of prescription set up by the defendants
would defeat plaintiffs’ action, if defendants’ allegations of fact in support
of that defense could be proved.  But the
court did not receive evidence on those
allegations, ruling that prescription did not lie because defendants were holding the property in trust for the plaintiffs and were, therefore, not in adverse
possession thereof.  The ruling is
untenable because from the allegations of the answer it is cleat that, from as
far back as 20 years ago, the
defendants have persistently refused to recognize plaintiffs’ claim to the
property in dispute and have also prevented the plaintiffs from taking
possession thereof.  These allegations
sufficiently suggest adverse
possession as well as positive repudiation
of the supposed trust.  As to whether the allegations are true or not is a matter that should be determined on the basis of the
evidence.  x x
x.” (Underscoring supplied).

In the present case, there are many controverted
matters, such as the ownership of the deposits, whether the deposits were
donated or given in trust, the rules and regulations of the bank, banking
practices the feet of moral damages and attorney’s fees, that
had to be proved by evidence, but were not properly proved.  The parties did not stipulate on any controverted allegation a fact, which stipulation would have validly done away with the
reception of evidence on the particular matter involved.  What the parties did in the pre-trial
conference was to state and define the issue — “whether the defendant was
justified withdrawing the deposits” But certainly, said issue could not
arise without findings of fact to serve as basis to define and resolve it and
no finding of fact may be made without evidence or stipulation upon it, unless
admitted in the pleadings (which, in the present case, are controverted
or denied) that would justify a summary judgment or a judgment on the pleadings
(Tan vs. Gua Tian Ho,
L-18820, 29 Dec. 1962 and cases
cited therein).

Appellees urge that the appellant’s
silence or non-objection to the order of the court requiring the parties to
submit memoranda and their actual compliance with the said order is
acquiescence or consent to the judgment. 
The argument is self-defeating: 
appellant acquiesced to the order, but not to the judgment, The cases, Vergara vs.
Laciapag, 28 Phil. 43? and Soriano
vs. Ramirez, 44 Phil. 519, relied upon by the appellee
holding that no objection to the procedure in the lower court, except lack of
jurisdiction, will be considered by this Court unless same was here raised, and
exception is duly taken to the action of the court overruling it, do not apply
in the instant case.  The cited cases did
not involve a judgment with findings of fact or no evidence.  In the case of Vergara, evidence was received by the trial
court, while in the Soriano case, the matter
involved was the discretionary power of the court to require notification of a
hearing of a motion for new trial based on insufficient evidence.

Nor can the present case
be considered as one of judgment by consent, at par with Manila Railroad Co.
vs. Arzadon, 20 Phil 452, in the latter
case, involving an expropriation, the parties agreed to the commissioner’s
report and requested the court to enter the corresponding judgment.  Here, the parties have not agreed on
anything, and they differ on the justification for the withdrawals from the
bank.  The fact that the parties
submitted memoranda did not make the case ripe for decision, as questions of
fact remain to be determined from evidence.

Finally, remand is made necessary by Article 222 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, that forbids the filing or maintenance of a suit
between members of the same family (in this case, children against their
father) unless it should appear that efforts toward a compromise have been made but that the same have failed.  Such efforts must be properly proved, or the
case will have to be dismissed.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed judgment is hereby
set aside and the case is ordered remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings.  No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Castro, and Angeles, JJ., concur.