G.R. No. L-14245. December 29, 1960
SOLEDAD ABIJUELA, DOROTEA LAGAMAYO AND REYNALDO LAGUIDAO, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS VS. HOSPICIA DOLOSA AND MARCOS AUMENTADO, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES. ESPERANZA ABIJUELA, THIRD…
PADILLA, J.:
Instance of Sorsogon to recover possession of two parcels of land situate in
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, described in the amended complaint, damages and attorney’s
fees, and to be declared owners thereof (civil No. 748). With previous leave of
court obtained, the defendants filed a third-party complaint against Esperanza
Abijuela, who answered it.
After trial, the Court rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’
complaint; declaring the defendants owners of the two parcels of land in
controversy and entitled to their possession; dissolving the writ of preliminary
injunction theretofore issued; and dismissing the defendant’s third-party
complaint, with costs against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have appealed.
On 12 May 1956 the Clerk of fJourt forwarded the appealed case to the Court
of Appeals where on 22 May 1956 the records were received (C.A.-G.R. No.
17848-R). On 10 March 1958 the Court of Appeals forwarded the case to this Court
on the ground that only questions of law are involved. On 18 August 1958, this
court resolved to have the case “provisionally docketed.” (G.R. No.
L-14245.)
The preliminary question raised in this appeal is whether this Court has
appellate jurisdiction of the case. In their notice of appeal filed with the
trial court on 21 December 1955, the appellants stated—
That they hereby make a formal Notice of Appeal of their intention to appeal,
as they hereby appeal, the decision of this Court in the above entitled case in
favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs, copy of said decision was
received by the plaintiffs thru their counsel on Dec. 1, 1955, to the Supreme
Court based on the ground of question of law and evidence, to wit: Can the
indefeasible and absolute character according to law of O.C.T. Nos. 1465 and
1967 of spouses Jorge Abijuela and Dorotea Lagamayo granted and issued, after
hearing in 1931 be successfully attacked and rendered without force and effect
after 24 years from its issuance? (pp. 77-78, rec. on app.)
and in their prayer for approval of the record on appeal, they asked
that—
* * * the Clerk of Court be ordered to certify same and be transmitted to the
Supreme Court together with all the evidence presented during the hearing of
this case, both oral and documentary which are made part of this appeal, (p. 79,
supra.)
However, in their brief submitted to the Court of Appeals, they charge the
trial court, among dthers, with having—
* * * erred in holding that O.C.T. No. 1465 (Exh. A) and O.C.T. No, 1967
(Exh~. E-), both in the name of spouses’ Jorge Abijuela and Dorotea Lagamayo,
issued in 1931, covering the land in question, do not affect the previous
property rights of Esperanza Abijuela, the predecessor in intereat of the
defendants for the said original certificates of title were issued to a mere
“encargado” and hence null and without effect, (pp. 2 and 5, appellants’
brief)
and dispute its finding that Jorge Abijuela, the appellants* husband, father
and father-in-law, was a mere “encargado” or overseer of the third-party
defendant.
Section 3, Rule 42, of the Rules of Court, provides:
Where the appeal is based” purely on questions of law, the appellant shall so
state in his notice of appeal, and then no other questions shall be allowed, and
the evidence need not be elevated.
Section 31, Republic Act No. 296, as amended, provides:
All cases which may be erroneously brought to the Supreme Court or to the
Court of Appeals shall be sent to the proper court, which shall hear the same,
as if it had originally been brought before it.
By categorically and specifically stating in their, notice of appeal that
they were appealing “to the Supreme Court based on the ground of question of law
and evidence,” and definitely stating the question of law to be raised, and
praying that “the Clerk of Court be ordered to certify” and transmit the record
on appeal and the evidence, both oral and documentary, presented at the trial of
the case to the Supreme Court, the appellants have waived their right to raise
questions of fact in their brief. In Millar vs. Nadres,’ 74 Phil., 307, where
the appellant stated in his notice of appeal that he was appealing to this Court
because ninety per cent of the questions involved were of law, and.caused the
record to be elevated thereto, this Court construed those statements as a waiver
of his right to raise any question of fact. In Portea vs. Pabellon, 84 Phil.,
298; 47 Off. Gaz., 655, where the petitioner stated in his notice of appeal that
his appeal was “on the ground that the question involved is one of law; and in
the record on appeal filed by him and approved by the trial court, it was prayed
that the case be certified and elevated to the Supreme Court, as only a question
of law is involved,” this Court followed the rule laid down in the first
mentioned case. Lastly, in Flores vs. Plasina, 94 Phil., 327; 50 Off.
Gaz., 1073, this Court held that “In bringing this appeal to this Court upon the
claim that plaintiffs would merely raise questions of law, appellants waived
their right to dispute the findings of fact of the lower court which under the
rules and precedents'”are deemed final and are binding upon this Court.” Hence,
.in the.case at bar, only questions of law may be raised and ijt is this Qourt
that has appellate jurisdiction of the case.
The following are the findings of the trial court:
Tratase de la demanda de reivindicacion de dos parcelas de terreno situadas
en el municipio de Sorsogon,’ provincia de Sorsogon, y mas particularmente
descritas en el parrafo 3 de la demanda enmendada, presentada por Soledad
Abijuela, Dorotea liagamayo y Reynaldo Laguidao contra Hospicia Doiosa y Marcos
Aesaentado. A peticion de los demandantes se expidio ex-parte en esta-causa
orden de interdicto prohibitorio preliminar contra los demandados.En el curso de la tramitacion de esta causa, los demandados, previo permiso
del Juzgado, presentaron demanda de terceria contra Esperanza Abijuela, de quien
alegan haber comprado de buena fe dichas propiedades.De las pruebas resulta que los esposos Jorge Abijuela, quien desa-parecio en
1943 y hasta ahora no ha vuelto, y la demandante Dorotea Lagamayo eran duefios
de las dos parcelas de terreno en cuestion; que la otra demandante, Soledad
Abijuela, es hija de dichos maridab-Jes, y esta casada con el demandante
Reynaldo Laguidao; que, el 3 de julio de 1928, dicho Jorge Abijuela vendio las
dos citadas parcelas de tsrrenp, que entonces formaban, una sola, a favor de su
hermana Esperanza Abijuela (Exhibit I), demandada en la demanda de terceria
presentada por los demandados, sin embargo, dichos esposos Jorge Abijuela y
Dorotea Lagamayo, con el permiso de su hermana y como encargado de Esperanza
Abijuela de dichas propiedades, siguieron viviendo en la casa que tenia
levantada erf/fattta. de dichas parcelas hasta que dieho Jorge Abijuela
desaparecio, y ilesde entonces los demandantes se trasladaron a vivir en el
barrio de’Abuyog, del mismo municipio de Sorsogon, pero alegan haber continuado
en pose-sion de las dos parcelas de terreno en cuestion hasta el ano 1948, en
que los demandados se posesionaron de los mismos, en concepto de duefios, por
haberlas comprado de Esperanza Abijuela; que en 1952, cuando se presento la
demanda original y con la expedicion de la orden de interdicto prohibitorio
preliminar a favor de los demandantes, los demandados fueron desposeidos de la
possesion de los citados terrenos; que durante el tiempo de la pos’esion de los
demandados, estos cosecharon los productos.Asi mismo resulta de las pruebas que no obstante haberse ven-dido en julio 3,
1928, el terreno en cuestion, ahora compuesto de dos parcelas por la medicion
catastral, por Jorge Abijuela a favor de su hermana. Esperanza Abijuela, aquel
consign io titularlas a su nombre y a su esposa, la demandante Dorotea Lagamayo,
como propiedad ganancial de los mismos en junio 10 y 11 de 1931,
res-pectivamente, a espaldas y sin conocimiento de su hermana Esperanza Abijuela
(Certificados Originales de Titulo Nos. 1967 y 1465, Ex-¦hibits B y A), las
cuales parcelas de terreno siguen hasta ahora tituladas. y regiatradas a nombre
de los referidos espososf Jorge Abijuela y Dorotea Lagamayo; que dichos
Certificados Originales de Titulo Nos. 1967 y 1465 fueron rescatados y pagados
por los demandantes los gastos correspondientes solamente el 11 de julio de
1952, o sea, mas de 20 anos despues de la expedicion de los mismos; que
Esperanza Abijuela, ignorando de que su hermano y encargado Jorge Abijuela habia
gestionado y obtenido la titulacion de los dos lotes de terreno en cuestion, los
vendio el noviembre 15, 1958, a los demandados Marcos Aumentado y Hospicia
Dolosa (Exhibit 1), por la cual se posesionaron de los mismos y los declararon a
su nombre para el pago de amillaramiento (Exhibits 3 y 4), desde entonces “nan
venido pagando la contribucion territorial de los mismos (Exhibits 4, 4-A al
4-G).En virtud do los hechos establecidos, arriba relatados, se presentan las
cuestiones siguientes: (a) Que efecto legal tienen los Certificados Originales
de Titulo Nos, 1967 y 1465 sobre el derecho de propiedad de Esperanza Abijuela y
consecuentemente del de los demandados, los esposos Marcos Aumentado y Hospicia
Dolosa, en las parceias de terreno objeto de dichos titulos; que estan
litigadas; y (b) Be puede legalmente declarar duena a Esperanza Abijuela y
consecuentemente a los demandados de las mencionadas parcelas de terreno no
obstante dichos titulos? (pp. 71-75, rec. on app.)
The Court held as follows:
El Juzgado es de opinion que los citados titulos no afectan ni anulan el
derecho da propriedad de Esperanza Abijuela ni de los demandados sobre las
parcelas de terreno en cuestion, pbrque cuando se titularon dichas propiedades a
nombre de Jorge Abijuela, este era un mero encargado de dichas propiedades, o
fideicomisario de las mismas, asi que la adquisicion de dichos titulos es
ilegal. La razon es obvia, porque la ley como regla general no autoriza la
titulacion de propiedades en fideicomiso a favor del fideicomisario y, por
tanto, los mismos deben declararse per. se nulos y de ningun valor. Aun
su-poniendo que dichos titulos fueran validos, el Juzgado cree que el derecho de
Esperanza Abijuela y consecuentemente de los demandados no ha cambiado, por la
razon de que dichos titulos sif>uen siendo hasta ahora a nombre del antiquo
dueño, Jorge Abijuela, y las propiedades no se han traspasado por ninguh procego
legal a otras personas ni existe tercera persona o comprador de buena fe de
dichas propiedades que puede ser perjudicado. La demandante Dorotea Lagamayo,
esposa de Jorge Abijuela, tampoco puede rec-clamar ni la mitad de dichas
propiedades, porque al tiempo de ser vendidas las mismas, su esposo, Jorge
Abijuela, estaba facultado por las leyes entonces vigentes de vender bienes
gananciales sin necesidad del consentimiento marital.La reconvencion de los demandados no fue debidamente probada. (pp. 75-76,
rec. on app.)
Since Jorge Abijuela, the appellants’ husband, father and father-in-law, had
sold to his sister Esperanza, the third-party defendant, the parcels of land in
question, and the latter only allowed him, as her “encargado” or overseer, to
stay in one fliP;he parcels of land, the registration of the two parcels of land
as conjugal property of the spouses Jorge Abijuela and Dorotea Lagamayo, without
her knowledge and consent, did not affect the right of ownership and title of
the true and real owner, the third-party defendant, and her right to alienate
them to the appellees. No cogent reason may be found for reversing the judgment
appealed from, except that the appellant Dorotea Lagamayo and the clerk of Court
of First Instance of Sorsogon, in behalf of £orge Abijuela, because of his
absence and his whereabouts unknown, be ordered to execute a document
transferring and reconvening the two parcels of land to Esperanza Abijuela and
upon the strength of the deed executed by the latter in favor of the appellees,
the Registrar of Deeds in and for the province of Sorsogon,. upon payment of the
lawful fees, to cancel the original certificates of title Nos. 1465 and 1967 and
to issue in lieu thereof transfer certificates of title in the name of the
appellees.
Modified as above stated, the judgment appealed irom is in all other respects
affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador; Conception, Reyes,
J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ.,
concur.
Judgment affirmed with modification.